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INPUT AND OUTPUT LEGITIMACY IN WTO LAW 
SUMMARY 
Christopher Alexander Thomas 
 
This thesis provides an analysis of the complex relationship between law and legitimacy in 
the WTO. It focuses on the notional dichotomy between ‘Member-driven’ (input-based) and 
‘results-oriented’ (output-based) narratives of the WTO’s legitimacy, and how such narratives 
are both framed by, and reflected in, WTO law. It demonstrates how these narratives are used 
to legitimate the exercise of legal power in ways that exceed the reach of their internal 
normative claims; how they are used to displace responsibility for decision-making in the 
WTO; and the consequences of choosing to emphasize particular forms of legitimacy for our 
understandings of the WTO’s place in the world. In the process, the thesis also seeks to 
destabilize these legitimacy narratives by highlighting their partial, contingent and often 
mutually contradictory natures.  
The thesis proceeds in three parts. The first part (Chapter Two) clarifies what is meant by 
the terms ‘power’ and ‘legitimacy’ as used in the thesis and stresses their significance for 
WTO law. The second part (Chapters Three and Four) addresses two key input-oriented 
narratives of legitimacy associated with WTO law — those of consent and democracy. It 
argues that although consent has been central to understanding the legitimacy of WTO law as 
it is, and democracy is increasingly advanced in relation to WTO law as it should be, both 
narratives suffer from serious normative and descriptive limitations. The third part delves 
further into the concept of output legitimacy and its limits (Chapter Five), before exploring its 
application in relation to the legal-institutional dynamics of WTO negotiation rounds (Chapter 
Six) and the treatment of economic evidence in WTO dispute settlement (Chapter Seven). 
This part ultimately concludes that a more critical engagement with the concept of output 
legitimacy could open up productive avenues for rethinking the law and practice of the WTO. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
I CONTEXT 
‘It is easier to make certain things legal than to make them legitimate.’1 
The last hundred years have seen the rapid and unprecedented proliferation of international 
institutions wielding powers with deeply intrusive implications for the autonomy of states, 
economies and individuals. States’ decisions as to how they package cigarettes for public 
health purposes are now made in the shadow of WTO law and international investment rules; 
the UK decided by referendum to leave the EU; the UN Security Council may impose 
sanctions that target individuals directly. Although in formal terms international institutions 
are notionally only capable of performing acts to which states (generally speaking) have 
consented, in substance it is clear that, in many areas, these institutions have taken on a life of 
their own. These developments have had a profound impact on the legal positions of various 
types of actors, including states, individuals, corporations and other international institutions. 
The manifestation of such power in the international order, both framed by and reflected in 
law, has generated significant and heated debate over the legitimacy of these institutions and 
their laws.
2
  
In (Western) liberal democracies, there is a broad consensus on the legitimate exercise of 
power centring on democratic processes, constitutionalism and human rights.
3
 Questions 
about what constitutes a legitimate exercise of power in the international sphere, however, 
remain comparatively under-explored and under-scrutinized. There has been a move away 
from traditional forms of state-based political and legal authority to more fragmented and 
                                                 
1
  ‘Il est plus facile de légaliser certaines choses que de les légitimer’: de Chamfort 1968, 134.  
2
  See, eg, Franck 1990; Cutler 2001; Afilalo 2004; Kagan 2004; Franck 2005; Gray 2007; Wolfrum & 
Röben 2008; Meyer 2009; Charlesworth & Coicaud 2010; Brunnée & Toope 2010; Wheatley 2010.  
3
  Some argue that even at the domestic level the question of legitimacy has not received sufficient attention. 
Richard Flathman notes that ‘[m]uch past and present political philosophy either subordinates the question 
of legitimacy or implicitly treats its possibility and desirability as philosophically and politically 
unproblematic. It is widely assumed that the politically organized association in which some persons rule 
others is the divinely, naturally or ontologically ordained state of human affairs’: Flathman 2007, 678. 
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diffuse forms in which significant parts are played by intergovernmental institutions, 
transnational networks and multinational corporations; even as the more powerful states exert 
more and more influence beyond their territorial borders. There has also been a breakdown of 
the traditional distinction between the national and the international, as attempts to transfer 
notions of democracy and constitutionalism from the national to the international and global 
levels have raised more questions than they have answered. As such, there are presently many 
active debates about what may constitute the legitimate exercise of power beyond the state. 
Yet while the question of legitimacy has long been addressed in international relations, 
political science and philosophy, it is only relatively recently that international lawyers have 
started to pay the concept much attention.  
The WTO has often found itself at the centre of this nascent multidisciplinary literature, 
for good reason. Even with its perceived effectiveness as a global rule-making institution at 
something of a low point, the WTO and its rules exert a substantial influence on world affairs 
in a way that is matched by only a handful of other international institutions. At the time of 
writing,
4
 the WTO has 164 Members,
5
 up from 75 at the time of its founding on 1 January 
1995,
6
 and up from 23 signatories at the time of the founding of its predecessor, the GATT, 
on 1 January 1948.
7
 A further 21 states are currently negotiating accession.
8
 The rules 
embodied in the WTO Agreements have been interpreted and applied in ways that affect 
Members’ rights to regulate with respect to the environment, public health, innovation and 
labour rights, among other issues. Indeed, they affect the very manner in which Members go 
about such regulation. The scope of the WTO’s powers and the breadth of its membership are 
themselves testament to the perception of the WTO as a locus of power, whether wielded 
autonomously or merely as an instrument for its membership (or at least a select few of the 
Members). 
                                                 
4
  This thesis is current until 30 July 2016. 
5
  WTO Website, ‘Members and Observers’. 
6
  Another 52 Members who had previously been GATT Contracting Parties were to ‘re’-join over the next 
two years: ibid.  
7
  WTO, World Trade Report 2007, iii. 
8
  WTO Website, ‘Accessions’.  
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There are, however, sharply divergent views about the legitimacy of the WTO and its 
laws. The WTO has been variously assessed as simply illegitimate,
9
 as facing a crisis of 
legitimacy,
10
 as being unproblematically legitimate,
11
 and even as being ‘too legitimate’.12 For 
some, the creation of the WTO in 1995 was a triumph of international negotiation, and a step 
forward for a rules-based international trading order. Indeed, roughly a decade ago, there were 
even those who argued for transforming the WTO into a World Economic Organization
13
 with 
a vastly broader remit. Others, however, have been much more wary about the WTO’s 
contribution. Anxiety over where law-making authority is located has led to extensive debates 
about ‘regulatory autonomy’, ‘policy space’ and ‘collective preferences’. Developing 
countries have pointed to lacklustre progress on agriculture negotiations, and expressed 
concerns about new rules for investment, competition, labour and intellectual property rights. 
Unease about globalization in the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the arrival of mass civil 
society protests, including the ‘Battle of Seattle’ which coincided with the WTO’s Seattle 
Ministerial Conference — and manifests today in the form of Donald Trump’s threats to make 
the US leave the WTO if he becomes President.
14
 Controversial dispute settlement decisions, 
including those relating to hormone-treated beef and genetically modified organisms, have 
also fuelled disagreement over the legitimacy of WTO law and its application. More recently, 
the 2008-09 global financial crisis, the regular disappointments associated with the Doha 
Round and the widespread turn to regional trade agreements have provoked further criticism.   
These debates have led to the development of a range of narratives about what does or 
what should make the WTO legitimate; including narratives of consent, public participation, 
deliberative democracy, expertise and constitutionalization, among others. These narratives 
may provide frameworks for either apology or critique in relation to the exercise of power by 
and through the WTO and its laws. They provide reasons for compliance with (or resistance 
against) WTO law, as well as foundations for legal-institutional design and reform. These 
narratives of legitimacy thus have an intimate and complex relationship with WTO law. Such 
                                                 
9
  See, eg, quotes from NGO representatives in Transnational Institute 2009.  
10
  See, eg, Esty 2002; Wiener 2005; Elsig 2007b; Herwig 2014.  
11
  See, eg, Bacchus 2004. 
12
  See, eg, Subramanian 2013.  
13
  See Bronckers 2001; Guzman 2004; contra McGinnis & Movsesian 2004. 
14
  Dyer 2016. 
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narratives may be invoked in isolation, or in combination with others. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon for various kinds of actors — trade negotiators, politicians, lobbyists, WTO 
Secretariat members, NGOs — to jump back and forth between different legitimacy narratives 
to justify their positions in a way that is wholly self-contradictory. In this, these narratives 
simultaneously hold out the promise of a legitimate WTO even as their lack of common 
foundation highlights just how far people are from even broad consensus about what a 
legitimate WTO (or legitimate WTO law) may mean.  
II AIM AND CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis does not attempt to provide a definitive answer to the normative question of 
whether or not the WTO is morally or politically legitimate. Nor does it claim to undertake a 
comprehensive empirical study of why different actors consider WTO law, or the WTO as an 
institution, to be legitimate. Rather, it explores the parameters of the debates over the WTO’s 
legitimacy with a view to illuminating the complex relationship between the various 
narratives of legitimacy advanced in these debates and WTO law. In the process, it seeks to 
reorient the debate about the WTO’s legitimacy away from purely input-oriented (Member-
driven) legitimacy narratives and towards a more rigorous focus on output-oriented (results-
oriented) narratives. The thesis also seeks to destabilize these legitimacy narratives by 
highlighting their partial, contingent and often mutually contradictory natures.  
Much of the response to the legitimacy ‘crises’ of the WTO’s two decades has focused 
on improving input legitimacy, with a strong emphasis on consent and the participation of 
Members in law-making and dispute settlement.
15
 These input legitimacy narratives, however, 
are often neither normatively capable of fulfilling the demands placed on them nor are their 
claims reflected in practice. Output legitimacy narratives, by contrast, although regularly 
invoked at a superficial level, have not received the same level of attention from academics or 
lawyers. Although WTO rules and practices are frequently justified in vague terms by appeal 
to their outputs — global welfare or prosperity, better governance outcomes, and the like — 
the questions of how output legitimacy is generated, whether claims to output legitimacy are 
justified, and how law is implicated in those processes, have received far less scrutiny. A 
focus on input legitimacy alone neglects important aspects of how law, legitimacy and power 
operate in relation to the WTO. As such, this thesis argues for a rethinking of the relationship 
                                                 
15
  The concepts of input and output legitimacy are defined more rigorously in Chapter Two, Part III(B)(3)(ii). 
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between input legitimacy, output legitimacy and WTO law which is more sensitive to the 
limits of input legitimacy and which engages critically and productively with the relationship 
between law and output legitimacy. How can law help to harness useful knowledge and 
capable analysis to improve the conditions of the global economy? How can law be used to 
hold actors and institutions accountable which fall short of the standards of expertise and 
objectivity that they claim to uphold? How does law shape the way that particular outputs 
come to be seen as necessary or desirable? And how can we emphasize questions of 
efficiency and effectiveness without sacrificing ideals of democracy and consent?  
To achieve these aims, the thesis investigates the most prominent of the legitimacy 
narratives advanced by various actors in relation to the WTO and considers their normative 
and descriptive limits in light of WTO law and practice. It shows how each of these narratives 
has different implications for how WTO law is shaped, interpreted and understood, and how 
the law in turn shapes perceptions of what is considered legitimate. The narratives have been 
identified based on an extensive survey of various legal, institutional and scholarly texts, 
including WTO dispute settlement reports, WTO treaties, WTO publications, statements of 
key WTO officials, NGO publications and the writings of trade insiders and academics.  
These texts have not been generated in a vacuum. Rather, they regularly invoke 
pervasive, well-established legitimacy frameworks relating to concepts of consent, democracy 
and effectiveness. These frameworks can strengthen or weaken the perception of how binding 
laws are and how much respect laws and institutions deserve.
16
 As such, to complete the 
picture of the narratives in question it is also necessary to more clearly identify the political 
philosophical traditions to which they refer. As such, several of the chapters also engage with 
the political philosophical literature surrounding the nature of political legitimacy, especially 
as applied to the international sphere. This helps to more clearly outline the origins and limits 
of these legitimacy narratives. 
In this way, the thesis aims to draw attention to the normative roots of the WTO’s 
various legitimacy narratives. It stresses the place of these narratives in their broader political 
philosophical context, and highlights the essential connection between the idea of legitimacy 
and political justification. This connection, which is often neglected in the literature on 
international institutions in favour of a focus on compliance, provides the definitional point of 
departure between legitimacy and other reasons for compliance with (or support of) the law. 
                                                 
16
  See also Brunnée and Toope 2010, 7-8.  
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In this sense, a focus on legitimacy draws attention to how WTO law comes to operate in, and 
be shaped, by politics and ideas in a way which cannot be explained merely by reference to 
rational self-interest, coercion or habit. Rather, a focus on legitimacy emphasizes the 
importance of the normative foundations for adherence to a legal-political order. Along the 
way, it demonstrates how these narratives are used to legitimate the exercise of legal power in 
ways that exceed the reach of their internal normative claims; how they are used to displace 
responsibility for decision-making in the WTO; and the consequences of choosing to 
emphasize particular forms of legitimacy for our understandings of the WTO’s place in the 
world. 
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that this thesis does not attempt to cover all 
of the various narratives of legitimacy that have been advanced in relation to the WTO. In 
particular, the thesis does not focus on inherently ‘judicial’, ‘adjudicative’, or ‘legal’17 
narratives of legitimacy. These are narratives that are specifically concerned with how the 
judicial character, legal form and/or legal reasoning in themselves contribute to legitimacy. 
How these legitimacy narratives may manifest in the WTO, and their influence on how the 
WTO is perceived, has been addressed extensively elsewhere.
18
 Howse, for instance, 
highlights the contribution of ‘fair procedures’, ‘coherence and integrity in legal 
interpretation’ and ‘institutional sensitivity’,19 while Brunnée and Toope argue that legitimacy 
may be derived from eight Fullerian ‘criteria of legality’ that are inherent in the legal form.20  
Similarly, the thesis leaves the legitimating narratives of constitutionalism largely to one 
side. Although legitimacy is generally relevant to the concept of constitutionalism, 
constitutionalism, particularly in its more baroque formulations, is not necessarily relevant to 
the concept of legitimacy. The analysis of constitutionalism and the WTO is rich and 
extensive, and again the contribution to legitimacy of constitutionalism qua constitutionalism 
has already been addressed elsewhere.
21
  
                                                 
17
  For an analysis of the legitimacy of the legal form as considered in relation to international law in general, 
see Brunnée and Toope 2010.  
18
  See, eg, Howse 2000a; Weiler 2001; Howse & Nicolaïdis 2003a, 331-41; Howse & Nicolaïdis 2003b; 
Howse 2003b; Piccioto 2005; von Bogdandy & Venzke 2012. 
19
  Howse 2001a, 376. 
20
  Brunnée and Toope 2010, 27. 
21
  See, eg, Cass 2005, 63-70 and 99; Dunoff 2009; Besson 2009b, 389-92; Krisch 2010, ch 1. 
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Setting these forms of legitimacy to the side for the purposes of this thesis does not mean 
that these types of legitimacy are unimportant, or that the questions they raise have been 
resolved conclusively; far from it. Indeed, the tensions explored in the coming pages between 
input-oriented and output-oriented approaches to legitimacy may also have intriguing 
implications for how to conceptualize and apply legal and adjudicative expertise and 
knowledge within the WTO. Overall, however, the relationship between WTO law and 
specifically legal, adjudicative or constitutional forms of legitimacy implicates a cognate but 
qualitatively different set of questions to those addressed in this thesis. This thesis does not 
reject these narratives, but rather notes that they represent a distinct strand of investigation, 
derive from different political philosophical foundations, and are deployed in different 
contexts. Their study is complementary, but not essential, to this thesis.  
III CHOICE OF FRAMEWORK 
A Why Legitimacy? 
There are several reasons why legitimacy is worthy of sustained attention from international 
lawyers. First, the ubiquity of the discourse on legitimacy, which extends across law, political 
philosophy and international relations but finds a recent focus in relation to WTO law, in 
itself provides a reason for scrutinizing that discourse further. Such scrutiny brings further 
clarity to the exchange of ideas, makes it easier to hold those making legitimacy claims 
accountable, and provides a better understanding of the function of these legitimacy claims in 
the world trade order. Given this, by virtue of its prevalence, the discourse of legitimacy is 
just as deserving of attention as other prominent discourses, such as those concerned with 
justice, liberty, equality, or the rule of law, which have been directly addressed elsewhere.
22
 
Second, legitimacy is worthy of study in its own right, beyond the fact of its discursive 
omnipresence. Other philosophical notions such as justice, liberty, equality and the rule of law 
are each broad concepts that can be directed towards a range of questions. In particular, each 
provides a different range of answers to the question of whether a particular set of power 
relations can be justified according to an associated set of normative criteria. But legitimacy 
                                                 
22
  Regarding justice, equality and the WTO, see, eg, Garcia 2003 and Garcia 2013. Regarding liberty and the 
WTO, see McGinnis 2004 and Gerken 2004. The concept of the rule of law and the WTO have not 
received as much dedicated, sustained attention, but see ILA 2000 and Wolfe 2001 for initial treatments of 
some of the issues. 
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not only considers the question of whether power is justified — it also considers the question 
of whether power is justified to such an extent that it is worthy of obedience or support. 
Indeed, this provides the essential basis for Thomas Franck’s seminal exploration of the 
relationship between legitimacy and international law, in which he focused on legitimacy as 
the basis for international law’s ‘pull toward compliance’.23 Legitimacy looks directly at how 
compliance with WTO law and support for the WTO as an institution are affected by shared 
understandings about how the exercise of power is justified. This focus on compliance and 
support differentiates legitimacy from concepts such as justice and equality for which 
questions of obedience and support are of only ancillary, rather than definitional, concern. 
Legitimacy may be treated as a metaconcept capable of addressing the question of how 
power relations are justified in the abstract, without necessarily requiring a commitment to an 
underlying set of normative criteria. It is also used in narrower sense, referring not to the 
broader concept but to more limited conceptions.
24
 In these cases, it can be harder to discern 
the distinction between questions of legitimacy and those of justice, but the distinction is 
nonetheless there and it is an important one. John Rawls notes that a ruler may be legitimate 
but not rule justly, or alternatively rule justly even if illegitimate.
25
 He argues that legitimacy 
makes ‘weaker’ demands than justice and has a more direct institutional focus.26 Justice is, in 
this sense, less shackled by the questions of what is politically achievable and what people are 
willing to accept. More recently Philip Pettit has advanced a contemporary republican 
approach to the distinction between legitimacy and justice, which defines ‘the justice 
question’ as whether ‘a coercively imposed order is acceptable or justifiable or desirable’ and 
‘the legitimacy question’ as ‘whether the coercive imposition of the order is acceptable or 
justifiable or desirable’.27 For Pettit, then, justice is predominantly a question of ends while 
legitimacy is a question of means, including the manner in which power is allocated and 
wielded. Carrying over these distinctions into the international sphere allows that a legitimate 
world trade order and a just world trade order need not be coextensive.     
                                                 
23
  Franck 1990, 24.  
24
  This distinction is further discussed in Chapter Two, Part III(A).  
25
  Rawls 2005, 427. 
26
  Ibid.  
27
  Pettit 2012, 60 [emphasis added]. Pettit advanced this distinction in relation to the coercive imposition of a 
social order by a state, rather than the international sphere, but the distinction may be translated between 
the two contexts.  
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Legitimacy therefore combines a series of questions together — concerning justification, 
obedience, compliance and institutional design — into a single, distinctive conceptual 
framework. These questions are particularly pressing at the international level due to the 
experimental nature of many international institutions, the lack of consensus about the basis 
for legitimate power at the global level, the disconnect between political and economic 
boundaries, and the quest for better adherence to international law worldwide.  
B Legitimacy and Global Governance 
A strongly related, but again conceptually independent, discourse is that of global governance. 
The notion of global governance arises repeatedly throughout this thesis, so it is important to 
demarcate the relationship between legitimacy and governance. Global governance has a far 
more recent intellectual pedigree than legitimacy. ‘Global governance’ emerged as a term of 
art in the 1990s following the release of the World Bank report From Crisis to Sustainable 
Growth.
28
 As a concept it is frequently used to transcend the divide from the national to the 
international or transnational planes. Whereas ‘government’ is generally tied the state or 
political entities contained therein (including provinces and local councils), ‘governance’ is 
also considered to cover a broader range of diffuse, non-hierarchical processes such as those 
undertaken by intergovernmental institutions and transnational networks, and even certain 
domestic administrative bodies. Lawrence S Finkelstein provides one of the most commonly 
asserted definitions relating specifically to global governance:  
Governance should be considered to cover the overlapping categories of functions 
performed internationally, among them: information creation and exchange; formulation 
and promulgation of principles and promotion of consensual knowledge affecting the 
general international order, regional orders, particular issues on the international agenda, 
and efforts to influence the domestic rules and behavior of states; good offices, 
conciliation, mediation, and compulsory resolution of disputes; regime formation, tending 
and execution; adoption of rules, codes, and regulations; allocation of material and 
program resources; provision of technical assistance and development programs; relief, 
humanitarian, emergency, and disaster activities; and maintenance of peace and order.
29
  
                                                 
28
  World Bank 1989. 
29
  Finkelstein 1995, 370-1. 
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‘Global governance’ as a discourse, then, relates to the instantiation of various forms of power 
relations in the global order. It addresses how those relations are structured, what functions 
they perform, what effects they have and how they interact with one another. Many of the 
legal and institutional arrangements addressed in this thesis, whether relating to trade 
negotiation rounds, the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement organs, or decision-
making by WTO committees may be considered as representing instances of global 
governance. 
As global governance mechanisms have become increasingly prominent across a range of 
areas so has it become necessary to question their legitimacy. The legitimacy of democratic 
government at the national level enjoys a degree of general consensus (albeit one frequently 
under threat), but the varied, multilevel and often experimental nature of contemporary global 
governance lacks this stable foundation. In this sense global governance and legitimacy 
provide complementary discourses for one another. While the discourse of global governance 
draws attention to the varied and multi-level mechanisms of global power relations, 
legitimacy addresses the question of how and whether those power relations are justifiable in 
a manner that should or does command obedience or support.  
Occasionally legitimacy and governance are conflated in the concept of ‘good 
governance’, which imports a more explicitly normative component to the governance 
literature. ‘Good governance’ is also a fairly recent addition to the conceptual armory;30 in the 
international context it has largely burgeoned in the literature concerning development, the 
World Bank, the IMF and the UN. The WTO website itself highlights the WTO’s capacity to 
‘encourage good governance’.31 The terminology of ‘good governance’ alone is, however, 
question begging. In the absence of a properly articulated framework of legitimacy defining 
‘the good’, it lacks a rigorous foundation. It is here that questions about how legitimacy 
narratives are framed, what impact they have on the development of the law, and how the law 
in turn affects how legitimacy is perceived all find their place. As such legitimacy and global 
governance are not clashing paradigms, but complementary analytical frameworks. Whereas 
global governance provides a largely descriptive analytical framework for the exercise of 
power at the global level, legitimacy concerns the justification of that power and the extent to 
which those justifications attract support.  
                                                 
30
  See Rothstein 2012, 143. 
31
  WTO, Ten Things the WTO Can Do (2012), point 5. 
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C Governance and Legitimacy in the WTO 
This thesis examines various narratives of legitimacy as they have manifested in relation to 
the WTO and WTO law. The WTO has been at the centre of debates over the interface 
between national sovereignty and global norms, often framed in terms of both governance and 
legitimacy. It is a complex institution, taking on rule-making, dispute settlement, knowledge-
generation, and compliance monitoring functions, among others. Both its centrality and its 
complexity make it a rich and worthy object of study. Moreover, while some other 
international institutions operate much more informally, the WTO is an institution that is 
heavily structured by law. It is also oriented towards the production, interpretation and 
application of law — and that law affects an enormous range of human endeavour, reaching 
beyond ‘pure’ trade concerns to include public health, the environment and human rights.  
In addressing input and output legitimacy narratives in the WTO, this thesis makes 
reference to many of the WTO’s different aspects and functions. In Chapters Six and Seven, 
however, it focuses on two specific case studies to illustrate the relationship between law and 
output legitimacy in the WTO: trade negotiation rounds and dispute settlement. These case 
studies have been selected because they provide excellent fora in which to demonstrate the 
limits of input legitimacy narratives as well as the value of dedicating additional (but not 
exclusive) attention to output legitimacy narratives. It is in these contexts that the debates 
about legitimacy are at their most sophisticated and provide the most material for analysis. It 
is also in these contexts that the operation of power in and through the WTO is most manifest. 
Binding rules are formulated and formalized in negotiation rounds, while they are given 
meaning and bite in the context of dispute settlement. It is here that the exercise of power is 
most definitively realized and poses the greatest need for justification. Moreover, these are 
also contexts which most directly raise questions of compliance and support with legal norms, 
and thus most directly raise questions of legitimacy. 
There are other contexts in which a similar analysis could be conducted in future. One 
such possibility would be the TPRM, where Members’ commitments to their WTO 
obligations are reviewed and where the implementation of WTO law may be carefully 
scrutinized. It has yet to receive the same degree of attention as negotiation rounds and 
dispute settlement, but its knowledge-generation, information exchange and monitoring 
functions, and how those functions may operate differently with respect to developing and 
developed countries, warrants further attention. A second possibility would be to consider 
how legitimacy narratives function in relation to the WTO committee system. The governance 
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implications of this system, and their relationship to notions of legitimacy, have been 
addressed already in part by Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott in their analysis of the SPS 
Committee and the subsidiary committees to the Services Council.
32
 There is still room for 
further analysis relating to other Committees (especially the TBT Committee and the 
Committee on Trade and Development), as well relating to how the functions of these bodies 
have changed over time in response to various external and internal stimuli. These analyses, 
however, lie outside of the bounds of this thesis.  
IV OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis proceeds in three parts. The first part, as set out in Chapter Two, is an exercise in 
conceptual ground-clearing which aims to clarify what is meant by the uses of the terms 
‘power’ and ‘legitimacy’ in this thesis. The aim here is to provide a more helpful analytical 
framework for understanding how the concepts of power and legitimacy operate in relation to 
WTO law, while arguing for the value of legitimacy as an analytical concept. It considers how 
law can be made to reflect but also constitute legitimacy claims relating to the WTO.  
The second part of the thesis, comprising Chapters Three and Four, addresses two 
predominantly input-oriented narratives of legitimacy strongly associated with WTO law — 
those of consent and democracy. These input-oriented legitimacy narratives are largely 
concerned with ensuring that the subjective interests and preferences of the subjects of the law 
(whether conceived as WTO Members, states, individuals, or otherwise) are properly 
reflected in both the creation and the implementation of the law. Such narratives tend to see 
the proper role of law as the channelling and maintenance of the will of the law’s subjects. 
While acknowledging the continued power of these legitimating narratives in the WTO, and 
indeed international law more generally, the focus here is on the limits of these languages as 
guarantors for the WTO’s legitimacy.  
Consent (addressed in Chapter Three) provides the traditional language of legitimation 
for the multilateral trade regime, just as it does for much general international law, and 
continues to be regularly invoked by the WTO and its commentators. Despite their 
impeccable pedigree in the international law context, narratives of consent alone struggle to 
carry the legitimating burden for the WTO and capture only a partial view of the relationship 
between WTO law and legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy narratives (addressed in Chapter 
                                                 
32
  Lang & Scott 2009, 601-14.  
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Four) are often advanced in relation to the WTO by those who seek to address some of the 
deficiencies of the consent narratives. They are seen as less Member-centric, less rigid, and 
more in line with contemporary mores. Nonetheless, there remains extensive disagreement 
over what democratizing the WTO would entail, and the demands of the democratic 
narratives are difficult to implement in practical terms.  
The third part of the thesis turns to narratives of output legitimacy; that is, narratives that 
emphasize WTO law’s capacity to deliver desirable outputs efficiently and effectively. Output 
legitimacy narratives have enjoyed less rigorous scrutiny than input legitimacy narratives in 
relation to international institutions in general, and to the WTO in particular.
33
 This part 
considers the role played by law in ensuring that the rules as formulated have the effects 
desired; if those effects are realised efficiently; and if those effects, once realised, are as 
desirable as initially thought.  
Chapter Five delves further into the philosophical foundations and limits of output 
legitimacy. It highlights the centrality of output legitimacy narratives at the domestic and 
international levels, before considering specifically how these narratives have justified the law 
and practice of the WTO as a ‘results-oriented institution’. In stressing the importance of a 
renewed critical focus on output legitimacy narratives, it does not seek to idealise such 
narratives nor to overstate the role that they can play in legitimating WTO law. Rather, it 
recognizes that such a renewed critical focus requires precisely an awareness of the dangers 
posed by such narratives. It thus calls for more careful scrutiny of the WTO law and practice 
as it affects and is affected by output legitimacy narratives. Chapters Six and Seven then 
explore, respectively, how such critical scrutiny of output legitimacy mechanisms may be 
applied in relation to the two contexts mentioned above: WTO negotiation rounds and the 
production of expert knowledge in WTO dispute settlement. Chapter Eight concludes.  
 
                                                 
33
  With the exception of the literature on the SPS Agreement. This literature, however, is generally 
constrained to the SPS Agreement and the discussion of the biological sciences, and tends to emphasize 
dispute settlement rather than other aspects of law-making, interpretation and application. This thesis seeks 
to consider how output-oriented legitimacy relates to WTO law more broadly, outside of the SPS context, 
in relation to non-biological modes of expertise, and beyond dispute settlement alone. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
CLARIFYING KEY CONCEPTS — POWER AND LEGITIMACY 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Before proceeding to the rest of the thesis there are two preliminary conceptual questions that 
must be addressed: what does it mean to speak of power in relation to WTO law, and what 
does it mean to speak of legitimacy? Both concepts are strongly intertwined in the public 
imagination. Power without legitimacy is considered tyrannical and abhorrent, while 
legitimacy without power is ineffective and immaterial. Yet even a cursory glance over the 
literature shows a wide divergence in how these concepts are understood, including in relation 
to the WTO.  
This chapter begins by demonstrating the multiplicity of meanings assigned to the term 
‘power’, and how power may be understood as being exercised by and through the WTO in 
more ways than are commonly acknowledged. Traditionally, few attempts were made to 
examine the legitimacy of international institutions as they were not considered to exercise 
any quantum of power that required political justification (beyond that provided by consent). 
Part of the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that this way of thinking about power at the 
international level is unduly limited, particularly in relation to the WTO. To this end, Part 
Two of this chapter breaks down the concept of power into three major components: the 
forms of power, the agents of power, and the settings of power. Breaking down the idea of 
power in this way makes it easier to understand how various actors put these components 
together in different ways to reach apparently contradictory conclusions about power and the 
WTO. It also provides an opportunity to think more methodically about the relationship 
between WTO law and power, and how this might raise additional problems of legitimacy.  
From there, the chapter turns to the concept of legitimacy, and seeks to disambiguate the 
various meanings of legitimacy to facilitate a more rigorous treatment of the concept. It seeks 
not only to clarify, but also to complicate, how legitimacy may be understood in relation to 
the WTO and international law more generally. To that end, it provides an initial conceptual 
sketch of three ways of approaching legitimacy — the legal, the moral and the social — that 
are commonly used by WTO actors and international lawyers. For each, it highlights how 
these different approaches to legitimacy can enrich our understandings of WTO law and its 
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place in the world. It then highlights three elements of legitimacy (its object, subject and 
basis) that may be used to cut through and contextualize the disparate uses of legitimacy. 
From there, it seeks to defend the relevance of legitimacy to international law as distinguished 
from other explanatory frameworks for obedience or compliance including coercion, self-
interest and habit. Ultimately this chapter argues that legitimacy is a useful analytical concept 
for WTO lawyers and general international lawyers alike, which can have profound practical 
implications for how law is made, enforced and understood.  
II POWER AND THE WTO 
Before one can turn to the complex relationship between legitimacy and the WTO, one must 
first establish that there is some form of power being exercised by or through the WTO that 
makes the question of legitimacy worth raising in the first place.
1
 In reflecting on some of the 
early debates about the legitimacy of the WTO, Robert Hudec noted that: 
The key issue is whether the WTO is really a separate institution of governance to which 
higher standards of legitimacy must be applied. And that issue, in turn, depends on 
whether the WTO really does exercise power of its own—that is, power that is outside the 
control of the governments upon which it is employed. Most critics who argue that the 
WTO must meet higher, “governance” standards of legitimacy do not confront this issue 
head on. To the extent they do, the well-informed critics usually concede that the WTO 
does not “govern” in the true sense of the word, but then they go on and apply the higher 
standard anyway. The issue cannot be finessed in this way.
2
 
This Part attempts to ‘confront this issue head on’3 by considering the different ways in which 
power can be understood as being exercised by or in relation to the WTO. It also aims to show 
that many of the claims that the WTO does not exercise any power that requires legitimation 
derive from unnecessarily limited visions of the forms that such power can take (Part II(A)), 
what kinds of entities are capable of exercising power (Part II(B)), and when and where 
power can be exercised (Part II(C)).  
                                                 
1
  For a thoughtful discussion of how different ideas about power, especially symbolic power, can apply to 
the WTO, see Eagleton-Pierce 2012, ch 2.  
2
  Hudec 2001, 298. 
3
  Ibid.  
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A The Forms of Power 
Claims that the WTO does not exercise any power worthy of legitimating often take one of 
two configurations. First, the WTO is said not to exercise any meaningful or significant power 
because its powers are not directly coercive.
4
 The WTO’s rules are the products of Member 
consensus, and, at most, dispute settlement organs only have the power to authorize the 
suspension of concessions against a losing party to a dispute.
5
 Second, what power the WTO 
does exercise is argued to be merely ‘technical’, and thus does not demand any detailed 
scrutiny.  
Both of these narratives about power (or the lack thereof) have deep roots. Traditionally, 
power has been very closely associated with coercion and the need to overcome resistance.
6
 
This has been reflected in Max Weber’s classic definition of power as ‘the probability that 
one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance’.7 It is similarly reflected in Robert Dahl’s ‘intuitive’ understanding of power, that 
‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do’.8 In The Changing Structure of International Law, Wolfgang Friedmann noted 
that the prevalence in the mid-twentieth century of a more directly coercive definition of 
power ‘as the assertion of one’s will over that of another by the use of coercion’.9 
But coercion, particularly willed coercion, need not exhaust the forms that power can 
take. In Power: A Radical View, Steven Lukes identified three ‘faces of power’. First is the 
                                                 
4
  See, eg, ‘[A]n examination of how the WTO really works reveals that no such threat exists to US 
sovereignty. […] The WTO wields no power of enforcement. It has no authority or power to levy fines, 
impose sanctions, change tariff rates, or modify domestic laws in any way to bring about compliance. If a 
member refuses to comply with rules it previously agreed to follow, all the WTO can do is approve a 
request by the complaining member to impose sanctions — a “power” that member governments have 
always been able to wield against each other’: Lash & Griswold 2000. Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo 
Venzke also note that the exercise of power by international institutions has often been considered to not 
require extensive justification because such institutions do not wield directly coercive powers: von 
Bogdandy & Venzke 2012, 17-18. 
5
  See DSU Article 22. Cf Charnovitz 2001, who argues that WTO authorization of suspension of 
concessions should properly be considered a sanction.  
6
  Hannah Arendt labelled this approach to power as the ‘command-obedience’ model: Arendt 1970, 36-40. 
7
  Weber 1968, 53. 
8
  Dahl 1957, 202-203. 
9
  Friedmann 1964, 49. 
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power to impose one’s will or policy preferences in a given decision-making context, despite 
resistance — a version that closely resembles the definitions above. Second is the power to 
control the agenda, including ensuring that certain items are kept off the agenda and that 
certain decisions do not happen.
10
 This more subtle sort of power is arguably exercised on a 
day-to-day level by the WTO Secretariat and by the chairs of WTO negotiating committees, 
as well as on a structural level by the major powers. A particularly controversial application 
of this second face of power in the WTO context was highlighted when a group of developing 
countries criticized Stuart Harbinson, then Chairman of the General Council, for keeping 
issues important to developing countries off the Doha agenda.
11
 Similarly, Faizel Ismail 
criticized the Chair of the Non-Agricultural Market Access group at the Potsdam Ministerial 
for ‘biasing the outcomes against the interests of developing countries and thus contributing 
to the collapse of the ministerial meetings at the end of July 2008’.12 This suggests that 
Lukes’s second form of power may have important implications for the design of both formal 
and informal rules and practices in relation to WTO negotiations.  
The third form of power identified by Lukes is the power to manipulate the preferences 
of others, even to the point where they make decisions that operate against their ‘real 
interests’.13 This aspect of power resonates with the work of two other major thinkers: 
Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault. For Gramsci, an ‘invisible’ form of power that was 
not directly coercive operated through the establishment and maintenance of hegemony. The 
spread of cultural norms and ideas would help constitute individuals’ subjective preferences 
in such a way as to manufacture their consent to the exercise of power, even if it operated 
against their interests.
14
  
                                                 
10
  Lukes 1974.  
11
  ‘The text [of the Doha draft declaration] does not take our interests into account. We will not have a third 
draft, not because we have no time. The text came in on Saturday. By Monday, we sent a letter signed by 
20 developing countries to make changes in implementation. And he [the Chair of the General Council, 
Stuart Harbinson, ambassador of Hong Kong] simply said no. We all know why he said that, because our 
Ministers will have a difficult time’; ‘We are in the worst possible situation, and it is a question of politics, 
not a lack of arguments’: anonymous delegates quoted in Kwa 2001. See also Odell 2005. 
12
  Ismael 2009, 1148. 
13
  Lukes 1974, 24-5 and 34-5. See also Clegg 2001, 11934.  
14
  See generally Gramsci 1992. See also Fry 2008. 
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Foucault took these ideas in another direction by dispensing altogether with the idea of 
objective or ‘real’ interests against which such preferences could be juxtaposed. For Foucault, 
power constructs ‘the order of things, the regimes of rationality, and the subjects and their 
daily practices’.15 It constructs preferences and identities without allowing for any standpoint 
from which objective interests may be measured. Power for Foucault is thus not merely 
coercive or constraining of interests and preferences. It is also productive, in that it allows for 
the realization of preferences and interests. Importantly, it is even constitutive — it is the 
operation of power that helps to create interests, preferences, and the relationships between 
them all in the first place.
16
 This, in turn, draws attention to how specific goals and outcomes 
are classified as desirable or undesirable.  
This takes us back to criticism that the power exercised by the WTO is merely technical. 
Former Appellate Body member James Bacchus, for instance, dismisses the idea that the 
WTO Secretariat wields any form of significant power on the grounds that it only provides 
‘technical assistance’. In his words:  
About half are translators. About half of the rest are clerical workers. The remainder are 
lawyers or economists or international civil servants of some other technical sort who 
work for ‘the WTO’.17  
Here, again we face a limited understanding of the potential forms of power, in which merely 
‘technical’ work is not seen as warranting much attention. Certainly, there is much that the 
WTO does may be thought of as implementing Member’s wishes in a relatively 
                                                 
15
  Buchstein & Jörke 2012, 286.  
16
  ‘[P]ower produces; it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth’: Foucault 1977, 
194. In Susan Marks’s words: ‘For Foucault, then, truth and power are mutually dependent, or at any rate 
mutually reinforcing. What counts as truth is produced through “forms of constraint”. That is to say, it is 
the outcome of structured social processes. At the same time, truth itself induces “effects of power”. It 
helps to establish and sustain the social structures within which validity is secured. Thus, truth is 
constituted through power, and power is partly constituted and reproduced through truth’: Marks 2000, 
133-4. For a discussion of how law has played a constitutive role with regard to the construction of the 
international trade regime, see Lang 2011; Lang 2013; Lang 2014. Similar insights have also been 
examined by constructivist scholars: see, eg, Wendt 1999. See also Eagleton-Pierce 2012, ch 2, and 
Bourdieu 1989, 22, in which Bourdieu argues that symbolic power is ‘world making’ and represents the 
power to ‘organize the perception of the social’. 
17
  Bacchus 2004, 668. 
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straightforward manner. But technical power — which may be taken to include both a kind of 
epistemic power and an associated professional capability — is power nonetheless. Such 
power helps to set the terms on which the world is understood.
18
 This is particularly so when 
such technical power is married to WTO law.
19
 This is because WTO law has the capacity to 
privilege certain types of knowledge in specified situations, and to allocate power to certain 
types of experts. Moreover law may go beyond this allocative function to actually help 
constitute distinctive regimes of knowledge.
20
 More specifically, ‘technical knowledge’ may 
help alter the outcomes of WTO disputes by shaping understandings of the facts and the law.  
Finally, one may consider the idea of distinct ‘legal power’. Wesley Hohfeld, for 
instance, defined a power as ‘one’s affirmative “control” over a given legal relation as against 
another’.21 Although the present thesis focuses on WTO law specifically, it seeks to draw on a 
broader understanding of the relationship between power and law than that advanced by 
Hohfeld; a broader understanding which is informed by the agenda-setting and knowledge-
constituting forms outlined above. As such, it concerns not only formal powers to make, 
apply, and interpret WTO law, but also how power may affect and influence such law-
making, application, and interpretation on a more informal basis. It deals not only with how 
                                                 
18
  Foucault argues that ‘[n]o body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, records, 
accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence and 
functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no power can be exercised without the extraction, 
appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge’: Foucault 1971, 283, cited in Sheridan 1980, 131. 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval take an expansive approach to power by defining it as ‘the 
production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
own circumstances and fate’: Barnett & Duvall 2004, 8. See also: ‘In other words, power can be 
understood as either an attribute that agents possess and may use as a resource to shape the actions of 
others, and to affect what agents take to be valid knowledge, or the socially diffuse control of agents by 
means of previously created rules and institutions’: Adler & Bernstein 2004, 294 and 298. 
19
  Foucault considered legal rules and judicial practices to provide an important site for the analysis of 
power/knowledge — ‘Judicial practices […] all these practices that were indeed governed by rules but also 
constantly modified throughout the course of history, seem to me to be one of the forms by which our 
society defined types of subjectivity, forms of knowledge, and, consequently, relations between man and 
truth that deserve to be studied’: Foucault 1994, 5.  
20
  Lang 2009; Lang 2013. See also Peel 2010, 265: ‘law may well represent a privileged and central venue for 
the constitution of regimes of knowledge’. 
21
  See Hohfeld 1913, 55; Hohfeld 1917. 
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legal powers may ‘determine’ the legal situations of others, but also how law is itself 
determined by the exercise of power.
22
 Indeed, Robert Howse notes that the power of 
transnational trade policy networks is often not formal in character, and rather derives from 
informal practices — putting items on the agenda, keeping items off the agenda, preparing 
reports and assessments that influence understandings of treaty obligations, monitoring trade 
policies, facilitating training for trade officials and the like.
23
 He notes that through these 
processes, these experts exert ‘a kind of epistemic power to define what should and should not 
have attention in the WTO forum’.24 In this sense, the informal practices associated with 
WTO law hold just as much importance in considering the relationship between power and 
WTO law as the formal practices.  
This thesis therefore conceptualizes power as concerned not merely with the coercive 
imposition of the will, but also in its agenda-setting and knowledge-constituting senses. This 
opens up a much broader range of ways in power may be understood as pervading and 
altering the terms of how law is made and interpreted in relation to the WTO, suggesting that 
there is more here that requires legitimation than has traditionally been accepted.    
B The Agents of Power 
Another common refrain that underplays the operation of power in relation to the WTO is that 
the WTO does not exercise power itself, but is merely an instrument for its Members. Robert 
Hudec, for instance, went on to note that: 
                                                 
22
  The word ‘determines’ is here borrowed from von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann 2010. In defining the 
exercise of ‘international public authority’, they define ‘authority’ as ‘the legal capacity to determine others 
and to reduce their freedom, ie to unilaterally shape their legal or factual situation. An exercise is the 
realization of that capacity, in particular by the production of standard instruments such as decisions and 
regulations, but also by the dissemination of information, like rankings. The determination may or may not 
be legally binding.’ Consequently this version of authority comes into play not only if its exercise modifies 
the legal status of a legal subject in a formal sense, but also if it merely ‘conditions’ a legal subject in a way 
that ‘builds up pressure for another legal subject to follow its impetus’: at 11-12. See also von Bogdandy & 
Goldmann 2008, 263 (limiting their discussions to specifically ‘legal’ authority). 
23
  Howse 2001a, 371.  
24
  Ibid 371-2. Howse nonetheless notes that the Secretariat’s power has diminished in the transition from the 
GATT to the WTO, as its influence over the selection of panelists for disputes and the drafting of panel 
reports has waned (although certainly not disappeared). See also Howse 2002a. 
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The World Trade Organization is a member-driven organization, and the force of its 
orders is the product of a process in which governments agree to participate and which 
they ultimately control. Unless that fact can be disproved, I cannot see any basis for 
asking the WTO to meet the legitimacy standards of an institution with powers of 
governance.
25
 
Similarly, James Bacchus denies the agency of the WTO when he claims that ‘[t]he WTO is 
nothing more or less than — at last count — 147 sovereign countries and other customs 
territories working together as something they have chosen to call “the WTO”’.26 In the 
international relations literature, these arguments are often engaged in terms of principal-
agent theory, which examines international organizations as agents that have been delegated 
authority by their Members and are responsible to them in turn.
27
  
One response to these claims is to argue that the WTO does in fact exercise autonomous 
power. Principal-agent theory, for instance, acknowledges that international organizations 
such as the WTO will still enjoy a measure of discretion, or ‘slack’, in carrying out their 
delegated tasks.
28
 Various actors in the WTO, especially the Appellate Body members, 
operate with a level of discretion which allows them to operate independently from Members’ 
immediate preferences (albeit within prescribed limits). Joel Trachtman neatly sums up one of 
the flaws of the argument that the WTO exercises no autonomous power thusly: ‘if the WTO 
were merely a conduit for member-state action, there would be no need to cloak member-state 
action in the WTO’.29 Similarly, Richard Steinberg notes that ‘[a]nalysis of international 
institutions and law is shifting from earlier concerns of whether institutions matter to 
questions of which aspects matter, how, and in what contexts’.30  
                                                 
25
  Hudec 2001, 298. 
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  Bacchus 2004, 668 (emphasis in original).  
27
  ‘What unites specific theories under the umbrella of “principal-agent theory” is a focus on the substantive 
acts of principals in granting conditional authority and designing institutions to control possible 
opportunism by agents’: Hawkins et al 2006b, 7.  
28
  See, eg, Bernstorff 2010, 780-9.  
29
  Trachtman 2009, 207. 
30
  Steinberg 2002, 339.  
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A second response takes things further by noting that international organizations may 
exercise power in a way that shapes the preferences of their Members and other actors. In this 
vein, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore argue that: 
[International Organizations (‘IOs’)] are powerful not so much because they possess 
material and informational resources but, more fundamentally, because they use their 
authority to orient action and create social reality. [...] As authorities, IOs can use their 
knowledge to exercise power in two ways. First, they regulate the social world, altering 
the behavior of states and non-state actors by changing incentives for their decisions. [...] 
Second, we can better understand the power IOs wield by viewing them as bureaucracies. 
IOs exercise power as they use their knowledge and authority not only to regulate what 
currently exists but also to constitute the world, creating new interests, actors, and social 
activities.
31
 
Thus it is not only that the WTO may act beyond the immediate control of the Members; it 
may also act in such a way that alters how those Members perceive their interests and 
preferences.  
A third response to the claims that the WTO is merely an instrument is to note that, even 
if one were to focus on the WTO’s status as an instrument rather than an actor in its own 
right, this would still make it an important locus of power.
32
 As an instrument, it extends, 
limits and modifies the powers of its Members and other actors, leading to new power 
configurations that are only possible as a result of the existence of the law and practice of the 
WTO. For instance, the WTO provides a space for negotiation of and discussion of laws and 
their implementation. But this negotiating space is carefully structured by formal norms and 
informal practices — including the single undertaking and consensus principles — that help 
to shape the outcomes of such negotiations. Similarly, the WTO’s dispute settlement system 
provides incentives for Members to channel their behaviour in specific ways that would not 
be possible in its absence, thereby discouraging unilateral actions with the potential to harm 
                                                 
31
  Barnett & Finnemore 2004, 6-7 (footnotes omitted). See also Venzke 2010, 68: ‘This contribution [...] 
discards an exclusively instrumental view of international institutions that portrays them as tools in the 
hands of their creators or as mere instruments in pursuit of global goals. In conclusion, it emphasizes law’s 
constitutive role in providing a space for legal and political contestation as an indispensable prerequisite for 
the normative desirability of autonomous international bureaucracies’. 
32
  See generally Abbott et al 2015.  
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other Members’ economies. As such, it is important to bear in mind not only how power is 
exercised by the WTO, but also how power is exercised through the WTO. 
This point becomes all the stronger when recognizing that power is not exercised through 
the WTO equally by all of its Members. Benedict Kingsbury, for instance, notes that ‘from 
the perspective of smaller developing countries, global regulatory institutions including the 
WTO […] might already appear to be “administering” them at the bidding of the 
industrialized countries’.33 It is no secret that multilateral negotiations have long been 
dominated by a small number of the more powerful economies, whether in the form of the US 
and the EU, the old ‘Quad’ (which also included Canada and Japan), or the ‘G-6’ of Australia, 
Brazil, the EU, India, Japan and the US. Daniel Drezner argues that threats to national 
sovereignty derive less from international institutions like the WTO than they do from the 
major powers, including the US and the EU, noting that in the WTO context, ‘US sacrifices of 
democratic sovereignty pale in comparison to the compromises other countries have had to 
make’.34 A further variant argues that the WTO merely provides an instrument for powerful 
lobbies within certain Members, a claim that has been directly denied by the WTO.
35
 
Finally, the WTO may also act as an arena for power even in the absence of the clear 
exercise of will. Although it is important to recognize the personal and group responsibility of 
those tasked with WTO rule- and decision-making, the specialized and fragmented nature of 
rule- and decision-making in complex fields such as multilateral trade can result in situations 
where no one actor takes, or can take, responsibility. Foucault, for instance, recognized the 
operation of power through disciplinary networks that did not rely on any particular will for 
their development and evolution.
36
 This is not to say that individuals cannot make use of such 
disciplinary networks for their own ends; far from it. Rather it is merely to recognize an 
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  Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart 2005, 27. 
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  Drezner 2001, 323. 
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  See WTO, Ten Common Misunderstandings about the WTO (1999). 
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  It is worth noting that Foucault’s conception of power largely dispensed with the notion of agency. This 
was in part because his focus on the productive and constitutive aspect of power undermined the idea that 
pre-established agents were capable of exercising power independently. In this sense, even leaving its 
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the law: see Foucault 1998, 92-6. 
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additional and subtle manner in which power is propagated at a structural level which can 
have significant impacts on the autonomy of various actors. 
Acknowledging both the autonomous power of the WTO, and its power as an instrument 
for others in shaping Member preferences, raises questions of how such power is being used 
and to what end. This invites consideration of matters beyond whether or not ‘the 
Membership’ has consented in broad terms to WTO rules, to include investigation of the 
WTO’s knowledge practices in generating ideas about the world and about the WTO’s role in 
that world. This in turn has important implications for how we think about law and the 
legitimacy of the WTO.   
C The Settings of Power  
1 The Institutional Dimension 
Another key feature in narratives about power, law, and the WTO is what will here be termed 
the setting of power. The setting includes both an institutional dimension and a temporal 
dimension. As far as the institutional dimension is concerned, it is important to remain aware 
of the many sites in which the various forms of power can be exercised, and how these 
different sites may relate to each other in a broader setting. These sites are important not 
because of their geographical location, but rather because of how they are legally constituted 
in different ways and operate in accordance with distinct sets of rules and practices that affect 
how decisions are made. Generally, discussions of WTO law and power to date have centred 
heavily on the WTO dispute settlement system and, to a lesser extent, its negotiation rounds. 
The various interstitial decision-making sites in the WTO, however — including the WTO 
committees,
37
 the General Council and its various emanations,
38
 and the WTO Secretariat — 
have received far less attention. There has also been a relative neglect of the WTO’s 
interaction with other IGOs,
39
 how the WTO interacts with national bodies implementing 
WTO rules and decisions, and the relationship between the WTO and the private sector. 
These spaces have continued to form what David Kennedy has termed the ‘background’ of 
international decision-making,
40
 while most of the focus remains on the ‘foreground’ 
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  See, eg, Lang & Scott 2009; Shaffer 2001. 
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institutions of the dispute settlement organs and the Ministerial conferences. Looking more 
broadly at the various institutional processes in the WTO — including not only its dispute 
settlement system and negotiation rounds, but also its Councils and committees, as well as the 
influence of non-institutionalised expert networks — has the potential to open up a different 
view of the relationship between power, law and the WTO.  
2 The Temporal Dimension 
Finally, turning to the temporal dimension of power; the exercise of power is often ignored, 
particularly in legal circles, if it is not directly associated with the moment of legislation or 
legally authoritative interpretation. It is not just that the focus is concentrated on particular 
institutional settings, such as the dispute settlement system. It is also that the focus largely 
remains on the words of treaty texts set down at the moment of collective agreement, or on 
the final texts of panel or Appellate Body reports. To this extent, the focus is generally on 
moments of formal prescription. 
Yet the exercise of power may also affect how law is created, shaped, interpreted and 
eliminated at many different times before and after these formal moments. Andrew Lang and 
Joanne Scott have noted that ‘important work is often done before we get to the stage of 
intergovernmental bargaining, and that the politics of international trade is found just as much 
in everyday routines of global economic governance as it is in its eye-catching moments’.41 
Looking at the GATT/WTO agenda-setting process, Richard Steinberg identifies three distinct 
stages:  
advancing and developing initiatives that broadly conceptualize a new area or form of 
regulation; (2) drafting and fine-tuning proposals (namely, legal texts) that specify rules, 
principles, and procedures; and (3) developing a package of proposals into a “final act” 
for approval upon closing the round [...].
42
  
Political scientists have addressed the distinct stages of such processes for decades. Harold 
Lasswell, for instance, broke down the policy process into seven stages: intelligence, 
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  Lang & Scott 2010, 1074. Cf Steinberg 2009, 1069; see also Lang & Scott 2009.  
42
  Steinberg 2002, 354 (emphasis in original). Although Steinberg points to research suggesting that, in 
domestic legislative settings, agenda-setting processes have more explanatory power than plenary voting 
processes, he discounts the value of this insight in relation to organizations that are governed by decision-
making processes that emphasize sovereign equality (including the WTO): at 354. 
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recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, and termination.
43
 Other 
breakdowns of the policy process emphasize the iterative and recursive nature of such 
processes, portraying them in terms of a policy cycle.
44
 Different stages of such policy cycles 
call for different forms of power and legitimacy, and are worthy of attention in their own 
right.  
Overall, then, it is possible to build a complex picture of how power relates to the WTO as 
an institution and more specifically to WTO law. Power may take many forms, including 
coercive, agenda-setting, epistemic and formal. It may be constraining, productive and even 
constitutive. Power may be wielded by the WTO, by others acting through the WTO, and its 
exercise by others may be shaped by WTO law. Moreover, power can have an impact on the 
development of WTO law in many different institutional settings and beyond moments of 
formal decision-making. In turn, the varying forms of power exercised by and through the 
WTO necessitate careful consideration of whether such exercise may be considered 
legitimate. A sharper awareness of how the forms, agents and settings of power operate in 
relation to WTO law helps to strengthen safeguards against abuses of such power. 
III THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY 
A Defining Legitimacy 
With so many different permutations of power on offer, it is no surprise that legitimacy, so 
concerned with the justification of power, also has many meanings and uses. ‘Legitimacy’ has 
been deployed by actors at all levels of the multilateral trading system, from activists to 
academics, from politicians to the press, from Appellate Body Members to bureaucrats, each 
of whom ascribe different meanings to the word. Indeed it is not unusual for any given author 
to use the word multiple times in the one setting while ascribing different meanings to it every 
time. The plurality of these meanings, and the frequency with which the word itself is used, 
make it a difficult concept to systematize.  
Following the publication of Thomas Franck’s seminal work The Power of Legitimacy 
among Nations in 1990, there has been a wave of scholarship linking legitimacy and 
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international law. This wave has prompted a backlash from eminent international lawyers 
with vantage points as diverse as James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi. A central 
criticism relates to legitimacy’s semantic ambiguity45 and its capacity to be used strategically 
with little regard for consistency.
46
 Strongly related to this is an assumption of the subjectivity 
of legitimacy — that, in direct contrast to law, it provides a license to privilege personal moral 
intuitions at the expense of the system as a whole.
47
 Political actors may call something 
legitimate or illegitimate not because they have made a considered philosophical reflection on 
whether that thing aligns strictly with a particular normative framework, but rather because 
they like or do not like it and are grasping for an authoritative way to express that emotion. 
Another criticism claims that legitimacy discourse seeks to supplant legal discourse,
48
 a 
concern that is not entirely unjustified considering the Goldstone report’s memorable verdict 
that the NATO military intervention in Kosovo was ‘illegal but legitimate’.49 In addition, 
legitimacy is criticized for lacking any meaningful normative content despite its claims to do 
so.
50
 Finally, Crawford suggests that reflection on legitimacy lies beyond the proper realm of 
the international lawyer: ‘Of legitimacy it is for others to judge’.51 
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If approached carefully, however, the concept of legitimacy can prove illuminating for 
international law scholarship and practice. In the WTO context, an awareness of the main 
narratives of legitimacy can help to clarify the nature of disagreements over, among other 
things, proposals for institutional reform, allocating authority between different expert groups, 
or the persuasiveness of specific dispute settlement reports. It can also make it easier to 
identify when actors are moving back and forth between contradictory legitimacy claims in 
order to justify their positions, so as to better hold them to account. 
To begin, Arthur Applbaum helpfully distinguishes between the word legitimacy, the 
concept of legitimacy and conceptions of legitimacy.
52
 The specific word has been used to 
denote various ideas across disciplines, time and space. Legitimacy as a concept is a kind of 
meta-definition that seeks to encompass as many of the different conceptions for legitimacy as 
possible. The majority of the literature on legitimacy is concerned with particular conceptions 
of legitimacy — associated with some variant of democracy, or justice, or ‘good 
administration’ — and it is only comparatively recently that the concept of legitimacy has 
been subjected to more sustained attention.  
There are several core understandings of the concept of legitimacy in academic writing. 
Most of the writing on legitimacy from the last several decades distinguishes between at least 
two main legitimacy categories. These categories are often allocated different labels, but the 
functional distinction is similar in each case. Thus distinctions are drawn between normative 
and sociological legitimacy;
53
 between normative and empirical legitimacy;
54
 between de jure 
and de facto legitimacy;
55
 and between moral and descriptive legitimacy.
56
 Some writers add 
a distinct category of legal or formal legitimacy to the mix.
57
 Joseph Weiler, for instance, 
distinguishes formal and social legitimacy, where formal legitimacy is ‘akin to the juridical 
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concept of formal validity’.58 This chapter distinguishes between legal, moral and social 
legitimacy — these labels express the distinctions between the various concepts of legitimacy 
well and are in reasonably common use in international law scholarship, including in relation 
to WTO law.  
1 Legal Legitimacy 
The term ‘legitimacy’ is etymologically derived from the Latin legitimus (lawful), as derived 
from lex (law), so it is not surprising that lawyers stake a claim to the word. Legal legitimacy 
is generally treated as the narrowest of the three disciplinary concepts of legitimacy. It may be 
defined as a property of an action, rule, actor, or system which signifies a legal obligation to 
submit to or support that action, rule, actor or system. Legal legitimacy is similar to moral 
legitimacy in that both assess given objects against particular normative framework; as such 
they are both sometimes grouped together as forms of ‘normative legitimacy’.59  
The concept of a specifically legal legitimacy, while undeniably important, does not 
provide the primary focus for this thesis. Rather, the thesis is concerned with the 
interrelationship between moral and social legitimacy and the making, interpreting and 
application of WTO law. It is nonetheless instructive to further elaborate on how the concept 
of legal legitimacy may be understood, for two reasons: first, to help elucidate the differences 
between legal legitimacy, moral legitimacy and social legitimacy; second, to highlight that 
even the concept of legal legitimacy raises complex moral considerations.  
To writers outside of legal scholarship, legal legitimacy is often directly equated with 
legal validity, to the exclusion of questions of moral justifiability.
60
 Legal validity in itself is 
then treated as a relatively straightforward concept.
61
 It is nonetheless recognized that legal 
legitimacy is particularly important because of the strength of its self-justification in a 
functioning legal system; once something has become legally legitimate, this provides an 
exclusionary reason for compliance even in the face of opposing moral considerations.
62
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Questions of legal validity thus have a direct impact on broader understandings of morality 
and order. 
That non-lawyers commonly conflate the concepts of legal legitimacy and validity is 
understandable, as this is a move commonly undertaken by lawyers themselves.
63
 For 
lawyers, however, the question of legal validity is anything but straightforward. There are two 
main (heavily disputed) schools of thought as to the requirements for legal validity, in the 
forms of positivism and natural law theory.
64
 In the positivist tradition, represented most 
famously by Hans Kelsen and HLA Hart, to claim that a law is legally valid is to claim that it 
was created in accordance with the correct legal process. In Kelsen’s view, this test for 
positive validity could be conducted recursively until a non-legal fundamental norm for a 
legal system, the Grundnorm, could be reached, for which authority is ‘presupposed’.65 For 
Hart, legal validity was ultimately traceable to a ‘rule of recognition’ — in contrast to 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm, the rule of recognition is a social fact rather than a norm.66  
In basic terms, then, for a positivist, a norm is legally legitimate if it is created and 
persists in accordance with correct legal process, in which correctness is ultimately derived 
from a basic norm or from social consensus. Actions taken in accordance with such norms, 
and actors appointed to positions of authority in accordance with such norms, can also be said 
                                                                                                                                                        
and would in the absence of the exclusionary reason have sufficed to justify proceeding in some other 
way’: Finnis 1980, 233. 
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  Kelsen 2007, 110-22. 
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to possess legal legitimacy. In international law scholarship there is still much conceptual 
disagreement about what constitutes a correct legal process, particularly when it comes to 
determining the sources of international law.
67
 In WTO law, this plays out most prominently 
in relation to the debates about the extent to which general international law is applicable in 
WTO dispute settlement.
68
  
Central to the positivist view of legal validity is also the idea that legal validity and the 
moral justifiability of the law’s substance are entirely separable. The formal fact of legal 
validity engenders a legal, but not necessarily a moral, obligation to obey.
69
 Hence no moral 
obligation necessarily arises either on the basis of the substance of law or due to its character 
as law. This is not to say that law cannot be moral or immoral, simply that the question of 
moral justifiability lies outside the question of legality. From this perspective, legal validity is 
a purely formal fact — an ‘amoral datum’.70  
The conflation between legitimacy and legal validity, when combined with this 
separation between legal validity and moral justifiability, raises some concerns. Analytically, 
distinguishing between legal validity and moral justifiability can be very important. However, 
taking legal validity to exhaust the concept of legitimacy has the potential to severely limit 
debates about WTO law. Questions of formal validity may crowd out broader questions about 
ethics and justice in WTO law.
71
 It can make it easier to dismiss how ‘external’ considerations 
can or should influence WTO law, or indeed how they have in the past.   
The classical natural law tradition, in contrast, is often said to have treated substantive 
moral justifiability as an essential element of legal validity. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, is 
often quoted as stating that ‘if in any point [human law] deflects from the law of nature, it is 
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no longer a law but a perversion of law’;72 while William Blackstone wrote that ‘no human 
laws are of any validity, if contrary to [the law of nature]’.73 Many legal philosophers, 
including Austin,
74
 Kelsen,
75
 Hart
76
 and Raz,
77
 have read these statements as indicating that, 
for natural lawyers, moral justifiability constitutes an inextricable aspect of legal validity. The 
quintessential distillation of natural law thinking — that ‘unjust law is not law’ — has thus 
been interpreted as arguing that positive law is invalidated if morally disagreeable. Echoes of 
this idea may be found in contemporary approaches to jus cogens norms in international law, 
in that such norms are considered non-derogable and their basis is sometimes ascribed to 
natural law.
78
  
Contemporary natural lawyers such as John Finnis, however, reject this reading as a mere 
caricature invented by the positivists.
79
 Finnis argues that there are two different meanings of 
‘law’ at play in the statement ‘an unjust law is not law’.80 The first ‘law’ refers to human-
made, positive law, and will continue to exist as such in accordance with the principles of 
positive legal validity and enforcement in its system of origin. The second use of ‘law’ means 
law which has full moral obligatory force, as all law should have. Although laws that lack 
moral legitimacy retain their status as law, they are defective in that they fail to achieve the 
quality of moral obligation that should be experienced in relation to law. Finnis thus separates 
out the question of law’s validity from the question of its moral justifiability, and agrees that 
legal validity is a question of social fact. In this limited respect, Finnis finds common ground 
with the positivists.
81
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Even positive legal validity is not clear cut in many cases, as ‘rules do not spell out the 
conditions of their application’.82 For a given legal problem there is often a range of 
permissible legal interpretations. The interpretation of particular laws frequently changes over 
time, and hence the question of whether a particular decision or norm is legally valid remains 
in flux. Consequently it is possible to speak of more or less legally legitimate actions, rules, 
institutions or systems depending on the emphasis one places on the determinative criteria for 
positive legal validity. Anthea Roberts, for instance, notes that legitimacy may be used to 
complicate the binary choice between valid or invalid law by providing a ‘spectrum’ where 
‘laws and actions may be more or less legitimate depending on the circumstances’.83 Attempts 
to shut down debates about the WTO’s legitimacy by appealing to the legal validity of its 
rules or decisions thereby misses much of the complexity inherent in the concept of legal 
legitimacy while also ignoring its non-legal meanings.  
2 Moral Legitimacy 
Another common understanding of legitimacy is that of moral legitimacy. Moral legitimacy is 
often framed in terms of who has the ‘right to rule’84 — that is, how the exercise of power by 
one actor over another can be morally justified. Moral legitimacy consequently posits an 
‘ought’ into the given power relationship. Moral legitimacy may thus be defined as a property 
of an action, rule, actor or system which signifies a moral obligation to submit to or support 
that action, rule, actor or system. Its opposite is moral illegitimacy. If something is morally 
illegitimate, then there is no moral obligation to submit; there may even be a moral obligation 
to resist.
85
 Moral legitimacy is thus closely bound up with questions of political authority. 
There are endless potential configurations of moral legitimacy, and over the centuries 
many different conceptions of morally legitimate rule have been advanced. Plato suggested a 
system of quasi-celibate philosopher-king guardians as the appropriate rulers.
86
 Aristotle 
identified six modes of rule, the first three of which were considered justifiable (royalty, 
aristocracy and constitutional government), while the second three (tyranny, oligarchy and 
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democracy) were considered perversions of the first three.
87
 Egyptian pharaohs, French sun-
kings and contemporary North Korean despots have all claimed a right to rule deriving from 
the divine.
88
 Since the seventeenth century the debate in liberal democratic states has focused 
on the tension between individual freedom and state power, somehow mediated by consent in 
the form of the social contract.
89
 It is important to bear in mind both the multiplicity and the 
historical contingency of different understandings of moral legitimacy. Contemporary 
writings on moral legitimacy are dominated by notions of democratic legitimacy, with sub-
genres concerned with individual consent, the social contract and deliberation. This tendency 
is so widespread that often the term ‘legitimacy’ is used as shorthand for ‘democratic 
legitimacy’.90 The preponderance of such writings has operated to eclipse the study of other 
forms of moral legitimacy. 
Each of the various forms of moral legitimacy articulated over the last several centuries 
has had its share of lawyers, politicians and philosophers ready to act as apologists or critics, 
contributing to increasingly elaborate justificatory apparatus for various modes of rule. This 
intermingling of power with attempts to define the conditions of legitimate rule has ensured 
that not only have the various conceptions of legitimacy played a powerful role in shoring up 
or destabilising rule, but also that these conceptions have been informed and shaped by the 
realities of power.  
The moral version of legitimacy remains intimately connected to the study of law.
91
 Law 
embodies, normalizes and enforces particular conceptions of the world. It informs our 
understandings of what is moral even as it is shaped by such understandings. Moral 
legitimacy is therefore central to the description and evaluation of the exercise of power 
through law. It is highly relevant to lawyers engaged in institutional design, in disputes 
steeped in moral issues, and for an appreciation of what it means to commit to a particular set 
of legal structures. Lawyers engaged in such projects may have a technical legal role to fulfil, 
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but that role is only enhanced by an appreciation of the moral legitimacy concerns associated 
with such projects. The WTO provides no exception to this.  
Moral legitimacy has tended to feature in international law discourse, including trade law 
discourse, in one of three ways. First, it has featured heavily in debates on the moral basis of 
obligation in international law — that is, debates about why international law is worthy of 
compliance in general terms. Traditionally a range of possible bases have been suggested, 
ranging from consent, to human dignity, to the realization of common purposes.
92
 These 
debates, long dormant, have been revived in recent scholarship.
93
 Second, conceptions of 
moral legitimacy may provide international law with competing, rather than complementary, 
normative justifications for action.
94
 It is this second relationship that tends to pose the 
greatest concern to general international lawyers worried about the dilution of international 
law’s normative force. Third, specific conceptions of moral legitimacy have provided a 
framework against which to evaluate international law.
95
 Such evaluation may highlight areas 
where legal reform is needed.
96
 From there, international law may be used as an instrument to 
promote or implement a particular vision of moral legitimacy. This has been the primary 
mode in which the WTO’s legitimacy debates have taken place, as various actors have sought 
to articulate reform proposals on the basis of democratizing the WTO or increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of its decision-making.  
3 Social Legitimacy 
The third common understanding of legitimacy is social legitimacy. Social legitimacy may be 
defined as the property projected onto an action, rule, actor or system by an actor’s belief that 
that action, rule, actor or system is morally or legally legitimate.
97
 Unlike legal or moral 
legitimacy, social legitimacy does not make a normative commitment to any relationship of 
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power; it drops any sense of an objective ‘ought’. It treats legitimacy as a social fact, not a 
normative goal. Nonetheless this definition does not completely disregard the role of moral 
and legal legitimacy. Social legitimacy is an empty concept without an account of the moral 
or legal framework to which the posited believer subscribes. Social legitimacy is an empirical 
concept, but it is one which is concerned specifically with what forms of power people 
believe to be morally or legally justified, even if those beliefs bear little relationship to the 
realities of power. Thus moral and legal concerns continue to play a key role in debates about 
social legitimacy.   
It may be possible for authorities to maintain their social legitimacy despite frequently 
violating the normative justifications for their legitimacy. Social legitimacy thus allows for 
the concept of ‘false legitimacy’, where there is an internal disconnect between people’s 
beliefs about the moral operation of a system and the actual operation of that system.
98
 This 
also helps to account for legitimacy’s capacity to motivate obedience even for those who are 
consistently disadvantaged by the system. 
The widely recognized progenitor of the social approach is Max Weber.
99
 Weber saw 
human beings as inevitably involved in relationships of rule, where one person exerts 
rule/dominance/authority over others. He used the concept of legitimacy as an aid to 
understanding how such relationships are perpetuated or dissolved, based on the beliefs which 
justify the acceptance of rule. Legitimacy was viewed as a cause for such belief which could 
be distinguished from coercion, or mere self-interest. It was therefore a social motivation for 
obedience that could operate independently of either of these — an explanatory framework 
for voluntary compliance towards rules (‘maxims’) because ‘it is in some appreciable way 
regarded by the actor as in some way obligatory or exemplary’.100  
Social legitimacy, as with the other forms of legitimacy, is strongly tied to the analysis of 
legal structures. Weber’s initial elaboration of legitimacy and the forms of ‘pure’ legitimate 
authority focused primarily on the exercise of legal authority, especially as operationalized 
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through bureaucracy.
101
 He placed legitimacy firmly within a historical narrative in which 
modernity is characterized by the displacement of ‘traditional’ and ‘charismatic’ authority by 
instrumental ‘legal-rational’ legitimacy in its many forms.102 Indeed, he argued that ‘[t]oday 
the most common form of legitimacy is the belief in legality, the compliance with enactments 
which are formally correct and which have been made in the accustomed manner’.103 Even 
removing the focus from specifically ‘legal’ ideal types of legitimacy, social legitimacy can 
prove useful for evaluating whether law’s formal claims accord with the normative 
expectations of its subjects (and other interested parties). This has important implications for 
enforceability and compliance, as the greater the distance between legal or moral legitimacy 
and social legitimacy, the less stable and effective a legal system will be. 
4 Legitimation 
The disconnect between people’s beliefs about whether or not power is normatively (that is, 
legally or morally) legitimate, and whether or not it may be considered normatively legitimate 
in any objective sense (within a given framework), leads to the concept of legitimation. 
Legitimation is the process by which actors come to believe in the normative legitimacy of an 
object.
104
 Legitimation may occur as the result of a conscious effort to influence beliefs about 
what is normatively justified, or as the product of the unconscious replication of pervasive 
legitimacy narratives. Whereas each form of legitimacy represents a property, legitimation 
represents action. It may either be narrowly strategic,
105
 or part of a process of public 
discourse leading to more broadly legitimate outcomes.
106
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Legitimation processes are not limited to mere assertions of legitimacy. They involve the 
articulation and practice of a highly complex and developed set of interconnected symbols 
and rituals, often pointing to underlying moral criteria. The creation, interpretation and 
application of law combine to form a quintessential legitimation process. Effective laws have 
the power to create legal and moral obligations where none existed previously, regardless of 
substance. These obligations exist not only in the abstract ‘out there’, but are internalized by 
various actors in the legal system.
107
 Even Kelsen, refuting TH Huxley, argued that:  
[i]f the legal norm, enacted by the legislator, provides sanctions, and if such a “law” 
becomes the content of a man’s consciousness, it can very well become a motive of his 
behaviour and hence a cause of his paying his taxes or his abstaining from theft and 
murder. A legislator enacts norms only because he believes that these norms, as motives 
in the mind of men, are capable of inducing the latter to the behaviour desired by the 
legislator.
108
  
The process of legitimation is not directly related to the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by its 
target. Organizations which have previously enjoyed legitimacy and have a highly 
sophisticated legitimation apparatus, with the most complex symbolic universes formed in 
human history, may still find their legitimacy eroding. The decline of the Holy Roman Empire 
provides one of the more obvious examples. Similarly, actions and ideas previously 
considered wholly illegitimate may be subjected to the full brunt of legitimating strategies: 
the US’s attempts to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the basis of pre-emptive self-
defence and the ‘new threat’ posed by modern terrorism provide a relatively recent example. 
Awareness of this dynamic nature of legitimation is crucial to avoid the trap of too easily 
conceding legitimacy to established rules, institutions and practices. 
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5 Mixed Approaches 
The three categories of legal, moral and social legitimacy are often treated as self-contained. 
Yet each concept of legitimacy may affect how the others are understood. For instance, as 
social legitimacy is by definition founded on beliefs about moral and legal legitimacy, it can 
be seriously undermined by the discovery that such beliefs are unfounded, or the underlying 
beliefs change. In the other direction, Harold Koh has drawn attention to how enmeshing 
international lawyers and other international actors in a web of procedural obligations and 
practices of legal decision-making can inspire a social-psychological ‘buy-in’ to the 
underlying procedural framework. This suggests that feelings of social legitimacy can help to 
influence underlying ideas about moral legitimacy.
109
 
Dissatisfaction with purely normative or social conceptualizations of legitimacy has led 
various authors to straddle the moral/social divide, by incorporating a social element when 
articulating the moral criteria for legitimacy. Jürgen Habermas is a leading figure in this 
tradition. Habermas’s approach to legitimacy is idiosyncratic and complex. For Habermas, 
‘[l]egitimacy means there are good arguments for a political order’s claim to be recognized as 
right and just: a legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means a political order’s 
worthiness to be recognized’.110 On first glance this would appear to be a standard moral 
legitimacy argument. However, what constitutes a ‘good’ argument in Habermas’s approach 
is determined according to a process of communicative action/public deliberation. Whether or 
not something is legitimate is thus a ‘contestable validity claim’.111 This therefore moves 
beyond a purely social account, yet avoids crossing the line entirely into moral legitimacy as 
it remains dependent on how a political order is perceived.
112
  
In international law scholarship, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope skilfully manage to 
incorporate elements of all three approaches — legal, moral and social — as defined above. 
They argue that legitimacy has a ‘specific, legal meaning’113 which goes beyond tests for 
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validity.
114
 Drawing on the work of Lon Fuller, they develop an ‘interactional account’ of 
legitimacy in which adherence to eight criteria of legality (generality, promulgation, non-
retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction, not asking the impossible, constancy and congruence 
between rules and official action) ‘produces a law that is legitimate in the eyes of the person 
to whom it is addressed’.115 Legitimacy is generated in a social sense through the creation of 
communities of practice in which adherence to the criteria of legality generates shared 
understandings about the law. These understandings carry with them a sense of moral 
obligation to comply with the law. Moreover, the fulfilment of these criteria is argued to have 
moral worth, in that it entails a ‘commitment to autonomous actor choices and diversity’ as 
well as to processes of communication.
116
 Brunnée and Toope thus address how moral and 
social legitimacy feed off one another in the international context. In contrast to their project, 
this thesis is less concerned with the legitimacy-generating qualities of the legal form and 
more with how legal procedures may embody and influence specific moral visions of 
legitimacy.  
6 Summary 
The distinction between legal, moral and social legitimacy is crucial to any understanding of 
how legitimacy narratives operate, within the WTO or elsewhere. In subsequent chapters, 
however, their relevance is generally treated as implicit. Breaking down legal legitimacy 
clarifies the important distinction between legitimacy and legality, and also highlights how 
even the concept of legality raises questions of moral and political justification. Defining 
moral and social legitimacy clearly helps to define the essential reliance of the social 
legitimacy on moral legitimacy, in that any claim to social legitimacy requires an underlying 
claim about what is morally legitimate. The legitimacy claims collated and dissected in 
subsequent chapters are inevitably moral and/or social in character, either making normative 
claims about how the WTO and WTO law should operate, or descriptive claims about 
whether such operation is perceived to be legitimate, or both. The distinction between legal, 
moral and social legitimacy allows us to more carefully dissect these claims by uncovering 
their underlying normative foundations and considering their social function.  
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B Three Elements of Legitimacy 
Having established the major categories of legal, moral and social legitimacy, it is worth 
further breaking them down into their distinctive components. Each conception of legitimacy 
involves a different permutation of three elements: the legitimated object, the legitimating 
subject and the basis for legitimacy. This part discusses each of these three elements in turn. 
In doing so, it seeks to provide the conceptual tools required to bring clarity to how different 
legitimacy claims are framed and the different ways in which they may reinforce or contradict 
one another. The section on the bases for legitimacy, in particular, more clearly defines the 
concepts of input and output legitimacy that are central to this thesis.  
1 Objects of Legitimacy 
Each of the categories provided above differentiate between when legitimacy is applied to 
actions, norms, actors and systems.
117
 As Ian Hurd and Katharina Coleman have 
highlighted,
118
 the legitimacy of each of these object types can be treated separately, even in 
the same factual context. Hence, the US invasion of Iraq (an action) could be criticized as 
morally illegitimate, even by those who still recognized the legitimacy of the US (an actor) as 
a state and major power, while the US criticized the legitimacy of existing restrictions (norms) 
on self-defence, while others criticized the Security Council (an institution) for being 
illegitimate because it failed to prevent the invasion, or the international legal order (a system) 
for proving so impotent.  
The legal, economic, social and cultural links between various objects of legitimacy 
ensure that what affects one will often affect another. In the short term, however, even 
intimately connected objects tend to operate, for legitimacy purposes, independently. Hence 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system may be said to enjoy widespread legitimacy even 
though panels may occasionally issue reports that are considered seriously deficient. 
Depending on the object of legitimacy, different legitimating mechanisms may apply, and its 
legitimacy may be subjected to greater or lesser scrutiny. When engaging in legitimacy 
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debates, it is thus important to be clear about exactly what one is arguing to be legitimate or 
illegitimate.
119
 The main objects of legitimacy addressed in this thesis are the WTO as an 
institutional whole, the WTO’s various organs and WTO law, both separately and in how they 
relate to one another. 
The way that different views of legitimacy may be attached to different objects in the 
same context helps to account for the quicksilver nature of legitimacy assessments, and why 
they can be so readily manipulated. A specific decision which may have been considered 
controversial on its own terms may be justified on the basis that it was issued by a legitimate 
individual or institution, or because it claims to accord with a legitimate norm, or to have been 
produced according to a legitimate procedure, notwithstanding its substantive content or its 
practical effects.
120
 Legitimacy can therefore, often problematically, provide a discursive 
space for the displacement of responsibility for decisions.  
2 Subjects of Legitimacy and Communities of Legitimation 
Both legal and moral legitimacy assume that there is a subject who should submit to or 
support the legitimate object. Subjects may vary depending on the particular conception of 
legitimacy employed. They may, for instance, be citizens of a state, people in a state’s 
territory, or adherents of a particular religion. The subjects of international law have 
traditionally been considered states, and the subjects of the WTO its Members. More recently, 
Jeremy Waldron has argued that the world’s billions of individuals should be considered the 
‘true’ subjects of international law, in moral if not formal terms.121  
It is important to differentiate the subjects of legal or moral legitimacy from the 
legitimating community or audience associated with social legitimacy. As discussed above, 
social legitimacy is constructed from beliefs about legal or moral legitimacy. As such, social 
legitimacy is only meaningful to the extent that it relates to a given audience. Social 
legitimacy must be projected by someone: ‘[t]here must be some social group that judges the 
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legitimacy of an actor or action based on the common standards acknowledged by this 
group’.122 The subjects of a given vision of legitimacy and its legitimating community are 
thus not necessarily co-extensive. Moreover, it is not enough that a given group consider an 
object to be legitimate or illegitimate; they must judge that it is legitimate according to the 
same ‘common standards’ (or at least a similar enough family of reasons to make the concept 
of community meaningful) to constitute a legitimating community. There can be many 
legitimating communities for the one object, with differing and overlapping common 
standards. Nevertheless, certain legitimating communities may be more powerful, or be given 
a more normatively privileged status, than others. In most democratic frames of reference, for 
instance, the supreme legitimating community is notionally the voting public. At the 
international level, the primary legitimating community has long been assumed to be the 
group of states, although this has increasingly been brought into question.  
Changes in understandings of what constitutes the relevant legitimating community over 
time can have significant implications for how power is distributed.
123
 Consider the GATT 
and the WTO — for decades, interest in the workings of the international trading system was 
largely confined to a select group of trade insiders. Formally, the legitimating community 
comprised the Contracting Parties (for the GATT) and the Members (for the WTO). 
Functionally, the legitimating community was made up of the agents of the Contracting 
Parties/Members and the ‘insiders’ who had access to such agents: trade officials, diplomats, 
lobbyists, academics. Robert Howse notes how this allowed for the exercise of power in the 
multilateral trading order to be legitimated on technocratic grounds.
124
 Yet as Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye note, this ‘club model’ was soon to fracture.125 As the international trading 
system pushed further into areas (such as public health and the environment) that were 
previously considered the exclusive domain of domestic regulators, the system drew the 
attention of outsiders who were not satisfied by the technocratic model. The formal 
legitimating community still comprises the WTO Members, but in substance there are now 
several legitimating communities competing to take the WTO in radically different directions: 
the trade policy insiders vie with, among others, human rights activists, officials from 
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developing countries, other intergovernmental organizations, anti-globalization protestors and 
environmental lobby groups.
126
 The proliferation of these legitimating communities requires a 
careful rethinking of the grounds for the WTO’s moral legitimacy to accommodate its new 
realities.
127
 
3 The Bases of Legitimacy 
The third element is the basis for legitimacy; that is, the grounds on which an object is 
determined to be legitimate. One way to categorise the bases of legitimacy is to distinguish 
between procedural (or process-based), substantive and outcome-based forms of 
legitimacy.
128
 Another, as preferred in this thesis, is to differentiate input and output 
legitimacy. This latter differentiation more clearly and consistently articulates the relationship 
between law, legal process and legitimacy; a relationship which is sometimes lost in 
discussions of substantive and outcome-based legitimacy. These categories reflect families of 
legal, moral and social legitimacy narratives that are qualitatively different in their scope and 
application. Given the prevalence of the tripartite distinction between procedural, substantive 
and outcome-based legitimacy it is nonetheless instructive to elaborate on these categories 
first, before proceeding to the input/output legitimacy distinction.   
i Procedural, Substantive and Outcome-Based Legitimacy 
Procedural legitimacy is concerned with the mechanisms by which power is conferred and 
exercised.
129
 It prioritizes the formal validity of power, focusing on secondary rules about the 
making, changing and destruction of laws, and the appointment and removal of officials. In 
Thomas Franck’s words: ‘A process, in this sense, is usually set out in a superior framework 
of reference, rules about how laws are made, how governors are chosen and how public 
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participation is achieved’.130 Weber’s articulation of social legitimacy was famously process-
based, as it focused on types of legitimacy that arise by reference to particular sources, rather 
than to the substance of the rules or actions generated by those sources. Franck also adopted a 
largely procedural approach to rule legitimacy with his criteria of coherence, consistency, 
adherence and symbolic validation.
131
 
Procedural legitimacy is closely tied to the source of commands, rules and actions, as 
performed by various actors through given rituals. In the international sphere, both 
international law and the multitude of diplomatic practices represent different process-based 
forms of legitimation. The most commonly articulated archetypes of procedural legitimacy in 
the domestic realm (and in Europe) are the various forms of democratic legitimacy,
132
 while 
in international law they are those of consent.
133
 The procedural approach to legitimacy helps 
to explain why actors are willing to support particular power relationships over others even 
when they fail to serve their substantive interests in specific instances. Legal legitimacy, at 
least as conceived by the positivists, represents a particularly prominent form of process-
based legitimacy. Law is the ultimate vessel for procedural legitimacy, as it claims an 
obligation to comply notwithstanding its substance.  
The procedural approach may be concerned narrowly with the ‘correctness’ of procedure 
as measured against procedural rules,
134
 which may in turn be understood as reflecting a given 
substantive aim (eg democratic representation, or the rule of law). It stops short, however, of 
interrogating the desirability of a given substantive aim. Once a system or institution is 
constructed, its background norms are often taken for granted and its procedures are followed 
for their own sake without deeper consideration of whether they are serving a more 
fundamental substantive aim or resulting in the best outcomes.  
Substantive legitimacy, by contrast, is more directly interested in the aim served by the 
object of legitimation. It can take on expressive or instrumental forms. Ernst Haas proposes a 
clearly substantive (expressive) form of legitimacy when he claims that ‘[o]rganizational 
legitimacy exists when the membership values the organization and generally implements 
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collective decisions because they are seen to implement the members’ values’.135 The 
archetypal form of substantive legitimacy is concerned with justice (or substantive 
fairness),
136
 but it is also reflected in work that seeks to critique or justify given rules or 
institutions on the basis of human rights,
137
 development,
138
 global welfare
139
 or indeed trade 
liberalization.  
The instrumental, rather than the expressive, aspect of substantive legitimacy is sometimes 
framed as outcome-based legitimacy. This form of legitimacy judges the object seeking 
legitimation in terms of a given set of outcomes that are considered desirable. Franck, in 
describing work focused on outcomes-based legitimacy, notes that writers in this tradition 
claim that ‘a system seeking to validate itself — and its commands — must be defensible in 
terms of the equality, fairness, justice and freedom which a realized by those commands’.140 
The boundaries of outcome-based legitimacy are occasionally blurred by a failure to 
distinguish between legitimacy based on actual, measurable outcomes and legitimacy based 
on potential outcomes. Purely outcome-based legitimacy, however, can focus almost 
exclusively on outcomes, and tends to ignore how those outcomes may be shaped by 
processes. The concept of output legitimacy, however, is not limited in this way; as can be 
seen in the following section.   
ii Input and Output Legitimacy 
A similar but separate distinction, and key for this thesis, is drawn between input and output-
based forms of legitimacy. The input/output distinction was developed by Fritz Scharpf in the 
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context of analysing the ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU.141 Input-oriented legitimacy, for 
Scharpf, refers specifically to the concept of ‘government by the people’.142 It is identity-
based, and emphasizes norms of participation and consensus. Output legitimacy instead refers 
to ‘government for the people’, which ‘derives legitimacy from its capacity to solve problems 
requiring collective solutions’ that are unable to be solved via individual action, market 
exchanges or voluntary cooperation.
143
 It is more interest-based, and emphasizes mechanisms 
of expertise and accountability. The procedures associated with the efficient and effective 
implementation of such outputs are sometimes encompassed by the terminology of output 
legitimacy and sometimes referred to as their own category of ‘throughput’ legitimacy, using 
a term borrowed from systems theory.
144
 The ‘throughput’ terminology is largely avoided in 
this thesis, however, as the concepts of input, throughput and output used in systems theory 
tend to differ significantly from the political definitions advanced by Scharpf and others as 
well as from how these terms have been deployed in relation to the WTO to date.  
Other writers have adopted the terminology of input and output legitimacy but expanded it 
beyond the democratic context,
145
 such that input legitimacy derives from the identity-based 
aspects of a rule- or decision-making process,
146
 while output legitimacy includes any form of 
legitimacy that is validated on the basis of how the practical consequences of such rule- and 
decision-making serve a defined set of interests. For Scharpf, this is ‘government for the 
people’. Victor Bekkers and Arthur Edwards, continuing in this mode, point to several 
commonly pursued outcome categories, including government effectiveness, efficiency and 
responsiveness.
147
 For the WTO it is arguable that much of its moral and social legitimacy 
(such as it is) derives from the claims that its rules have successfully increased global welfare 
through reducing trade barriers. The difference between this and the substantive or outcome-
based categories identified above is the continued focus on the relationship between aims, 
                                                 
141
  See generally Scharpf 1999. 
142
  Ibid 6. 
143
  Ibid 11. 
144
  See, eg, Schmidt 2010.  
145
  Keohane & Nye 2001; Kelly 2008, 608. 
146
  Victor Bekkers and Arthur Edwards characterize input legitimacy as largely being concerned with ‘the 
normative idea of “government by the people”’, relating to norms of quality of representation, participation 
and openness: Bekkers & Edwards 2007, 44-5. 
147
  Bekkers & Edwards 2007, 45. 
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outcomes, and the processes that bridge the two. Output legitimacy in its original incarnation 
directly included the idea of government for the people. Its application in the international 
sphere instead looks to the mechanisms of governance, and the question of who those 
mechanisms is intended to benefit remains hotly debated.
148
   
Drawing on these more expansive approaches, this thesis defines input-oriented 
legitimacy narratives as those concerned with identity-based concerns about who or what may 
wield legitimate rule- or decision-making authority. Input legitimacy narratives therefore 
emphasize processes of consent, representation, participation and accountability. Such 
narratives operate independently of justifications based on whether the resulting rules and 
decisions are just, efficient or effective. Institutional and legal structures may enjoy input 
legitimacy if the views of an agreed set of stakeholders have been channelled in an 
appropriate manner during the law- and decision-making process. What is considered 
appropriate will depend on the particular conception of legitimacy that is being advanced. The 
idea that the legitimacy of international law rests on state consent, for instance, provides the 
quintessential example of an input-oriented legitimacy narrative in the international sphere. 
Similarly, certain calls for the democratization of WTO processes, which variously seek to 
trace legitimate authority back to ‘the people’, provide other, more recent input legitimacy 
narratives.
149
 These narratives and their limits are explored, respectively, in Chapters Three 
and Four.  
By contrast, output-oriented legitimacy narratives are those concerned with the outcomes 
of rule- and decision-making, and justify processes according to their ability to produce 
desirable outcomes in an efficient and effective manner. Whereas for Scharpf this entailed 
‘government for the people’, as a concept output legitimacy need not direct what constitutes a 
‘desirable’ outcome as such. It may be left to others to determine the normative principles that 
give shape to what is considered desirable. Output-oriented legitimacy narratives will thus 
emphasize procedures relating to competence/expertise, deliberation, and enforcement, among 
                                                 
148
  For a claim that the output legitimacy of international organizations should serve the global public interest, 
see Steffek 2015.  
149
  Not all democratic legitimacy narratives are purely input based. In particular, deliberative democracy 
narratives tend to have an output legitimacy component, as they are also concerned with the quality of 
decision making.  
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others. The moral and social legitimacy claims relating to output legitimacy and the WTO are 
examined more fully in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.  
Some narratives of legitimacy incorporate both input- and output-oriented elements. 
Deliberative democratic legitimacy narratives, for instance, emphasize the importance of 
popular representation, participation and deliberation as inherently valuable, but also stress 
their instrumental value. That is, norms of representation, participation and deliberation 
reflect a set of political ideals that are considered valuable in themselves (although opinions 
as to who gets to be represented, to participate and deliberate may differ), but also may be 
understood as enhancing the quality of decision-making by allowing for the contestation of 
ideas and reflexive decision-making. Input and output legitimacy do not operate in isolation 
from one another, and indeed specific approaches to moral and social legitimacy may provide 
room for both. It is important that the two not be seen as mutually exclusive. The distinction 
between input- and output-based forms of legitimacy is particularly central to this thesis. Both 
forms of legitimacy affect the perception of WTO law in different ways, and influence the 
development of WTO law according to very different logics. To date, most of the scholarship 
on the legitimacy of the WTO has focused on strengthening input-based legitimacy 
mechanisms, without emphasising the limits of such input legitimacy mechanisms and to the 
neglect of output legitimacy mechanisms. A stronger focus on output-based aspects of the 
WTO’s legitimacy, and a deeper consideration of the dynamic interrelation between input 
legitimacy, output legitimacy and WTO law, has the potential to alter the way we view our 
understandings of the WTO’s role in the world and the various proposals for the WTO’s 
reform.  
C Distinguishing Legitimacy and Compliance 
Having established the central components of the concept of legitimacy, it is important to 
distinguish between the aims of legitimation and compliance. Much of the wave of legitimacy 
scholarship in international law has directed itself towards the problem of compliance. 
Franck, for instance, identified his ‘working definition’ of legitimacy as  
a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward 
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule 
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of institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted 
principles of right process.
150
  
The emphasis here is on the beliefs of ‘those addressed’ and their capacity to facilitate 
compliance with international law, although it is worth emphasising that Franck never lost 
sight of the moral component of social legitimacy.
151
 A similar emphasis on the relationship 
between social legitimacy and compliance with international law may be found in the work of 
Harold Koh,
152
 Antonia and Abram Chayes,
153
 and Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope.
154
  
The direct association between compliance and legitimacy can become problematic, 
however, when compliance is taken as the end in itself and the underlying reasons for 
compliance are ignored. This undermines opportunities for critical reflection on the values 
and purposes of international law and dispenses with the possibility of articulating alternative 
approaches to global problems. Compliance should never be taken as an independent 
normative goal in itself — it is only a tool for the achievement of other goals.155 Koskenniemi 
cites a note of caution about focusing on compliance to the exclusion of other considerations, 
as it results in a ‘managerial position that no longer questions the need for “compliance” and 
is only concerned over the “legitimacy” of institutions to which everyone is assumed to have 
already committed’.156 The concept of social legitimacy does not in itself, however, 
necessitate such a limited view. Social legitimacy relates to beliefs about normative 
legitimacy. As such, debates about legitimacy should point not only to how compliance may 
be maximized, but also to more fundamental questions about why laws and institutions are 
worthy of compliance at all. It also raises questions as to how legal processes can be used to 
                                                 
150
  Ibid 24. 
151
  ‘When it is asserted that a rule or its application is legitimate, two things are implied: that it is a rule made 
or applied in accordance with right process, and therefore that it ought to promote voluntary compliance by 
those to whom it is addressed. It is deserving of validation.’: Franck 1995, 26 (emphasis added). 
152
  See, eg, HH Koh 1997. 
153
  See, eg, Chayes & Chayes 1995. 
154
  See, eg, Brunnée & Toope 2010. 
155
  For an example of a focus on compliance to the exclusion of legitimacy, see Posner 2005; cf Helfer & 
Slaughter 2005.  
156
  Koskenniemi 2011, 320. 
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generate a sense of legal obligation that extends beyond a mere acknowledgement of legal 
validity.
157
  
As such, it is important to clearly distinguish between legitimacy as a reason for action 
and alternative reasons for compliance, including coercion, self-interest and habit. 
Differentiating between social legitimacy and these alternative reasons for action highlights 
the independent analytical and social value of legitimacy.
158
 Careful differentiation of these 
factors also helps to reinforce the important difference between legitimacy and compliance, 
and provides some protection against Koskenniemi’s charge that ‘legitimacy is indifferent to 
the conditions of its existence: fear, desire, manipulation, whatever’.159 
1 Legitimacy vs Coercion 
Coercion may be defined as what occurs when one actor causes another to act against their 
will, usually by the application or threat of harm to that actor or something/one that they 
value.
160
 The motivation here is not one of belief, incentive or persuasion, but rather one of 
fear.
161
 Coercion is distinct from legitimacy in that it forces obedience even when a subject 
does not believe such obedience to be normatively justified. Both motivations can, however, 
act in tandem. Indeed, a significant portion of the legitimacy literature focuses on precisely 
this point, treating legitimacy as concerned with the justification of specifically coercive 
power.
162
 In this, the literature parallels much of the traditional scholarship which identifies 
power with coercion, as discussed above in Part II(A). Even now, much of the literature 
                                                 
157
  See Brunnée & Toope 2010, ch 3. 
158
  See Kratochwil 1984; Nanz & Steffek 2004; Elsig 2007b, 80. See also Weber: ‘But custom, personal 
advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a 
given domination. In addition there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy. Experience 
shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or 
ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such system attempts to establish and 
cultivate a belief in its legitimacy’: Weber 1968, 213.  
159
  Koskenniemi 2009a, 409. 
160
  For a more detailed account, see Nozick 1969; Anderson 2006. 
161
  See Hurd 2007, 35. 
162
  See, eg, Ripstein 2004. Weber defined the state as ‘the form of human community which (successfully) 
lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory’: Weber 2004, 33 
(emphasis in original). 
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relating legitimacy and international law is expressly concerned with the legitimate use of 
force across state boundaries.
163
  
John Austin and several subsequent generations of legal positivists based the law’s 
obligatory power on coercion (as manifested through sanctions). For Austin, only those orders 
capable of enforcement via centralized coercion deserved the designation of ‘legal’ order. He 
proposed a chain of positive legal legitimacy that was ultimately held to rest not on any form 
of belief or moral justification but the mere fact of coercive power.
164
 Austin excluded laws 
that were not backed by sanction from law ‘properly so called’ and dismissed them as either 
‘imperfect laws’165 or ‘positive morality’, thereby lacking in obligatory character.166 Coercion 
could thus be considered to cover the field when it came to evaluating reasons for compliance 
with the law, which would make the study of legitimacy redundant. Austin thus separated the 
validity of a legal order from its acceptance by a population. Even if this approach were to be 
adopted, it would not provide a reason for ignoring legitimacy in relation to international law, 
which Austin included in the category of ‘positive morality’. Franck highlights that it is this 
very exclusion of international law from systematized coercion that makes it such a fruitful 
subject for the study of legitimacy.
167
 
Kelsen also defined law as a normative coercive order. Although he recognized the 
psychological internalization of legal norms by individuals — norms could ‘[become] the 
product of a man’s consciousness’— he did not recognize this as leading to independent 
reasons for action beyond coercion. Kelsen did, however, distinguish between different forms 
of coercion, recognising psychological coercion as well as coercion in the form of sanctions. 
He was thus able to generate the apparent paradox that ‘[v]oluntary obedience is itself a form 
of motivation, that is, of coercion, and hence is not freedom, but it is coercion in the 
psychological sense’.168  
                                                 
163
  See Armstrong 2006; Falk, Juergensmeyer & Popovski 2012, pt 2.  
164
  Except for the moment of identification of the sovereign, who could be recognized as enjoying the habitual 
obedience of the population: Austin 1995, lecture I. 
165
  Ibid 27-8. 
166
  Ibid 11-12. 
167
  Franck 1990, 19. 
168
  Kelsen 2007, 18-20.  
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Hart, in criticising and building on Austin’s theories, moved the debate on from simple 
coercion. On the one hand, he highlighted that not all laws are coercive in nature.
169
 There are 
laws that are followed for reasons other than the threat of sanction. Hart also illustrated that it 
was not enough for commands backed by coercive sanction to constitute a legal order. There 
must be some other factor that allows us to accept the coercion backing a legal order but not 
the coercive threats of, say, a gun-wielding bank robber. For Hart, the determinative 
mechanism was the rule of recognition — the founding social fact of legal legitimacy. 
Moving even further, Leslie Green argues that in contemporary legal systems coercion 
provides only a secondary motivation for obedience and support, as a mere ‘reinforcing 
motivation when the political order fails in its primary normative technique of authoritative 
guidance’.170 This suggests that narratives of moral and social legitimacy, and the legal 
processes that embody and produce them, play a central role in producing this sense of 
obligation and commitment.  
2 Legitimacy vs Self-Interest 
Self-interest
171
 provides a third reason for action, based on the calculation of personal 
advantage. Self-interest is much favoured by international relations realists,
172
 who often 
dismiss the effect of international norms on state behaviour. This approach tends to treat 
actors as profoundly egoistic and focuses largely on material interests.
173
 The idea is that 
individuals and states make decisions as to whether to obey or support norms, actions or 
institutions based on ‘an instrumental and calculated assessment of the net benefits of 
compliance versus noncompliance, with an instrumental attitude toward social structures and 
                                                 
169
  Contrasting coercive laws with facilitative laws such as those governing contract or marriage: Hart 1994, 
27-33. 
170
  Green 1988, 75. 
171
  See also Weber’s discussion of ‘expediency’ in Weber 1968, 37. 
172
  Hurd 2007, 37. 
173
  See, eg, Weber: ‘Purely material interests and calculations of advantages as the basis of solidarity between 
the chief and his administrative staff result, in this as in other connexions, in a relatively unstable 
situation’: Weber 1968, 213. See also Steffek 2003, 6. Cf Goldsmith & Posner 2005, who include 
reputational interests as part of a game theoretical approach to understanding order in international 
relations. They nonetheless express concern that ‘scholars sometimes lean too heavily on a state’s 
reputational concern for complying with international law’: at 102 (emphasis omitted). 
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other people’.174 One of the clearest articulations of this position in international law comes 
from Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, who argue that ‘international law does not pull states 
toward compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what international law 
can achieve are limited by the configurations of state interests and the distribution of state 
power’.175 Both Joel Trachtman and Gregory Shaffer have also engaged specifically with 
rationalist explanations for how the WTO operates.
176
 
Ian Hurd describes the key difference between self-interest and coercion as lying in their 
different outcomes. The application of coercion leaves an actor worse off than previously, 
whereas the application of self-interest leaves an actor better off. Moreover, Hurd 
distinguishes between self-interest and legitimacy by analogy to the distinction between 
interest and self-interest. Although legitimacy can be understood to encapsulate a set of 
interests, self-interest assumes a narrowly egoistic attitude on the part of the relevant actor.
177
 
The self-interested actor ignores normative structures in favour of maximally improving its 
own situation ‘de novo at each decision point’.178 Self-interest therefore represents a narrowly 
instrumentalist view which dismisses the relevance of the interests of others.  
As with coercion, legitimacy has a dual relationship to self-interest. On the one hand it 
provides a parallel — occasionally complementary, occasionally competing179 — reason for 
action. On the other hand, it provides a framework for analysing how interests come to be 
seen as self-interests.
180
 Beyond the basic necessities of survival (and not always then), there 
is nothing inevitable about what is conceived of as self-interest. Is it better to be materially 
rich in life, or to follow a moral code prohibiting riches which nonetheless guarantees a 
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  Hurd 2007, 37. 
175
  Goldsmith & Posner 2005, 13; cf van Aaken 2006. 
176  
See, eg, Shaffer & Trachtman 2011; cf Cho 2012. 
177
  Ibid 38, citing Jenks 1990 and Wendt 1999. 
178
  Ibid 39. 
179
  Daniel Bodansky argues that ‘self-interest cross-cuts the distinction [...] between rational persuasion, 
power, and legitimacy. As Professor Keohane noted, one of the reasons why states might agree to subject 
themselves to the authority of an international institution, and consider its authority legitimate, is that they 
think such institutions are in their self-interest’: Bodansky 2008, 312, referring to Robert Keohane’s 
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when he introduces state interests to explain compliance pull of rules, rather than sticking to rule-inherent 
factors’ (citation omitted): Steffek 2003, 4 fn 4. 
180
  See Wendt 1999, 92-138: ‘the content of interests are in turn constituted in important part by ideas’. 
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blissful afterlife? Does following IMF requirements necessarily result in the best economic 
and social outcomes, or are there more worthwhile ways to restructure an economy to serve 
human interests? Legitimacy provides a vocabulary for exploring who gets to make the 
decisions about what lies in an individual or state’s self-interest. Self-interest, conversely, 
may also affect the extent to which people perceive a rule, ruler or system as morally 
legitimate. A continued failure to satisfy the self-interests of a large enough community will 
invariably suggest a failure of output legitimacy and spark a reconsideration of existing 
processes.
181
 Yet rule may be easier to sustain if the ruled think that the established 
relationship of rule tracks their self-interests. Appeals to either legitimacy or expediency alone 
are much less effective at maintaining stability and obedience over time. 
3 Legitimacy vs Habit 
A fourth reason for action is that of habit. Although addressed by Weber,
182
 habit has received 
less attention in the more recent writings on legitimacy. The ideas of coercion, self-interest 
and legitimacy discussed above all assume a level of conscious reflection about a given 
subject’s reasons for action. Yet, as Weber notes, ‘[i]n the great majority of cases actual 
action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its 
subjective meaning’.183 Consequently, much of the time actors take actions not on the basis of 
conscious fear, or moral rectitude, or the promise of material gain, but simply out of 
unreflective habit. This may be justified by the understanding of habit as involving the 
unthinking extension of an initial conscious reason for acquiescence. The possibility of any of 
                                                 
181
  Beetham echoes Hart’s gunman metaphor in this context: ‘To explain all action conforming to rules as the 
product of a self-interested calculation of the consequences of breaching them, it to elevate the attributes of 
the criminal into the standard for the whole of humankind’: Beetham 1991, 27. 
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legitimacy, self-interest, or coercion forming the basis for habit, however, highlights the 
danger in inferring social legitimacy from mere public acquiescence to authority.
184
 
Overall therefore, social legitimacy may provide a reason for complying with law that is 
conceptually distinct from coercion, self-interest, and habit. Moreover, specific conceptions of 
what is legitimate may be used to shape understandings of what is coercive or what is in one’s 
self-interest, or to help constitute the psychological space in which unreflexive habit takes 
over. As such legitimacy can make a distinctive contribution to debates about compliance, as 
long as one avoids the assumptions that compliance implies legitimacy or that with legitimacy 
comes compliance.  
IV CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to clarify some of the distinctions between the different uses of the 
terms ‘power’ and ‘legitimacy’ in relation to the WTO, WTO law and general international 
law. In particular, it has argued that power is exercised through a complex constellation of 
forms, agents and settings in and through the WTO in a way that undermines claims about the 
powerlessness of the WTO. Questions about legitimacy, meanwhile, may be understood as 
questions about the justificatory frameworks behind the creation, interpretation and 
application of law. That the word legitimacy has been used indiscriminately and ambiguously 
by various actors is no argument against its utility, or potential for analytical clarity. If it were, 
it would also be necessary to throw out any number of other concepts ranging from justice, to 
equality, to freedom. As one of the prime motivators for international action, alongside 
coercion, self-interest and habit, it occupies a central position in our understandings of the 
stability and effectiveness of legal regimes, including the WTO. It can also point the way to 
more fundamental questions about why institutions such as the WTO may or may not be 
worthy of compliance or support, or how particular rules should be drafted or implemented. 
The remainder of this thesis will now focus on how specific conceptions of input and output 
legitimacy have been used to frame debates about the legitimacy of the WTO, and the 
implications of such framing for WTO law.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two unpacked the concepts of power and legitimacy and how they relate to debates 
about WTO law and international law more generally. From here, Chapters Three and Four 
respectively explore the most prominent and regularly invoked input-oriented bases for the 
moral and social legitimacy of the World Trade Organization: consent and democracy. 
Narratives of consent provide the paradigmatic legitimating narrative for world trade law as it 
is, while narratives of democracy are frequently invoked in relation to world trade law as it 
should be. These narratives are deeply tied to corresponding sets of rules, procedures and 
practices which purportedly enshrine the values of consent and democracy. Both sets of 
narratives, however, suffer serious normative and descriptive deficiencies when applied in the 
WTO context, and tend to ignore or at least defer important questions of substance and 
outcome. 
There is an initial appeal to the idea that state consent can provide a solid legal and moral 
grounding for the legitimacy of WTO law. Consent at the international level provides a 
superficial parallel to several of the dominant social contract justifications for the legitimacy 
of the domestic state. It also appears, at least upon first inspection, to reaffirm key 
international law principles such as sovereign equality, non-interference, and self-
determination. Moreover, consent-based decision-making processes lie at the heart of WTO 
rule- and decision-making. Closer examination, however, suggests that consent alone has a 
much weaker and more limited capacity for legitimation than is generally assumed, 
particularly when dealing with something as complex and far-reaching as WTO law. 
Moreover, the form that the consent narrative has taken in the WTO has largely been one of 
arid formalism. This, in turn, has undermined the social legitimacy of the WTO for several of 
its legitimating communities.  
This chapter highlights the central role played by narratives of consent as providing the 
moral and social basis for legitimating the WTO’s authority. In the process, it demonstrates 
that although consent does play an important discursive, formal, and even moral role in 
legitimating WTO rule- and decision-making, it nonetheless suffers from clear normative and 
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descriptive limits. Part II traces the emergence of consent as one of the most prominent 
narratives of legitimation for both the nation-state and for international law and institutions. It 
also highlights the extent to which actors rely on the idea of consent to justify the exercise of 
the WTO’s power, and the various procedures used to preserve and channel Member consent 
in WTO rule- and decision-making procedures. Part III draws attention to seven key 
normative and descriptive deficiencies of consent-based legitimacy: (1) the inability of 
consent to account for law’s normativity; (2) the artificial identification of sovereign will with 
law; (3) the agency costs associated with consent; (4) the overly Member-centric nature of 
consent; (5) consent as obscuring alternative settings for power; (6) the tension between 
formal and substantive conceptions of consent; and (7) consent as failing to address matters of 
substance and outcome. The Chapter thereby draws attention to the limitations of consent 
narratives for legitimating the WTO’s authority as well as the failure of the WTO to live up to 
even the minimal requirements of consent-based narratives. In the process, it seeks to open up 
space for considering alternative approaches to the legitimacy of the WTO.  
II CONSENT-BASED LEGITIMACY NARRATIVES 
A Consent and the Domestic State 
Theories of consent have been central to authority of the state for centuries. Consent ascended 
as one of the dominant discourses of political legitimacy in the seventeenth century, largely 
displacing discourses of divine right and natural reason.
1
 At the domestic level, Thomas 
Hobbes’ conception of the social contract saw individuals — free and in a state of nature — 
consent to obey the state in exchange for protection.
2
 This position was modified and more 
fully developed by John Locke, who argued that individuals consented to delegate their 
powers of self-preservation to impartial sovereign to regulate conflicts and protect property.
3
 
A more mystical strand of consent was soon developed by Rousseau,
4
 who saw consent as 
expressed via submission to the state, which was in turn conceived of as the embodiment of 
the collective will (thus allowing for a congruence between the authors and the subjects of the 
                                                 
1
  See Peter 2010.  
2
  See generally Hobbes 1914. 
3
  See generally Locke 1988. 
4
  Raz divides consent theory into two traditions; the instrumental approach advocated by Hobbes and Locke, 
and the non-instrumental, ontological approach deriving from Rousseau: Raz 1988, 80.  
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law). In contrast to Locke, for Rousseau the concept of will was inalienable, and could only 
be realized through participation in the collective. Both of these strands have been developed 
over the centuries by thinkers from Kant,
5
 to Rawls,
6
 to Nozick.
7
 It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to provide a full account of these theories.  
The criticism of consent theories has just as long and illustrious a history. David Hume 
launched an attack on Locke’s social contract writings as soon as they were published. Hume 
pointed out that, as a historical matter, the authority of most states is founded on violence, not 
on spontaneous acts of consent.
8
 Moreover, for most people, the lack of alternatives and the 
practical impossibility of exit from the political system made the idea of consent 
meaningless.
9
 Hume thus saw consent as both descriptively inaccurate and normatively 
inadequate.
10
 Later, Antonio Gramsci saw consent as a ‘mask’ for coercion essential to the 
maintenance of hegemony. The idea of consent was thus viewed as artificial and deceptive.
11
 
More recently, Joseph Raz
12
 has criticized consent on several grounds: that it is often tainted 
by duress; that it merely reinforces other instrumental reasons for fidelity to authority; that it 
masks important substantive reasons to disobey authority; and the meaninglessness of 
‘consenting’ in a way that ‘binds for life, is open-ended, and affects wide-ranging aspects of a 
person’s life’.13 As such, he argues that consent ‘can have no more than a marginal 
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  See especially Kant 1991, 73-87. 
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  See generally Rawls 1999. 
7
  See Nozick 1974, ch 6.  
8
  Hume 1994, 188-91.  
9
  Ibid 193-4. 
10
  Hume did acknowledge the normative value of consent: ‘My intention here is not to exclude the consent of 
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  Raz’s distinctive approach to legitimacy, based on his ‘normal justification thesis’, has recently proven 
attractive to public international lawyers for whom consent has always appeared a weak ground for 
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  Raz 1988, 90. 
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ceremonial, as well as an auxiliary and derivative, role’ in justifying the authority of law.14 
Despite these criticisms, Lockean and Rousseauian approaches to consent and popular 
sovereignty remain deeply embedded in the popular consciousnesses of democratic states and 
remain at the heart of academic debates over legitimate authority. 
B Consent and International Law 
Consent-based approaches to international law rose to prominence in tandem with their 
domestic law counterparts.
15
 Grotius, although still tied to the natural law tradition, advocated 
consent as the basis for government at both the domestic
16
 and international levels,
17
 although 
as Brierly noted he ‘did not regard consent as its ultimate or independent basis’.18 Over time, 
although consent continued to feature in natural lawyers’ discussions of law, the idea that 
consent (as the manifestation of, and way of transmitting, sovereign will)
19
 provided the 
foundation for obligation in international law became increasingly tied
20
 to the legal 
positivists.
21
 This development was accompanied by the consolidation of the central role of 
                                                 
14
  Raz 1987, 93. Raz defines consent as ‘consent to a change in the normative situation of another — to a 
change in his rights and duties’: Raz 1988, 80.  
15
  See generally Hall 2001. For a discussion of the role of ‘sacral obligation’ and international law prior to 
and during the ascendance of consent as the main signifier of obligation, see Reus-Smit 2003, 615-20. 
16
  ‘But as there are several Ways of Living, some better than others, and every one may chuse which he 
pleases of all those Sorts; so a People may chuse what Form of Government they please: Neither is the 
Right which the Sovereign has over his Subjects to be measured by this or that Form, of which divers Men 
have different Opinions, but by the Extent of the Will of those who conferred it upon him’: Grotius 2004, 
64. 
17
  Hersch Lauterpacht noted that the Grotian approach to international law is characterized in part by the 
recognition that ‘the binding force of even that part of [international law] that originates in consent is based 
on the law of nature as expressive of the social nature of man’: Lauterpacht 1946, 21.  
18
  Brierly 1958, 10. 
19
  See Bederman 2002, 14. 
20
  Note that while there has been a tendency to link the ideas of consent and positivism, there is no necessary 
connection between the two. There have been positivists who locate the source of the law’s normativity 
outside of consent (eg Raz). See Leslie Green’s argument to this effect in Green 1989, 796. See also Priel 
2010. 
21
  Similarly, Bruno Simma and Andreas L Paulus outlined the ‘classic’ voluntarist approach to international 
law as: ‘the association of law with the emanation of state will (voluntarism). Voluntarism requires the 
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the state in international law discourse, and the idea that states were ‘individuals writ large, as 
autonomous, free and equal actors, each rationally pursuing their own exogenously 
determined interests’.22 Until the early twentieth century, the focus of consent was on creating 
order between equal sovereigns — pacta sunt servanda was an instrumental doctrine for 
ensuring the smooth running of the major powers’ empires and their relationships with one 
another.
23
  
One of the first to investigate the relationship between consent and international law 
systematically was the nineteenth century jurist Georg Jellinek. For Jellinek, the binding force 
of international law — indeed its very legal character — relied on its status as an emanation 
of state will.
24
 Jellinek proposed that there were no per se limits to the exercise of sovereign 
will on the international plane. This unfettered autonomy of sovereign will meant that states 
were also able to bind themselves by voluntarily limiting their own sovereignty.
25
 Jellinek’s 
theory also, however, allowed for states to retract any self-limiting actions, to return to their 
previous unlimited state. It was thus considered normatively self-defeating.
26
 
Soon after, Heinrich Triepel proposed an alternative way of conceiving of consent
27
 
which replaced the idea of self-limitation with that of voluntary submission to a collective 
                                                                                                                                                        
deduction of all norms from acts of state will: states create international norms by reaching consent on the 
content of a rule’: Simma & Paulus 2004, 25 (citation omitted). See also Wolfrum 2008, 6. 
22
  Reus-Smit 2003, 599.   
23
  As such, the version of consent espoused by international lawyers at the time had little to do with popular 
sovereignty, and better reflected a vision of direct consent by state-embodying monarchs. 
24
  See generally Jellinek 1880. Cf Koskenniemi 2005, 125-30.  
25
  Koskenniemi describes Jellinek’s voluntarism as a representation of a ‘pure fact’, rather than ‘legal’, 
approach to sovereignty, in that it assumes that sovereignty is external to law rather than constituted by 
law: Koskenniemi 2005, 228-33. 
26
  Hart noted that these voluntarist approaches were ‘the counterpart in international law of the social contract 
theories in political science’, in that they ‘attempted to reconcile the (absolute) sovereignty of states with 
the existence of binding rules of international law, by treating all international obligations as self-imposed 
like the obligation which arises from a promise’: Hart 1994, 224. In referring to the ‘social contract’ here, 
Hart appears to be referring to the Lockean rather than Rousseauian strand. 
27
  Triepel 1899. Similarly, Anzilotti argued that: ‘[r]ules of international law may derive only from the will of 
several States: “ex omnium aut multorum gentium voluntate”. Only the will of several States, by becoming 
a collective or common will, may acquire the character of a will which is higher than that of individual 
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will (volonté générale).
28
 That is, states could provide their initial consent to restrictions on 
their freedom, but their actions thereafter were subject to the limitations imposed by the 
collective will thus created.
29
 The act of consent was thereby decoupled from the idea of 
individual state will with which it had previously been identified. The collective will theory 
and its descendants provide rough parallels to the Rousseauian tradition at a domestic level,
30
 
in that they focus on the generation of right and obligation in accordance with a general and 
indivisible will rather than the transmission of individual will.
31
 
By the early twentieth century, Oppenheim would claim authoritatively that ‘[i]f law is 
[...] a body of rules for human conduct within a community which by common consent of this 
community shall be enforced by external power, common consent is the basis for all law’,32 
and that: 
As the basis of the Law of Nations is the common consent of the member-States of the 
Family of Nations, it is evident that there must exist, and can only exist, as many sources 
of International Law as there are facts through which such common consent can possibly 
come into existence.
33
 
                                                                                                                                                        
States and is capable of imposing on their conduct some positive rules, that are not lacking in the essential 
character of law’: Anzilotti 1902, 34 as translated in Gaja 1992, 127. See also Hall 2001, 283.  
28
  For a further development of the ‘collective will’ theory in international law, see Jenks 1955, ch 1. 
29
  Brierly further rejects Triepel’s resort to a superior ‘collective will’ of states: Brierly 1958, 15. Hall 
distinguishes between the creation of international law by sovereign will in command mode, as in earlier 
positivist theories, and creation of international law by sovereign will in consent mode: Hall 2001, 283. 
30
  See Koskenniemi 2005, 316-17. 
31
  One must be wary of drawing too direct a comparison. For Rousseau, it was not a matter of transmitting 
will to a general consciousness, but the manifestation of will through a general consciousness. Also, 
Rousseau so heavily privileged the idea of popular sovereignty, as against the idea of representative 
democracy, that it is a little misleading to claim that an approach which treats states as fundamental units 
has Rousseauian characteristics. The question is further complicated in relation to the WTO as there is 
disagreement about whether the covered agreements create merely bilateral obligations or multilateral 
obligations: see Pauwelyn 2002a; Pauwelyn 2003b; cf Carmody 2006 and Carmody 2008. For an attempt 
to apply a slightly modified (adding a further limit of allowing the possibility of approval or rejection) 
version of Rousseau’s vision of the volonté générale to assess whether WTO law is ‘just’, see Tijmes-Lhl 
2009, 419-20.  
32
  Oppenheim 1905, 15 § 11. 
33
  Ibid 21 § 16. 
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This approach was famously reflected in the Lotus case when the Permanent Court of 
International Justice held that ‘the rules of law binding on States [...] emanate from their own 
free will’.34 The consent model was also forcefully advocated by the Italian jurist Dionisio 
Anzilotti, who initially argued that even the norm of pacta sunt servanda could be derived 
from state consent.
35
 More recently, Louis Henkin claimed that ‘State consent is the 
foundation of international law. The principle that a law is binding on a State only by its 
consent remains an axiom of the political system, an implication of State autonomy’.36  
Consent and sovereign will are also heavily prioritized in much of the principal-agent 
literature in international relations.
37
 This literature tends to assume that states are a priori 
legitimate, and that consent provides the basis for constructing delegation chains through 
which state will may be rightfully exercised on the international plane.
38
 The legitimacy of 
institutional rules and procedures on such accounts is thus closely tied to the extent to which 
they constrain the autonomy of an international organization and ensure that the organization 
remains accountable to its state principals. The idea that state consent forms the basis for 
legitimate authority in international law thus remains pervasive across disciplines.
39
 
                                                 
34
  SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ (Series A) No 10, 18. Brierly claimed that this decision was 
‘based on the highly contentious metaphysical proposition of the extreme positivist school that law 
emanates from the free will of sovereign independent States’: Brierly 1928, 155. 
35
  See discussion in Lauterpacht 1927, 134 et seq.  
36
  Henkin 1989.  
37
  See Hawkins et al 2006a. See also Venzke 2010. 
38
  See Elsig 2007a; Alter 2006; and Cortell & Peterson 2006. Cf Petersmann 2006, 90; Petersmann 2008c. 
See also Guzman and Landsidle 2008. 
39
  The relatively straightforward application of consent theory to treaty formation, when compared to the 
tortured intellectual gymnastics involved in tying together consent and international custom, has led many 
authors to assume that the application of the consent model to treaty law was in itself unproblematic. This 
tends to ignore problems immanent to the theory of state consent, the incompleteness of the theory, and the 
capacity of treaty regimes to affect non-parties negatively. On this last point, see, eg, Bhagwati 2011: 
‘evidence is mounting that [PTAs] foster harmful trade diversion by increasing discrimination against non-
members through differential use of anti-dumping actions. Thus, recent work by the economists Tom Prusa 
and Robert Teh has produced convincing evidence that anti-dumping filings decrease by 33-55% within a 
PTA, whereas such filings increase against non-members by 10-30%’. 
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C Consent and the WTO: The Rhetoric 
The idea of Member consent, as reflective of Member’s will, is crucial to the WTO’s self-
image; indeed, one of the WTO’s central mantras is that it is a ‘Member-driven 
organisation’.40 In fending off claims that the WTO is a marauding engine of globalization, 
and countering the ‘myth’ that the WTO tells governments ‘what to do’, from 1999-2012 the 
WTO website explained that being a ‘Member-driven organization’ means that WTO rules 
are the product of ‘agreements resulting from negotiations among member governments’, that 
the ‘WTO’s agreements have been ratified in all members’ parliaments’, and that decisions 
are ‘virtually all made by consensus among all members’.41 More directly, it claimed that ‘it’s 
the governments who dictate to the WTO’.42 The website noted that ‘[s]ince decisions are 
taken by the members themselves, the Secretariat does not have the decision-making role that 
other international bureaucracies are given’.43 Although it recognized the prominence 
accorded to dispute settlement in the WTO, the website nonetheless claimed that ‘the scope of 
[a dispute settlement] ruling is narrow: it is simply a judgement or interpretation of whether a 
government has broken one of the WTO’s agreements—agreements that the infringing 
government had itself accepted’.44 A more recent (and less defensive) version of this 
document has been on the website since 2012. It drops most of the discussion of the 
Secretariat, but continues to emphasize the importance of consensus decision-making, 
ratification by parliaments, and that ‘there is a clear basis for judging who is right or wrong’ 
in WTO disputes because the disputes are based on the WTO Agreements.
45
   
Continuing in this vein, James Bacchus claims that the WTO is ‘only a label’ which the 
‘vast majority of sovereign nations of the world have chosen [...]’.46 Writing of his work on 
the Appellate Body, he claimed that:  
[i]n all we do every day, we work exclusively for the 147 Members of the WTO. [...] We 
do only what they agree we should do. We are simply the agents of their shared will as 
                                                 
40
  Cf Jackson 2001. 
41
  WTO, Ten Common Misunderstandings about the WTO (1999).  
42
  Ibid.  
43
  Ibid.  
44
  Ibid.  
45
  WTO, Ten Things the WTO Can Do (2012) 12.  
46
  Bacchus 2004, 668. 
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expressed by consensus in the “Member-driven” institution that is “the WTO”. [...] The 
source of the “legitimacy” of the WTO is the Members of the WTO.47 
Similarly, Robert Wolfe, writing in the early days of the WTO, argued that the WTO ‘remains 
an essentially member-driven, contract-based organization. Like the GATT, it has no 
autonomous power, and the Secretariat is kept on a tight leash [...]’.48 Both Bacchus and 
Wolfe treat the WTO’s legitimacy as purely derivative of that of its Members, which are in 
turn assumed to possess some sort of foundational legitimacy. The emphasis here on the 
primacy of the will of the Members in WTO rule- and decision-making thus strongly plays 
into the idea that the WTO does not exercise any power worth legitimating, and rather that all 
power and responsibility lies with the Members independently. 
Other commentators acknowledge the centrality of consent to the legitimacy of the WTO 
but recognize that consent alone is insufficient. Robert Howse notes that ‘[t]he consent of 
sovereigns provides a powerful basis for the legitimacy of the rules that constitute the WTO 
treaties’,49 while Joshua Meltzer argues that ‘[f]rom the perspective of state sovereignty, state 
consent to the WTO is the starting point for any assessment of the WTO’s legitimacy’.50 John 
Jackson long maintained a more ambivalent relationship with consent, and suggested that ‘in 
some cases, the “state consent” theory will not carry the legitimization far enough to be 
broadly persuasive’.51 The limits on the capacity of state consent to legitimate the WTO’s 
authority thus require further analysis.  
                                                 
47
  Ibid 669 (emphasis in original). 
48
  Wolfe 1996, 697. See also Hudec 2001, 298. 
49
  Howse 2001a, 359. 
50
  Meltzer 2005, 694. Meltzer continues: ‘There are, however, limits to the extent that states’ consent to the 
WTO agreements can explain why states should comply with their WTO obligations’. 
51
  Jackson 2003, 797. Jackson argues that the consent approach is most visibly insufficient in relation to a 
‘core of issues’ in international law including humanitarian intervention, terrorism and possibly weapons of 
mass destruction; international trade law is conspicuously absent from this list. See also Andrew Guzman, 
who argues that the emphasis on state consent prevents international law from progressing towards 
beneficial outcomes in certain areas, and that it is time to prioritize more non-consensual decision-making 
by further empowering international organizations: Guzman 2012. Jackson made a stronger version of this 
claim back in 1967, arguing against the unanimity requirement in GATT Article XXX for any amendments 
to GATT Part I, suggested that ‘the idea that no international trade obligations should be imposed on a 
nation without its consent no longer deserves unwavering recognition’. Jackson continues: ‘Such an idea 
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D Consent and WTO Procedure 
Consent provides more than a merely discursive legitimating vocabulary for the WTO. 
Mechanisms for expressing consent are central to its formal rules and procedures for norm-
generation.
52
 Such mechanisms may be found at four levels of decision-making processes. 
These include: (1) the negotiation processes leading to the WTO’s creation and the acceptance 
of the obligations under the covered agreements; (2) the processes relating to the WTO’s 
secondary rules; (3) the processes relating to general decision-making in the WTO, through 
the General Council and its emanations, the Secretariat and the various committees and 
working groups;
53
 and (4) processes incidental to other forms of decision-making that provide 
Members with additional political control. 
First, consent played a crucial role in legitimating the creation of the WTO and its rules. 
The WTO’s claim to legitimacy upon its founding was based not on GATT’s legislative fiat 
nor some form of cosmopolitan spontaneous acclamation, but rather on the direct consent of 
its (soon to be) Members. Following the Uruguay Round negotiations,
54
 the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was adopted 
                                                                                                                                                        
was truly effective, if at all, for only a few large, powerful nations. For most countries, dependence on 
international trade is a fact of life and leaves them vulnerable to forces beyond their control including 
sometimes selfish and irresponsible actions of trading parties’: Jackson 1967, 143. 
52
  ‘Recognition that consent can—and perhaps in a limited number of cases, does—justify international law’s 
claim to legitimate authority has important implications for the sources of international law. For example, a 
focus on the conditions in which consent actually generates an obligation can lead to changes in the 
processes whereby international legal norms are created, modified, or annulled that aim specifically at 
clarifying when an [international actor] has genuinely consented to be subject to (some part of) 
international law, and increasing opportunities for them to do so’: Lefkowitz 2010, 194. 
53
  d’Aspremont and de Brabandere draw a distinction between the legitimacy of origin (legitimacy flowing 
from the manner of an institution or rules’ creation) and the legitimacy of exercise (legitimacy flowing 
from the manner in which the institution operates): d’Aspremont and de Brabandere 2011. D’Aspremont 
and de Brabandere claim that this distinction is only relevant to the external, rather than internal, 
legitimacy of a government, claiming that ‘the internal legitimacy of an authority is usually related to the 
achievement of social and distributive justice’: at 193-4 (footnote omitted).  
54
  As managed under the auspices of the GATT. The Uruguay Round was launched by the GATT Contracting 
Parties on 20 September 1986, by consensus: see Punta del Este Declaration, MIN.DEC. 
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by consensus on 15 December 1993.
55
 It was signed by Ministers representing 111 of the 125 
participants in the negotiations at the final Ministerial-level session of the TNC.
56
 The 
covered agreements only became legally binding on states once those states had indicated 
their consent in accordance with the requirements of WTO Agreement Article XIV and the 
general international law of treaties.
57
 Consent to the covered agreements thus provided the 
formal basis for obligation in the WTO.  
Second, consent continues to play a central role in the operation of the WTO’s secondary 
rules,
58
 ie those rules relating to the suspension, interpretation, amendment, and termination of 
the primary WTO rules. Thus, WTO Members may collectively waive obligations under the 
WTO Agreements via WTO Agreement Article IX:3; may issue authoritative interpretations 
of the covered agreements under Article IX:2;
59
 and may amend the covered agreements 
under Article X.
60
 Although the provisions regarding authoritative interpretation and 
amendment have rarely been put to use,
61
 their existence is testament to the political and 
                                                 
55
  See the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
Paragraph 1 of the Final Act provides that the representatives of the governments and the EC: ‘agree that 
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in this Final Act as the “WTO 
Agreement”), the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in 
Financial Services, as annexed hereto, embody the results of their negotiations [...]’.  
56
  Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994, Preamble. 
57
  See VCLT Part II (‘Conclusion and Entry into Force of Treaties’). 
58
  On secondary rules generally see Hart 1994, 94-9; for a detailed breakdown of the application of secondary 
rules in the WTO, see Footer 2006, 203-66. Cf Wolfrum 2008, 9: ‘The consent of a State will undoubtedly 
be sufficient as a mechanism to invoke the legitimacy of the measure in question if the obligation is a 
specific and static one and can be implemented by an isolated act or omission. The same is true even if the 
obligation is of a continuing nature but the commitment does not change over time as far as its substance 
and scope is concerned. There is, de facto, the danger, though, that the legitimizing effect of the original 
consent may fade over time’.  
59
  When making an authoritative interpretation in relation to one of the Annex 1 Agreements, the General 
Council must exercise their authority on the basis of a recommendation from the Council overseeing that 
Agreement: WTO Agreement Article IX:2.  
60
  This has been attempted officially only three times to date. See WT/L/940 (on trade facilitation; yet to 
enter into force); WT/L/641 (the TRIPS Amendment, yet to enter into force); and the failed attempt to 
amend the DSU to deal with the sequencing issue regarding DSU Articles 21.5 and 22: 
WT/GC/W/410/Rev.1. 
61
  See Steger 2007, 484 and 495. 
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symbolic importance of consent. The waiver provision has been invoked far more often, 
regarding matters of varying political and legal significance.
62
 Although various parts of the 
WTO Agreement set out majority voting requirements for certain classes of decisions 
(including for authoritative interpretations, waivers, and amendments), following the General 
Council Decision on Decision-Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO 
Agreement
63
 the vast majority of such decisions are now made by consensus instead. 
Although an amendment under Article X may come into force in the absence of consensus, it 
will only be binding on those Members which have ratified it. In addition, Article XV of the 
WTO Agreement allows Members to withdraw from the covered agreements (as a whole) on 
six months’ written notice. In formal terms, this contributes strongly to the idea of the WTO 
as an organization based on state consent as it allows for Members to withdraw from all of the 
covered agreements (and only all of the agreements) if they feel their interests are not being 
met.
64
  
                                                 
62
  See generally Feichtner 2012. See also Feichtner 2008.  
63
  The Decision provides that consensus should be used in lieu of the voting requirements in relation to 
waivers under WTO Agreement Article IX:3 (which provides for a 3/4 majority vote) and the approval of 
the terms of accession under WTO Agreement Article XII:2 (which provides for a 2/3 majority vote). 
Members nonetheless retain the power to request a vote in such circumstances: see WT/L/93. 
64
  To date, no Member has withdrawn from the WTO, although the possibility has certainly been mooted in 
national legislatures. The six month notice requirement for withdrawal is significantly longer than the 60 
day notice requirement in place under the GATT 1947: see Protocol of Provisional Application of the 
GATT, para 5. Robert Howse also notes the illusory quality of the right to withdraw from the WTO, 
arguing that such withdrawal ‘would probably have very serious, if not catastrophic consequences for 
many Members, given the dependence of private economic actors on the rules in question and their binding 
character. [...] Thus, the fact is that WTO rules, or even interpretations of those rules, are not reversible 
within the law in any kind of way that is analogous to the ability of domestic polities to change all but a 
small number of constitutional rules through the routine expression of democratic will within that country’: 
Howse 2003a, 94. See also Philip Pettit, who argues that: ‘Any individual state that signs up to a trading 
agreement, or to any organization in which its interests overlap with those of other members, is going to 
find it very hard to exercise the right of exit. The other members will generally be disposed to penalize any 
defector and the penalties in prospect may act as a powerful deterrent against secession. [...] The existence 
of a formal right of exit may guard in principle against domination by such an agency. But in practice it 
will not do so’: Pettit 2010b, 156. 
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Third, the WTO’s general decision-making powers operate largely on the basis of 
consent; or more specifically, consensus.
65
 Participation in each level of WTO decision-
making, from the Ministerial Conferences,
66
 to the General Council,
67
 to the various 
emanations of the General Council (ie the DSB
68
 and the TPRB,
69
 followed by the Councils 
on Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, and TRIPS
70
), to the myriad committees
71
 and working 
groups, is formally open to representatives of all Members, and each Member has only one 
equal vote.
72
 Members in these bodies, for the most part, continue the practice of decision-
making by consensus followed under GATT 1947.
73
 At higher levels matters may be decided 
by voting where consensus fails, unless consensus is mandated by the relevant provision of 
the covered agreement.
74
 Lower level bodies, including the specialized Councils, are required 
by Rule 33 of their various Rules of Procedure to refer the matter upwards for decision.
75
 
Importantly, in the WTO, ‘consensus’ does not require that all WTO Members express their 
                                                 
65
  The main exception to this lies in DSU Article 16.4, which establishes a rule of ‘reverse consensus’. When 
faced with a dispute settlement report from a panel or the Appellate Body, the DSB (another emanation of 
the General Council) generally has 60 days to adopt the report unless it decides by consensus not to adopt 
the report. Nonetheless, maintaining the possibility for the membership as a whole to reject such reports 
preserves a symbolically important formal hierarchy placing consent above judicial reasoning/expert 
hermeneutics: see Van Damme 2010, 647. 
66
  The Ministerial Conference is given plenary power to ‘take decisions on all matters under any of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements’: WTO Agreement Article IV:1. The Ministerial Conference is composed 
of representatives of all of the WTO Members, generally at a Ministerial level. 
67
  WTO Agreement Article IV:2. The General Council is composed of representatives of all of the WTO 
Members, generally at an ambassadorial level. 
68
  See WTO Agreement Article IV:3. 
69
  See WTO Agreement Article IV:4. 
70
  See WTO Agreement Article IV:5. 
71
  WTO Agreement Article IV:7 expressly provides for the creation of a Committee on Trade and 
Development, a Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions and a Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration. The General Council may create additional committees and charge them with such 
functions as it deems appropriate, and it does. 
72
  Although see footnote 2 to WTO Agreement Article IX:1, which provides that the number of votes of the 
EC and its member States is not permitted to exceed the number of the EC’s member states. 
73
  See WTO Agreement Article IX:1.  
74
  See table in Footer 2006, 136. 
75
  Ibid 36. 
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agreement with a decision. Rather, a body ‘shall be deemed to have decided by consensus [...] 
if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the 
proposed decision’.76 It is not necessary for Members to provide any positive indication of 
their consent to a decision; it is enough that no one present formally objects.  
Fourth, Members are given the opportunity to express or withhold their consent (albeit 
not always decisively) at various stages of WTO law-making and application. With respect to 
dispute settlement, for instance, Petersmann highlights that:  
WTO Members politically control the first “diplomatic phase” of WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings (see Articles 5 and 6 of the DSU), the initiation and conduct of panel and 
Appellate Body proceedings (Articles 6 and 17 of the DSU), the terms of reference, the 
composition, and the working procedures of panels (Articles 7 and 8 of the DSU), the 
“applicable law” in WTO dispute settlement proceedings (Article 7), the interim review 
stage (Article 15), and the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports (Articles 16 and 
17) and their implementation [...] or alternative dispute settlement (including 
compensation, Articles 21, 22, and 25).
77
  
In practice parties to disputes are also given a role, although not the final word, in the 
selection of scientific and technical experts by panels. 
III THE LIMITS OF CONSENT-BASED LEGITIMACY 
Narratives of consent are therefore deeply embedded within the discursive and procedural 
legitimating structures of the WTO and WTO law. They provide a highly visible and effective 
vocabulary for legitimating the exercise of power through the WTO, in part through their 
affinity with dominant liberal-democratic discourses affiliated with the legitimacy of the 
domestic state. Less well-explored in the WTO context, however, are the limits on the 
legitimating capacity of consent, and the implications of such limits for the WTO.  
                                                 
76
  Footnote 1 to Article IX:1 of the WTO Agreement. To this extent, Tijmes-Lhl’s treatment of unanimity and 
consensus as ‘substantially equivalent because of their shared characteristic of being decision-making 
procedures [...] by which not even one member of the political unit disagrees with the content of the 
decision’ is problematic: see Tijmes-Lhl 2009, 421. This is because it ignores the substantial normative 
difference between affirmative consensus and consensus by default, especially given that several WTO 
Members are unable to attend even important meetings due to resource constraints. 
77
  Petersmann 2006, 97-8. 
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A First Limit: The Contingency of Consent 
First, consent alone cannot provide a basis for legitimacy, as the procedural fact of consent in 
isolation says nothing about relations of rule. Consent must always be parasitic on some non-
consensual norm.
78
 In Koskenniemi’s words, ‘the emergence of a consensual norm assumes 
the existence of a non-consensual norm according to which consent is to have a law-creating 
effect’.79 The idea that states are bound by the act of consent requires a deeper normative 
principle to supplement the exercise of state will. One common candidate for this principle is 
pacta sunt servanda. Those taking this approach argue that there is inherent value in an 
international system where states honour their agreements with each other.
80
 Hans Kelsen, for 
instance, in his early work, posited pacta sunt servanda as the Grundnorm for international 
law.
81
 In later years, however, he relegated pacta to a position as merely one of the most 
important international law norms, rather than a foundational norm, arguing instead for a 
Grundnorm to the effect that ‘States should behave as they customarily behave’.82  
Others have taken a more instrumental approach, seeing consent as creating binding 
commitments to achieve particular ends. These ends may be quite specific, as pursued through 
subject-specific functional regimes, or quite broad. James Leslie Brierly, for instance, hinted 
that the binding force of international law ultimately derived from the pursuit of order
83
 
(although this simply leaves open the question of why an order prioritising consent is more 
desirable than the alternatives). More recently David Lefkowitz has constructed a rudimentary 
                                                 
78
  Howse notes that any theory of consent is unable to account for obligation unless accompanied by a 
substantive case for why ‘agreed-upon rules’ should be followed: Howse 2001a. 
79
  Koskenniemi 2005, 311. See also Hart 1994, 222-5, who notes that there must be pre-existing rules 
defining the capacities of the sovereign state and binding a state to its undertakings. See also Brierly: 
‘Consent cannot of itself create an obligation; it can do so only within a system of law which declares that 
consent duly given, as in a treaty or a contract, shall be binding on the party consenting. To say that the 
rule pacta sunt servanda is itself founded on consent is to argue in a circle’: Brierly 1958, 54.  
80
  Or, in the language of Article 26 of the VCLT, ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith’. See also Brierly 1958, 10.  
81
  See, eg, Kelsen 1967, 216, fn 80. In his early work, Anzilotti also suggested pacta sunt servanda could in 
turn be justified on the basis of state consent; however he was later to refute this position: see Anzilotti 
1955, 26f, discussed in Gaja 1992, 128. 
82
  Kelsen 2007, 369; cf Lauterpacht 1970, 91; see also Rigaux 1998, 328. 
83
  Brierly 1958, 67. 
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argument positing self-determination as the normative foundation underpinning consent.
84
 
Robert Howse has argued again for pacta sunt servanda, but notes that the principle can also 
take on an instrumental form that serves broader functional goals.
85
 The choice of the 
substantive basis underlying consent is important, as procedural rectitude only has meaning 
when measured against substantive goals, against which effectiveness, efficiency and fairness 
can be measured.
86
 Hence the choice of underlying substantive goal has potentially normative 
implications for the design of procedures involving consent. This relationship between 
substantive aims and procedural norms, including consent, will be further explored in 
Chapters Five through Seven.  
Of course, those who emphasize consent as the source or basis of obligation in WTO law 
may simply be using ‘consent’ as a short hand, by pointing to consent as a historical fact 
which stands in for a larger, non-consensual, premise. If that is the case, however, this larger 
premise remains largely unarticulated and requires further attention.  
B Second Limit: The Changeable Will 
Second, in the absence of a broader non-consensual premise which overrides the mere fact of 
consent at any given point, consent is unable to account for the normativity of international 
law across time. A state may give their consent to international norms at one point in time, but 
wish to withdraw or ignore such consent later on. As Brierly noted: ‘A consistently 
consensual theory [...] would have to admit that if consent is withdrawn, the obligation 
created by it comes to an end’.87 More recently, Howse has noted that ‘the hard issue is, of 
course, why sovereigns should be bound to past acts of consent, if obedience to the rules no 
longer serves their perceived interests’.88 This led to the central problem with Jellinek’s 
approach. Overall, Jellinek’s failure to provide well-defined limits on when and how states 
could withdraw their consent could not account for the persistent normativity of international 
                                                 
84
  Lefkowitz 2010, 193.  
85
  Howse notes that the substantive case for why it following pacta sunt servanda is desirable varies, from 
appeals to collective economic welfare to natural law: Howse 2001a, 359. 
86
  See, eg, Galligan 1994, vol I, 114 and 116, referring to Bentham’s theories on procedure (‘The role of 
procedures is to ensure that the law is applied accurately and, as a consequence, that the social good is 
realized’). 
87
  Brierly 1955, 54. 
88
  Howse 2001a, 359. 
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law in the face of changing state will.
89
 Martti Koskenniemi nonetheless points out that 
Jellinek did preserve a modest role for normativity by including a substantive limit on states’ 
ability to retract their consent to be bound. Any exercise of state will, including retracting 
consent, had to be based on a ‘reasonable motive (vernünftliche Motive)’ seeking to fulfil a 
‘natural State purpose (Staatszwecke)’.90 However, in glossing over this aspect of his theory, 
Jellinek was forced to turn away from a model based purely on state will towards a 
naturalistic vision of state purpose. Later writers have tried to get around this problem in other 
ways, either by relying on collective state will as providing an autonomous limit on individual 
state will (as Triepel did), or by turning to deeper substantive bases for legitimacy to 
supplement and constrain consent.
91
  
C Third Limit: Agency Costs 
1 Generalized Grants of Authority 
Third, consent is unable to provide a convincing narrative of legitimation in the face of the 
agency costs resulting from the broad delegation of vaguely defined powers. Turning once 
more to the principal-agent literature, one of the most direct ways to ensure that the exercise 
of power by an agent in a given system is tied to some previous act of consent by the principal 
is to ensure that the agreed rules are highly detailed and specific. This leaves the agent 
exercising such power with little discretion/slack; the capacity to determine policy, and to 
create norms, remains in the hands of the principal(s).
92
 The less detailed the rules are, and the 
broader the grant of power, the larger the agent’s role in policy- and norm-generation;93 
potentially to the point where it is no longer tenable to describe them as merely an agent.
94
 
                                                 
89
  See criticisms in Lauterpacht 1933, 409-12; Brierly 1958; Hall 2001, 282. 
90
  Koskenniemi 2005, 129. See also Koskenniemi 2009a, 403. 
91
  See discussion in Part III(A) above.  
92
  Exactly who or what constitutes the principal(s) in relation to the WTO remains unresolved. It is unclear 
whether there are multiple principals, in the form of the individual Members, or whether the membership 
creates some sort of collective principal, or whether there are two stages of principal-agent relationship at 
hand. For attempts to grapple with the issue of multiple principals in the international law context, see: 
Nielson & Tierney 2003; Lyne, Nielson & Tierney 2006, 44-6; Besson 2010, 164. 
93
  ‘Under discretion-based [as opposed to rule-based] delegation, the policy-making role of the agent is 
greatly enhanced’: Hawkins et al 2006b, 27. 
94
  See, eg, Alter 2008; Elsig and Pollack 2014.  
 84 
 
This relationship is not strictly linear, as several other mechanisms may be employed to 
control the agent’s autonomy, including processes of agent selection, consultation, 
monitoring, approval, and exit. The broader the delegation, however, and the less such 
controlling mechanisms are employed, the less adequate the idea of consent proves as a basis 
for legitimation. As consent moves from specific, detailed consent to general, or ‘meta’ 
consent, the underlying (Lockean) idea of the transmission of sovereign/Member will 
becomes less convincing and increasingly artificial.
95
 
 
The history of the last century is replete with examples of international institutions that 
have taken broad grants of authority, that states have consented to in a general manner, and 
built them into something more than their makers anticipated. The ICJ set the scene relatively 
early on when it recognized the doctrine of implied powers for international institutions in the 
Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion.
96
 The doctrine of implied powers has enabled 
various international bodies, from the UN to the EU to the IMF, to take on a range of powers 
in the name of fulfilling functional imperatives. The foundational treaties of several 
international institutions may even be thought of as what Cass Sunstein has termed 
‘incompletely theorized agreements’97 — the rules have been intentionally underspecified by 
the negotiating parties on the assumption that they would be further developed by various 
institutional mechanisms (such as dispute settlement organs) further down the track.
98
  
In the WTO, dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body have been granted broad 
discretion to set their own procedures
99
 and there are few detailed formal constraints
100
 on 
                                                 
95
  ‘The growth in the number of States and the complexity of international legal obligations makes the forms 
of consent as a means of justifying norms increasingly fictitious, requiring the invocation of presumptions, 
silence, meta consent and the like’: Weiler 2004, 557. See also Raz 1988, 90. 
96
  See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion [1949] ICJ 
Rep 174, 179-80. The doctrine of implied powers had already been recognized by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Case concerning the Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 
December 1
st
, 1926 [1928] PCIJ (Series B) No 16, 20.  
97
  See generally Sunstein 1995; Sunstein 2007. 
98
  See also Schropp 2009, pt II; Horn, Maggi & Staiger 2010. 
99
  DSU Article 12.1 (Panels); DSU Article 17.9 (Appellate Body). 
100
  DSU Article 3.4 provides that the DSB’s ‘[r]ecommendations or rulings [...] shall be aimed at achieving a 
satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations’ under the covered 
agreements. DSU Article 11 requires that panels ‘assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities’ by 
‘making an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of 
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how they are to reach their decisions.
101
 In some cases, it has even been argued that the 
dispute settlement organs have powers of inherent jurisdiction, an argument which takes the 
exercise of legal power even further from the notion of consent-based legitimacy.
102
 While 
there is a hugely important formal link between Member consent to the terms of the DSU and 
the broad contours of the dispute settlement mechanism’s powers, the details of those powers, 
and even the determination of their limits, has largely been left to panels and the Appellate 
Body. This is arguably necessary to their efficient functioning — as John Jackson contended: 
“consent” should not be considered as a requirement for every small detail, or for every 
resolution of ambiguity or gap-filling by a dispute settlement institution. The mere fact 
that the original consent of nation-states included consent to a dispute settlement system, 
suggests a measure of deference to the results of that system [...].
103
  
That said, if consent cannot adequately legitimate the exercise of power in the dispute 
settlement mechanism, this requires a turn to a more principled alternative basis for 
legitimacy than is provided by a general appeal to ‘necessity’ or ‘efficiency’.  
Similarly, both the SPS
104
 and TBT Agreements
105
 require Members to base certain 
measures on international standards developed by non-WTO intergovernmental organizations, 
such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the ISO. Although exceptions alleviate the 
bluntness of these rules, in practice this has transformed these international standards into 
rules enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The SPS and TBT 
Agreements thus allocate broad norm-generating powers to non-WTO institutions with non-
                                                                                                                                                        
the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make other such 
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the 
covered agreements’. DSU Article 17.1 requires that the Appellate Body ‘hear appeals from panel cases’. 
See also DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2 which provide that the DSB, the panels and the Appellate Body may 
not add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. See also the panels’ 
standard terms of reference in DSU Article 7. 
101
  See Ginsburg 2005, 631. 
102
  See Mitchell & Heaton 2010; cf Chalmers & Tomkins 2007, 53. 
103
  Jackson 2006, 206. 
104
  See SPS Agreement Article 3.1. 
105
  See TBT Agreement Articles 2.4 and 4, and Annex 3, para F. 
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identical parties while providing little opportunity for collective oversight or veto.
106
 Joost 
Pauwelyn goes as far as to say that holding Members to such international standards under the 
TBT and SPS Agreements takes the basis for normativity outside of the ‘rule of state consent’ 
on the grounds that Members may not have consented to the specific rules in question.
107
 
Again, this calls for rethinking the moral and social bases of legitimacy for important aspects 
of the multilateral trading order.  
Hence, although broad delegations of power may be brought within the legitimating 
framework of state or Member consent, consent’s legitimating power in relation to such broad 
delegations is weak and inadequate. Consent has little to contribute when trying to evaluate 
the normative justifiability of particular delegatory choices (ie why particular groups have 
been given privileged decision-making powers as opposed to others). It also seems 
descriptively implausible when the broad delegation of powers means that international 
institutions act beyond what their founders anticipated. It is thus necessary to form some 
account of how the rules governing the selection and interaction of particular types of agent 
— panel members, allied institutions, technical experts — affect (and are affected by) 
different understandings of legitimacy.  
2 The Nature of the Agents and the Principals 
Moreover, agency costs may continue to undermine the legitimating value of consent even in 
cases where there are relatively specific delegations of authority. Joshua Meltzer highlights 
how agency costs undermine the extent to which state consent can meaningfully legitimate 
Appellate Body decisions, and his analysis holds equally for other forms of authority in the 
WTO.
108
 Meltzer notes the gap between the interests of individual negotiators and their state 
employers, and suggests that ‘repeat player’ negotiators at the WTO, particularly those based 
in Geneva who spend long periods of time far away from their home bases, may prioritize 
their working relationships with negotiators from other states over immediate state 
                                                 
106
  Both the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the ISO have tightened up their accountability mechanisms, 
partly as a result of the elevated normative status they have enjoyed as a result of the SPS and TBT 
Agreements: see Livermore 2006; Pollack & Shaffer 2009, 172-3. Such accountability mechanisms, 
however, remain internal to the standards organizations — they do not provide for direct accountability to 
WTO Members. 
107
  See Pauwelyn 2006, 208 and 211-12. 
108
  Meltzer 2005. 
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interests.
109
 It is important that this effect not be overstated. For one thing, Meltzer’s 
formulation seems to assume a level of unity, definition and finality to state negotiating 
interests which predates the negotiators’ inputs (including information about their working 
relationships with other negotiators). One must also not overlook Article 51 of the VCLT, 
which vitiates a state’s consent if such consent was procured by coercion of its representative, 
and the requirements in many Members for further executive and legislative oversight of 
treaties prior to their ratification.
110
  
More significant agency costs may well arise in relation to the delegation of authority to 
individuals to act on behalf of the Membership as a whole, rather than those who act on behalf 
of individual Members. Secretariat officials, panel and Appellate Body members, and 
international standards organizations all provide higher agency costs as they have multiple 
principals with inevitably conflicting interests,
111
 and often are formally required to place the 
interests of the collective above those of individual states. Moreover, lacking the same 
oversight and monitoring mechanisms associated with state representatives, they are more 
likely to be caught up in forms of WTO groupthink and for their interests to diverge from 
those who originally appointed them.
112
 This makes it all the more important that the nature of 
these actors and the terms of their interaction be considered more closely.  
Turning to the WTO as an agent for its Members, international law has also inserted 
additional slack in this relationship through the mechanism of separate legal personality. The 
legal personality of the WTO, as well as its privileges and immunities, are specifically 
provided for in Article VIII of the WTO Agreement. Separate legal personality ensures that 
the WTO enjoys a separate legal existence from its makers. In formal terms, this alters the 
                                                 
109
  Ibid 707. 
110
  Cf Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, who point out that negotiators seeking consensus must be given 
a fair amount of autonomy as it is simply not effective to provide for parliamentary control of consensus-
based decision making at the international level: von Bogdandy & Venzke 2012, 20. Gregory Shaffer has 
recorded the extent to which negotiators in the Trade and Environment Committee appear to remain 
strongly committed to their individual state interests notwithstanding the pull of their technocratic 
community: Shaffer 2001, 83. 
111
  See Nielson & Tierney 2003, 247-9.  
112
  Andrew Cortell and Susan Peterson argue that the WTO’s ‘staffing and voting rules suggest an agent 
capable of forming its own preferences and escaping the control of its principals, at least with respect to the 
dispute settlement system’: Cortell and Peterson 2006, 271. 
 88 
 
character of decisions made by the WTO as they become decisions of the WTO itself, rather 
than of the Members acting collectively. 
D Fourth Limit: Consent as Overly Member-Centric 
On a related note, the Member consent narrative of legitimacy is descriptively and 
normatively incomplete because, in treating Members as the fundamental political units, it 
ignores how power may be exercised by other actors.
113
 This falls into the trap of ignoring the 
alternative institutional settings through which power is exercised in relation to the WTO. 
Focusing on the exercise of power by Members entails a displacement of responsibility from 
the WTO, and diverts critical focus away from the WTO as an institution. In particular, it falls 
into the trap of treating Members as having fixed, pre-established preferences which are 
expressed at the moment of consent. Jellinek, Triepel and Anzilotti, for instance, treated 
sovereign will as a matter of fact, ignoring that its construction, expression and recognition 
are all contingent upon a pre-existing legal, social and economic landscape.  
The Member-centric approach is also descriptively
114
 incomplete because of its tendency 
to treat the Members as ‘black boxes’, with clearly discernible, rational, and unified 
interests.
115
 By treating Members as monolithic entities, it fails to account for the complex 
                                                 
113
  The assumption that states are the basic unit of analysis is slightly complicated in the WTO, as WTO 
membership is open not only to any state but also to any ‘separate customs territory possessing full 
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for [in the 
covered agreements]’: WTO Agreement Article XII:1. Consequently Hong Kong; the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei); and Macau are all WTO Members, as is 
the EU. The problems of the purely state-centric approach are, however, largely preserved in this slightly 
more expansive set. 
114
  Weiler also points to the normative problems with this approach: ‘You take the obedience claim of 
international law and couple it with the conflation of government and State which international law posits 
and you get nothing more than a monstrous empowerment of the executive branch at the expense of other 
political estates or an empowerment of those internal special interest [sic] who have a better capture of the 
executive branch’: Weiler 2004, 558. 
115
  This is sometimes referred to as the ‘billiard ball model’ of international relations: see Burton 1972, 28. 
Similarly, Stephan argues that: ‘Traditionally conceived, international law governed the relations among 
sovereigns. […] This kind of international law—the “old” international law—has hardly disappeared’: 
Stephan 1999, 1556. 
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variety of competing interests jostling beneath the surface of the Member construct.
116
 It also 
ignores the influence of NGOs and other IGOs. In practice, Member policy is generated by 
complex interactions between elected representatives, competing government departments, 
lobbyists, business networks, civil society, and the media.
117
 Unpacking the internal 
operations of the Member highlights how different interests both internal and external to the 
Member can use international organizations such as the WTO to serve their interests. For 
example, Susan Sell demonstrates how a small group of multinational pharmaceutical and 
electronics corporation executives came together in the form of the Intellectual Property 
Committee (‘IPC’) to influence the drafting and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement to 
reflect their private interests.
118
 Sell notes that Jacques Gorlin, a consultant to the IPC, 
claimed that the IPC got 95% of what it sought from the TRIPS Agreement negotiations.
119
 
Amrita Narlikar further highlights the different negotiating outcomes that result from 
negotiating processes that privilege either bureaucratic/technocratic agents or politicians.
120
  
The consent-based approach to legitimacy in this light is thus descriptively inadequate, in 
that it fails to recognize important details about the allocation of power within and across 
Members, including how Member interests may be shaped by their interactions on the 
international plane. It is also normatively problematic, in that its pretensions to formal 
Member consent can mask how Member policy can be manipulated by special interests. A 
more diffuse approach which considers the roles played by various kinds of actors and experts 
at various stages of the policy cycle is needed to provide a convincing narrative of legitimacy 
in such circumstances.  
E Fifth Limit: Consent as Obscuring Alternative Settings for Power  
A fifth limitation of the consent-based approach is that it overemphasizes the moment that 
norms are formally adopted at the expense of other moments which relate to the formulation 
and application of such norms. As discussed in Chapter Two, the temporal setting of the 
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  Weiler notes that ‘classical consent was based on a conflation of government with State. That conflation is 
no longer tenable’: Weiler 2004, 558. 
117
  See Slaughter 2002, chs 1-3 which attempt to ‘disaggregate the state’.  
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  Sell 1999a; Sell 1999b; Sell 2003. See also Gervais 2003; Braithwaite & Drahos 2002.  
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  Sell 1999a, 188. 
120
  Narlikar 2004, 10-13.  
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exercise of power extends beyond the moment of formal prescription in significant ways.
121
 
Focusing on formal consent privileges the ‘prescription’ phase of the rule-making process, 
while ignoring the operation of power in other, more subtle forms that shape the content of the 
prescribed rules and decisions and affect how they are received. Although consent may be 
implicated in other parts of these processes — including, to a limited degree, the composition 
of a panel and selection of panelists in WTO dispute settlement — this still only provides a 
partial view of the operation of power. Concomitantly, this results in a focus on formal rule-
making bodies to the exclusion of consideration of bodies more concerned with agenda-
setting and information dissemination and exchange. The relative importance of these 
alternative settings may be debated: Steinberg, for instance, points to research suggesting that, 
in domestic legislative settings, agenda setting processes have more explanatory power than 
plenary voting processes, but then discounts the value of this insight in relation to 
organizations that are governed by decision-making processes that emphasize sovereign 
equality (including the WTO).
122
 Lang and Scott, on the other hand, counter Steinberg 
directly by arguing that: 
important work is often done before we get to the stage of intergovernmental bargaining, 
and that the politics of international trade is found just as much in everyday routines of 
global economic governance as it is in its eye-catching moments. This is the 
‘background’ world of discursive interaction which helps both to set the scene for formal 
decision-making and to shape how such decisions are implemented.
123
 
Thus both temporally and institutionally speaking, the consent narrative is unable to 
convincingly account for important exercises of power which have significant implications for 
law-making and application. The moment of formal prescription, and the plenary bodies 
prescribing the laws, are certainly of central importance — but narratives of legitimacy that 
ignore the alternative settings of law-affecting power are simply incomplete.  
                                                 
121
  See also McDougal & Lasswell 1959.  
122
  Steinberg 2002, 354.  
123
  ‘[I]mportant work is often done before we get to the stage of intergovernmental bargaining, and that the 
politics of international trade is found just as much in everyday routines of global economic governance as 
it is in its eye-catching moments. This is the “background” world of discursive inter-action which helps 
both to set the scene for formal decision-making and to shape how such decisions are implemented’: Lang 
& Scott 2010, 1074. 
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F Sixth Limit: Formal vs Substantive Consent 
‘Consent’ may refer to the formal process of signing up to WTO obligations, but it may also 
be understood to include a substantive, voluntaristic component; one which emphasizes the 
free, informed, and participatory nature of the act of consent. As David Lefkowitz notes, 
‘consent can give rise to genuine moral obligations only if it is free and informed, and [...] 
most acts of putative consent to be bound by international legal norms fail to meet at least 
one, if not both, of these conditions’.124 To the free and informed requirements is sometimes 
added the element of participation in the process of norm-generation.
125
 Indeed, several 
coalitions of developing countries came together in 2007 to declare that ‘[a] major positive 
feature of the multilateral trading system is the principle that it allows all trading partners the 
opportunity to participate in making the rules. The legitimacy of the WTO rests on whether 
this principle is adhered to’.126  
This thicker concept of consent — which is free, informed, and participatory — has been 
largely absent from narratives about consent both in the WTO and in international law.
127
 In 
the WTO, the principle of sovereign equality, as reflected in the one-Member-one-vote 
rule,
128
 gives each Member a formally equal say in rule negotiation and decision-making. 
Similarly, the principle of consensus notionally gives each Member the equal power to veto 
any new developments. In practice, however, most of the decision-making power has resided 
with only a few key players: the US and EU at the top, historically the remaining members of 
                                                 
124
  Lefkowitz 2010, 193. Lefkowitz notes, however, that when: (a) states can be said to have entered into 
treaties on an informed and voluntary basis; (b) consent does not imply violation of another moral duty; 
and (c) consent derives from the agents of states that are themselves legitimate, then their consent gives 
rise to an independent ‘obligation to uphold the legal obligations created by these treaties [...] even if some 
of the other signatories to the same treaties did not accede to them voluntarily’. See also Meltzer 2005. 
125
  See Narlikar 2002. See also generally Bonzon 2014. 
126
  WT/L/687. 
127
  See also Buchanan 2004, 303: ‘the super-norm of state consent, as it actually operates in the international 
legal system, is too morally anemic to confer legitimacy, either on individual norms or on the system as a 
whole. For one thing, what counts as consent in the system is not qualified by any requirement of 
voluntariness that would give what is called consent normative punch’. The lack of focus on the free and 
informed aspect may also have followed on from the attempts in the domestic sphere to downplay these 
elements in relation to the foundation of political authority. Many social contract theories are dedicated to 
establishing consent even when ‘citizens have no choice but to consent’: Raz 1988, 88-9. 
128
  WTO Agreement Article IX:1. 
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the Quad (Japan and Canada), and now increasingly China, India, Brazil, and potentially 
Russia.
129
 The domination of the ‘major players’ during the GATT era was so pervasive as to 
prompt Jock Finlayson and Mark Zacher to declare the operation of a ‘major interests norm’ 
in GATT decision-making — that is, a norm by which the Members with the greatest interests 
in a decision (de facto equated with the greatest power) should have ‘paramount influence’ 
over that decision.
130
 Mary Footer has argued that such a norm has continued to operate in the 
WTO era, albeit in a challenged and altered form.
131
 It also resonates with some of the recent 
formulas proposed for weighted voting and critical mass voting, which would take into 
account matters such as Members’ populations, GDP, contributions to world trade and the 
like in allocating voting share.
132
  
On first glance this would seem to be complicated by the practice of consensus decision-
making, which essentially gives each Member a veto power on any new developments. On the 
surface, the consensus principle ensures that rules are not created, amended or terminated 
without the acquiescence of all Members affected. This can have a flattening effect, forcing 
powerful states to take into account the preferences of the less powerful and to frame rule 
proposals in a form that is at least minimally acceptable to such smaller powers.
133
 Yet upon 
closer inspection, taking into account the reputational effects of blocking consensus and the 
persuasive capacity granted by the possession of resources and desirable markets, the 
                                                 
129
  Cf Kissinger’s definition of legitimacy: ‘Legitimacy as here used should not be confused with justice. It 
means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the 
permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the 
international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like 
Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy’: 
Kissinger 1973, 1. Similarly Hans Morgenthau once argued that ‘[t]here is no such thing as the policy of an 
organization, international or domestic, apart from the policy of its most influential member [...]’: 
Morgenthau 1953, 150. 
130
  Finlayson & Zacher 1983, 304.  
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  Footer 2006, 90, 107-08 and 110-12. 
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  See, eg, Cottier & Takenoshita 2003. 
133
  Allen Buchanan notes that consent provides ‘an important safeguard against the rule of the strong’. If 
authority cannot be exercised over a state without its consent, this substantially hobbles the ability of 
powerful states to ‘hijack the project of international law’. He notes that the flipside of this is that it gives 
any state the power to veto even progressive change in international law: Buchanan 2010, 92-3. 
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consensus principle may be seen to preserve underlying power differentials.
134
 This effect has 
been well described by Jonathan Charney in relation to consensus-based negotiations for the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
The consensus system assures that decision-making as a multilateral negotiation of a 
convention will not be dominated by the numerical superiority of any group of nations. 
Rather, procedural significance will be given to the variations in power of nations. Since 
it is difficult to obtain acceptance of voting systems that overtly recognize the differences 
in nations’ importance, the consensus approach permits the maintenance of an egalitarian 
procedure which in practice may assure that multilateral negotiations reflect the real 
geopolitical power of the negotiating nations.
135
 
Similarly, Steinberg concludes that this makes the GATT/WTO decision-making process 
‘organized hypocrisy in the procedural context’, in which ‘[t]he procedural fictions of 
consensus and the sovereign equality of states have served as an external display to domestic 
audiences to help legitimize WTO outcomes’.136 
There are limits to how far Members may go to leverage these power asymmetries. 
Article 52 of the VCLT, for instance, voids a treaty if its conclusion has been procured by the 
threat or use of force.
137
 Yet there is no equivalent hard law relating to merely political or 
                                                 
134
  Several developing countries have nonetheless expressed their preference for consensus decision-making in 
relation to ministerial declarations: see WT/GC/W/471, 2. For a critique of the legitimating function of 
formal voting more generally, see Marks 2000, 64-5.  
135
  Charney 1978, 43 (footnote omitted); see also Buzan 1981, 327. 
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  Steinberg 2002, 342. Steinberg nonetheless notes that a group of developing countries led by the ‘Group of 
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Round of matters important to developing countries, including, among other things, tropical products, 
textiles, and the elimination of Voluntary Restraint Agreements, and to make sure that these issues were 
not dropped. Similarly, various coalitions of developing countries threatened to block the launch of the 
Doha Round unless it included issues in which they were interested: at 352-3.  
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  Until well into the twentieth century, customary international law did not treat the coercion of a state as 
vitiating consent. In keeping with the general legality of the use of force as a means of resolving 
international disputes, the use of coercion or the threat of force against a state to make them consent to a 
treaty was considered similarly unobjectionable under law: see Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries 1966, 246. At most, international law recognized that consent was vitiated if the state’s 
representative had been corrupted or coerced as an individual to consent on behalf of the state. In 1932 
Chester Rohrlich was able to write confidently that ‘as far as existing international law is concerned, 
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economic coercion. Although the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties
138
 and the General 
Assembly
139
 have adopted declarations denouncing ‘the use of economic political or any other 
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind’,140 neither of 
these are binding under international law.  
There is no suggestion that individual countries were subjected to the threat of force to 
consent to the WTO Agreements. There are, nonetheless, various indicators that undermine 
the claim that consent to the WTO rules was voluntary in a thicker substantive sense for all 
participants.
141
 It is widely acknowledged that the US and EU’s final move to gather the 
necessary formal support for the WTO involved threatening to withdraw from the existing 
GATT and to implement various unilateral trade measures against those who elected not to 
join them. After signing up to the Uruguay Final Act, both the US and the EC formally 
withdrew from the GATT 1947, ending their obligations to any GATT signatories who chose 
not to sign up to the WTO Agreements.
142
 Robert Howse points out that: 
                                                                                                                                                        
freedom of consent is not actually essential except as applied to the person of the negotiator’: Rohrlich 
1932, 19. Following various unusual and harsh treaty obligations imposed on Russia following the 
Crimean War, on China following the Opium Wars, and on [Germany] following the First World War, 
various states advocated an alternative ‘unequal treaties doctrine’: see, eg, Putney 1927, 89, for the view 
prevalent in 1927. See also Buell 1927; Stone 1968. For a discussion of the decline of interest in the issue 
of unequal treaties altogether, see Craven 2005. In particular, Craven highlights the distinctions drawn 
between economic and political coercion on the one hand, and formal and actual consent on the other, 
noting Sinclair’s proto-positivist emphasis on formal consent as the only relevant factor to the exclusion of 
evidence of duress: at 374-5.  
138
  Soon after the adoption of the VCLT, the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties adopted the 1969 
Declaration on Political, Military or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties. This Declaration 
addressed economic coercion directly; it ‘condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form’, including 
economic, ‘by any State in order to coerce another State to perform any act relating to the conclusion of a 
treaty in violation of the principles of sovereign equality of States and freedom of consent’. 
139
  See Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter Of The United Nations 1970. 
140
  Ibid.  
141
  Weiler states this forcefully when he argues that ‘for most States both the Take it is fictitious and the Leave 
it is even more. […] One cannot afford to be out, and one cannot afford to leave’: Weiler 2004, 557. 
142
  See Steinberg 2002, 360. 
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In a number of cases, including services and intellectual property rights, it is highly 
unlikely that a large number of countries, particularly developing countries, would have 
agreed to new multilateral rules, except under the threat of unilateral action, largely from 
the United States.
143
 
Steinberg expressly frames the ‘threat to exit’ as coercion, ‘in its most potent form’, to 
‘generate consensus for an outcome that makes powerful states better off and weaker states 
worse off, or that is Pareto-improving but with benefits distributed in favour of powerful 
states’.144 In this sense, the criticism of the genesis of the WTO echoes Hume’s criticism that 
states are generally not founded on consent but on violence. That said, Howse and Meltzer 
both note that the covered agreements contain several provisions which indicate a level of 
balance between interests that would sit uneasily with the claim that the content of the 
agreements were dictated by only the powerful,
145
 and the larger developing countries are 
increasingly making use of the WTO Agreements to serve their interests effectively.
146
  
Beyond the issue of overt coercion, claims to substantive as opposed to merely formal 
consent are also undermined by the lack of opportunities for many of the less powerful 
players to participate in key negotiations, whether through active exclusion or lack of 
capacity, as well the lack of transparency in certain negotiations and decision-making fora. 
Green Room
147
 negotiations — that is, informal small group negotiations that take place 
between 20 to 40 WTO Members,
148
 but which have tended to present draft proposals to the 
broader membership as fait accompli
149
 — have come under particular scrutiny. Originally 
                                                 
143
  Howse 2001a, 360. 
144
  Steinberg 2002, 349, citing Gruber 2001. See also Hudec 1999, 14; Higgott & Erman 2010, 468.  
145
  Howse 2001a, 360; Meltzer 2005, 709. 
146
  Santos 2012; see also Higgott & Erman 2010, 467 (emphasis in original): ‘The growth of Southern activity, 
including stronger positions in Green Room negotiations that have emerged during the Doha Round, is a 
reflection of an increased understanding by the developing countries of their juridical equality within the 
WTO legal framework. This is having the effect of breaking some of the traditional asymmetries’. 
147
  Named after a green-painted conference room at the Centre William Rappard in which they originally took 
place. See generally Pedersen 2006. 
148
  See Narlikar 2001, 3. 
149
  Charnovitz 2003, 49. 
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seen as a step forward from secretive, confidential meetings between the major powers,
150
 
Green Room negotiations would soon face substantial criticism for being both opaque and 
unrepresentative.
151
 At the Seattle Ministerial African, Latin American, and Caribbean 
delegations issued statements criticising the practice for its exclusivity and lack of 
transparency.
152
 In particular, they noted that those excluded had no notice of Green Room 
meetings, were not informed in advance as to their subject-matter, and were given little to no 
time to consider the resulting proposals.
153
 The exclusive, closed, and non-consultative nature 
of the Green Room process has also been credited with causing, at least in part, the failure of 
the Cancún Ministerial in 2004 and deadlock at various other Ministerials.
154
 
The Green Room process has begun to evolve as a result of these pressures. Following 
the Seattle collapse,
155
 WTO Director-General Mike Moore launched a series of consultations 
                                                 
150
  Indeed, the ‘invention and the institutionalization of the smoky green room process’ was feted as one of 
Arthur Dunkel’s more significant contributions to the transparency of the Uruguay Round negotiations: 
GATT Council, ‘Farewell to the Outgoing Director-General, Mr Arthur Dunkel’, Spec(93)24. 
151
  T Koh 1997, 439; Schott & Watal 2000; Pedersen 2006, 107; Steinberg 2002. 
152
  At one stage the Secretariat kept the list of attendees to Green Room meetings secret to avoid being 
‘flooded’ with requests for participation: Narlikar 2001, 9. See also Pedersen 2006, 111.  
153
  These criticisms were repeated in 2007 in WT/L/687 by the ACP Group, the African Group, the LDC 
Group, Bolivia and Venezuela: ‘We have been concerned that the recent negotiating process has been less 
than transparent and participatory. Although it is widely known that important negotiations are taking place 
in the G4 process, the vast majority of members have little or no knowledge of the progress and content of 
different stages of the negotiations. Although two developing countries are part of the G4, we cannot 
expect them to carry the responsibility of representing the views and positions of all developing countries. 
We have been told that the Geneva multilateral process is central, but without knowledge of the political or 
technical aspects of the G4 negotiations, it is not possible for the majority of members to prepare 
themselves or provide inputs. We are concerned that members may be faced with texts arising from small 
plurilateral processes and requested to consider them at very short notice and to adopt them for the sake of 
the system. As we are the majority of members of the system, we have the right to know what is going on 
and to be given the opportunity to participate. [...] The multilateral system cannot be used to rubber stamp 
and legitimize the decisions made by a few members.’ 
154
  See Wolfe 2010, 82-3. 
155
  ‘In the preparations for the Seattle ministerial conference, [developing countries] tabled about half of the 
proposals made for the WTO agenda. The Geneva decision-making machinery could not accommodate the 
diversity of views’: Schott & Watal 2000. See also Pedersen 2006, 121-2. 
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on ‘internal transparency and participation’.156 Even by Cancún, there were additional 
measures to notify those not participating in Green Room negotiations of their subject matter 
and the Membership was given greater time to consider Green Room proposals.
157
 The WTO 
website now goes as far as to claim that the Green Room’s deficiencies relating to 
representation and transparency have largely been resolved by the development of other 
informal practices such as coalition-building and notification. Indeed, it claims that the 
proliferation of coalitions means that ‘all countries can be represented in the [Green Room] 
process if the coordinators and other key players are present’ and notes that there are now 
‘regular reports back to the full membership’.158 That said, the focus on increased 
participation and transparency for Green Room meetings may have simply driven the more 
powerful Members to other fora. At the 2008 mini-Ministerial in Geneva, for example, some 
countries expressed ‘unease’ with the Director-General’s ‘near-exclusive focus’ on the G-7 
countries.
159
 Therefore although some steps have been made to improve less powerful states 
ability to participate in WTO law-making processes and to do so on a more informed basis, 
continuing power and information asymmetries suggest that the legitimating narrative of 
‘consent’ will continue to prove less than convincing for many of these states.  
G Seventh Limit: Neglecting Questions of Substance and Outcome 
This leads to the seventh and final limit of consent-based narratives addressed in this chapter. 
As with other purely input-based accounts of legitimacy, the consent-based approach provides 
no real handle on which to address questions of substance and outcome. One way that this 
issue has manifested in relation to the WTO is through the formalist interpretive tendencies of 
the WTO’s Appellate Body. It is well-recognized there are multiple ways of interpreting 
treaties, including (but not necessarily limited to) the textual, the intentional, and the 
teleological approaches.
160
 Sol Picciotto argues that the Appellate Body draws on the 
legitimating power of textual interpretation, which notionally provides for fidelity to the text 
                                                 
156
  Pedersen 2006, 112. See also WT/GC/M/57. 
157
  Narlikar 2004, 2. Narlikar notes that the preparatory process for the Ministerial was also far more open, 
with institutionalized small group meetings which allowed ‘the possibility of self-selection’.  
158
  WTO Website, ‘Whose WTO Is It Anyway?’.  
159
  ICTSD 2008.  
160
  See, eg, discussion in Fitzmaurice 2014, 178-9.  
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to which the Members have consented, to mask much more complex and ‘political’ decision-
making.
161
 A legalist focus on the contours of consent thus not only obscures the operation of 
judicial discretion and choice in such matters,
162
 it also fails to ‘persuade a broader 
constituency of the fairness of WTO rules’.163 By making the central question whether or not 
a state or Member has consented to a given rule or decision, one can elide the broader 
question of whether the rule or decision is functionally appropriate, or substantively just, or 
whether or not it leads to desirable results.
164
  
This problem is only exacerbated when considered in light of the increased 
technicalization of WTO law and practice, a development which purely consent-based 
narratives struggle to track. The knowledge considered essential to contemporary governance, 
whether it relates to global economics, development theory, trade law or other disciplines, is 
considered to require a level of expertise and specialization that puts it beyond the reach of 
most people,
165
 including, often, the notional principals. Even the experts themselves are 
likely to be highly specialized and unable to assess for themselves the validity of other 
knowledge claims made in the same institutional context. Functional differentiation in the 
international system has meant not only do different international regimes have their own 
internal vocabularies and grammars, but also that even within given regimes there will be a 
multiplicity of expert languages at play.
166
 In the WTO, this has played out most visibly in 
SPS disputes, and is increasingly being recognized as a feature of disputes involving complex 
                                                 
161
  Picciotto 2005. 
162
  Similar criticisms have been made of the Appellate Body’s reasoning in EC — Sardines by Weiler and 
Horn: Weiler & Horn 2005.  
163
  Picciotto 2005, 496. 
164
  Although instrumental justifications for consent may be found, they have not featured strongly in the WTO 
legitimacy debates. One such justification claims that it is the principals which have the best information to 
judge whether or not their interests are being served, and their consent ensures that their well-informed 
decisions are respected: see Raz 1988, 85-6. 
165
  ‘Expertise, the high degree of division of labor, new technologies, and many more factors also seem to put 
many current issues beyond the grasp of even the best-informed citizens’: Bohman 1996, 151. 
166
  ‘But modern “functional differentiation,” beginning with the differentiation of state and economy from 
society, culminates in increasingly distinct but interdependent subsystems, each with its own specific role 
and organizational structure. According to these theories, each distinct system also develops its own 
“functional code” (such as money in economics or votes in politics) which determine the significance of 
actions within such a social system’: ibid 155 (citations omitted). See also Koskenniemi 2007b. 
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economic evidence.
167
 The prevalence of such expert languages and the difficulty in 
translating them has important implications for the allocation of rule- and decision-making 
authority. Yet consent-based legitimacy, on its own, has nothing to say about such technical 
complexity, and its assumption of formal equality may serve to obscure the differing degrees 
to which WTO Members are able to access technical expertise to form and pursue their 
interests.  
A related challenge arises due to the increased political complexity of the WTO’s 
membership. Even at the level of the state, there are qualms about the extent to which consent 
may legitimate the exercise of power once a certain population threshold has been reached or 
there are sufficiently divergent views within a given population. While the diversity of 
interests represented by the first 23 Contracting Parties to the GATT must not be 
underestimated, it was nothing compared to the WTO’s now 164 Members. During the 
Uruguay Round it became abundantly clear that the interests of even developing countries 
were diverging significantly,
168
 and this process has only continued in the course of the Doha 
Round. Such complexity seriously reduces the likelihood of reaching consensus decisions, let 
alone engaging in any meaningful deliberation about which options to pursue. This weakens 
the legitimating power of consent on a structural level, as evident in the recent calls for 
‘streamlining’ various aspects of WTO rule- and decision-making, ranging from further 
empowering the Secretariat to introducing some form of weighted voting rather than 
consensus.
169
 The weakening of the legitimating power of consent consequently calls for 
greater attention to be to be devoted to the questions of why so many Members have come 
together in the first place — in other words, to questions of substance and outcome. 
IV CONCLUSION 
Consent-based legitimacy therefore has a more limited role to play than its advocates might 
suggest. It is formally incomplete in that it is unable to account for the ultimate basis of legal 
normativity in the WTO. Moreover, it is descriptively incomplete in that it is unable to 
account for generalized delegations of power; the reasons for selecting particular agents; the 
influence of other aspects of the policy cycle on normativity; or the operation of interests 
                                                 
167
  See discussion in Chapter Seven. 
168
  Page 2003, 9-10.  
169
  See discussion in Chapter Six. 
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within and beyond the state. The substantial gap between the rhetoric of consent and any 
commitment to a genuinely voluntaristic notion of consent also has the potential to further 
undermine consent’s power to legitimate the WTO. Nonetheless, consent-based legitimacy, 
even when thus whittled down, continues to play a hugely important role in justifying WTO 
law and regulating the exercise of the WTO’s power that should not be discounted. Consent 
provides an important signal to help identify a substantial portion, if not all, of the WTO’s 
binding legal norms. It thus plays a crucial role in establishing positive legal legitimacy.
170
 An 
emphasis on formal consent also provides a definitive moment around which debates on 
broader legitimacy and justifiability can be centred. Moreover, many of the rules and 
processes in the WTO are founded on the idea that consent is an essential aspect of the 
multilateral trading order. The consent model therefore continues to provide an important 
starting point for considering the legitimacy of the WTO — a starting point which, 
nonetheless, highlights the need for a more multifaceted understanding of legitimacy which 
brings in other elements. 
 
                                                 
170
  Even there, it has limits, as it is not always clear whether the decisions of the General Council are intended 
to be legally binding or otherwise: see Footer 2006, 176-8. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
‘NOT UNDEMOCRATIC’ — THE BOUNDARIES OF DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY IN THE WTO 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Although state consent has traditionally provided the dominant legitimating narrative for the 
exercise of authority at the international level, at the domestic level that title has long been 
held by democracy. Until recently democratic theory was largely considered to be a matter of 
only national concern, with no relation to the international sphere. The international law on 
the recognition of states and governments is, after all, notionally indifferent to the form that 
government takes. Following the rapid spread of democracy in the late twentieth century — or 
at least the increase in the number of states claiming to be democratic — much was made of 
the idea of an emerging customary international law right to democratic governance.
1
 Even 
then, these debates largely, if not exclusively, focused on the character and operation of 
democracy as a national phenomenon — international institutions were considered to play 
only an ancillary role. Starting in the mid-1990s however, international relations theorists and 
international lawyers began to investigate in detail whether or not international institutions 
could or should be made democratically legitimate. The WTO, in particular, found itself at the 
centre of debates about the ‘democratic deficit’ in the international sphere.2 These debates 
have become increasingly prominent as the legitimating power of consent simpliciter has 
receded.  
The ways that narratives of democracy have been deployed in debates about the 
legitimacy of WTO law are complex and multifaceted. As such, this chapter aims to map the 
most common democratic legitimacy narratives that have been advanced in relation to WTO 
law, addressing their relationship to WTO law and their limits. The chapter begins by 
providing a brief overview of the rise of democracy as a narrative of legitimacy for the 
exercise of power at both the national and global levels. Part III sketches out four families of 
democratic legitimacy narratives that have proven particularly prominent in relation to WTO 
                                                 
1
  See, eg, Franck 1992; Fox 1992; Cf Marks 2000; Marks 2011. 
2
  See, eg, Atik 2001; Barfield 2001b; Krajewski 2001; Howse 2003a; Elsig 2007b; Bonzon 2014. 
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law: direct democracy, representative democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy, and some of the implications these narratives have for how WTO law is made, 
implemented, and even conceptualized. In particular, it highlights the potential for the 
participatory and deliberative approaches to democracy to break free of the purely input-
oriented constraints of the direct and representative approaches to allow for some 
consideration of outputs. Rather than treating law as simply an instrument for channelling 
Member will, these latter narratives view WTO law as also playing a role in shaping such 
will. That said, all four of the narratives identified in this chapter suffer from their own 
limitations. In particular, certain deliberative democratic narratives run the risk of 
overemphasising the epistemic and reason-based aspects of democratic decision-making at the 
expense of meaningful popular participation.  
II THE TURN TO DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The idea of democracy stretches back to at least the ancient Greeks, but it is only in the last 
few hundred years that it has achieved its privileged position as the dominant account of 
national legitimacy.
3
 In the words of Susan Marks, ‘the character of democracy as a form of 
mass politics, and its identification with legitimate political authority, are signally recent 
phenomena’.4 The word ‘democracy’ derives from the Greek demokratia, a composite of 
‘demos’ (‘the people’) and ‘kratos’ (‘power’)5 dating back to roughly the fifth century BCE. 
This simple conjunction belies the complexity of the idea and its many variations. Early 
Athenian democracy, for instance, involved direct voting by only the adult male ‘citizens’ of 
the Athenian city-state who had completed military training.
6
 More recognizably 
contemporary accounts of democracy — emphasizing representative government, periodic 
elections, the separation of powers and respect for the ‘rights of man’/human rights — were 
only formulated around the time of the eighteenth century French and American revolutions.  
                                                 
3
  See Held 1992; for Jürgen Habermas, ‘[o]ne cannot adequately describe the operation of a constitutionally 
organised political system, even at the empirical level, without referring to the validity dimension of law 
and the legitimating force of the democratic genesis of law’: Habermas 1996a, 287-8. Cf Isakhan & 
Stockwell 2011. By contrast, Aristotle famously denounced democracy as a perverted form of constitution, 
alongside tyranny and oligarchy: Aristotle 1996, III: 7-8, cf III:11.  
4
  Marks 2000, 30.  
5
  See Larsen 1973. 
6
  See generally Stockton 1990. 
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The word ‘democracy’ has since become something of a floating signifier,7 and a full 
account of its myriad incarnations is well beyond the scope of this chapter. It is nonetheless 
helpful to distinguish between four common understandings of democracy which are reflected 
in WTO legitimacy debates: the direct, the representative, the participatory, and the 
deliberative.
8
 Direct democracy requires that the members of a polity participate directly in 
creating the laws that govern them, primarily through voting. It was a version of this that was 
pursued in Ancient Athens. Direct democracy also found a forceful modern advocate in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau,
9
 who argued for unmediated direct voting as the best means for 
manifesting the general will of the people (as discussed in Chapter Three).
10
 Representative 
democracy, by contrast, allows for democratic will to be mediated by intermediaries. The 
strand often corresponds to the Lockean idea that individuals in a state of nature may transfer 
their will to a representative by consent,
11
 at which point their representatives may make 
decisions on their behalf.
12
 Participatory democracy does not necessarily contradict either 
direct or representative democracy, but focuses more on citizen participation in the processes 
                                                 
7
  Or, again in Susan Marks’s words, ‘fertile material for cant’: Marks 2001, 48.  
8
  Although there are other procedural accounts of democracy, including consociational democracy, 
republican democracy, decentralized democracy, epistemic proceduralism, and more, these have featured 
less strongly in WTO legitimacy debates and are not the focus of the present chapter. 
9
  Rousseau 1997, bk II § 6. To that end, Rousseau was specifically scornful of representative accounts of 
democracy: bk III § 15. For Rousseau, the less deliberation there was between voters, the better — 
deliberation only served to corrupt the purity of the collective will. This would appear to reflect Rousseau’s 
faith in the purity of the human being in a state of nature as compared to the ‘modern’ version corrupted by 
politics and socialization: ibid bk II § 3 and bk IV § 2. Moreover, to the extent that Rousseau supported 
governmental deliberation, this was only for the purpose of discerning and implementing the general will, 
not shaping or correcting or improving it. That is, the ends were to be chosen in accordance with the 
general will of the people, but the means for doing so could be the subject of deliberation by administrators 
and experts: bk III § 15. 
10
  Recognizing that such direct democracy would work best with smaller polities, Rousseau’s ideal 
government was that of the city-state; he was sceptical of anything larger: ibid bk III § 15. Cf Madison 
1961, 71-9, on the benefits of larger polities and territories.  
11
  Locke 1988 § 140. 
12
  There has long been a link between representative democracy and the idea of deliberation. Theorists such 
as Edmund Burke and James Madison were distrustful of the capacity of the ordinary citizen to engage in 
reasoned deliberation, and saw part of the virtue of representation as allowing for reasoned deliberation by 
wise elites (ie the representatives): Brown 2009, 65-6.  
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of policy-making and implementation.
13
 Instead of focusing on formal representatives and 
voting, participatory democracy stresses the creation of a broader, autonomous and informal 
public sphere in which political disagreements can be thrashed out even as they influence and 
inform formal decision-making. Finally, deliberative democracy shifts the emphasis away 
from the channelling of will through voting and onto processes of deliberation and reason-
giving.
14
 In doing so, deliberative accounts tend to allocate greater value to expert knowledge 
and guidance than alternative accounts of democracy.  
As with other narratives of legitimacy, democratic legitimacy narratives can be 
categorised into input-based and output-based accounts.
15
 Input-based accounts focus on the 
inputs to democratic decision-making processes: who gets to make laws/decisions and how 
they make those laws/decisions. Questions of representation, participation, and deliberation 
loom large.
16
 Output-oriented accounts of democracy instead focus on the substantive outputs 
of such laws/decisions, considering instead whether the laws serve democratic principles of, 
for instance, distributive justice or human rights.
17
 Of the four narratives identified above, 
direct and representative democracy provide squarely input-based visions of democracy. 
Participatory and deliberative democracy can also contain an output-oriented component — 
through an emphasis on political participation and self-realization as overarching goods in the 
case of participatory democracy, and through an emphasis on the manifestation of collective 
rationality and epistemically superior decisions in the case of deliberative democracy. Overall, 
the ‘democratic deficit’ debate in the WTO has been characterized by an emphasis on 
procedural, input-based approaches to democracy at the expense of output-based 
                                                 
13
  See generally Pateman 1975; Pateman 2012; Mutz 2006. 
14
  See Cohen 1989, 17; Habermas 1996a; Gutmann & Thompson 1996; Young 2000; Dryzek 2006; Dryzek 
2010. See also Howse, who broadly defines the deliberative understanding of democracy ‘a legitimation of 
power that depends on a conception of public justification and deliberative reason’: Howse 2001b, 478. 
15
  See Scharpf 1999, ch 1; Elsig 2007b. 
16
  On the dangers of a purely procedural conception of democratic legitimacy, and its disassociation from 
justice, see Marks 2000, 59-61; Tribe 1980; Rawls 2005, 427-33. 
17
  See Bellamy 2007, ch 3; Elsig 2007b; Michelman 1996; and Dahl 1999, 20. This distinction turns on a 
matter of emphasis, as procedural and substantive accounts are often interrelated. Any democratic 
procedure must of necessity rest on a particular substantive account of what democracy means, and 
systems that focus on substantive values democratic legitimacy will invariably put in place procedures to 
protect those values. 
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alternatives.
18
 In this way, they often replicate the consent narratives’ failure to engage with 
how questions of substance and outcome relate to the legitimacy of WTO law.  
Notwithstanding the primacy of democratic legitimation at the national level, it is only 
recently that democracy has been considered to have any relevance to international law. 
Indeed, Joseph Weiler and Iulia Motoc suggest that ‘for most of the 20th Century, generally 
speaking International Law has displayed indifference, even hostility, to the concept of 
democracy’.19 Arguments about the democratic legitimacy of international institutions were 
not completely absent from international debates — in 1919 the League of Free Nations 
Association, for instance, argued for ‘complete publicity’ and ‘effective popular 
representation’ to guard against an ‘immense bureaucratic union of governments instead of a 
democratic union of peoples’.20 Yet it was only at the close of the twentieth century that the 
language of democracy began to be invoked regularly and systematically in the international 
sphere.
21
  
The language of democracy and democratization also largely bypassed the GATT. Until 
the mid-1990s, with the notable exception of the New International Economic Order, there 
were few calls to examine the GATT’s democratic credentials, or worries about the threat it 
posed to national democracies.
22
 It was only with the inception of the WTO that the 
multilateral trading order regularly found itself on the defence against charges of a democratic 
deficit. Indeed, for years the WTO website stated emphatically that the WTO is ‘NOT 
                                                 
18
  With a few exceptions: see Zampetti 2003; Elsig 2007b, 88; Fakhri 2009. See, eg: ‘The “democratic” 
procedures drawn on for this purpose tend to be ones in the liberal proceduralist tradition, which emphasise 
processes for ensuring transparency, deliberation and public participation in decision-making as the basis 
of legitimate authority’: Peel 2007, 365. 
19
  Weiler & Motoc 2003, 49. 
20
  League of Free Nations Association 1919, 43; cf ‘[I]t is not necessary in the interest of democracy, to 
democratize diplomacy, as some imprudent demagogues demand; it is the government, the executive 
power which is and which must remain the first organ, the first representative of democracy in its external 
policy’: Barthélemy 1917, quoted in translation from the French in Garner 1918, 536. 
21
  See, eg, Marquand 1979; Dahl 1999; Marks 2000; Moravcsik 2004; Wheatley 2010.  
22
  Cf Tumlir 1983; Housman 1994. Cf the unadopted provision in the Draft Declaration on the Right to 
Development for ‘democratic participation in international economic institutions, particularly International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ as part of a new international 
economic order: see Report of the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development 
1982, para 12(d)(iii). 
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undemocratic’.23 Speaking more ambivalently in 2010, then Director-General Pascal Lamy 
noted that ‘the very credibility of national democracies is at risk if global governance fails to 
establish its own democratic credentials’.24 What form these ‘democratic credentials’ may 
take, however, remains open to contestation.  
III FOUR KEY NARRATIVES OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY (AND THEIR LIMITS) 
The four visions of democratic legitimacy briefly identified above — direct, representative, 
participatory and deliberative — have all manifested in very particular ways in debates about 
WTO law and legitimacy.
25
 Each of these narratives provides a different framework from 
which the law and institutional structure of the WTO may be justified and critiqued, as well as 
different agendas for legal reform. As such, they tend to be advanced by different groups 
seeking to promote different sets of interests.  
A Direct Democracy 
The first prominent WTO-related narrative takes elements of direct democracy and gives 
them a distinctly Westphalian spin. This ‘democratic’ narrative treats WTO Members as the 
central moral and legal actors; it pays essentially no attention to the representation or 
participation of the individuals or groups inhabiting those Members.
26
 This narrative is not 
recognizably democratic in the sense of providing government by ‘the people’.27 Rather, the 
                                                 
23
  WTO, Ten Common Misunderstandings about the WTO (1999) 10 (emphasis/capitalization in original). 
Intriguingly, the WTO’s replacement for this document contains no references to democracy at all: WTO, 
Ten Things the WTO Can Do (2012) 12. 
24
  Lamy 2010. In 2002 then Director-General Mike Moore delivered a speech in which he argued that the 
WTO did not pose a threat to democracy: Moore 2002.  
25
  They are also awkwardly refracted through an economic lens, as the Members of the WTO are not only 
states, but also autonomous customs territories. Individuals in the WTO context are generally envisaged as 
producers, consumers, or regulators rather than as citizens. 
26
  For instance, one of the main papers addressing democracy in the WTO, as promulgated on the WTO 
website, is attributed to Saif Alqadhafi — not a man generally recognized for his strong commitment to 
democracy, to say the least: Alqadhafi 2007. 
27
  ‘So long as an international agency continues to be maintained and financed by member governments, its 
right to exist, and to carry out the functions which those members have collectively assigned to it, is clear. 
To this extent, and in this sense, its legitimacy derives from governments alone. Questions of public 
acceptability and ‘popular sovereignty’ do not enter in’: Henderson 2002, 280. 
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primary emphasis is on how WTO rules and decisions should reflect the interests of the 
broader Membership, rather than of a small handful of Members or a detached international 
bureaucracy. The WTO’s pamphlet on Ten Common Misunderstandings about the WTO, for 
instance, claimed that ‘decisions taken in the WTO are negotiated, accountable and 
democratic’ because the WTO is ‘Member-driven’, decisions are rules are ratified by 
Members’ parliaments and decisions are made by consensus.28 Similarly, in 2002, then 
Director-General Mike Moore argued that those who claimed that the WTO system was 
‘undemocratic’ started ‘from a basic fallacy’, in that ‘no other body is as directly run by 
Member governments’.29 In their emphasis on Members and the expression of Members’ will, 
these narratives often strongly resemble consent-based narratives.  
Some variants of the direct democracy narrative emphasize the democratic credentials of 
consensus voting. The Ten Common Misunderstandings about the WTO pamphlet argued that 
consensus voting is ‘[i]n principle […] even more democratic than majority rule because no 
decision is taken until everyone agrees’.30 A similar perspective is provided by Peter Van den 
Bossche and Werner Zdouc, who claim rather boldly that ‘[i]t cannot be disputed that 
decisions taken by consensus have more “democratic legitimacy” than decisions taken by 
majority vote’.31 The emphasis on Members and on consensus provides for little distance 
between this vision of democracy and the narratives of consent-based legitimacy.  
Another variant of the direct democracy narrative is more open to the possibility of 
majoritarian rather than consensus-based voting. Jaime Tijmes-Lhl, for instance, attempts to 
                                                 
28
  WTO, Ten Common Misunderstandings about the WTO (1999) 2 (emphasis added). The language of 
democracy has been dropped from the pamphlet’s successor: WTO, Ten Things the WTO Can Do (2012). 
29
  ‘Indeed, the irony is that many of the things opponents of the WTO do not like about the system stem from 
too much democracy, not too little. Many who say the WTO is too powerful, actually want it to take on 
wider powers. They want the WTO to force open markets, preserve union jobs, strengthen labour 
standards, protect animal rights, preserve the environment, save the developing world from capitalism, and 
a lengthening list of other goals — even when these goals are resisted by sovereign countries. The WTO 
has an ambitious enough mandate without making it a substitute for a “global government”. The fact is that 
on certain issues international consensus simply does not exist. The WTO does not and cannot perform a 
role in areas where it does not have a mandate. The WTO cannot impose rules and standards on unwilling 
sovereign governments. Indeed, imposing rules on unwilling Members is “undemocratic”’: Moore 2002. 
30
  WTO, Ten Common Misunderstandings about the WTO (1999). Peter Singer identified this as ‘a very 
strange view of democracy’: Singer 2004, 75. 
31
  Van den Bossche & Zdouc 2013, 142. 
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frame consensus-based
32
 and majoritarian decision-making rules in the WTO in an expressly 
Rousseauian direct democratic framework.
33
 Ultimately Tijmes-Lhl argues that a Rousseauian 
view of democratic legitimacy supports consensus as the most democratic decision-making 
procedure possible in the WTO,
34
 in that: 
because every member of Rousseau’s ideal political community is involved in the process 
of approving a statute (that is, universal participation) and the bill is approved by 
everyone (put differently, unanimity and therefore every member has a right to veto), this 
regulation is just.
35
  
Tijmes-Lhl nonetheless allows that majoritarian voting could be democratically just, but notes 
that a Rousseauian perspective would require this to be supported by a rigorous system of 
checks and balances to check the tyranny of the majority — checks which he does not 
consider the WTO to have in place currently.
36
 As such he suggests that ‘expanding majority 
voting in the WTO might cause or deepen problems regarding input legitimacy’.37  
While Tijmes-Lhl raises some important reservations about the WTO’s general lack of 
checks and balances in relation to majoritarian rule-making, his article offers an 
unrecognizable reading of Rousseau.
38
 It also reflects the serious normative deficiencies of 
attempting to transfer direct democracy to the international sphere while maintaining a 
Westphalian ontology. Rousseau placed a heavy emphasis on direct citizen participation in a 
democratic setting. Treating Rousseauian democratic conditions as fulfilled because Member 
                                                 
32
  See also Ehlermann & Ehring 2005. 
33
  See also Röben 2008. The consensual strand closely resembles the consent-based approach dealt with in 
Chapter Three of this thesis, and tends to make similar arguments about the need for increased Member 
participation and internal transparency. 
34
  Tijmes-Lhl 2009, 423-4. Cf Weiler & Motoc 2003, 54. When Mike Moore claimed that the WTO was 
inherently democratic, one of his main arguments was that no other international body is ‘as firmly rooted 
in consensus decision-making. [...] What the consensus rule embodies is the right to sovereignty, free 
choice, self-government — in other words “democracy” in its most basic sense’: Moore 2002. See also 
Elsig and Cottier 2011, 297. 
35
  Tijmes-Lhl 2009, 419. 
36
  Ibid 423-4.  
37
  Ibid 425. 
38
  For a more plausible reading of how Rousseau’s thought can be applied in the international sphere, see Nili 
2011. 
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states and customs unions participate directly, notwithstanding their internal government 
structures, is a non-sequitur. This approach also runs directly counter to Rousseau’s desire to 
rest the foundation of authority with ‘the people’. By treating states as ‘moral persons in their 
own right, rather than merely being institutional resources for human beings’,39 the cord to 
Rousseau’s thought, and indeed to popular sovereignty in general, is cut.40  
The direct democracy narrative has also been invoked by less-powerful Members seeking 
a louder voice in WTO decision-making, along very similar lines to the invocation of the 
participatory narrative in relation to consent. In seeking such a voice, these Members have 
turned to the formal and informal rules governing WTO rule- and decision-making. They note 
that, despite the seeming levelling effect of the principle of consensus, in practice many 
Members have been effectively excluded from decision-making processes.
41
 Calls for reform 
in this area have generally focused on ‘internal transparency’ issues concerning the lack of 
representation in Green Room decision-making, the lack of transparency of decision-making 
processes, the wide discretion given to the chairs of WTO negotiation groups, and the general 
informality of decision-making processes.
42
  
When accompanied by such an emphasis on ongoing participation and transparency, and 
on informal practices as well as formal rules, the direct democracy narrative appears to move 
beyond some of the limitations of the more formalist consent narratives. It is not as tied to the 
moment when formal consent to a rule is given. Moreover, a turn to majoritarian voting, 
although controversial, would at least have the potential to address some of the rule- and 
decision-making efficiency concerns raised by the increased political complexity of the WTO. 
However, the direct democracy narrative also shares many of the consent narratives’ 
limitations. First, the vision of ‘democracy’ underlining the narrative is painfully thin and has 
little to offer in terms of moral legitimation. If we are to reach for the democratization of the 
                                                 
39
  Buchanan 2004, 305, citing Beitz 1979, 71.  
40
  See Roth 2011 for a defence of sovereign equality that does not claim to be democratic. See also Christiano 
2010, 123; and Bodansky 1999, 613-4.  
41
  See generally the views expressed by various delegates in Jawara & Kwa 2003, esp 19-21. See also 
Alqadhafi 2007, 2: ‘WTO member countries are all equally represented and influential within the 
organization, or if a certain set of members has illegitimately amassed an undemocratic—“unfair”—
amount of influence’.  
42
  See, eg, Pedersen 2006; Odell 2005; Ismael 2009; Gathii 2004, 891-900; CIDSE & Caritas Internationalis 
2005. 
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international sphere, surely we can reach for more than this. Second, the narrative’s exclusive 
focus on Members neglects the role of non-Members (including bureaucrats) not only in 
influencing and shaping WTO laws and decisions, but also in influencing and shaping 
Member preferences. Third, in focusing only on whether or not WTO rules and decisions are 
‘Member-driven’, it continues to ignore whether the outcomes of such rules and decisions are 
substantively desirable.  
B Representative Democracy 
The second major narrative of democratic legitimacy to manifest in debates about the WTO is 
the representative narrative. This is by far the most common of the democratic legitimacy 
narratives articulated in relation to the WTO. It treats individuals rather than Members as the 
central moral entities, but sees Members as the primary representative agents for individuals 
in their international relations.
43
 In representative accounts of the WTO’s democratic 
legitimacy, Members are not treated as fundamental moral subjects in themselves, but rather 
as conduits for the will of ‘the people’,44 either as a vague collective or a mathematical 
aggregate of individuals.
45
 Legal mechanisms relating to accountability feature strongly in 
such narratives. The legitimacy of WTO laws and practices are assessed in light of their 
capacity to constrain or facilitate
46
 the practice of democracy within Members.
47
 In this way, 
the representative narratives sidestep some of the problems faced by the direct narratives.  
                                                 
43
  Cf Slaughter 2000; Simpson 1994, 115-20 (on ‘democratic liberalism’). 
44
  Robert Howse identifies a ‘dimension’ of the legitimating value of sovereign consent with the idea that 
‘this consent stands as a surrogate for the democratic legitimacy of the wills in question. The WTO rules 
represent the wills of various demoi, to which sovereigns are accountable’: Howse 2001a, 361. This 
approach has also been articulated with respect to international law more generally. Samantha Besson 
argues that ‘states do not make international law just for themselves as free, rational agents, but as officials 
for their respective populations, other states and IOs’: Besson 2009a, 362. See also Matthew Lister, who 
‘assume[s] the traditional view that the primary subjects of and actors in international law are states’ even 
though he does not ‘take states to be moral agents in their own right, but rather because states are, or 
should be, the representatives of individuals at the international level’: Lister 2010, 665 fn 3.  
45
  Although the WTO Agreements nowhere make reference to individuals, and Members have membership in 
light of their autonomy over commercial matters, most of the liberal accounts of the idea of democratic 
legitimation in the WTO make use of the idea of individuals rather than consumers.  
46
  See, eg: ‘The investment of lawmaking authority in multilateral international bodies, whether through the 
negotiation of international agreements or the resolution of international disputes, engages three 
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The representative narratives include both nationalist and internationalist strands. 
Nationalists tend to be sceptical of any measure that has the capacity to impose external 
constraints on national decision-making processes. The democratic legitimacy of the WTO in 
such accounts is considered purely derivative of the democratic legitimacy of the individual 
Members,
48
 and international institutions such as the WTO are viewed with suspicion. Thus 
when Gregory Shaffer interviewed a US congressional staffer in May 2003, the staffer 
considered that any attempt to systematize inter-parliamentary meetings in the WTO would be 
‘hurting legitimacy’, which should instead be maintained ‘through national oversight’.49 What 
may at first have appeared to facilitate global democracy in the form of the increased 
                                                                                                                                                        
antidemocratic tendencies. All things being equal, this shift strengthens the Executive with respect to 
Congress, enhances the ability of concentrated interest groups to procure rules that benefit their own, rather 
than the general, welfare, and bolsters the power of the bureaucracies of international institutions. Each of 
these developments shrinks the realm of democratic public decision-making and makes it less likely that 
lawmaking will reflect the popular will’: Stephan 2000, 238 and 249-53. Cf Paul 2000, 268-70 who agrees 
with Stephan’s identification of the anti-democratic influence of ‘new international law’ generated by 
multilateral institutions such as the WTO and takes them even further. See also Hudec 1993. 
47
  In the words of Gregory Shaffer, ‘[t]he core concept of contemporary democracy is to hold rulers 
accountable through elected representatives’: Shaffer 2005b, 385. Shaffer is quick to highlight that this 
does not mean that the idea of representativeness is exhausted by elections and voting: ‘The central 
normative concept for assessing the normative legitimacy of decision-making should not be whether a 
decision has been rendered by a popularly elected body. […] Rather, the legitimacy of institutions should 
be viewed in a broader sense as concerning the relative accountability of decision-making processes to 
those affected by them’: at 386 (emphasis in original). 
48
  ‘To the extent that the individual states that are the Members of the WTO become more truly democratic, 
and to the extent that those individual states are more democratic in the making of their own domestic trade 
policies, the combined efforts of those individual states in their combined capacity as the WTO will be 
more truly democratic as well’: Bacchus 2004, 670 (emphasis in original).  
49
  Shaffer 2005b, 397. Note how Shaffer’s main basis of criticism against the civil society/stakeholder model, 
a variant of what is here termed the cosmopolitan model, is based on a metric of representation. In a 
nuanced and detailed analysis of the operation of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Shaffer 
also came to the conclusion that ‘the [Committee] served as a conduit for states responding to domestic 
pressures. In this sense, the WTO is a much more democratically accountable institution than its critics 
claim’: Shaffer 2001, 81. That said, Shaffer’s argument may be more convincing for wealthy and 
influential Members; those with lesser ability to influence decision-making may find they have little 
opportunity to channel domestic priorities through WTO Committees. 
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participation of national parliaments is here viewed as simply another attempt to relocate the 
setting of power away from national legislatures.  
Internationalist accounts allow for the validity of decision-making at the international 
level, and are more optimistic about the democracy-preserving aspects of long-term consent to 
general rules. In this vein, Andrew Mitchell and Elizabeth Sheargold have argued that: 
assuming that the decision to accede to the WTO was initially made by democratically 
elected representatives, complying with an unpopular WTO ruling is not necessarily 
undemocratic. Rather, members are simply being held to follow rules that their 
governments agreed to uphold.
50
  
Similarly, at the WTO-sponsored NGO forum in Seattle in 1999, then Director-General Mike 
Moore argued that:  
Our decisions must be made by our Member States, agreements ratified by Parliaments 
and every two years Ministers meet to supervise our work. There’s a bit of a contradiction 
with people outside saying we are not democratic, when inside over 120 Ministers all 
elected by the people or appointed by elected Presidents, decide what we will do.
51
  
This was also echoed in a joint statement by three former WTO Directors-General — Arthur 
Dunkel, Peter Sutherland and Renato Ruggiero — who traced ‘public and political 
disenchantment with international institutions’ to, in part,  
a view that powerful international bodies are less accountable to the ordinary citizen than 
should be the case. It is a view we cannot share. It is governments which negotiate in 
institutions like the WTO, and governments are accountable to their citizens.
52
 
                                                 
50
  Mitchell & Sheargold 2009, 1078. Note also their framing of the question ‘Does popular will within 
democratic nations undermine compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement, and hence the effectiveness of 
global governance?’ first conflates compliance with WTO dispute settlement with the effectiveness of 
global governance, and second takes the ‘effectiveness of global governance’ as a matter of technocratic 
implementation. 
51
  PRESS/155. Similarly, Claude Barfield has argued that the ‘best means of achieving continued democratic 
legitimacy is for the WTO to remain a “government-to-government” organization, one in which 
governments take decisions in the WTO after having sorted through and resolved conflicting claims and 
the demands of competing interests in the domestic political process’: Barfield 2001a, 411.  
52
  Dunkel, Sutherland & Ruggiero 2001.  
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At the centre of most representative narratives is the concept of the ‘legitimacy chain’, a 
continuous chain of formal accountability between individuals and those making WTO rules 
and decisions. The idea is that through clear delegations of formal legal authority WTO rule- 
and decision-making can be made democratically legitimate. The role of law here is to 
facilitate such accountability through institutionalising requirements of legality and 
transparency and by providing for fair voting processes. As Howse notes, ‘[u]nder a 
representative democracy model, the problem of “democratic deficit” is essentially a problem 
of agency costs’.53 To this end, nationalists tend to emphasize the importance of national-level 
accountability mechanisms, seeking an end to ‘fast-tracking’ of trade agreements, increasing 
ex ante restrictions on trade negotiators, demanding ex post legislative approval of agreed 
rules, and even requiring referenda on the adoption of new WTO rules.
54
 Internationalists, too, 
may subscribe to some or all of these national-level mechanisms for legally controlling 
agents;
55
 however they place more emphasis on international-level accountability and 
transparency mechanisms. The WTO Secretariat, for instance, is notionally kept accountable 
through narrowly ascribed competences,
56
 annual reports to the Members, the appointment of 
the Director-General by the Ministerial Conference,
57
 the General Council’s control over the 
Secretariat’s budget,58 the requirement that the Director-General and Secretariat staff ‘not 
seek or accept instructions from any government or any other authority external to the 
WTO’,59 and the fact that officials are expected to internalize an ethos which prizes the 
‘international character’ of their responsibilities.60  
                                                 
53
  Howse 2003a, 83; Stein 2001, 490; Dahl 1999, 20. 
54
  See Howse 2003a, 83-9 for a fuller discussion of these accountability mechanisms. 
55
  Robert Howse points to the inclusion of a ‘rider’ placed by the US Senate on the Trade Promotion 
Authority for the US President that required the executive not to agree to any provisions that would require 
US trade remedy law to be amended: ibid 88. See also Petersmann 2002a, 63.  
56
  The regulations setting out the ‘powers, duties, conditions of service and term of office of the Director-
General’, which also determine the scope of the duties and conditions of service for Secretariat Staff, are 
determined by the Ministerial Council: WTO Agreement Article VI:2 and 3. See also Staff Regulations, 
WT/L/282. 
57
  WTO Agreement Article VI:2. 
58
  WTO Agreement Article VII:1. 
59
  WTO Agreement Article VI:4. 
60
  WTO Agreement Article VI:4. 
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The legitimacy chain argument is subject to two major criticisms. First, many WTO 
Members simply cannot make a claim to be democratic. Unlike the EU
61
 and MERCOSUR,
62
 
WTO law does not require Members to adhere to any particular form of government, let alone 
democratic government. Despite James Bacchus’s claim that the ‘vast majority’ of WTO 
Members are democracies,
63
 the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (‘EIUDI’) 
suggests otherwise. Of the 144 WTO Members represented in the EIUDI in 2014, only 24 
were classified as ‘full democracies’, another 50 were considered ‘flawed democracies’, 33 
were ‘hybrid regimes’ and 37 were ‘authoritarian regimes’.64 This is further complicated in 
the WTO as Members need not even be states; any ‘separate customs territory possessing full 
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in [the covered agreements]’ may accede to the WTO.65 As economically-
defined entities rather than comprehensive political states, these Members have even less 
claim to be channels for the broad ranging political preferences of their citizens. 
Second, any attempt to stretch the chain from the individual to the WTO results in the 
chain becoming too attenuated to provide a convincing basis for social legitimacy.
66
 Problems 
with access to Green Room meetings, the information and power asymmetries which 
                                                 
61
  See Treaty on European Union Articles 2, 6(1) and 49; European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of 
the Presidency, SN 100/1/93 Rev.1 (21 – 22 June 1993). 
62
  Cf MERCOSUR’s suspension of Paraguay in June 2012 under Articles 3 to 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol on 
Democratic Commitment following the Paraguayan impeachment of its President in the absence of due 
process: Nejamkis & Flor 2012.  
63
  Bacchus 2004, 668; see also McGinnis & Movsesian 2000, 588. 
64
  Economist Intelligence Unit 2014. The Polity IV Project’s (‘PIVP’) Global Report 2013, which focuses 
more on formal procedure to the exclusion of other factors, was more generous. Of the 141 WTO Members 
included in its State Fragility Index and Matrix 2013, 88 were considered to be institutionalised 
democracies, 22 uninstitutionalised democracies, 18 uninstitutionalised autocracies, and 11 
institutionalised autocracies, with two classified as undergoing state failure: Marshall & Cole 2014, 45-54. 
Considering that China is included in PIVP’s ‘institutionalised autocracies’, it can hardly be said that the 
non-democracies lack influence in WTO decision-making. Even for those that are democracies, the 
decisions of distant IGOs rarely have much of an impact on electoral campaigns, further weakening the 
accountability chain: see Woods & Narlikar 2001. 
65
  WTO Agreement Article XII:1.  
66
  ‘Between someone who actually got elected, and the director general of the WTO, there are so many miles 
that, in fact, he and his staff are accountable to no one’: Lori Wallach, quoted in Wallach & Naím 2000, 47. 
See also Dahl 1999, 19; Atik 2001, 457; Keohane & Nye 2001, 285; Buchanan & Keohane 2008, 37. 
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characterize WTO decision-making, the agency costs which separate WTO delegates from 
their home governments, and the agency costs which separate those governments from the 
preferences of their citizens in even the most democratic Members severely weaken any 
claims that individuals are able to hold WTO decision-makers accountable.
67
 Practices of 
agent selection and delegation in the WTO are not well-suited for democratically-oriented 
decision-making. Delegates and Secretariat members as are generally drawn from similar 
epistemic communities and share a particular functionally-oriented worldview centred on the 
importance of international trade. In contrast, at the national level, rules and decisions are 
made by elected legislators of general competence from (ideally) various backgrounds who 
are able to weigh competing values and interests against one another. Although the 
competences of government departments are more specialised, they operate within a 
framework of rules formulated with an eye to the system as a whole, and interact with other 
departments on a constitutionally ordered legal basis. In the WTO, delegations are composed 
of delegates from usually only one or two government departments, those concerned with 
trade and foreign affairs. Even at the Ministerial level, it is the trade and foreign ministers 
who attend.  
To counteract this problem, one set of proposals has sought to expand the range of 
governmental interests represented at the WTO.
68
 The idea is that by ‘increasing the 
participation of national representatives of the economic and social activities in the work of 
the WTO’ this could help improve the transparency and representativeness of WTO decision-
making processes.
69
 This could include, for instance, the creation of an advisory 
parliamentary body.
70
 A related set of proposals highlights the representative value of national 
parliaments, operating not just as filters for international rules but also active participants in 
the creation of those rules.
71
 In the WTO, this finds limited reflection in the operation of the 
                                                 
67
  See also Elsig 2010b. 
68
  Samantha Besson advocates ‘enhanced executive cooperation’ by ‘building a stronger secretariat general at 
the level of the WTO, but linking it at the same time to domestic executives through a committee whose 
role would be intergovernmental on the model of the EU Council’: Besson 2011, 27. 
69
  See ILA 2000, 193.  
70
  Ibid.  
71
  See Shaffer 2005b; Skaggs 2005; Hilf 2005; Mann 2005; Krajewski 2001; Steger 2009, 824-30. 
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biennial Parliamentary Conferences on the WTO.
72
 These conferences seek expressly to 
‘strengthen democracy at the international level by bringing a parliamentary dimension to 
multilateral cooperation on trade issues’.73 The WTO Secretariat also runs national and 
regional parliamentary workshops, and dispenses regular bulletins on WTO matters 
specifically for parliamentarians.
74
 However, these inter-parliamentary meetings and 
measures have no formal decision-making role in relation to the WTO, and several of the 
WTO’s major players simply do not attend.75  
Therefore although representative democracy is regularly invoked to justify the exercise 
of legal power by and through the WTO, it still faces several problems as a narrative of 
legitimacy. The appeal of representative democracy as a basis for moral legitimacy, so strong 
at the national level, is severely weakened at the international level for three reasons: first, 
because many WTO Members cannot plausibly claim to be democracies; second, because of 
the intractable agency costs associated with the legitimacy chain; and third, because of the 
continued empowerment of the executive branch of domestic governments at the expense of 
legislatures.
76
 Its almost exclusive focus on input-based/procedural mechanisms also again 
                                                 
72
  See generally Krajewski 2011. Greg Shaffer traces parliamentary involvement at the international level 
back to the 1999 WTO Ministerial in Seattle, where Members of the European Parliament presented a 
proposal to establish a Parliamentary Assembly for the WTO. The European Parliament was the main 
champion of the proposed Interparliamentary Assembly. The US was unenthused, and developing country 
reactions were mixed — many were wary of the extra resource demands that would be made by such a 
body, and felt that countries with larger delegations would be favoured, could undermine executive control 
of negotiation, and could be diverted by vested interests: see Shaffer 2005b, 400.  
73
  See WTO Website, ‘Parliamentary Conference on the WTO’.  
74
  Shaffer 2005b, 403 and 406. 
75
  Among others, the 2011 Conference did not include representatives from Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, or 
the USA. Gregory Shaffer has gone into some detail about how the US government and US Congress’s 
antipathy to global interparliamentarian meetings: ibid 394-7. Indeed, he notes that when he ‘raised the 
issue of congressional oversight and democratic control of the WTO with staff of Congress’s trade and 
foreign relations committees, as well as with the heads of staff of some congressional representatives, no 
one expressed much interest in interparliamentarian meetings. Such meetings were viewed as either purely 
symbolic or, even worse, legitimizing an illegitimate process’: at 397 (emphasis in original). 
76
  ‘You take the obedience claim of international law and couple it with the conflation of government and 
State which international law posits and you get nothing more than a monstrous empowerment of the 
executive branch at the expense of other political estates or an empowerment of those internal special 
interests who have a better capture of the executive branch’: Weiler 2004, 558. This echoes earlier 
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neglects issues of substance and outcome. Overall, this narrative treats international rule- and 
decision-making as an aggregative process, as if all that is necessary is to calculate the 
preferences of individuals as expressed through their Members to arrive at ‘the right 
decision’. In this way, it neglects the question of how WTO law may itself shape those 
preferences or the conditions under which Members are able to express them. Moreover, it 
deflects from the question of whether or not the decision reached is substantively desirable by 
once again (as with the consent and direct democracy narratives) relying exclusively on 
procedural inputs to determine the desirability of a given rule or decision. This failure to 
address the ideational and substantive dimensions of WTO rule- and decision-making renders 
the representative account of the WTO’s legitimacy seriously deficient.  
C Participatory Democracy 
The third major narrative of democratic legitimacy to manifest in WTO debates is the 
participatory narrative.
77
 As with the representative narrative, this narrative takes the 
individual, rather than the Member, as the central moral subject. This approach, however, 
abandons the Member as a normatively privileged legal vehicle for the transmission of 
collective will to the WTO in favour of more varied, often informal possibilities for individual 
engagement, including through NGOs, social movements and corporations.
78
 It is generally 
cosmopolitan in orientation. Although these narratives have the potential to be quite radical, 
in general their advocates recognize the continued ‘Member-driven’ formal basis for the 
WTO. There have been only a few isolated suggestions, for instance, that individuals be given 
legal subjecthood in the WTO.
79
 This does not mean, however, that the concept of the moral 
subjecthood of the individual has no relevance for how law is designed, interpreted, and 
implemented, or that WTO law itself has no impact on how we come to understand the idea of 
individual moral subjecthood.  
                                                                                                                                                        
observations by Max Weber: ‘Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy, in contrast to 
the democratic government of small homogeneous units’: Weber 1968, 983 (emphasis in original). 
77
  For a detailed investigation of public participation and WTO legitimacy, see Bonzon 2014. 
78
  For more on cosmopolitan approaches to international law and order, see Falk 1998; Held 1995; and 
Archibugi 2008. 
79
  See discussion in Shell 1995, 885 and 902-03 and associated citations. 
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There have been several advocates of participatory democracy in the WTO. In a 
comparatively early (1994) article on democratizing international trade decision-making, 
Robert Housman argued that representative democracy was ill-suited to an international 
sphere lacking free and fair elections. He instead proffered a participatory approach 
concerning ‘the democratic right of citizens to have knowledge of and participate in decisions 
that will effect [sic] their interests’.80 Similarly Peter Gerhart argues that the WTO should be 
considered as an ‘institution of international participatory democracy’, because it allows 
Members to participate in the trade policy-making of others.
81
 A participatory element is also 
present in Charnovitz’s work on the WTO and ‘cosmopolitics’.82 Defining ‘cosmopolitics’ as 
‘global political action transcending a strict state-to-state, or multilateral, basis’ which ‘has to 
be tested against democratic norms’,83 Charnovitz argues that, instead of states, ‘one should 
start with the most basic unit — the individual person’,84 whose views are then mediated 
through ‘cosmopolitan communities’ of their own creation (including, but not limited to, 
NGOs).
85
  
The participatory narrative continues to embrace accountability as a fundamental 
principle, but stresses the value of accountability mechanisms that operate alongside those 
provided by and in relation to the state/Member. This focus on accountability is often 
accompanied by the articulation of the principle of ‘affectedness’. That is, that the basis for 
participation does not lie in membership of a formally defined community (such as a 
Member), but rather on the basis that one is affected by a given decision or rule. In this way, 
some participatory narratives break free of the tendency shared by the direct and 
representative narratives to treat WTO rules and mechanisms as merely instruments for the 
propagation of Members’ preferences. Instead, they recognize that the operation of WTO 
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  Housman 1994, 703. 
81
  Gerhart 2004, 897.  
82
  Charnovitz 2002; Charnovitz 2004. 
83
  Charnovitz 2002, 299-300. 
84
  Ibid 310. 
85
  Cf Keohane & Nye 2001, 290: ‘In this sense of shared externalities and a degree of shared understanding, 
there may be some global publics even if there is no global community’. Daniel Bodansky treats ‘public 
participation’ as an independent ground of legitimacy, but does not consider it to be democratic as such: 
Bodansky 1999, 617-18. 
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rules and decisions may help to constitute the very communities in which such preferences are 
generated.
86
  
For some, however, the principle of affectedness provides an insufficient grounding for 
democratic community. These accounts require accountability to a well-defined demos that is 
the product of ‘underlying cultural commonalities and a shared identity’.87 It is the common 
identity provided by the sense of demos which allows for the political trade-offs necessary to 
effective democratic government. At the international level many argue that the ties of 
community and identity are too weak to sustain the notion of a membership-based demos. 
Commentators from Dahl,
88
 to Weiler,
89
 to Howse,
90
 to Pauwelyn
91
 have all noted variations 
on the theme that ‘governance with government and without demos means there is no 
purchase, no handle whereby we can graft democracy as we understand it from Statal settings 
on to the international arena’.92 
Charnovitz, by contrast, claims that arguments concerning the lack of a global demos are 
not ‘constructive’.93 Invoking the principle of affectedness, he argues that the lack of an 
equivalent demos or elected decision-makers at the international level ‘do not make the 
individual uninterested in participating in international organizations, institutions, and 
processes that affect her’.94 Indeed, ‘[i]ndividuals will create their own cosmopolitan 
communities of common concern’.95 Others have taken this criticism of demos in a different 
direction to redefine demos in terms of this sense of common concern.
96
  
                                                 
86
  See generally List & Koenig-Archibugi 2010. 
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  Ibid 81. Howse concurs with Stein that a demos requires a ‘certain community of common good and 
common expectations of the people that bridges the cultural differences’: Howse 2001a, 362, quoting Stein 
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  Weiler 2004, 560. 
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  Howse 2001a, 362. 
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  Weiler 2004, 560. 
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  Ibid 313. 
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  Ibid (citations omitted). 
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  See discussion in List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010, 81-6. 
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Participatory narratives have become bound up in legal debates in two main ways. The 
first emphasizes transnational regulatory transparency,
97
 which enables citizens of one 
Member to scrutinise trade-related regulations promulgated by another Member. Several 
WTO Agreements require Members to improve their regulatory transparency in this way. 
GATT Article X, for instance, requires Members to publish all trade-related laws, regulations, 
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application ‘in such a manner as to 
enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them’. Article 25.3 of the SCM 
Agreement requires Members to notify certain types of subsidies in a manner ‘sufficiently 
specific to enable other Members to evaluate the trade effects and to understand the operation 
of notified subsidy programmes’. Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards requires 
Members to immediately notify the Committee on Safeguards upon the decision to, among 
other things, apply or extend a safeguard measure, while Article 12.6 requires Members to 
notify the Committee of any ‘laws, regulations and administrative procedures relating to 
safeguards’. Article 12.3 requires Members proposing to apply or extend such measures to 
‘provide adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a 
substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned, with a view to, inter alia, reviewing 
the information provided […], exchanging views on the measure and reaching an 
understanding’ on ways to ‘maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other 
obligations to that existing under GATT 1994’98 between it and the relevant exporting 
Members. There are further notification and consultation requirements in Article 7 and Annex 
B of the SPS Agreement and throughout the TBT Agreement.
99
 
Participatory narratives have also featured strongly in debates over the role of NGOs in 
WTO decision-making. NGOs are considered to assist participatory democracy in the WTO in 
two ways. First, they improve the transparency of the system by scrutinizing the WTO’s 
activities and translating the technical elements of those activities into languages that can be 
more readily understood by laypeople (thereby improving accountability).
100
 The Guidelines 
for Arrangements on Relations with NGOs (‘NGO Guidelines’),101 for instance, provide that 
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  See, eg, McGinnis and Movsesian 2000, 547-8. 
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‘Members recognize the role NGOs can play to increase the awareness of the public in respect 
of WTO activities’.102  
Second, NGOs have the potential to increase opportunities for participation by giving 
voice to interests that are not well-represented by the Members’ delegates. The WTO does 
not, however, see the WTO as the appropriate forum for this form of NGO participation, 
stating in those same Guidelines:  
there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be 
directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. Closer consultation and 
cooperation with NGOs can also be met constructively through appropriate processes at 
the national level where lies primary responsibility for taking into account the different 
elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making.
103
  
Similarly, proposals for an Advisory Economic and Social Committee in which NGO 
representatives would advise the WTO have largely fallen on deaf ears.
104
  
The argument that greater NGO participation in WTO rule- and decision-making is 
necessarily more democratic has drawn many critics. One strand of criticism notes that NGOs 
dealing with ‘non-trade’ concerns are vastly outnumbered by industry groups and that their 
contributions to WTO legal debates are likely to be weighted accordingly.
105
 Another strand 
highlights that most NGOs come from wealthy, developed countries; they are thus perceived 
as representing Northern concerns without taking into account the political and economic 
                                                 
102
  Article V of the WTO Agreement provides that the ‘General Council may make appropriate arrangement 
for consultation and cooperation with [NGOs] concerned with matters related to those of the WTO’. See 
also Petersmann 2001, 108-09. Howse suggests the formation of a more radical ‘Citizen’s Task Force’ on 
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  NGO Guidelines, WT/L/162, para VI. 
104
  Bonzon 2014, 231-4. 
105
  See, eg, Edwards & Zadek 2003, 202 and 208-11. Contra Hanegraaff, Beyers & Braun 2011, who argue 
that there is ‘no systematic underrepresentation of non-business interests compared to business interests’ 
(at 462) and that few industry groups appear to be maintaining a long-term lobbying presence in the WTO 
(at 468). That said, in recent years this could be attributed to the private sector’s continuing disappointment 
of the Doha Round and the diversion of its attention to the negotiation of regional trade agreements. 
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issues of concern to the South.
106
 A third (representative) strand suggests that NGOs simply 
interfere with and distract from the formal mechanisms of accountability at the state level — 
Jeffery Atik criticizes NGO involvement in WTO decision-making on the basis that ‘NGOs, 
as wonderful as they may be, are hardly reliable channels of the popular will’.107  
The participatory narrative is not as philosophically unconvincing as the direct narrative, 
and it can at times complement rather than contradict the representative narrative. Its 
legitimating power nonetheless remains limited. Although the participatory narrative does 
away with many of the problems of accounting for the exercise of legal power by non-
Members, it does so at the expense of introducing additional problems of agency and 
representation. When it comes to NGOs, it is unclear on whose behalf they can claim to 
speak. Although NGOs may assist in keeping national and international bureaucrats 
accountable, the NGOs then make their own claims to expert authority in the service of 
specific agendas.  
In addition, the participatory narrative seriously exacerbates the problems of political and 
technical complexity identified in relation to the consent narratives. The notification and 
enquiry requirements described above require the development of particular forms of 
knowledge which are framed in accordance with the technical vocabularies that have grown 
up around WTO disciplines of safeguards, subsidies and the like.
108
 They require masses of 
data to be collected, categorised, and represented in accordance with associated sets of expert 
professional vocabularies and methodologies. Once published, this information requires 
further armies of technical experts to scrutinise and dissect the published claims. The 
participatory narratives that have been advanced to date in relation to the WTO have not made 
any attempt to grapple with the law and legitimacy implications of such a turn to expertise or 
the greater reliance on more complex and inaccessible representations of knowledge about the 
world.  
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  For a fuller discussion see Joseph 2009, 321-2; Bhagwati 2001, 27; Shaffer 2001, 62-74; cf Sjöstedt 2012, 
99-100. 
107
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Finally, through the principle of affectedness, the participatory narrative attempts to 
break free of the exclusive focus on process and inputs as the foundation for legitimacy. The 
principle of affectedness gestures towards a broader substantive commitment to how the 
WTO should operate by requiring a degree of sensitivity to the distributive consequences of 
rule- and decision-making. Its effectiveness in this regard is nonetheless limited, as its 
solution to the question of how to achieve better outcomes for all those affected is ultimately 
procedural — better outcomes will be produced if those affected have a say in the processes 
that generate those outcomes.  
D Deliberative Democracy 
The fourth and final democratic narrative addressed by this chapter is that of deliberative 
democracy. Markus Krajewski and Robert Howse were among the first to draw attention to 
the deliberative possibilities of WTO rules at the advent of the millennium, and over the last 
decade calls to make WTO decision-making more deliberative have become more 
common.
109
 The legal requirements of deliberative democracy are not necessarily inconsistent 
with those of direct, representative, or participatory democracy — indeed, some elements of 
participatory democracy pursue similar notions of citizen empowerment. However, although 
deliberative democracy recognizes the importance of individual will and participation, it 
places a greater emphasis on the value of public deliberation and public reason in shaping 
democratic decision-making. In the words of Joshua Cohen:  
citizens in [a deliberative democracy] share a commitment to the resolution of problems 
of collective choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as 
legitimate in so far as they establish the framework for free public deliberation.
110
  
                                                 
109
  This follows a pattern taking place more generally: ‘Increasingly, proposals to overcome the democratic 
deficit of international governance are rooted in deliberative models of legitimation, following Jürgen 
Habermas’ discourse theory’: Nanz 2006, 68. See, eg, Howse 2000b; Krajewski 2001 and 2011; Verweij & 
Josling 2003; Steffek 2003; Kapoor 2004; Chimni 2004; Evenett 2008; Higgott & Erman 2010; von 
Bogdandy & Venzke 2012. 
110
  Cohen 1989, 21. Cohen enumerates four criteria for deliberative democratic decision-making: that they be 
free of coercion; that participants get an equal chance to deliberate; that deliberative outcomes are based on 
reasons; and that consensus is directed towards the common good: Cohen 1996, 99. 
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Deliberation is supposed to be a communicative process, in which individuals exchange and 
respond to reasons as equals while adopting a reflexive posture in relation to their own 
arguments. Deliberation is thus ‘arguing and not bargaining’.111  
Deliberative democracy aims not only at fair decision-making processes, but also at 
‘better’ decision-making.112 Consequently, deliberative democracy seeks to link democratic 
inputs and outputs in a way that the other democratic models addressed above do not. In 
Habermas’s words: 
democratic will formation draws its legitimating force not from a previous convergence 
of settled ethical convictions, but both from the communicative presuppositions that 
allow the better arguments to come into play in various forms of deliberation and from 
the procedures that secure fair bargaining processes.
113
  
‘Better arguments’ are to arise naturally under conditions which encourage communication 
rather than strategic bargaining.
114
 This faith in deliberative processes to produce superior 
outcomes is typical. For Higgott and Erman, ‘fair deliberative procedures and equal respect 
and participation’ must be institutionalized ‘to promote the democratic values of justice and 
equality’.115 Verweij and Josling go as far as to propose deliberative democracy as a 
counterweight to a Weberian process of rationalization and bureaucratization, thereby 
preventing bureaucratic self-interest from overtaking the public interest in law and policy 
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  Habermas 1996b, 24 (emphasis added).  
114
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  Higgott & Erman 2010, 463. They see the WTO as having ‘ventured further down this discursive route 
than any of the other international economic institutions’: at 464. 
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making.
116
 Deliberative narratives thus claim to provide moral and epistemic legitimacy 
benefits that improve the quality of decision-making in service of the public interest while 
encouraging participants to accept the resulting decisions.
117
 In this sense deliberative 
democracy, unlike direct and representative democracy, is meant to be more than merely 
‘aggregative’, or input-oriented. This can lead to a tension in deliberative narratives between a 
voluntaristic dimension that emphasizes equal participation in consensually-oriented decision-
making processes, and an epistemic dimension that prioritizes expert knowledge and the 
production of ‘reasonable results’.118 
Deliberative democracy also provides a very different account of human will and agency 
to aggregative accounts of democracy, as represented by the direct and representative 
narratives. Instead of treating preferences as pre-formed and coherent, they are instead 
characterized as amenable to change (including as a result of communication and persuasion) 
and formed in and through inter-subjective social contexts.
119
 There is thus a much greater 
emphasis on informal processes of opinion- and will-formation that come before and after the 
moments of formal decision-making. Attention shifts to the ability of an informal public 
sphere to affect formal decision-making processes over time. As such, ‘[c]ommunicative 
power is exercised in the manner of a siege. It influences the premises of judgment and 
decision-making in the political system without intended to conquer the system itself’.120 This 
                                                 
116
  This ‘points the way towards building an “output” argument in favour of democratizing and pluralizing 
multilateral decision-making. If Weber’s analysis is valid, then the lack of democracy among multilateral 
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  Habermas 1996a, 486-7.  
 126 
 
also provides a potential way around the demos problem. As noted by Nanz, ‘instead of 
presuming that democratic legitimacy presupposes a certain pre-political homogeneity, 
[deliberative democracy] claims that democratic legitimacy is ultimately created by the 
communicative power of the public as a collective body’.121  
1 Deliberation in the WTO 
Deliberative narratives in the WTO tend to focus on the benefits of democratic deliberation at 
one of two levels: at the international level, focusing directly on WTO rules and procedures, 
and at the national level, focusing on the effect of such rules and procedures on national 
decision-making. To begin with international deliberation, even Pascal Lamy, then Director-
General of the WTO, referred to the ‘deliberative function’ of the WTO, pursuant to which 
the WTO is ‘a platform for governments to exchange views on important issues relating to 
trade, to assess whether existing arrangements need to be revisited, and to analyse policy 
challenges facing the international community’.122  
i Deliberation and WTO Rule-Making 
Arguably the most important sites for deliberation in the WTO are the trade negotiation 
rounds, which have the potential to create longstanding and binding rules across any area on 
which the Members can reach formal agreement. Several commentators have noted that these 
rounds are characterized by strategic, interest-based bargaining, rather than open, 
communicative argumentation. In 2004, Ilan Kapoor criticized the deliberative failings of 
WTO negotiation rounds. Assessing WTO rule-making procedures against an expressly 
Habermasian ‘ideal speech situation’ (emphasizing inclusion, non-coercion, and 
openness/symmetry), Kapoor pointed to familiar problems with Green Room negotiations, the 
lack of NGO involvement, the US threats to withdraw from the Uruguay Round, and the lack 
of developing country capacity. Kapoor concluded that WTO rule-making falls well short of 
deliberative requirements.
123
 In 2006, BS Chimni made similar criticisms, adding further 
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suggestions for reform including amending the VCLT to ‘eliminate the use of economic and 
political coercion in multilateral negotiations’, assigning a stronger role to national 
parliaments in negotiating and ratifying WTO Agreements, moving from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ 
consensus, and considering alternatives to the single undertaking approach.
124
  
In the intervening years, the WTO initiatives to increase internal and external 
transparency, open up Green Room negotiations, improve Member capacity, and augment 
opportunities for developing Member participation have represented generally positive, if 
small, steps forward for advocates of deliberative democracy in the WTO. Higgott and Erman 
even characterize these changes as being driven in part by developing country attempts to 
enhance their ‘deliberative impact’.125 Such improvements are, however, widely recognized as 
quite limited and can only be thought of as representing the first step in a much longer 
process. The continuing disparities in Member capacity, the confines of the single 
undertaking, the continued emphasis on consensus-based decision-making, and raw self-
interest have all continued to allow power and bargaining to trump reasoned deliberation.  
ii Deliberation and WTO Decision-Making 
Deliberation has also been argued to play a role for the legitimacy of ongoing WTO decision-
making processes.
126
 There is less literature critiquing the deliberative potential of the WTO 
in relation to general decision-making as opposed to primary rule-making, reflecting the 
‘missing middle’ of WTO activity.127 What material there is largely concerns how 
deliberation can be encouraged either through the increased involvement of NGOs or through 
augmenting the inter-parliamentary dimension of the WTO.  
Another potential site for ongoing deliberation may be found in WTO committees and 
working groups. Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott both draw attention to the ‘hidden world of 
WTO governance’ in the WTO committee system, emphasising their value as sites of 
information exchange, norm elaboration and regulatory learning.
128
 To this end, Lang and 
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Scott’s contribution may be contrasted with Shaffer’s earlier investigation of the Committee 
on Trade and the Environment, which concluded that Committee negotiations were largely 
driven according to the logic of a two-level intergovernmental game.
129
 Lang and Scott do not 
expressly draw on the vocabulary of deliberative democracy. Nonetheless their analysis has 
clear resonances with the deliberative narratives discussed here.
130
 
The possibilities for deliberation in this context nonetheless appear rather limited. 
Richard Steinberg critiques Lang and Scott’s findings on the basis that they do not sufficiently 
question the possibilities for the strategic manipulation of information by committee 
representatives or attend to the problems of information asymmetry.
131
 Steinberg also 
considers the examples of ‘norm elaboration’ provided by Lang and Scott to be essentially 
insignificant.
132
 In the process, however, Steinberg neglects to address the ideational 
dimension of Lang and Scott’s argument, which is that these WTO committees provide legal-
institutional structures which affect how Members formulate and reassess their 
understandings of their interests.
133
 How the balance is struck between deliberative instances 
of preference- and interest-formation and between strategic gaming by the relevant delegates 
is likely to vary from committee to committee and from issue to issue. Further research is 
required to determine just how significant any deliberative effects are. 
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2 WTO Rules as Promoting National Democratic Deliberation 
i Promoting National Democratic Deliberation during WTO Accessions 
Deliberative narratives may also act to legitimate the WTO through claiming that WTO rules 
exert a beneficial deliberative influence on law- and decision-making at the national level. 
These arguments tend to come in one of three forms. The first claims that WTO rules can be 
used to encourage national deliberation when making choices about whether or not to commit 
to WTO rules. There have, for instance, arguably been some small steps to improve national 
deliberative capacity in relation to WTO accessions. Aaronson and Abouharb note that during 
its accession process Saudi Arabia was pushed to create a website to disseminate trade policy 
information, to ‘publish notices of proposed measures related to trade and to provide an 
opportunity for “interested persons” to provide comments and views on such measures’.134  
The notionally deliberative potential of such measures, however, is undercut by the 
manner in which the WTO Secretariat has encouraged them. Aaronson and Abouharb point 
out that Vanuatu’s accession was stalled by a public backlash against the changes required for 
accession. In its review of the situation, the WTO Secretariat proposed two forms of 
consultation: one aimed at ‘determining private views’ for the purposes of ‘deciding the 
content of negotiating proposals’, the other in the form of ‘frequent national seminars aimed 
and stimulating debate and arriving at an overall viewpoint’, ‘mostly to create a sense of 
public ownership’.135 The aim here appeared not to be to stimulate discussion to enable more 
informed and considered decisions, but rather to normalize the idea of trade liberalization: 
‘[i]f local players feel that they have been consulted, they are more likely to commit to any 
final outcome even if they disagree with it’.136 ‘Stimulating debate’ thus appears largely 
geared to legitimating a set of pre-determined economic baseline rules through participation 
in accession process; there is little sense that such participation would be used to highlight 
local concerns about WTO rules. ‘Deliberation’ in WTO accessions thus seems aimed at 
encouraging, to use David Held’s words, homo credens rather than homo politicus.137 
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ii Promoting National Deliberation through WTO Rules 
A second approach suggests that WTO rules serve deliberative democracy at a national level 
by constraining regulatory processes in a way that promotes public deliberation and reason-
giving. Jan Tumlir argued that the GATT rules served a constitutional function in improving 
the ‘quality of democratic discussion’ by providing protection for private property rights.138 
Robert Keohane, Stephen Macedo and Andrew Moravcsik similarly argue for recognition of 
the ‘democracy-enhancing’ aspects of multilateralism, in helping ‘domestic democratic 
institutions restrict the power of special interest factions, protect individual rights, and 
improve the quality of democratic deliberation, while also increasing capacities to achieve 
important public purposes’.139 These arguments seem less convincing when one considers the 
potential for regulatory capture of WTO rules themselves. Indeed, many of the intellectual 
property protections in the TRIPS Agreement appear to provide a quintessential example of 
regulatory capture.
140
  
In addition, Robert Howse has suggested that the science provisions in the SPS 
Agreement be viewed as enhancing domestic deliberation. SPS Agreement Article 2.3 
requires that any SPS measure be ‘based on scientific principles and is not maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence’, while Article 5.1 requires that such measures be based on a 
‘risk assessment’. These ‘science provisions’ have been heavily litigated before the WTO’s 
dispute settlement organs, and the resulting decisions have frequently been framed in a way 
                                                 
138
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that casts the normativity of WTO rules against the democratic autonomy of individual 
Members.
141
  
Howse seeks to recast the relationship between the science provisions and democratic 
government by considering how they might serve a deliberative account of democracy. He 
argues that the role of science may be transformed ‘if one understands democracy not simply 
in terms of popular will and decision, but as a form of legitimation of power that depends on a 
conception of public justification and deliberative reason’.142 Following Cass Sunstein and 
Richard Pildes, he argues that  
the appropriate role of scientific expertise in the regulatory process is not to trump 
citizens’ intuitive judgments about which risks are acceptable and which not, but rather to 
help ensure that citizens’ judgments result from an appropriately structured deliberative 
process.
143
  
To this end, Howse argues that the Appellate Body in EC — Hormones read the ‘risk 
assessment’ provisions of SPS Agreement Article 5.1 as only bringing ‘science in as one 
necessary component of the regulatory process, without making it decisive’.144 This is 
because of the distinction made between setting the appropriate level of protection (which is 
not governed by science) and requiring evidence that there is a risk to be protected against; 
the separation of risk assessment and risk management; and the relatively open 
epistemological approach taken by the Appellate Body to scientific evidence, in which it 
permitted risk assessments to be made on the basis of ‘nonmainstream’ science.145 Similarly, 
in a later article, Howse argues that neither the SPS Agreement’s science provisions nor the 
TBT Agreement’s disciplines need be viewed as ‘constraining democratic regulatory choices’, 
arguing that they instead only discipline ‘the processes by which those choices are arrived at’. 
As such, these rules ‘may be understood as democracy-enhancing with respect to regulatory 
processes’.146 
                                                 
141
  For a further discussion of these issues that complicates this binary, see Peel 2004; Peel 2010, ch 7. 
142
  Howse 2000b, 2334. 
143
  Ibid 2335, referring to Sunstein & Pildes 1997. 
144
  Howse 2000b, 2341. 
145
  See, eg, Canada — Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para 194. 
146
  Howse 2003a, 90-1 (emphasis in original). 
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Yet Howse is too quick to argue that the SPS Agreement does not make science 
‘decisive’, and that the science provisions necessarily improve the democratic credentials of 
national regulatory processes. A key tenet of deliberative democracy is that the processes 
themselves must also be open to reflexive contestation, but Howse treats the science 
provisions as fixed, ignoring whether a populace may wish to structure their regulatory 
processes less rigidly. Many of the deliberative benefits elaborated by Howse could be 
maintained, for instance, by requiring that Members utilise risk assessment and scientific 
evidence as part of the regulatory process, but then allow such evidence to be counted as only 
one factor in the decision as to whether to implement an SPS measure. Although Howse 
acknowledges that citizens may still desire to enact a regulation that is not considered 
scientifically rational, and that failing to honour the citizen’s choice would be to ‘favor an 
artificial and cryptically elitist conception of democratic deliberation’, he does not resolve this 
issue. His appeal to the ability of ‘openness in government’ to improve trust in expert 
regulation cannot bridge the gap in all cases. As such, treating the science provisions as 
enhancing deliberative democracy falls into the trap of losing sight of the democratic subject 
— it becomes deliberation without the democracy. 
iii Regulatory Transparency
147
 and ‘Improving’ National Democracy 
A third approach claims that the WTO Agreements enhance national deliberation through 
their creation of a panoply of transparency, notification, and consultation measures, some of 
which were discussed in relation to the participatory democracy narratives in Part III(C) 
above. Certain provisions of the WTO Agreements concerning transparency and notification 
procedures arguably go further than improving opportunities for participation to encourage a 
species of regulatory deliberation. GATT Article X, for instance, requires that: 
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, 
made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the valuation 
of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to 
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of 
payments therefor, or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, 
warehousing inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be published 
promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted 
                                                 
147
  See generally Wolfe 2003. 
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with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy which are in force between the 
government or a governmental agency of any contracting party and the government or 
governmental agency of any other contracting party shall also be published. 
Annex B (in conjunction with Article 7) of the SPS Agreement takes things further. It requires 
that Members publish promptly all SPS regulations that are not based on international 
standards, and which may have a significant impact on trade ‘in such a manner as to enable 
interested parties to become acquainted with them’. Annex B also requires that Members set 
up enquiry points to provide ‘answers to all reasonable questions from interested Members as 
well as for the provision of relevant documents’ regarding SPS regulations and associated 
procedures.
148
 Members are required to give notice ‘at an early stage, when amendments can 
still be introduced and comments taken into account’149 of any proposed SPS regulation 
which would not be substantially the same as an international standard, including the 
‘objective and rationale’ of the regulation. They are consequently required to provide at least 
brief written reasons for their choice of SPS regulation. Finally, Members must ‘allow 
reasonable time for other Members to make comments in writing, discuss these comments 
upon request, and take the comments and the results of the discussions into account’.150  
Annex B thus requires Members to engage in quite a detailed process of information 
exchange, comment and justification. It requires Members to make certain information 
available to others, and requires them to offer reasons for their decisions to make particular 
regulatory choices (even if those reasons need only be brief). Moreover, Members are 
required to discuss comments made by other Members, and thus may have to elaborate further 
on their reasons for particular regulation. As they must take the results of the discussion into 
account, this also allows for the possibility that Members will change their laws and 
regulations as a result of such deliberation. That said, it is questionable as to how much of the 
international consultation associated with SPS rules may be considered open and contestatory 
in nature and how much it involves conversations between the like-minded members of a 
given epistemic community. 
                                                 
148
  Similar provisions regarding enquiry points may be found in Article 10 of the TBT Agreement. See also 
TBT Agreement Annex 3.  
149
  SPS Agreement Annex B para 5(b). 
150
  SPS Agreement Annex B para 5(d).  
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The WTO also provides for more generalized instances of regulatory assessment through 
the TPRM. The administration of the TPRM is one of the permanent central functions of the 
WTO.
151
 Its purpose is to ‘contribute to improved adherence’ to WTO rules and ‘the smoother 
functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and 
understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members’.152 Assessments are understood 
to take place ‘against the background of the wider economic and developmental needs, 
policies and objectives of the Member concerned, as well as of its external environment’.153 
Each Member must ‘report regularly’ to the TPRB, another emanation of the WTO General 
Council, which carries out the trade policy reviews.
154
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues for 
greater use of the TPRM as a mechanism for encouraging national deliberation,
155
 while 
Aaronson and Abouharb portray trade policy reviews as sites where Members can ‘openly 
debate another member’s trade conduct’ while also discussing ‘the broad context in which 
trade occurs’.156  
Trade policy reviews are technically carried out by the TPRB on the basis of a report 
made by the Member under review and an economic report formulated by the WTO 
Secretariat.
157
 To date, the approach taken by the Secretariat in providing such reports appears 
to have undermined the potential deliberation-enhancing effects of the TPRM. Valentin 
Zahrnt views the TPRM as a vehicle straightforwardly designed for promoting a particular 
vision of trade policy liberalization
158
 rather than a process by which Members can push back 
and give reasons for alternative regulatory choices. Howse, too, notes that the TPRM’s 
‘democratic potential [...] has not been realized, due to the narrowness of the policy 
perspective adopted in examining Members’ policies and a failure to realize the potential of 
broad civil society input’.159  
                                                 
151
  See WTO Agreement Article III:4. 
152
  TPRM Agreement para A(i).  
153
  TPRM Agreement para A(ii). 
154
  TPRM Agreement para D. 
155
  Petersmann 2008d. 
156
  Aaronson & Abouharb 2011, 387. 
157
  For a more detailed breakdown of how trade policy reviews operate in practice, see Ghosh 2010, 419. 
158
  ‘In the future, the main objectives of the TPRM should be to shape domestic politics’: Zahrnt 2009. 
159
  Howse 2003a, 92. Cf Bonzon 2014, 72-6. 
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Although some of the discussion in trade policy reviews does address issues of political 
participation, transparency, and due process, these are rarely posited as being intrinsically 
valuable, and instead are linked to the development of more predictable and trustworthy 
economic arrangements. China, for instance, in 2008, claimed that implementing new trade-
related laws had helped to create ‘a more rule-based predictable business environment, which 
was particularly important for foreign investors’.160 Advances in the rule of law may 
ultimately be beneficial, but the implementation of market liberalization measures that benefit 
foreign investors should not be confused with the implementation of democracy. 
3 The Limits of Deliberative Narratives 
i Forgetting the deliberatively democratic subject 
Many accounts linking deliberative democracy and the WTO fall into one of four common 
traps. The first trap is losing sight of the democratic subject. Some accounts of the WTO’s 
legitimacy emphasize the value of reasoned and efficient deliberation by experts at the 
expense of broader participation. For instance William Smith and James Brassett, as well as 
Jens Steffek, have expressly attempted to detach deliberation from democratic ideals at the 
international level.
161
 In the process, they risk abandoning the democratic premise of the 
deliberative narrative in favour of a more recognizably technocratic approach.
162
 John Dryzek 
                                                 
160
  WT/TPR/M/199, para 42. See also Aaronson & Abouharb 2011, 387-8. 
161
  Smith and Brassett ‘understand deliberation in a minimal fashion as a process of public reasoning geared 
toward generating political decisions or public opinion about how to solve shared problems’: Smith & 
Brassett 2008, 72 (emphasis in original); Steffek 2003, 251 and 258. 
162
  ‘There is especially the danger of a slippery slope from deliberative politics, through epistemic 
communities, to the rule of experts’: Buchstein and Jörke 2012, 278, citing Joerges and Neyer’s work on 
comitology as representing the slippery slope: see Joerges 2002; Joerges & Neyer 1997. Similarly, Martin 
Shapiro cites Joerges and Neyer as exemplary of when ‘[t]he whole paraphernalia of deliberation is 
employed as a cover for technocratic government. […] In transnational regimes, the desire to transcend 
national logrolling, the need to establish some sort of non-electoral legitimacy, and the very real technical 
complexity of transnational regulatory issues create a natural push toward technocratic government under 
the camouflage of deliberation’: Shapiro 2005, 351. 
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even reconfigures the very meaning of ‘democratic’ to abandon the human subject in favour 
of competing ‘discourses’.163  
ii False trade-offs between deliberation and efficiency 
A second, and related, trap is to assume that there is a straightforward trade-off between 
deliberative legitimacy and decision-making efficiency. Creating more opportunities for 
deliberation in trade rounds may only create more opportunities for Members to entrench their 
bargaining positions. Nonetheless, others have argued that deliberation may serve to increase 
efficiency if used properly. While negotiation rounds and the limited output of Ministerials 
are still largely characterized by bargaining rather than arguing or deliberation, there is a 
penumbra of deliberative activity at other stages of the policy cycle which lead up to, 
surround and shape these bargaining moments. Thomas Risse has emphasized that 
[e]mpirical research demonstrates that arguing and persuasion matters particularly during 
specific phases of negotiations. […] processes of persuasion are particularly relevant 
during agenda-setting and pre-negotiations.
164
  
Similarly, Simon Evenett asks whether the current Doha impasse could ‘have been have been 
avoided had there been more deliberation before the Round was hurriedly launched in 
2001’.165 It may well be that institutionalizing deliberative procedures during the agenda-
setting and pre-negotiation phases will allow consensus to be reached more easily in future 
(although there is little that this can do for the Doha Round). At present, however, the WTO 
does not have any specific institutionalized procedures relating to how agenda-setting and 
pre-negotiation should be structured; law is yet to be seen as a productive mode of 
intervention in this regard.
166
  
                                                 
163
  ‘Democracy here cannot be interpreted in electoral terms, as universal suffrage for everyone affected by an 
international issue. Transnational discursive democracy does not have to be integrated with any particular 
set of formal institutions […]. Democracy is about communication as well as voting, about social learning 
as well as decision-making, and it is the communicative aspects that for the moment can most 
straightforwardly be pursued in the international system’: Dryzek 2006, 25. 
164
  Risse 2004, 302 (footnote omitted). 
165
  Evenett 2008, 4. 
166
  Chimni suggests that the VCLT be amended to cover ‘all aspects and phases of the process of negotiations 
including pre-negotiations and agenda setting’ to improve effective participation for members in 
international economic institutions: Chimni 2006, 17. It seems unlikely that such amendments to the 
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iii Neglecting the contingency of WTO rules 
The third trap is that of losing sight of the contingency of WTO rules. In this trap, certain 
WTO rules are posited as objectively enhancing democratic deliberation. Those arguing for 
the deliberative value embodied in these rules then tend to ignore that those rules are 
themselves socially produced and subject to contestation. This is perhaps most obvious in 
Petersmann’s deontological defence of a right to trade in international law,167 but is not 
otherwise uncommon. Steffek, for instance, points to the ‘moment of consensus in regime 
foundation’ which ‘provides consensual reference points for the regime’s discursive 
justification and thus legitimacy’.168 One the moment of foundation has passed, it seems, 
these ‘reference points’ are no longer subject to debate. Such perspectives are particularly 
evident in relation to those who argue for the constitutionalization of WTO rules. After all, 
domestic constitutional law scholars such as Bruce Ackerman have argued that full popular 
involvement in law-making is only necessary or even desirable at key ‘constitutional 
moments’ — of which he argues that the US has had only three in its over 200 year history.169  
It is, however, a problem in relation to many of the WTO’s rules which enjoy nothing 
like a broad constitutional consensus, and they did not originate in anything approaching a 
deliberative context. This is particularly problematic as the WTO’s ongoing negotiating 
mandate is limited, even if that mandate is broader than often assumed. The WTO’s aims are 
formulated broadly, and it is generally recognized that there is no natural boundary to the idea 
of ‘trade concerns’. Nonetheless, the WTO remains an institution operated by actors schooled 
and socialized in very particular languages of law, economics, and trade policy, which 
formally addresses Members as predominantly economic actors, and generates and enforces 
rules aimed at, among other things, non-protectionism, trade liberalization, and efficient good 
governance. When Members negotiate with one another during trade rounds, discourses of 
public health and the environment may be salient but these discourses do not provide the 
bases for specific WTO rules — rather they provide discursive spaces around which 
                                                                                                                                                        
VCLT, or equivalent formal provisions for the WTO specifically, are likely to be forthcoming any time 
soon. 
167
  See Petersmann 1991. See also Petersmann 2002b; contra Howse 2002b and Alston 2002; cf Petersmann 
2002c. See further Petersmann 2008a; contra Howse 2008; cf Petersmann 2008b. 
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  Steffek 2003, 263-4. 
169
  Ackerman 1991, 40-1. 
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multilateral trade rules are built. While the WTO is not a ‘mono-culture’ in that it covers 
issues ranging from intellectual property rights to telecommunications,
170
 it still views these 
diverse areas through the lens of ‘international trade’, rather than, say, human rights or 
innovation.  
The WTO thus provides a profoundly different setting to that of domestic legislatures, 
which are usually imbued with the general competence to weigh all possible arguments 
against one another for the purpose of making laws across all relevant fields. Von Bogdandy 
and Venzke describe this as the ‘requirement of generality’ — that is, the requirement that 
‘the democratic legislature is the central place of norm production and legitimation’ and that 
‘procedures in [the democratic legislature] are thematically unsettled and open to all kinds of 
competing perspectives’, as well as ‘open-ended’.171 The likelihood of satisfying such a norm 
of generality in a functionally-oriented international institution such as the WTO is effectively 
nil without a profound transformation in the way the WTO is understood and operated.
172
 
Calls to democratize the WTO in this way may be seen as a more demanding procedural 
accompaniment to calls to further empower the WTO to deal directly with various ‘other’ 
issues, such as human rights and the environment.
173
  
The problem of generality may be alleviated somewhat, however, if the WTO is recast as 
merely one player among many in the international system — as the carrier of a particular 
family of trade-related discourses which are, at least to some extent, permeable, reflexive, and 
capable of engaging with discourses in diffuse processes of international interaction.
174
 In this 
sense, and bearing in mind the limits of domestic analogies, the WTO could be viewed as 
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  Bronckers 2001, 44-5. 
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  See Bronckers 2001 arguing for an expansion in the ambit of the WTO, claiming it would be ‘salutory’ if 
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rights’: Klabbers 2005, 291. 
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more akin to a government department than a government
175
 — but without all of the 
attendant legal and political safeguards to ensure that its powers remain bounded and that the 
interests it was created to serve do not swallow competing interests. This would appear to take 
some of the edge of the demands that the WTO itself be democratic,
176
 as long as it forms part 
of an overall democratic international system. There is, however, hardly such a system in 
place at present, and it is well beyond the scope of this chapter to engage with this highly 
distant possibility more fully.
177
  
4 The Distance between Deliberative Democratic Ideals and Practical Reality 
The fourth trap lies in ignoring the disparities between the ideals of deliberative democratic 
theory and the practical realities of the operation of power. As regards the WTO, this requires 
careful attendance to Member disparities in legal and expert capacity. Deliberation only 
serves autonomy in a universal sense if all participants are able to participate on an equal 
footing. If there are substantial resource and information asymmetries that cannot easily be 
resolved, deliberation may deteriorate into a mere process of justifying the actions of the 
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  Jeremy Waldron argues that states should be ‘recognized by [international law] as trustees for the people 
committed to their care’: Waldron 2011, 325; Alexander Somek paraphrases this as arguing that states 
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  See Verweij & Josling 2003, 11; Krisch 2010, ch 8; Besson 2011, 27; von Bogdandy & Venzke 2012, 36-
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powerful.
178
 Martin Shapiro is particularly sceptical of the purported virtues of deliberation, 
whether at the national or at the global level:  
[T]here is little reason to believe that people with substantial, long-term, material interests 
in achieving a particular outcome are going to abandon those interests and their 
dedication to those outcomes as sweet reason emerges from the talk fest.
179
 
Indeed, even Habermas does not see global society as particularly well-suited to legitimation 
through deliberation. Arguing against the legitimating potential of a world state, he claims 
that: 
Within the framework of a common political culture, negotiation partners also have 
recourse to common value orientations and shared conceptions of justice, which make an 
understanding beyond instrumental-rational agreements possible. But on the international 
level this “thick” communicative embeddedness is missing. And a “naked” compromise 
formation that simply reflects back the essential features of classical power politics is an 
inadequate beginning for world domestic policy.
180
 
As such, he argues that ‘[r]ather than a [world] state, it has to find a less demanding basis of 
legitimacy in the organizational forms of an international negotiation system’.181 The role of 
international institutions would then be to strengthen the deliberative/communicative 
processes of the nation-state — for instance, by allowing for greater participation by NGOs 
which ‘would strengthen the legitimacy of the procedure insofar as mid-level transnational 
decision-making processes could then be rendered transparent for national public spheres’.182  
Consequently, notwithstanding the current ascendancy of deliberative democracy in the 
world of democratic theory, there are some serious practical constraints that make its 
realization in or through the WTO problematic. Sophisticated deliberative theories have the 
capacity to overcome many of the limitations faced by consent-based legitimacy narratives, as 
well as by the exclusively input-oriented direct and representative democracy narratives. 
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Deliberative narratives provide a more nuanced normative role for non-Members in rule- and 
decision-making, whether they be national bureaucrats or NGOs. Indeed, if anything some 
deliberative narratives run the risk of pushing this too far, by over-emphasising the authority 
of expert decision-makers and discursive openness. Deliberative narratives also engage 
directly with the problem of technical complexity, although they face if anything greater 
problems than the alternatives when it comes to political complexity. Importantly, too, 
deliberative narratives aim to bridge some of the gap between purely input-based and output-
based approaches to legitimacy. By emphasising broad participation and reasoned 
deliberation, they seek to ensure that ‘better’ outcomes are reached.  
IV CONCLUSIONS 
Democratic narratives thus play an increasingly prominent, but by no means unified, role in 
constructing arguments about the legitimacy of WTO law and practice. This chapter has 
sought to map out the major elements of four of the most prominent democratic narratives in 
the WTO context, namely the direct, the representative, the participatory, and the deliberative 
approaches to democratic legitimacy. In the process, it has sought to highlight their 
similarities and contradictions, as well as their different implications for the reform of WTO 
rule- and decision-making procedures. Commitment to these narratives often reflects 
underlying interests. Direct narratives are often used by developing countries seeking more 
influence in WTO rule- and decision-making. Representative narratives are invoked not just 
by those seeking to extend the liberal democratic project to the international sphere, but by 
those seeking to deflect non-Members from taking part in WTO decisions. Participatory 
approaches are advanced by those same non-Members in trying to increase their own 
participation. Deliberative approaches, meanwhile, are increasingly been invoked in a way 
that helps to justify practices of expert rule.  
Collectively, however, a distinctive feature of democratic legitimacy narratives in the 
WTO context is their emphasis on inputs and procedure. The direct and representative 
narratives are essentially input-oriented in character and make no attempt to account for the 
quality or effectiveness of rules and decisions produced other than to note that they are 
‘Member-driven’. These narratives have little to say about the character of the rule- and 
decision-making processes beyond the idea that each Member should try maximize the 
realization of their subjective preferences. The participatory and deliberative narratives 
provide an improvement in this regard, as their procedural ramifications are concerned with 
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making ‘better’ decisions. They also provide a more sophisticated account of how Member 
and citizen preferences are formed in the first place, by acknowledging that Member will is in 
part a product of the WTO’s legal-political processes. Overall, however, as presently 
formulated they remain heavily input-focused, showing little concern with questions of 
efficiency and effectiveness either in relation to the making of rules and decisions in 
themselves or in realising the aims of those rules and decisions. Consequently, the present 
lack of consensus over what it means for the WTO to be more democratic, the enormous 
practical hurdles to realizing any of the possible approaches, and the continued neglect of the 
output dimension of legitimacy ensure that the capacity of these democratic narratives to 
legitimate the WTO is limited at best. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
‘A RESULTS-ORIENTED INSTITUTION’? TURNING TO OUTPUT 
LEGITIMACY IN THE WTO  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Although input-oriented narratives of consent and democracy have provided the dominant 
legitimating narratives for international law and WTO law to date, there has also long been a 
strong instrumental, output-oriented strand associated with the legitimacy of world trade law. 
Although frequently invoked, this strand has been subjected to less stringent scrutiny and 
theorizing in the international context; with the extensive scholarship on expert legitimacy as 
it relates to the SPS Agreement providing a clear but narrow exception.
1
 It is timely to further 
consider the roots and limits of output legitimacy in the WTO for several reasons. The 
increased technical and political complexity of the WTO’s rules and decision-making 
procedures has made it more difficult to justify the exercise of power in consent-based or 
input-oriented democratic terms. Major actors in the international trade regime increasingly 
frame issues in technical terms (whether economic, legal, scientific or otherwise) leading to 
the rise of the expert as a source of both epistemic and political authority on the world trade 
stage. And the ever-broader subject-matter covered by the contemporary trade regime calls for 
careful reconsideration of its aims and techniques. 
Indeed, as much as the WTO presses the idea that it is a ‘Member-driven organization’,2 
it is also framed as ‘a results-oriented institution’.3 WTO law is strongly associated with a 
family of legitimacy narratives that depend not on procedures designed to make it reflective 
of Members’ subjective preferences, but on substantive visions of what is in those Members’ 
interests and what WTO law should achieve.
4
 WTO law has a central role to play in 
                                                 
1
  See discussion in Peel 2010, 47-55. 
2
  This was identified by John Jackson as one of seven ‘mantras’ that the WTO Members chant continuously: 
Jackson 2001, 72. 
3
  Sutherland Report 2004, ch VII. 
4
  Thomas Franck distinguished between ‘procedural-substantive’ and ‘outcome-based’ forms of legitimacy. 
He associated the former with a Habermasian approach in which legitimacy is the product of ‘discursive 
validation which is rooted in scientific empiricist reasoning that produces a rational result’: Franck 1990, 
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determining, making visible, and sometimes modifying which outputs are considered 
desirable in the international trading order, as well as in ensuring that those outputs are 
achieved efficiently and effectively. How WTO law goes about doing this has important 
implications for the WTO’s role in the world and whether its legitimacy claims are well-
justified.  
This chapter explores the concept of output legitimacy, the role played by output 
legitimacy narratives in WTO law debates to date, and the implications that a stronger focus 
on output legitimacy may have for how we think about WTO law. It begins in Part II by 
elaborating on the concept of output legitimacy — tracing its development over time and 
noting its increasingly prominent role in the justification of WTO law. In Part III, the chapter 
highlights the limits and risks associated with output legitimacy narratives, including the lack 
of a clear substantive mandate for the contemporary WTO, the WTO’s lack of adherence to 
certain accepted aims, the threats of technicalization and depoliticization, and the problem of 
expert overreach. In Part IV, it considers what implications a focus on output legitimacy may 
have for the design, implementation and evaluation of WTO law at a broad level, to set up the 
further consideration of these matters in Chapters Six and Seven.  
II OUTPUT LEGITIMACY NARRATIVES 
A Output Legitimacy and the Domestic State 
As with the input-oriented narratives of consent and democracy explored in Chapters Three 
and Four, output-oriented narratives have long played a role in legitimating authority at the 
domestic level. Rather than focusing purely on procedural rectitude as the basis for the right 
to rule, these narratives have justified the exercise of authority by reference to law’s ability to 
facilitate the efficient and effective achievement of desirable outputs. Such outputs may be 
divided into two categories. The first category includes goal-oriented, instrumental outputs, in 
which the aim is to achieve something concrete, preferably in a way that can be managed 
according to a set of indicators and metrics. The second category relates to value-oriented, 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 (footnote omitted). By contrast, for the latter he notes that ‘a system seeking to validate itself — and its 
commands — must be defensible in terms of the equality, fairness, justice, and freedom which are realized 
by those commands’: at 18. This thus strongly resembles Weber’s notion of ‘value-rational’ legitimacy: 
Weber 1968, 33-7.  
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expressive outputs, in which the aim is to act in a way which reflects underlying moral-
normative commitments.
5
  
Most output-oriented narratives of legitimacy rely heavily on notions of superior 
knowledge and expertise, and justify the allocation of not only epistemic but also political 
power on this basis. The authority of the rulers in Plato’s Republic, for instance, was based on 
their nature as philosopher-kings, possessed of the relevant expertise in the ‘science’ of 
ruling.
6
 The idea that only a privileged elite had access to the knowledge necessary for right 
rule persisted for centuries. In medieval times this gave rise to a rich literature known as the 
‘mirrors for princes’, which claimed to offer guidance on how to be a virtuous and effective 
ruler.
7
 Over time these works came to emphasize virtue less and instrumental effectiveness to 
a greater degree, with Machiavelli’s The Prince providing the apotheosis of the genre.8 As the 
Enlightenment progressed, those with claims to superior empirical knowledge (as opposed to 
moral or theological knowledge) accrued an increasingly powerful hold over the processes of 
government. By the early nineteenth century, Henri de Saint Simon was claiming that the 
world of nation-states and politicians was soon to give way to a productive utopia ruled by a 
technocratic elite of engineers and industrialists.
9
 Even those with more liberal democratic 
tastes placed a high premium on knowledge in governing. John Stuart Mill, for instance, 
sought to introduce plural voting for the highly educated, and to deny the vote to the illiterate 
and innumerate, on the grounds that such differentiation would lead to better decision-
making.
10
 
Max Weber, the progenitor of the social understanding of legitimacy discussed in 
Chapter Two, was particularly concerned about the technical-rationalization of rule that 
accompanied modernity and the concurrent legal-political elevation of the expert, and indeed 
                                                 
5
  These roughly map on to Weber’s somewhat underdeveloped distinction between instrumental rationality 
and value-rationality: see Weber 1968, 24-6. 
6
  Plato treats ‘just rule’ as a technical craft that can be learned, in the same way as building a ship: Plato 
1991, §§ 342, 473 and Book IV in general; see also Plato 1995. The idea that there is a distinct art or 
science of rule found a much more recent reflection in the professional image of the British civil service 
mandarin: see Laski 1931; Shapiro 2005.  
7
  See generally Gilbert 1938; Nederman 1998. 
8
  Machiavelli 1988.  
9
  See Audi 1999, 809. 
10
  Mill 1861, ch VIII. 
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the bureaucracy more generally. For Weber, the process of modernization was characterized 
by the displacement of the metaphysical ideal of universal reason by instrumental rationality, 
and of natural law by positive law.
11
 ‘Traditional’ forms of legitimacy and authority were 
viewed as increasingly giving way to a ‘legal-rational’ form of legitimacy.12 Weber was 
particularly concerned by what he saw as the increased bureaucratization of government that 
accompanied this turn to legal-rational authority, creating a class of agents which were not 
accountable in traditional ways either to the people or to the market.
13
 
Although Saint Simon’s rather distinctive vision has long since faded from view, 
Weber’s persists in the legal-political imagination. In the last few decades output legitimacy 
narratives have proven increasingly important at the level of the nation-state. The rise of 
quasi-independent, non-majoritarian administrative agencies such as central banks, financial 
services authorities, food and drug agencies, and environmental protection agencies, has led to 
what Frank Vibert has termed the ‘rise of the unelected’.14 More and more power has been 
concentrated in the hands of administrative agencies, operating with significant discretion or 
slack, and framed by only weak accountability mechanisms.
15
 This phenomenon has not been 
confined to specialist government departments. Governments worldwide have also sought to 
outsource governmental functions to private bodies, in relation to everything from education 
and health to immigration detention. Legal power is regularly being delegated to 
administrative, expert institutions based on their superior competence in achieving certain 
aims, rather than based on their ability to respond to their principals’ immediate demands or 
                                                 
11
  See especially Weber 1968, 809-38 and 865-900. See also Onuf 1998, 19. 
12
  Weber 1968, 217-26.  
13
  ‘Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—
that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of 
attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of 
exercising authority over human beings’: ibid 223. See also the discussion of Weber’s ‘scientisation’ of 
politics in Habermas 1970, ch 5. 
14
  Vibert 2007, 5. See also Habermas 1996a, 430-52; Thatcher & Stone Sweet 2002; Kahan et al 2006. 
15
  Standard accountability mechanisms such as transparency tend not to work as well in relation to these 
agencies due to the complexity of the information, models, and projects with which they are involved: see 
Jasanoff 2012, ch 8. 
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reflect popular preferences. This has led to attempts to grapple with the legitimacy of such 
institutions in specifically instrumental terms.
16
  
Two rather distinct visions of the role of specialised knowledge and expert power emerge 
from the above. The first is a technocratic vision,
17
 which draws on the ‘guardianship’18 
tradition spearheaded by Plato. This vision emphasizes deference to expert authority and is 
suspicious of popular input, particularly where such input may lead to ‘irrational’ decision-
making. This vision has serious anti-democratic tendencies, and often forms the basis for 
critique of some of the more expert-oriented theories of deliberative democracy. The second 
is a facilitative vision,
19
 which sees the role of expert knowledge and power as a means of 
facilitating political decision-making by providing access to more reliable and effective 
knowledge and analysis, and more clearly laying out the likely consequences of given 
decisions and laws. It has faith in the experts’ abilities to provide rational, unbiased 
knowledge which can be placed at the service of policy-makers. The facilitative vision can 
prove just as problematic as the technocratic vision. The bureaucratic dream of having experts 
‘on tap, not on top’20 can prove a misleading fantasy as a consequence of the sheer scale of 
                                                 
16
  See, eg, Majone 1996; Lindseth 2010; Maggetti 2010, 2. 
17
  The Oxford English Dictionary defines technocracy as ‘[t]he organization of the social order based on 
principles established by technical experts’. Ironically, the earliest use of the term ‘technocracy’ recorded 
in the Dictionary was by William H Smyth. Smyth’s original version, however, was envisaged as more 
democratic in character. He defined it as ‘the rule of the people made effective through the agency of their 
servants, the scientists and engineers’: see Jones 1995, 210. 
18
  For a further discussion of the idea of guardianship, see Dahl 1989, 52-79. See especially his discussion of 
another version of guardianship, that is ‘Lenin’s doctrine of the vanguard party with its special knowledge 
of the laws of history and, as a consequence, its special, indeed its unique, claim to rule’: at 53. See also 
Holden 2002, 31-57. 
19
  Cf Habermas 1970, ch 5, who differentiates between decisionistic and technocratic approaches, which 
roughly parallel the facilitative and technocratic approaches discussed here, respectively. He also identifies 
a Deweyan ‘pragmatistic model’, but argues that the empirical conditions for this are not met in 
contemporary mass democracies as due to widespread depoliticization and the decline of the public realm: 
at 70. This observation would only be strengthened at the international level. Sunstein argues for the 
virtues of entrusting large areas of government to experts of various kinds, particularly through embedding 
practices of cost-benefit analysis (‘CBA’) and comparative risk analysis (‘CRA’) in governmental 
processes: see, eg, Sunstein & Pildes 1999; Sunstein 2002, 7. 
20
  Martin Shapiro notes that, in practice, such views tend not to work very well as ‘the experts supposedly on 
tap are likely in reality to end up on top’: Shapiro 2005, 343.  
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contemporary law- and policy-making and the difficulty of translating expert languages into 
something that can be understood by non-experts. It also neglects the modern tendency to vest 
epistemic experts with political or legal authority, and the blurred boundaries between what 
constitutes an epistemic, legal or political test.
21
 Both the technocratic and facilitative visions 
attempt to separate politics and technical decision-making into separate realms.  
It is not necessary to force a choice between the technocratic and facilitative visions. 
Instead, the two may be understood to operate simultaneously in ineluctable tension with one 
another. Indeed, one of the central problems of deliberative democratic theory lies in the 
attempt to resolve this tension. Narratives of expert or output legitimacy often move back and 
forth between the two visions depending on the circumstances. The two may thus be seen as 
dynamically interrelated modes of justification for power. Viewing their interaction in this 
way draws attention to the socially constructed nature of ideas of expertise and effectiveness 
and the artificiality of the technical/political division assumed under either approach. 
Expertise is not merely the product of superior technocratic knowledge, or a means of 
facilitating better decision-making, but rather a contested concept, the capacity to legitimate 
of which varies depending on the context.  
There have been a few different attempts to reconcile input and output modes of 
legitimacy that draw on this dynamic interrelation. John Dewey’s pragmatism, for instance, 
stressed the importance of consultation, debate and persuasion to democracy. He saw experts 
as playing an important role in clarifying and refining the public’s idea of its interests, while 
the consequences of expert determination and policy were to be held up to careful scrutiny to 
ensure that those interests were being met.
22
 Dewey’s approach fell out of favour over the 
course of the twentieth century, in part because it over-idealised the relation between experts 
and the public and their capacity to mutually inform one another in the overall public 
interest.
23
 Further attempted syntheses may be found in many of the contemporary theories of 
deliberative democracy, some of which were discussed in Chapter Four.  
                                                 
21
  See generally discussion in Foster 2013, 136-82. 
22
  See, eg, Dewey 1927. 
23
  See criticism in Habermas 1970, ch 5. 
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B Output Legitimacy and International Law 
Output legitimacy narratives have also played an increasingly prominent role in general 
international law, including in debates about the basis for the authority of international law.
24
 
Perhaps the most well-known instrumental understanding of the authority of law lies in 
Joseph Raz’s ‘service conception’ of legitimate authority. Highly skeptical of consent-based 
justifications for the authority of law, Raz instead argues that law’s authority derives from its 
capacity to further our objective interests through social coordination.
25
 Samantha Besson has 
recently adapted Raz’s service conception for the international sphere by ‘re-interpreting’ it in 
a way that gives greater emphasis to democratic coordination.
26
 Raz’s theory is by no means 
the only point of departure for such instrumental narratives. Working from a very different 
jurisprudential basis, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope have formulated a theory of legal 
legitimacy that draws on Lon Fuller’s approach to law as a ‘purposive enterprise’ that enable 
actors to ‘pursue their purposes and organize their interactions through law’.27  
                                                 
24
  Quasi-instrumental justifications for the authority of customary international law have also been advanced 
by natural lawyers such as John Finnis, who argues that: ‘recognition of the authoritativeness of particular 
customs affords all states an opportunity of furthering the common good of the international community by 
solving interaction and co-ordination problems otherwise insoluble. And this opportunity is the root of all 
legal authority, whether it be the authority of rules or (as here) of rules’: Finnis 1980, 244. 
 The ultimate root of customary international law’s authority for Finnis, then, is one that is instrumentally 
oriented towards achieving the common good, rather than purely procedural (as might be suggested by 
theories based more on consent).  
25
  The instrumental quality of obligation attaching to law is central to Raz’s thought, and complements his 
scepticism about input-oriented approaches based on consent: see Raz 1988; Raz 2006; Raz 2009. See also 
the discussion of the ‘favourable-outcomes approach’ to legitimacy as discussed in Hurd 2007, 67-9. 
26
  Besson argues that this focus on democratic coordination does not, as might first appear, collapse Raz’s 
substantive theory of legitimacy into a purely procedural account of legitimacy. Rather, she sees the 
democratic element as ‘building on’ Raz’s conception: ‘What a legal authority does, when understood 
along those lines, is provide legal subjects with reasons to co-ordinate over an abstract set of reasons they 
share objectively even if they disagree about it or its internal ordering concretely. In circumstances of 
reasonable disagreement about issues of justice and matters of common concern, they will be able to abide 
by their own reasons better overall if they co-ordinate, getting their turn in identifying a salient point of co-
ordination, than if all of them decide (even correctly) for themselves in each case’: Besson 2009a, 356.  
27
  Brunnée & Toope 2010, 7 and 21. See also generally the work of the New Haven School, which saw law as 
a purposive enterprise aimed at creating a world public order of human dignity: Reisman, Wiessner & 
Willard 2007.  
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Output legitimacy narratives have also been applied to the law of international 
institutions. Just as there has been a turn to non-majoritarian administrative institutions at the 
national level, the last century has also seen the significant empowerment of international 
institutions. Daniel Esty argues for a mixed approach to the legitimacy of such institutions in 
which  
[l]egitimacy […] can also be grounded in an institution’s delivery of good results, its 
capacity to carry out rulemaking in ways that provide clarity and stability, its systemic 
strength and structure of checks and balances, its ability to promote political dialogue, 
and its commitment to procedural rigor.
28
  
Daniel Bodansky, too, notes that the promise to ‘deliver the goods’ could provide an 
alternative or supplementary basis for the legitimacy of international environmental 
governance. Importantly, he notes that in some ways output legitimacy can be easier to 
achieve than democratic forms of input legitimacy, as it requires only the ‘thin’ connection of 
perceived common interests rather than the ‘thick’ requirements of shared identity, language 
and history.
29
  
Robert Keohane and Allen Buchanan go even further to claim that ‘[t]he justification for 
having [global governance institutions] is primarily if not exclusively instrumental’.30 As 
such, they have formulated a complex standard of legitimacy for international institutions that 
comprises several desiderata, including:  
(1) the consent of democratic states;31 
                                                 
28
  Esty 2006, 1561 (emphasis added). See also Wolfrum 2008, 7: ‘[I]t has been argued that authority can be 
legitimated or delegitimated by the outcome it produces. This is a crucial issue and one that deserves 
further consideration. If a particular body, such as the Security Council or an international court or tribunal, 
although established in accordance with applicable rules and taking decisions according to the established 
procedure does not achieve results which the community as the addressee of such decisions considers to be 
adequate, this may, in the long run, lead to an erosion of its legitimacy.’ See also Wolfgang Friedmann, 
who wrote in the mid-twentieth century of the changing structure of international law, noting a move from 
international law’s traditional preoccupation with coexistence, to an international law of cooperation, 
focused on addressing collective problems: Friedmann 1964, chs 5 and 6. 
29
  Bodansky 1999, 619-23. 
30
  Buchanan & Keohane 2006, 422.  
31
  Ibid 414-16. 
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(2) minimal moral acceptability, requiring at minimum that international institutions 
respect human rights, but not ruling out the possibility of holding them to higher 
standards;
32
 
(3) comparative benefit, requiring that international institutions ‘provide benefits that 
cannot otherwise be obtained’;33 
(4) institutional integrity, prohibiting ‘major discrepancies between an institution’s 
behaviour and its prescribed procedures and professed goals’;34 
(5) an epistemic-deliberative element, which emphasizes notions of accountability and 
transparency (including public justification).
35
  
Elements (3) and (4) in particular focus on the legitimacy associated with the outputs 
produced by international institutions, while (5) focuses on how such outputs are formulated 
as desirable in the first place. 
Output-oriented accounts of legitimacy have also loomed large in scholarship on the EU. 
Fritz Scharpf was, after all, writing on the governance of Europe when he popularized the 
term ‘output legitimacy’.36 Carol Harlow notes the ‘mass-élite gap’ in the EU which finds 
‘businessmen and politicians’ concerned more about strengthening output legitimacy to 
improve regulation while ‘popular discontent’ festers over inadequate input legitimacy.37 
Peter Lindseth, too, has written on the technocratic legitimacy of European institutions, 
‘rooted in their ability to produce sound regulatory policy for an increasingly integrated social 
and economic space transcending national borders’.38 He further argues that the focus on 
classical notions of democratic and constitutional legitimacy in the EU is misguided; and 
rather, that the EU’s legitimacy may be more productively considered as administrative in 
character, in a way that parallels the legitimating structures of the post-World War II 
‘constitutional settlement of administrative governance’.39  
                                                 
32
  Ibid 419-22. 
33
  Ibid 422. 
34
  Ibid 422-4. 
35
  Ibid 424-33. 
36
  Scharpf 1999, 10-21.  
37
  Harlow 2010, 16. 
38
  Lindseth 2010, 8.  
39
  Ibid 13. 
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The focus on output legitimacy for international institutions also has important legal 
consequences. It provides functionally-oriented background norms which encourage the broad 
use of legal mechanisms such as the implied powers doctrine, inherent jurisdiction, and 
teleological treaty interpretation to justify the exercise of power by international institutions. 
By contrast, the input-oriented doctrines of attributed powers, express delegation, and textual 
treaty interpretation are often far more focused on ensuring that such institutions remain 
explicitly ‘Member-driven’.  
C Output Legitimacy and the WTO 
To date, output legitimacy narratives in the WTO have not received the same degree of 
detailed attention as input legitimacy narratives. What little there has been has focused on one 
of four issues: the role of experts in dispute settlement, issues relating to the SPS Agreement, 
the bureaucratic legitimacy of the WTO Secretariat, and teleological treaty interpretation. The 
first of these relates to debates about the role of experts and expert knowledge in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Joost Pauwelyn has written perceptively on the role of expertise-
based legitimacy in WTO disputes, arguing that the ‘“epistemic authority” of experts is what 
gives expert-based WTO decisions their extra legitimacy’.40 Joseph Conti has addressed how 
the very idea of legal expertise is used to ‘produce’ legitimacy at the WTO, by encouraging 
Members to focus on the acquisition of expertise so that they can more effectively get the 
system to serve their interests in future, rather than questioning why it does not serve their 
interests well in the present.
41
 Meanwhile, Arthur Daemmrich has claimed that the ‘basis for 
the broader legitimacy of the WTO is shifting from questions of representation that have long 
drawn attention to epistemic issues, especially concerning the design of econometric 
models’.42 One does not need to agree with the idea of this shift to see the prominence that the 
notion of expertise plays in these accounts of the dispute settlement system’s legitimacy.  
The output-oriented legitimacy that derives from expert knowledge and expertise has 
also been addressed extensively in the SPS context, both in relation to SPS disputes and the 
broader SPS architecture.
43
 The SPS Agreement has provided particularly rich grounds for the 
                                                 
40
  Pauwelyn 2002b, 330.  
41
  Conti 2010. 
42
  Daemmrich 2012, 200-201. See also Daemmrich 2011, 1. 
43
  See, eg, Winickoff 2005; Cooney & Lang 2007; Pollack & Shaffer 2009; Peel 2010; Foster 2013. 
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consideration of output legitimacy. Several of the SPS Agreement’s rules44 make direct 
reference to scientific evidence and risk assessment to provide normative yardsticks for 
assessing the legitimacy and legality of national SPS measures. Parties, panel members and 
Appellate Body members have made extensive reference to scientific expert evidence when 
making arguments in the course of WTO litigation. Indeed, questions of how to most 
appropriately engage with scientific experts and knowledge have sat at the centre of these 
disputes. The SPS Agreement also draws on the related authority of international standard 
setting associations such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the IPPC and the OIE.
45
 
This association has, in turn, triggered a series of debates about the legitimacy of such 
standards institutions that addresses both input- and output-related aspects of legitimacy.
46
 
The intensity of the debate over the SPS Agreement’s science and risk assessment 
provisions has led to the development of a sophisticated and nuanced literature on the 
relationship between the WTO law, the natural sciences, risk analysis, risk management and 
legitimacy. Commentators have incorporated post-normal
47
 and post-positivist
48
 
understandings of science and have engaged directly with complex epistemological problems 
concerning different kinds of scientific uncertainty.
49
 These lessons are only beginning, 
however, to be extended to other forms of expertise in the WTO; economic expertise in 
particular has long been overlooked.  
A third context within which the idea of output legitimacy has been addressed, albeit less 
extensively, relates to the exercise of power by trade policy networks and the WTO 
Secretariat. In excavating the ‘source’ of the bureaucratic legitimacy associated with such 
networks, Howse proposes a degree of self-conferral, motivated by mutual perception of 
                                                 
44
  Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement requires that Members’ SPS measures be ‘based on scientific principles’ 
and not be ‘maintained without sufficient scientific evidence’, and Article 5.1 requires that Members base 
their SPS measures on an ‘assessment […] of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health’. 
45
  See SPS Agreement Preamble, Articles 3.4 and 12.3, and Annex A para 3. 
46
  Claire Kelly notes the ‘derivative legitimacy’ that international institutions such as the WTO can obtain 
from their relationships with other international organizations such as the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission: Kelly 2008, 646-7; cf Livermore 2006. 
47
  See Footer 2007. 
48
  See, eg, Bohanes 2002; see also discussion in Lang 2011, 334-5. 
49
  See, eg, Schropp 2012; Foster 2013. 
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greater far-sightedness and less emotivity than more demotic actors like politicians, 
NGOs and activists, or journalists; relatedly, an absence of nationalist attachment and a 
distaste for xenophobia; and high “technical” competence in a rather naïve, or 
straightforward, sense.
50
  
For Howse, a major concern is that there are insufficient checks on even the informal power 
exercised by such bureaucratic actors.
51
 In addition, Howse is particularly scathing of the 
‘illusion’ that trade-related conflicts, which are irreducible to mere ‘technical’ conflicts, can 
be satisfactorily resolved by such insiders’ networks.52  
Recently the WTO’s general law-making paralysis has recently encouraged 
commentators to propose reforms to the WTO law- and decision-making processes which 
would give more authority to such experts.
53
 The Sutherland Report, for instance, called for 
the creation of a permanent consultative group of senior policy officials, of limited but 
rotating membership, which would (when appropriate) ‘seek to provide some political 
guidance to negotiators’.54 In addition, the Report argued for a ‘more assertive role’ for the 
WTO Secretariat in negotiations, including through the more direct involvement of the 
Director-General and the reinforcement of the practice of using ‘facilitators’ — persons 
‘commanding wide respect’ who have no national interest in the negotiating issues at hand — 
to steer negotiations productively.
55
 Others have called for furthering empowering the 
Secretariat and chairs in negotiations, for creating a WTO Advisory Council, or for requiring 
that Members produce reasons for decisions to veto measures that would otherwise enjoy 
                                                 
50
  Howse 2001a, 372 (footnote omitted).  
51
  As a result of, for instance, a lack of transparency: ibid 373. Howse has elsewhere argued that the WTO 
have moved from a politically oriented form of decision-making, to a technocratic one, and was signalling 
a move away from excessive technocracy to once more embrace politics through broader participation and 
increased transparency: Howse 2002a.  
52
  Howse & Nicolaïdis 2008, 170-1.  
53
  Other suggestions have included introducing some form of majority or weighted voting, or abandoning the 
single undertaking in favour of a variable geometry that would allow Members to pick and choose which 
WTO obligations they enter into in future: see, eg, Sutherland Report 2004, paras 291-300.  
54
  Ibid para 324. It also called for Members who veto measures that otherwise enjoy overwhelming support to 
be required to give written reasons for their decision.  
55
  Ibid para 331. 
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overwhelming popular support.
56
 In this context it should be noted that there is nothing 
inevitable about a turn to expertise or steering committees to ‘streamline’ WTO law- and 
decision-making, even when faced with a process as dysfunctional as the Doha Round. 
Procedural alternatives, including the introduction of majority or weighted voting, exist; the 
negotiating agenda could be rolled back; different types of experts may be empowered; or the 
WTO can continue to carry on, as now, in a state of near-paralysis while the locus of trade 
law innovation moves to preferential trade agreements. These issues will be addressed more 
fully in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
Finally, output legitimacy narratives have played a significant role in relation to 
questions of treaty interpretation in the WTO. For example, the GATT Panels for US — Tuna 
I and US — Tuna II interpreted GATT Article XX restrictively in a way that invalidated US 
measures that imposed conditions on US imports of shrimp products with the aim of 
protecting endangered turtle populations.
57
 Howse notes that, in both cases, the Panels 
showed a fairly loose regard for the text of Article XX and instead based their decisions on 
the purportedly pernicious consequences of allowing states to regulate for environmental 
protection in a way that could have extraterritorial effects.
58
 This would, in the view of the 
Panels, have undermined the very purpose of the GATT as providing a multilateral 
framework for trade. The Panel in US — Tuna I, for instance, claimed that: 
if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States were accepted, 
each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies 
from which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights 
under the General Agreement. The General Agreement would then no longer constitute a 
multilateral framework for trade among all contracting parties but would provide legal 
security only in respect of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with 
identical internal regulations.
59
 
                                                 
56
  For a further discussion of these issues, see Chapter Six of this thesis. 
57
  Neither Panel report was ultimately adopted.  
58
  See Howse 2002c; Howse 2002a, 102.  
59
  US — Tuna I, GATT Panel Report, para 5.27. 
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Such broad appeals to a vaguely-defined overall telos of the WTO,
60
 which show little regard 
for the formal text of the WTO Agreements,
61
 have been in retreat since the WTO’s inception. 
Even at the time they were released, the GATT tuna decisions were roundly criticized. The 
Appellate Body has not only largely abandoned the rather simplistic ‘free trade’ ideology that 
underpinned those decisions,
62
 but has since insisted on a more robustly textual methodology 
when it comes to treaty interpretation.
63
  
This turn to formalism, however, and thus away from one form of output-oriented 
legitimation, has merely contributed to the demand for a different form of expertise. Andrew 
                                                 
60
  Such teleological readings of WTO law have had implications not only for treaty interpretation, but also for 
applicable law in WTO disputes. The ILC Fragmentation Report, for instance, noted that: ‘It is sometimes 
argued that general international law should not be applied in the administration of WTO treaties as the 
latter differ fundamentally in their general orientation from the orientation of regular public international 
law: where the latter is based on State sovereignty, the former derives its justification from the theory of 
comparative advantage’: Report of the Study Group of the ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 
(13 April 2006) para 134. 
61
  Robert Hudec argued that such ‘aggressive unilateralism’ could in principle be justified (normatively, if not 
legally) even if it broke GATT law so long as it served the broader aims of the GATT. He considered that 
disobedience to GATT law had ‘has made a constructive contribution to breaking legal deadlocks and 
stimulating improvements in GATT law’ and had ‘been an important element in the process of GATT legal 
reform over the past decade or so’: Hudec 1990, 116. Hudec nonetheless considered Section 301 to 
represent ‘bad law’ because of the US’s failure to live up to its own standards under the law: at 152. The 
WTO Panel in US — Section 301 Trade Act eventually determined that Section 301 was not inherently in 
violation of the WTO Agreements: US — Section 301 Trade Act, Panel Report, para 8.1.  
62
  Andrew Lang argues that ‘the claim that the decisions taken in and around the trade regime tend to 
prioritize economic efficiency over other values and objectives—whether as a result of the regime’s 
mandate, or as a result of the influence of neoliberal priorities, or both—is somewhat misleading, at least 
when stated so baldly’: Lang 2011, 9. This is far from claiming that WTO decisions are otherwise 
‘objective’ or ‘balanced’, as ‘there has been very little direct consideration within the WTO of the 
distributive, environmental, or social costs of international trade liberalization, not in my view (or at least 
not directly) because such costs are considered unimportant, but because such matters are not considered 
appropriate topics of conversation given the limited purpose of international economic governance, as 
redefined within the liberal imagination’: at 10. 
63
  This formalist approach arguably in turn uses the idea of legal expertise to mask political decision-making 
in the dispute settlement system: see Picciotto 2005. But cf Van Damme 2009, who argues that the 
Appellate Body has been turning away from strict formalism in its more recent decisions.  
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Lang has demonstrated how shared understandings in trade policy networks have more subtly 
affected the way that WTO obligations are interpreted in a way that further legitimates expert 
power. He traces how the intuitive understandings of what constitutes a ‘trade barrier’ in the 
multilateral trading order has expanded over time to include more ‘behind the border’ 
measures,
64
 expanding the realm in which trade experts are called on to operate as technical 
experts. Lang argues that vague rules regarding non-discrimination in the GATT and TBT 
Agreements, as well as risk assessment in the SPS Agreement, have increasingly been given a 
highly technical, scientized reading by the dispute settlement organs that too-often excludes 
serious consideration of regulatory purpose. The legitimacy of government intervention in the 
market is then determined by way of reference to technical bodies of knowledge (including 
economic and scientific knowledge) as if this led to straightforward normative conclusions.
65
 
As a consequence, WTO disputes are increasingly being taken over by contests over expert 
evidence and knowledge.  
Thus although there has definitely been a place for output legitimacy narratives in the 
WTO, they have largely been confined to a few key contexts. Little consideration has been 
given to how output legitimacy may be relevant to WTO law outside of these contexts. 
Moreover, most of the literature to date has focused specifically on issues relating to experts 
and expert knowledge. Notwithstanding the perception of the WTO as a ‘results-based’ 
institution, little attention has been given to how law helps to structure the discursive spaces 
in which certain forms of knowledge or expert authority become privileged or ignored.  
III ON THE DANGERS OF OUTPUT LEGITIMACY NARRATIVES 
Output legitimacy narratives have the capacity to address some of the deficiencies of purely 
input-oriented narratives. They tend to focus much more directly on the nature of the agents 
chosen to implement given laws and policies — the experts, whether economic, scientific, 
legal or otherwise. This more granular focus simultaneously helps to counteract the tendency 
                                                 
64
  Lang 2011, 169-72 and chs 7 and 8; see also Kennedy 1991; Howse 2002a, 95-6. 
65
  ‘As a result, the social purpose of domestic regulation became a less secure yardstick by which to measure 
its legitimacy, and the GATT/WTO legal system increasingly turned to technical expertise—including 
economic and scientific expertise—for guidance in its interpretation and application of legal disciplines on 
domestic regulation’: Lang 2011, 18. Lang further argues that WTO negotiating fora are unable to provide 
a remedy for this, as they are increasingly treated as a ‘political marketplace’ in which Members bring their 
fixed preferences to bear in negotiations and votes. 
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of the consent-based and direct democratic approaches to the WTO’s legitimacy to focus 
solely on Members as the relevant political units. In addition, output-oriented narratives draw 
attention to how various forms of expert knowledge are used to frame problems and draw 
conclusions about how those problems should be addressed. They thus have the potential to 
highlight the way in which Member preferences are shaped by different knowledge practices 
and professional sensibilities. In addition, by their very nature such narratives are more 
focused on substance and outcome, although the risk of procedural myopia in which the 
means come to stand in for the ends remains ever present.  
In advocating for more rigorous consideration of the relationship between output 
legitimacy narratives and WTO law, it is important to stress that output legitimacy should not 
be considered as a simple substitute or alternative for ailing narratives of input legitimacy. 
Both are important to an understanding of both the moral and social aspects of the legitimacy 
of WTO law; both derive from different foundational assumptions and seek to address 
different forms of power. Moreover, as with the consent and democracy narratives, output 
legitimacy narratives in the WTO suffer from their own significant limitations.  
A Absence of a Clear WTO Mandate 
One of the primary obstacles to those attempting to legitimate the WTO on the basis that it is 
a ‘results-driven institution’ is the confusion over which results the WTO should be trying to 
achieve. Disagreement over the nature of the outcomes the WTO is intended to achieve makes 
it more difficult to legitimate the WTO by reference to those outcomes. The aims purportedly 
served by WTO law are legion, but tend to fall into one of two categories. First are the 
substantive aims of WTO law, which at their most simple include aims such as trade 
liberalization and market access. Second are the institutional aims, which are neutral as to the 
ultimate purpose of the WTO other than to ensure that the WTO provides an effective forum 
for multilateral trade negotiations and a well-functioning dispute settlement system.
66
 For 
both, WTO law seeks to induce a particular type of conduct in its Members, which then seeks 
to create some form of substantive or institutional benefit.
67
 Both sets of aims raise important 
questions of institutional and legal design.  
                                                 
66
  Cf Fakhri 2011, 71.  
67
  Robert Hudec defined the capacity to induce such conduct as ‘legal effectiveness’ and the resulting 
achievement of the economic benefit desired as ‘economic effectiveness’: Hudec 2011, 123.  
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In the early days of the GATT, the multilateral trading regime’s aims were often 
portrayed as relatively straightforward: tariffication and non-discriminatory tariff reduction 
(key substantive aims) and providing an orderly forum for negotiations and disputes (key 
institutional aims).
68
 Such aims clearly remain at the heart of the current system, but do not 
tell the whole story. For some, the shared assumptions of ‘embedded liberalism’ — that 
Members would be left with sufficient regulatory autonomy to ensure the continuation of the 
welfare state and a degree of flexibility in ensuring domestic economic stability — tempered 
the drive to liberalize trade in a way that could otherwise have excited accusations of a 
democratic deficit.
69
 The New International Economic Order movement, however, and the 
turn to SDT for developing countries within the GATT, signalled deeper divisions about the 
direction of the interim institution. From there, the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds introduced 
the ‘post-discriminatory’ disciplines in the SPS, TBT and TRIPS Agreements70 which raised 
controversial challenges to non-tariff regulatory trade barriers. The tendency of these non-
tariff barriers to implicate matters of environmental protection and public health, or in the 
case of TRIPS to redraw the boundaries between the interests of intellectual property 
producers and consumers, made attempts to challenge them through trade law appear less 
defensible in technical terms.
71
 In addition, the narrow functional logic applied by the GATT 
panels in Thailand — Cigarettes, US — Tuna I and US — Tuna II drew the attention of new 
communities of legitimation to the operations of the GATT. These new communities were 
much less convinced by the legitimating power of the substantive ‘freer trade’ narratives, and 
the relative simplicity of the early GATT era’s consensual vision faded rather quickly.72  
Now, aside from a few central yet vaguely defined principles, what is considered a 
‘desirable outcome’ for the WTO varies wildly depending on who is asked. This confusion, 
                                                 
68
  This is not to state that the initial GATT negotiations were in any way straightforward, or that the various 
Contracting Parties’ reasons for signing up were identical: see Irwin, Mavroidis & Sykes 2008. Moreover, 
although the original preamble to the GATT 1947 made reference to other aims, including ‘raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steady growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and 
exchange of goods’, there was substantial variation in the extent to which these aims were taken seriously.  
69
  See generally Lang 2006; Ruggie 1982.  
70
  See Hudec 2003.  
71
  Although cf Lang 2011, ch 8. 
72
  See Keohane & Nye 2001.  
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among other things, has helped to feed into the deadlock of the Doha Round. Even WTO 
insiders such as Debra Steger (the first Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat) argue that 
‘[t]here is presently, it is fair to say, no common understanding on what the mandate of the 
WTO is’.73 Candidates for the overall substantive aims74 of the WTO have included trade 
liberalization and maximising the benefits of comparative advantage,
75
 or maximizing some 
nebulously articulated concept of global welfare
76
 or efficiency.
77
 Other suggested substantive 
aims, which have achieved varying degrees of acceptance, have included facilitating any one 
of ‘embedded liberalism’,78 ‘good governance’,79 development,80 world peace,81 a right to 
trade,
82
 global justice,
83
 or human rights
84
 (although it should be noted that these last two have 
                                                 
73
  Steger 2007, 492. See also Steger 2009, 807-08. In the latter article, Steger identifies a broad split between 
‘those who believe that the mandate of the WTO is trade liberalization through reciprocal exchanges of 
concessions’ and ‘those who consider that the mandate of the WTO should extend to international 
economic regulation more generally’: at 807. 
74
  Robert Howse has analysed several options for grounding the WTO’s substantive legitimacy, including in 
global wealth, economic welfare, the Washington consensus, Petersmann’s neo-Kantian approach, conflict 
management, and political liberalism: Howse 2001a, 359-70.  
75
  Cf Jackson 1992, 1231, as cited in Dunoff 1999, 737. 
76
  Writing generally on the value of world trade law, John Jackson argued that if ‘“liberal trade” goals […] 
contribute to world welfare, then it follows that rules which assist such goals should also contribute to 
world welfare’: Jackson 1997, 28. Jackson had earlier defined ‘liberal trade’ as ‘the goal to minimize the 
interference of governments in trade flows that cross national borders’: at 11. For a discussion of the 
problems with treating ‘economic welfare’ as the basis for the WTO’s substantive legitimacy, see Howse 
2001a, 363-8. He notes that ‘the welfare-based case for trade liberalization can provide important, albeit 
limited and qualified, substantive legitimacy to multilateral trade rules, at least those such as tariffs and 
other border restrictions on imports that have direct, explicit, price-distorting effects in domestic markets, 
or even discriminatory regulatory policies that have indirect but clearly identifiable effects of this nature. 
This is not the case, however, for many of the new era rules that characterize the WTO system […]’: at 
365.  
77
  See the discussion of the ‘efficiency model’ in Dunoff 1999, 737 and 745-7. 
78
  See Lang 2006; Ruggie 1982. 
79
  Bonzon 2014, 63-79. 
80
  Fakhri 2009; Broude 2006. 
81
  See Van den Bossche & Zdouc 2013, 21-2; Howse 2002a, 369-70. 
82
  See, eg, Petersmann 1991. See also Petersmann 2002b. Cf Cass 2005, ch 5. 
83
  See, eg, Garcia 2003; Garcia 2013; Caney 2009, 110-17. 
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received less attention than others). Institutional aims that have been proposed for the WTO 
include protecting the security and predictability of the international trading system,
85
 
constraining special interest capture of domestic politics,
86
 and providing an ordered 
framework in which Members can manage expectations in their trade relations.
87
 This is all 
before we even consider the various aims and values listed in the preamble to the WTO 
Agreement, which include ‘ensuring full employment’ and ‘to preserve and protect the 
environment’.88  
Each of these visions brings with it advantages and disadvantages for different sets of 
actors — the problem lies in the absence of even broad consensus on new issues which would 
allow those actors to come together. Arguably, too, this lack of clearly defined telos has 
encouraged the predominantly input-oriented approach to the legitimacy of the WTO. 
Deborah Cass argued that it was precisely this lack of agreement on a common telos that 
encouraged the WTO’s retreat into considering only input-based matters of process:  
Improvement being impossible on the particular outcomes or even starting points, focus 
moved to method. Instead, improvements in participation (for other states and non-state 
groups); increases in the representative nature of the body making decisions whether it be 
the WTO, the IMF or the World Bank; and improved communication and transparency 
                                                                                                                                                        
84
  See, eg, Joseph 2011; Pogge 2002; Petersmann 2000a, 1377; Petersmann 2002a, 32-3; Petersmann 2002b, 
644. Philip Alston has referred to Petersmann’s attempt to draw on the vocabulary of human rights to 
legitimate WTO rules as a ‘form of epistemological misappropriation’: Alston 2002, 815. See also Howse 
& Nicolaïdis 2001; see also references in n 167 of Chapter Four of this thesis.  
85
  See, eg, DSU Article 3.2, which provides that ‘[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central 
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’. 
86
  See, eg, McGinnis & Movsesian 2000; Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik 2009. 
87
  See discussion in Cass 2005, ch 4. 
88
  The Preamble to the WTO Agreement provides a whole range of potentially contradictory aims for the 
WTO to pursue, from raising standards of living, to ‘ensuring full employment’, to ‘seek to preserve and 
protect the environment’, to encouraging ‘positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development’. The extent to which these have realized or 
been taken seriously varies depending on the aim — full employment, for instance, has not been on the 
agenda for some time. These aims do not, however, exhaust the list of the aims which can be used as 
metrics against which to assess the substantive legitimacy of the WTO. Moreover, the GATT and WTO 
case law has emphasized different goals at different times.  
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will improve and safeguard the legitimacy and authority of international economic law 
regulation and decision-making.
89
 
This may also help to account for the Appellate Body’s ostensibly formalist approach to treaty 
interpretation.
90
  
The capacity of such input-oriented processes to legitimate WTO law-making and 
application can only go so far, however. As it is, the inability of the WTO’s membership to 
reach consensus on how to address contemporary issues relating to, say, human rights and 
labour protection, increased intellectual property protection, regulatory cooperation, or trade 
and investment matters has helped to set the conditions for the recent proliferation of regional 
trade agreements. Unable to advance their agendas successfully through multilateral trade 
negotiations or dispute settlement, states have instead turned to bilateral and regional 
agreements for this purpose.
91
 This also shows the limits of legitimacy narratives in 
constraining various actors’ self-interests. An iterative, dynamic model of legitimacy that 
incorporates both input and output concerns — that takes expertise seriously even as it allows 
for contestation of expert determination and contestation of the choice of expertise — may 
provide a theoretically strong basis for the legitimacy of future WTO law. The time, money 
and opportunity costs associated with implementing such a vision, however, may simply be 
too much for those states that are more easily able to achieve their aims through means other 
than a multilateral trading order.  
The divergence between the views of the Members as to the overall aims of the WTO 
must not be overstated. There is at least relative consensus at a general level surrounding 
many of the core aims and disciplines: progressive but limited liberalization, tariffication, 
non-discrimination, economic stability, the peaceful settlement of trade disputes. The purpose 
in identifying the nonetheless substantial disagreement over the current and future direction of 
the WTO is not to disregard WTO’s contributions to the world, but rather to call for greater 
caution in justifying the exercise of WTO power by reference to nebulously conceptualized 
outcomes that nonetheless sound broadly desirable. That said, the resulting indeterminacy can 
paradoxically make it easier for the WTO to legitimate itself. It allows for the WTO to invoke 
‘common sense’ and a general sense of instrumental efficiency and effectiveness while 
                                                 
89
  Cass 2005, 85 (footnote omitted). 
90
  See Picciotto 2005 and Van Damme 2009.  
91
  See Gathii 2011, 441-9. 
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leaving open the question as to what its specific goals are, justifying further expansion of the 
scope of WTO rules while confounding attempts at criticism.
92
 Achievements in one area may 
be held up as evidence of the WTO’s overall effectiveness even for unrelated matters.  
B Lack of Adherence to Accepted Aims 
Even for those aims that enjoy a measure of consensus, questions arise as to whether they are 
well-served by WTO law and its application. Output-based narratives are more difficult to 
sustain if it appears that even agreed outcomes are not being achieved by the existing legal-
institutional machinery. At one level, this raises the question of whether the WTO’s practice 
adheres to its overall aims. Buchanan and Keohane describe this as the problem of 
‘institutional integrity’, noting that legitimacy problems can arise for an international 
institution when there is ‘a pattern of egregious disparity between its actual performance, on 
the one hand, and its self-proclaimed procedures or major goals, on the other’.93 At another, 
more specific level, there is a question over whether or not the aims underlying specific WTO 
rules are being realized by their application, in terms of both guiding Member conduct and in 
terms of achieving the result to which that conduct is directed.  
In light of the indeterminacy of the WTO’s overall aims, it can be difficult to determine 
whether the WTO is indeed adhering to such aims, especially in relation to some of the newer 
disciplines. Even when there is relative consensus on particular aims, there are questions 
about whether the WTO is implementing those aims as efficiently, effectively and universally 
as it can. Similarly, the introductory WTO E-Learning module on ‘The WTO Multilateral 
Trade Agreements’ states that: 
                                                 
92
  See also: ‘Regrettably, proposals on WTO reform are frequently advanced on the basis of ill-defined 
concerns about weak “efficiency” or “performance,” without a sufficiently clear articulation of the broader 
goals, normative purpose or benchmarks against which the WTO’s performance, efficiency, or credibility 
should be judged’: Deere-Birkbeck 2012, 121.  
93
  Buchanan & Keohane 2006, 422. Writing specifically on the WTO, they suggest that ‘if the WTO claims 
to provide the benefits of trade liberalization to all of its members, but consistently develops policies that 
exclude its weaker members from the benefits of liberalization, this undermines its claim to legitimacy’: at 
423. 
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The economic case for an open trading system based on multilaterally agreed rules not 
only rests on commercial common sense, but it is also supported by evidence: the 
experience of world trade and economic growth since the Second World War.
94
 
Such statements gloss over the sometimes ambivalent effects of WTO membership on many 
smaller Members.
95
 It also flattens the unequal way that benefits may be distributed between 
Members in general as a result of structural defects in the rules, such as the relative neglect of 
market access for agricultural as opposed to industrial products. More broadly, the ‘economic 
case’ for the WTO often rests on the idea that economic growth deserves priority over other 
interests. This has tended to mean that distributive questions about where any extra wealth 
generated by having a well-ordered multilateral trading system should be allocated tend to be 
pushed to the side.
96
 It is thus important that the economic benefits of joining the WTO, 
central to the global wealth and welfare cases for the WTO, not be overstated or 
oversimplified.
97
 
Issues of integrity also arise in relation to the drafting and application of specific WTO 
rules. The claim that the underlying economic logic of the WTO is simple ‘common sense’ 
neglects the weaknesses of the economic justifications for the existing disciplines on 
safeguards,
98
 subsidies
99
 and anti-dumping,
100
 as well as the confused justifications for the 
                                                 
94
  WTO E-Learning, ‘The WTO Multilateral Trade Agreements’.  
95
  See, eg, Subramanian & Wei 2007; Eicher & Henn 2011. See also Rose 2004; Tomz, Goldstein & Rivers 
2005.  
96
  Michael Davis and Dana Neacsu argue that ‘globalization and those features we have examined produce, 
contrary to their express claims, disastrous global disparities of income and welfare’. They even ‘conclude 
that it is the legitimizing functions of the law of comparative advantage that allows globalization to 
proceed in the manner it does while claiming to do quite the opposite’: Davis & Neacsu 2001, 734. See 
also Gonzalez 2006; Chang 2002; Chang 2008. 
97
  This has led Roberto Unger to observe that ‘[t]he attempt to claim for a particular system a free trade a 
neutrality it does not deserve makes no contribution to world peace and reconciliation. On the contrary, 
disguising a contentious global project as simple common sense is asking for trouble’: Unger 2007, 24. See 
also Howse 2002b, 651-2. 
98
  See Sykes 2003; Sykes 2004a; Jones 2004; Sykes 2004b; Sykes 2006; Lee 2006. 
99
  See Sykes 2010. Howse argues that the WTO rules on subsidies, even if not particularly efficient or 
welfare improving on their own, may have value as parts of a political bargain to ‘curb the unilateral use of 
countervailing duties against subsidies’: Howse 2010, 90 and 101-02.  
100
  See Sykes 1996. See also Trebilcock 1990, 235. 
 166 
 
TRIPS Agreement’s stringent intellectual property requirements.101 There are genuine 
questions as to whether these rules, as drafted, are capable of furthering their purported goals. 
Problems also arise in relation to the application of rules in WTO disputes, when dispute 
settlement organs fail to engage in sufficiently rigorous fact-finding and fact-checking 
processes and make legal decisions on dubious evidential grounds. This problem is 
particularly acute in relation to cases involving complex economic and scientific evidence 
requiring modes of expertise that lie beyond the panel or Appellate Body members’ personal 
competences.
102
 For some observers, these problems of application have already adversely 
affected the WTO’s social legitimacy. 
Failures of institutional integrity can then lead to a further problem, in that they may 
result in a decoupling of process and outcome. Writing on the GATT, Robert Hudec noted the 
ease with which debates over ‘effectiveness’ would shift back and forth between the concepts 
of legal effectiveness (inducing the desired conduct in the Contracting Parties) and economic 
effectiveness (achieving the economic benefit desired).
103
 This is a problem when the legal 
effectiveness of the application of WTO rules fails to result in economic effectiveness (or for 
that matter other forms of non-economic effectiveness). In such cases, a focus on legal 
compliance may come at the expense of considering whether the results of compliance are 
worthwhile.
104
 Tobias Hofmann and Soo Yeon Kim, for instance, point out that often, even 
where ‘the WTO’s dispute settlement process had yielded a positive record of juridical 
compliance’, actual ‘trade flows do not recover through dispute resolution’.105 Trade flows 
remain unchanged in disputes which do not reach the panel stage, while a ‘significant drop in 
trade flows’ post-dispute is associated with cases that do reach a panel.106 Similarly Gabriele 
Spiker highlights how WTO Members can rely on complex trade instruments to help prolong 
                                                 
101
  See Trebilcock, Howse & Eliason 2013, 514-19. 
102
  This will be further explored in Chapter Seven.  
103
  Hudec 2011, 123. 
104
  This is reminiscent of Weber’s account of the operation of value-rationality: ‘The more the value to which 
action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more “irrational” in this sense the 
corresponding action is. For, the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value for its own 
sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute goodness or devotion to duty, the less he is influenced by the 
consideration of the consequences of his action’: Weber 1968, 26. 
105
  Hofmann & Kim 2012, 20. 
106
  Ibid 18. 
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the duration of WTO disputes in a way that allows ‘a politically relevant sector to enjoy the 
benefits of trade protection for a longer time’.107 Such Members may be strictly complying 
with what is required of them by the DSU and the relevant trade agreements until the 
conclusion of the dispute, but cannot be said to be acting in a way which furthers the 
substantive objectives of the WTO.
108
  
C Technicalization and Depoliticization 
A third problem with output legitimacy narratives derives from the perils of technicalization 
and depoliticization. The technicalization of issues may result from the framing of WTO law 
as a domain of technical bodies of knowledge rather than one of political disagreement. 
Criticisms of WTO law on the basis that it is ‘anti-democratic’ or constrains regulatory 
autonomy are then construed as misguided, as the application of WTO rules is framed as 
product of neutral technical consensus. At its most extreme, this can result in claims that 
WTO rules are beyond politics, either because they represent transcendental substantive 
norms, or because politics was confined to an earlier stage of the legislative process and all 
that remains is application of the law. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, for instance, acknowledges 
the normative content of trade decision-making, but seeks to place this normative element 
beyond the reach of political debate by framing it in the language of a transcendental right to 
trade.
109
 This displacement of the political can prove to be a powerful legitimating tool.
110
  
Technicalization is not inherently problematic. Framing certain issues in technical terms 
is often essential to enjoying the instrumental benefits that specialized and methodologically 
                                                 
107
  Spiker 2012, 1.  
108
  This calls to mind the words of John Jackson, that ‘realistic observations of the operation of the legal 
system, even as it pertains to international economic affairs, will lead one to perceive that many 
government and private practitioners are not all in favour of an effective international rules system!’: 
Jackson 1997, 108. 
109
  See Petersmann references at (n 82) and (n 84) above. See also McGinnis and Movsesian 2000, and 
discussion in Shaffer 2001, 13. 
110
  The WTO may also be understood to provide senior members of Member’s governments with legitimating 
devices for implementing otherwise unpopular policies, by appealing to the need to comply with 
international trade law and to adjust to ‘the realities’ of globalization. In Anne Orford’s words: 
‘Governments make use of an “internationalist discourse” about the need to adjust to a changing world 
economy in order to ensure that citizens endorse “the modernizing actions taken by the state on [their] 
behalf”’: Orford 1997, 476 (citation omitted). 
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rigorous knowledge practices can bring. Moreover, some forms of depoliticization may make 
disputes and other forms of disagreement easier to resolve. As Kenneth Abbott has argued: 
the GATT-WTO system has achieved results on many issues by treating them in a 
technical fashion that allows economic effects to be quantified and tradeoffs calibrated. 
This approach has for the most part kept the emotional heat of international trade 
negotiations below the boil.
111
 
As Abbott goes on to note, ‘many issues on the current trade agenda — including corruption, 
labor rights, environmental protection, and consumer issues (including those relating to 
genetically modified food) — have strong normative components that are difficult to keep 
under control’, with the result that technical narratives of legitimacy are rendered 
ineffective.
112
 It is not enough, however, to note the increased profile of issues with ‘strong 
normative components’ in the trade regime as undermining technicalization. There is a more 
fundamental question of how something gets classified as a technical or political matter in the 
first place.
113
  
It is a truism that no ‘bright line’ can be drawn between what constitutes a ‘trade’ and a 
‘non-trade’ matter, and it is remarkably easy to reframe almost any issue as affecting trade in 
some way. Where this line is drawn is always the result of political choices born along social, 
economic and political currents. The denial of the political character of processes of 
technicalization has a number of problematic consequences. It results in philosophically 
impermissible attempts to justify the exercise of normative authority on the sole basis of 
epistemic competence,
114
 by claiming that economists and scientists hold not only answers 
within their professional-epistemic domains but also when it comes to political life. It deflects 
attention from the understanding that technical decisions may have political and legal 
implications, or that notionally technical decisions inevitably take place within a given social 
                                                 
111
  Abbott 2001, 294. 
112
  Ibid.  
113
  See generally Lang 2011.  
114
  Scientific expertise does not provide a standalone normative basis for the exercise of political power. It 
cannot. The sciences, including economics, are part of a descriptive enterprise concerned with producing 
‘factual’ statements based on empirical observation in accordance with professionally accepted 
vocabularies and methodologies. The impossibility of deriving normative statements from factual 
statements has been well established since David Hume and clearly stated in the legal context by Hans 
Kelsen: see Hume 1817, 171-2; Kelsen 1967, 6.  
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and political frame.
115
 It allows actors making such decisions to displace their sense of 
responsibility for the practical implications of their decisions. It operates to obscure 
underlying power imbalances and stifle opportunities for change. Ironically, this can lead to 
the entrenchment of particular ways of knowing and approaching the world that are actually 
less effective and less efficient at producing desired outcomes.  
To further emphasize this point: output legitimacy narratives sometimes assume that the 
forms of knowledge included in the notion of ‘the technical’ — whether economic, scientific, 
or legal — are inherently universal and neutral. Yet David Kennedy has noted how particular 
ideas and disciplinary vocabularies can gain ascendancy as a result of the institutional 
resources channelled in their favour. He argues that ‘[p]ower in this sense — money, access to 
institutional resources, relationship to underlying patters of hegemony and influence — is 
central to the chance that a given idea will become influential or dominant within the 
international law profession’.116 Scholars identifying with the Third World Approaches to 
International Law tradition have also heavily criticized the purported neutrality and 
universality of ‘technical’ WTO rules. Bhupinder Chimni suggests that in some cases 
(particularly with respect to the TRIPS Agreement) WTO rules, rather than being neutral, 
rather reflect the interests of the ‘transnational capitalist class’.117 Antony Anghie links the 
WTO to the IMF and World Bank as all helping to facilitate a neoliberal vision of the global 
economy which poses distinctive challenges for Third World states.
118
 Meanwhile, James 
Gathii argues that there has been a ‘neoliberal turn’ in recent years in regional trade 
agreements, not only as the result of material drivers but also as the result of the actions of 
national and transnational networks which are partially constituted by shared cultural-
                                                 
115
  Scientific experts, in their capacity as scientific experts alone, may therefore only provide epistemic 
legitimacy, not normative or political legitimacy. That is, on their own, scientific experts give people 
reasons for believing that something is or is not empirically verifiable according to the precepts of a given 
discipline, not whether or not it is normatively justified. This is not to say that experts cannot be given 
political power to wield, but simply that their authority to wield such power cannot derive from their 
character as ‘experts’ per se. Where power is allocated on the basis of expertise, such allocation can only 
be justified on the basis of a larger overarching normative system that privileges that particular form of 
expertise.  
116
  Kennedy 2000, 422. 
117
  See Chimni 2004, 7-8; Chimni 2006, 7-10. 
118
  See Anghie 2006, 749. 
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economic assumptions.
119
 As such, rather than viewing the technical languages associated 
with WTO law (legal, economic, scientific, diplomatic) as inherently apolitical, they may be 
productively considered as representing competing knowledge systems about the WTO that 
may be used to advance the interests of certain actors over the interests of others.
120
 
Moreover, if anything, the ongoing functional differentiation of international expertise is only 
set to aggravate such competition, as an ever-multiplying series of specialist technical 
languages with ever higher barriers to entry are deployed in the service of framing and 
addressing particular problems.
121
  
D Expert Overreach 
Technicalization is in part a matter of substance, in that it concerns which modes of 
knowledge are prioritized and how they are then notionally stripped of political associations. 
It is also in part a matter of procedure, as technicalization processes invariably require 
normative power to be allocated to specific people and groups (experts) on the basis of, 
among other things, their epistemic competence. WTO law allocates power to various types of 
individuals and institutions on the basis of their expertise, often to good effect. Indeed, as will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven, there are even cases where the WTO could stand to make 
more use of experts. Problems arise, however when the limits to expert competence are not 
clearly defined or recognized and when the political dimensions of expert decisions are 
ignored. Experts may thereby exceed their authority in two ways: either by overstepping the 
bounds set for them in law, or overstepping their own professional competence. In such cases, 
the social element of output legitimacy in these cases may outstrip the normative benefits that 
expert knowledge can bring. As Emanuel Adler and Steven Bernstein note: 
as an unintended consequence of the actions of epistemic communities, scientific 
knowledge becomes socially validated as truth, the power that is used on behalf of this 
                                                 
119
  See Gathii 2011. 
120
  ‘The opening up of international governance to greater deliberations among a wider array of actors has 
contributed, perhaps not surprisingly, to an increasing preoccupation with struggles over the truth status of 
knowledge claims and the resources for making those claims more or less believable to diverse publics’: 
Miller 2007, 330.  
121
  See Koskenniemi 2007b, 4-9. See also Koskenniemi 2009b. 
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truth acquires social legitimacy, instrumental rationality becomes deeply institutionalized, 
and efficient practices rather than good practices become the natural order of things.
122
  
This problem is exacerbated by the social logic of expert institutions and epistemic 
communities, which can operate to swallow up more areas of rule- and decision-making than 
might otherwise be desirable. 
Closely related is the critique of managerialism, which highlights how issues are framed 
as ‘problems’ to be managed by appropriately tasked and competent experts. Indeed, Deborah 
Cass identified one of the central narratives of the constitutionalization debate within WTO as 
one of ‘institutional managerialism’, which  
creates the illusion of being a flexible, neutral, technocratic constitution while running the 
risk of becoming a self-legitimating, bureaucratic, insufficiently deliberative, and 
legalistic constitution which appeals to a predominantly classical economic telos and, 
indirectly, intrudes on national regulatory function and diversity.
123
  
This is accompanied by the problem of broad delegation to such experts, as strictly defined 
legal tests give way to the discretionary application of informal ‘balancing’ rubrics that are 
applied on a case-by-case basis.
124
 Writing on war and law, David Kennedy has raised similar 
issues about the way that framing decisions in a technical-legal vocabulary allows people to 
displace their ‘political and ethical responsibility’ for such decisions. Indeed, Kennedy argues 
that such ‘denial of both freedom and responsibility’ is an essential part of the self-
construction of the expert as an expert.
125
 Output legitimacy narratives can thus contribute to 
the empowerment of experts in a way that has problematic implications for expert groupthink 
and the displacement of responsibility for the consequences of decisions.  
Difficulties also arise when trying to properly demarcate between the competences of 
various experts. Article 14.9 of the Tokyo Round Standards Code, for instance, provided for 
the establishment of technical expert groups to make findings on whether a given measure 
was necessary for protecting human, animal or plant life or health. The experts in question 
were envisaged as scientific experts, but the determination as to what constitutes ‘necessity’ 
                                                 
122
  Adler & Bernstein 2004, 301. Cf Shapiro & Guston 2007, who also note that this can lead to the increased 
politicization of expert knowledge practices.  
123
  Cass 2005, 99. See also Koskenniemi 2007a. 
124
  See Koskenniemi 2007b, 9-10.  
125
  Kennedy 2006, 168-72. 
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in such circumstances has since been understood to be more of a legal question than a 
scientific question.
126
 Caroline Foster has similarly noted that it is not uncommon for the 
boundaries between fact and law, and the factual or normative character of particular 
determinations, to be blurred in SPS disputes.
127
 The panels in SPS disputes have sometimes 
struggled to identify the appropriate boundaries of experts’ epistemic competence, either by 
requesting information which lies beyond the expertise of the expert in question (either 
because it is outside of their specialization or is normative in character)
128
 or taking into such 
information when it is improperly volunteered by such experts. Jacqueline Peel also notes that 
panels may ‘feel obliged to defer to the “epistemic superiority” of experts’, which may carry 
with it a deferral to experts’ framing of issues, thereby importing a series of value judgments 
that may not be shared by the broader community.
129
 This is not to dismiss the value of using 
scientific experts in the SPS context, where Members are in agreement that science provides 
the best available metric for determining whether or not something poses an SPS risk. 
Nonetheless in harnessing the instrumental power of expertise, it is important to remain aware 
of these limitations and risks.  
Finally, many WTO Members clearly struggle to access sufficient expertise as a result of 
a lack of institutional and professional capacity and in the absence of the kinds of 
sophisticated knowledge gathering infrastructures that are such a central aspect of the 
regulatory apparatus of the wealthier Members. This hampers their ability to claim the 
modicum of power set aside for experts in the WTO for themselves. It also undermines these 
Members’ abilities to participate in steering the systems of knowledge prevalent in the WTO 
to serve their interests, and indeed to define the very boundaries of what constitutes relevant 
expertise in the context of the WTO. As argued by Diane Stone, ‘asymmetries in power 
relationships within the global polity are reproduced within these [international] knowledge 
networks as well as occasionally modified by them’.130 Although some attention has been 
                                                 
126
  This provision was quietly dropped from the SPS and TBT Agreements, which succeeded the Standards 
Code. Cf art 4.5 of the SCM Agreement, which empowers the SCM Committee, once their assistance has 
been requested by a panel, to reach determinative conclusions on whether or not a measure is a prohibited 
subsidy. The SCM Committee, however, is not framed as a purely technical body.  
127
  Foster 2013, 139-43. 
128
  Ibid 175-7. 
129
  Peel 2010, 77. 
130
  Stone 2004, 125. 
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paid to these capacity problems in the WTO dispute settlement context,
131
 more investigation 
of the social construction of expertise in the face of systemic global inequality is needed.  
IV CONCLUSION 
A focus on output legitimacy brings into focus a very different set of challenges for the 
creation, interpretation, and application of WTO law. It directs attention towards the role of 
otherwise neglected ‘background’ actors in the WTO, including experts, international and 
domestic bureaucrats, and other participants in the creation of systems of knowledge relating 
to the WTO. It raises questions about whether and how the operation of WTO law leads to 
desirable outcomes, rather than focusing exclusively on the degree to which certain 
procedural criteria, such as transparency or participation, are being fulfilled for their own 
sake. Such a focus raises questions not only about whether the WTO is effectively and 
efficiently achieving its goals, but also whether those goals are desirable at all. It also has the 
potential to show how, contrary to many of the consent and democratic narratives, Members’ 
and individuals’ preferences and interests are not pre-established and fixed, but are in part 
constituted by WTO law and practices. Careful consideration of how input- and output-based 
modes of legitimacy dynamically interact with one another could therefore lead to a richer 
understanding of the relationship between law, knowledge, and legitimacy.
132
  
To be clear, however, this thesis is not aimed at ‘maximising’ output legitimacy in the 
WTO or elsewhere, or for input-oriented concerns to be neglected in favour of a legitimacy 
focused narrowly on results. Output legitimacy provides no panacea for the WTO’s 
legitimacy woes. The present uncertainty over the WTO’s direction, the gap between various 
of the WTO’s laws and procedures and their purported aims (not least the widespread malaise 
about the Doha Round), the failures of technicalization and the dangers of expert 
empowerment all impose their own limits on the legitimating capacity of such narratives. 
Moreover, output legitimacy narratives can prove particularly problematic where they begin 
to discount questions of consent and democratic participation. To echo Joseph Weiler: 
                                                 
131
  See, eg, Shaffer 2005a; Nottage 2009; Hsieh 2010; Santos 2012.  
132
  ‘[W]e need to apply a dynamic view of input and output legitimacy to overcome a rigid dichotomy. A 
categorization that focuses either on processes/structures or output runs the risks of segmenting the 
problem, cutting it into small salami slices and losing the broader picture’: Elsig 2007b, 88. 
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I believe too that in the international sphere as elsewhere the end can justify the means 
only so far. That a legitimacy powerfully skewed to results and away from process, based 
mostly on outputs and only to a limited degree on inputs, is a weak legitimacy and 
sometimes none at all.
133
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, output-oriented narratives still have a prominent role to 
play in legitimating the law and operations of the WTO. A legitimacy skewed towards inputs 
and away from substance and outcome takes on its own fragility as its means become 
increasingly distant from its ends.  
What the thesis does call for, then, is greater scrutiny of output legitimacy claims, greater 
awareness of how such claims intersect with WTO law and practices, and further 
investigation of both the benefits and the dangers that a more rigorous approach to output 
legitimacy may bring for international governance. It is thus worthwhile to consider how it is 
that knowledge about what constitute appropriate and desirable outcomes for the WTO, and 
knowledge about how to achieve such outcomes, is framed and generated by WTO law.
134
 
WTO law and practice to structure what kinds of knowledge claims are acknowledged, 
prioritised, validated, or discarded in different fora. Of particular significance in this regard 
are the WTO’s laws and practices that are used to frame and resolve competing knowledge 
claims about such outcomes and their realization. As Clark Miller argues: 
Justificatory arguments about both the substance of international norms — what goals 
and objectives international governance should strive to achieve — as well as compliance 
with those norms demand recourse to knowledge, evidence, and proof.
135
 
The remainder of this thesis will focus on how the laws governing the WTO’s negotiation 
processes (Chapter Six) and dispute settlement processes (Chapter Seven) have been shaped 
by conceptions of output legitimacy, and how they in turn have contributed to how output 
legitimacy is constructed with respect to the WTO.  
                                                 
133
  Weiler 2004, 562. 
134
  When he first defined output legitimacy, Fritz Scharpf also identified a series of ‘mechanisms of output 
oriented legitimization’. These mechanisms include, among others: electoral accountability, independent 
expertise, intergovernmental agreement, and pluralist policy networks (ie policy networks that reflect an 
openness to mutual rational persuasion, as sometimes reflected in associative or deliberative democratic 
theories): Scharpf 1999, 13-21. 
135
  Miller 2007, 330. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY, LAW AND WTO NEGOTIATIONS 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations disappointed many, having variously been 
described during its tenure as ‘stalled’,1 ‘failed’,2 ‘paralysed’3 and ‘doomed’.4 Even having 
been pronounced ‘dead’ on several occasions, it showed a remarkable capacity for 
resurrection, albeit fairly half-hearted.
5
 Its current status is somewhere in limbo; at the Nairobi 
Ministerial in 2015 although ‘many Members reaffirm[ed] the Doha Development Agenda’, 
other Members chose not to do so; negotiations on the remaining Doha issues continue.
6
 The 
aura of failure surrounding the round has impinged on the WTO’s legitimacy more broadly, 
by encouraging commentators to somewhat extravagantly question whether the WTO as a 
whole is still relevant
7
 and even whether it can survive.
8
 The incremental progress in recent 
years, such as on the Trade Facilitation Agreement at the Bali Ministerial in 2013
9
 and on 
agricultural trade, electronic commerce and matters relating to LDCs at the Nairobi 
Ministerial,
10
 only goes some way to countering this.  
There have been two common responses to this malaise from trade lawyers and diplomats. 
The first is to emphasize that, for the very survival of the multilateral trading system, the 
WTO needs to keep moving forward by making new trade agreements — reflecting the 
‘bicycle theory’ of international trade. The second claims that the WTO’s law-making 
processes should be ‘streamlined’ to make them more efficient and effective. To date, the vast 
                                                 
1
  Beattie 2011.  
2
  Bhagwati 2012. 
3
  ‘Goodbye Doha, Hello Bali’ 2012. 
4
  Schwab 2011. 
5
  See, eg, ‘Doha Is Dead…’ 2006; Kleimann & Guinan 2011; Agence France-Presse 2011; Wilkinson 2012. 
6
  WT/MIN(15)/DEC [30]. 
7
  See Meunier 2009; Elliott 2013.  
8
  ‘Can the WTO Remain Relevant?’ 2013.  
9
  WT/L/940. See Clarke 2005; Agence France-Presse 2013.  
10
  See WT/MIN(15)/DEC [21] for a list of decisions adopted.  
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majority of the proposals associated with these responses were focused on how to make the 
conclusion of the Doha Round more likely, or at least make the conclusion of some legally 
binding agreements more likely; the focus was thus on the institutional efficiency and 
effectiveness of the negotiations, and to some degree the level of commitments rather than the 
character of those commitments.
11
 The broad desirability of additional rules and instruments 
was largely assumed. The precise content of such agreements and whether they are headed in 
the right direction — what may be thought of as the functional effectiveness of the rules 
negotiated — has received less attention from legal scholars.  
Despite the WTO’s apparent emphasis on being a ‘results-oriented institution’, WTO rules 
as drafted do not necessarily represent economically first-best solutions; indeed they are not 
even always functionally coherent. As early as 1975 Robert Hudec observed that ‘never has 
such a practical program enjoyed so much prestige with so little justification in historical 
experience’,12 and he was writing of the comparatively limited rule-set contained in the 
GATT. New rules, and further elaborations of the old rules, have attracted further criticism. In 
1990, Michael Trebilcock argued that ‘there is no intellectual case for antidumping laws’ and 
that ‘there is no intellectual case for countervailing duty laws’.13 Similarly, Alan Sykes argues 
that the WTO’s detailed rules on subsidies are ‘largely indefensible from an economic 
perspective’, as they are unable to identify subsidization effectively and cannot distinguish 
whether or not subsidies are socially desirable.
14
 Sykes also argues that certain rules on 
safeguards in WTO law are internally incoherent; for instance, ‘the current interpretation of 
the “non-attribution” requirement for the use of safeguard measures in the WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards obliges members to make a demonstration that is logically impossible as an 
economic matter’.15 Writing with respect to GSP schemes, Gene Grossman and Sykes also 
note that, notwithstanding the relative enthusiasm from certain Members for such schemes, it 
is ‘exceedingly difficult to say whether discrimination and reciprocity in GSP schemes make 
the trading community worse off or better off over the long haul’.16 These studies are not 
                                                 
11
  See Rolland 2010, 66. 
12
  Hudec 1975, 4 and 15-16. 
13
  Trebilcock 1990, 238. 
14
  Sykes 2010. Cf Howse 2010; Lang 2014.  
15
  Sykes 2004b, 523. See also Sykes 2003; Jones 2004; Sykes 2004a; Sykes 2004b; Lee 2006; Sykes 2006. 
16
  Grossman & Sykes 2005, 42. 
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necessarily the last word on these matters; but they do raise important questions about 
whether multilateral trade law-making processes are (a) well-tailored to creating efficient and 
effective rules; and (b) whose interests those rules are intended to serve.
17
   
Further problems arise when WTO rules are interpreted and applied; yet the problems 
identified above lie in the nature of the rules themselves. These rules embody ideas about how 
the world operates that are not necessarily justifiable in epistemic terms. No matter the legal 
effectiveness of these rules — of how completely Members’ conduct may reflect what the 
rule requires — their functional effectiveness will, of necessity, be lacking. It is thus 
worthwhile to consider what role WTO law may play in facilitating, or appearing to facilitate, 
the drafting and adoption of more functionally effective rules. At the same time, it is 
important to consider how output legitimacy narratives concerned with knowledge, expertise 
and the concept of ‘the technical’ are used to justify the exercise of power by and through 
WTO law in relation to multilateral trade negotiations, and how these narratives intersect with 
the idea of functional effectiveness. 
This chapter therefore explores how the legal mechanisms governing law-making at the 
WTO are framed as enhancing the WTO’s output legitimacy, while also drawing attention to 
the serious limitations of those mechanisms. It argues that such mechanisms have a 
potentially beneficial role to play in leading to more informed and better reasoned policy 
formation, including at the negotiation stage, and in turn to more efficient and effective yet 
contestable WTO rules. This beneficial potential is, however, accompanied by the dangers 
identified in Chapter Five, especially those of technicalization and expert overreach. This is 
not to claim that the functional effectiveness and therefore output legitimacy of potential rules 
should be the sole or overriding concern in trade negotiations. To ignore the role of national 
interest, historical grievance and political trade-offs would be naïve. Nonetheless given that 
the WTO is characterised as a results-based institution, it is worth considering how law may 
help steer WTO negotiations in a way that facilitates the creation of more functionally 
efficient and effective rules on matters of common agreement. 
The chapter proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a brief overview of the legal 
framework for WTO negotiations. Part III considers the relationship between output 
                                                 
17
  For instance, Members may still see antidumping rules as politically desirable even in the absence of a 
political ‘intellectual case’ for them, while GSP schemes may still benefit the beneficiaries of those 
schemes even if they do not benefit ‘the trading community’ overall from an economic perspective.   
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legitimacy narratives and the legal requirements governing the characteristics of participants 
in WTO law-making processes, including norms relating to epistemic competence, 
independence and diversity. Part IV then examines the relationship between output legitimacy 
and the norms that govern the terms of interaction between those participants. This Part 
focuses on recent proposals to ‘streamline’ WTO law-making and how these are framed in 
terms of ‘necessary’ trade-offs between input and output legitimacy. Throughout, this chapter 
highlights the politicized and materially driven manner in which various regimes of 
knowledge are deployed and become embodied in WTO rules, and notes the importance of 
maintaining reflexive processes to ensure that WTO rules are able to adapt to changing 
circumstances and preferences. Overall it argues that law is central to how we understand both 
the functional and institutional efficiency and effectiveness of WTO law-making processes; 
that input legitimacy does not necessarily come at the expense of output legitimacy; and that 
institutional efficiency considerations should not be allowed to eclipse questions of whether 
given rules are substantively desirable or functionally effective.   
II LAW-MAKING THROUGH NEGOTIATION ROUNDS 
The WTO Agreement sets out various law-making options for WTO Members, including 
through amendment,
18
 waiver
19
 and authoritative interpretation.
20
 For the most part, however, 
Members have continued to prefer negotiating new general rules
21
 in bulk through GATT-
style multilateral negotiating rounds. There have been only a few cases of primary multilateral 
trade law-making outside of this context.
22
 These negotiating rounds are only loosely 
                                                 
18
  WTO Agreement Article X. 
19
  WTO Agreement Article IX:3 and 4. 
20
  WTO Agreement Article IX:2. 
21
  Although there has been rather extensive use of the waiver power, these waivers are generally directed at a 
small fraction of the membership. Waivers of general application, such as the TRIPS waiver on access to 
essential medicines, the Kimberley Waiver, and the GSP waivers, are more rare: see Feichtner 2012, ch 4.  
22
  There have also been limited plurilateral negotiations between Members for agreements within the WTO 
but outside of the context of negotiating rounds. Article XVIII of the GATS, for instance, provides that 
Members ‘may negotiate commitments with respect to measures affecting trade in services not subject to 
scheduling under Articles XVI or XVII’. These have given rise to, inter alia, further agreements on 
telecommunications and financial services. In addition, Members may amend the WTO Agreements in 
accordance with WTO Agreement Article X.  
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structured by formal law, with GATT Article XXVIII regarding the conduct of tariff 
negotiations providing only the most tenuous connection to today’s complex negotiations. A 
variety of informal and customary practices nonetheless abound, some of the most of 
important of which include the consensus principle
23
 and the single undertaking principle.
24
  
The Doha Round was launched by the Membership with the Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
which was adopted on 14 November 2001. The Declaration set up a TNC for the duration of 
the round to supervise the negotiations and establish appropriate negotiating mechanisms.
25
 
The TNC operates under the authority of the General Council and is chaired by the Director-
General. It has set up myriad issue-specific negotiating groups. Some of these were created 
whole-cloth, while others operate as special sessions of existing WTO bodies, such as the 
Agriculture Committee and the Services Council. Each negotiating group is led by a chair 
who plays a key role in facilitating and influencing negotiations.
26
  
Trade law and policy formation does not start when a negotiation round is opened, nor 
does it stop at the moment a treaty or instrument has been finalized and signed. Trade 
ministries and foreign offices worldwide work in conjunction with the private sector to gather 
information and develop theories about what policies would suit their interests. These 
processes have likely been both further stimulated and further fragmented by the surge in 
negotiations for preferential trade agreements outside of the aegis of the WTO. Discussions 
taking place in WTO committees and working groups, as well as in other IGOs, also help to 
shape perceptions about what may constitute desirable developments in the trade regime. 
Once rules are in place, various evaluative mechanisms may be used to highlight whether 
there are grounds for elaboration, amendment or termination, using information culled from 
WTO disputes, from the Member reports for the TPRM, from Secretariat reports, from 
national agencies and from civil society. Throughout the policy cycle, and in various fora, 
knowledge about the trade regime and national interests is framed by law.
27
 
                                                 
23
  See Doha Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paras 20, 23, 26 and 27; WTO Agreement Article IX:1. 
24
  See Doha Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para 47. 
25
  Doha Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para 46. 
26
  See generally Odell 2005.  
27
  Although Steinberg argues that ‘most of the important information generated through the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism […] is known already to the EU Commission and the US government, is much less 
complete than the information they have, and is not as well prioritized for understanding measures which 
domestic industry finds most significant’: Steinberg 2009, 1064-5. Steinberg encourages the reader to 
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Within this broad and relatively loose structure, there are a variety of norms and practices 
that may be understood as relating to the functional and institutional effectiveness of WTO 
negotiations, and by extension to the WTO’s output legitimacy. The remainder of this chapter 
divides these norms and practices into two groups: those regarding the characteristics of the 
major participants in trade negotiations, both formal and informal; and those regarding the 
terms of interaction between those participants. These groups do not necessarily exhaust the 
potential categories into which output legitimacy-oriented norms and practices may be 
divided, but they have proved loci for ongoing debates about how to structure the WTO’s 
negotiating processes.  
III RULES GOVERNING THE PARTICIPANTS IN WTO NEGOTIATIONS 
The first major category of output-oriented legal mechanisms relates to the characteristics 
required of the various participants in WTO negotiations. There are three main categories of 
output-oriented norms that relate to participant characteristics: these are norms which relate to 
epistemic competence, independence and diversity.
28
 Norms of epistemic competence 
facilitate output legitimacy by encouraging negotiators to have a stronger command of the 
facts and ideas underlying their negotiating positions;
29
 they may also specify which forms of 
knowledge and professional orientations are preferred in given circumstances.
30
 Norms of 
                                                                                                                                                        
compare the TPRM country reports with the USTR’s country analyses in the annual National Trade 
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers: at fn 7.  
28
  These norms are more obvious in other WTO contexts. As will be discussed further in Chapter Seven, for 
instance, Article 17.3 of the DSU requires that Appellate Body members be ‘persons of recognized quality, 
with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements 
generally’ (competence), ‘be unaffiliated with any government’ (independence) and ‘be broadly 
representative of membership in the WTO’ (diversity). 
29
  ‘The more robust the findings and the better they are communicated to decision makers, the greater the 
chances that the research will find echo in high-quality and effective public policies — that is, policies that 
can solve a given problem’: Botto 2010, 16 (citation omitted). 
30
  Competence is not just about ensuring that decision-makers have the information and the expertise at hand 
to make instrumentally effective decisions. It also provides as a limited form of accountability, in that 
expert discretion is limited by their professional integrity. At the same time, however, it also has the 
capacity to allow for individual experts to displace their personal responsibility for certain decisions. As 
David Kennedy points out, ‘[t]hese people are experts who come upon their roles as investors, managers, 
patent holders or bishops precisely by routinizing themselves into a professional vocabulary and practice 
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independence and impartiality facilitate output legitimacy by guarding against the capture of 
law-making process by special interests. Norms of diversity facilitate output legitimacy by 
bringing alternative perspectives to the table and thereby increasing opportunities for 
knowledge contestation. The remainder of this Part how examines each of these norms 
manifest in relation to the major participants in WTO negotiations (including the Members, 
the Secretariat, NGOs and IGOs), and how they have been deployed in claims about the 
legitimacy of the WTO.  
A The Members 
The primary participants in WTO rule- and decision-making, and the only actors entitled to 
vote or to veto, are the Members.
31
 The WTO Agreement provides that the WTO ‘shall 
provide a forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade 
regulation in matters dealt with under the [WTO Agreements]’ and that it ‘may also provide a 
forum for further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade 
relations, and a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may 
be decided by the Ministerial Conference’.32 The number of WTO Members has risen steadily 
over the last couple of decades, as had the number of Contracting Parties to the GATT before 
it. The 23 original Contracting Parties of the GATT 1947 had risen to 128 Contracting Parties 
by 1994, while at the time of writing the WTO had 164 Members.
33
 Although increasingly 
beleaguered by the rise of bilateral, regional and even ‘mega-regional’ trade agreements, the 
WTO remains the primary negotiating forum for multilateral trade rules.  
Not surprisingly, at the WTO level there are no formal requirements of epistemic 
competence, independence or diversity for Members or their delegates participating in 
multilateral trade negotiations. Formally speaking, every Member of the WTO has an equal 
legal right to participate in the negotiations. The WTO Agreement provides that the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council are ‘composed of representatives of all the 
                                                                                                                                                        
which makes it difficult for them to experience human freedom and the direct responsibility that goes with 
it. The difficulty is to understand just how expertise limits expert freedom, and dulls the experience of 
responsibility’: Kennedy 2005, 17. 
31
  See WTO Agreement Articles IX and X.  
32
  WTO Agreement Article III:2.  
33
  See WTO Website, ‘Members and Observers’.  
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Members’34 — it is left to the Members to decide who they want to appoint as representatives 
and their advisors.
35
 When it comes to norms of independence, customary international law 
and the VCLT require that states not be coerced into entering agreements under the threat of 
force
36
 and that they not be bound by agreements where their consent has been procured via 
the corruption or coercion of their representatives.
37
 The WTO does not add anything more to 
this, and the idea that Members be independent and impartial in entering into negotiations in 
any broader sense is, for good reason, generally considered a non-starter. As to norms of 
diversity, informal norms have arguably come into play that affect the diversity of 
representation in WTO negotiations; these are most visible in the debate over Green Room 
participation. For the most part, however, changes to Green Room practices have been 
justified in terms of the inherent virtues of participation, rather than the instrumental virtues of 
ensuring that a more diverse range of views are represented.  
1 Competence: Members and Expertise in WTO Negotiations 
Norms of epistemic competence, nonetheless, play a significant role in WTO negotiations in 
two ways: first, in the extent to which Members make use of expert knowledge in formulating 
their trade policy positions and in negotiating trade-offs;
38
 and second, as a result of 
asymmetrical access to information and expertise in negotiations. Even in the absence of 
formal requirements, Members have increasingly recognized the importance of having 
dedicated trade policy experts to focus on formulating and representing their interests in 
multilateral trade law negotiations. In the US, for instance, the Havana negotiations for the 
ITO were originally largely handled by the State Department, and responsibility for foreign 
                                                 
34
  WTO Agreement Articles IV:1 and 2.  
35
  These representatives and advisors are members of various overlapping communities defined by, among 
other things, nationality, professional orientation, educational background (disciplinary and institutional), 
and employment history, to form part of both national and global policy networks.  
36
  See VCLT Article 52.  
37
  See VCLT Articles 50-51. The Doha Ministerial Declaration, which sets out the mandate for the Doha 
Round, is written in the collective voice of the Ministerial Conference. Not surprisingly, the Declaration 
also makes no reference to the epistemic competence of trade negotiators: see WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.  
38
  In trying to assess the likely national impact of new trade commitments, Members ‘need information about 
and knowledge not only of the national economy and regulations, but also of the country with which they 
are negotiating’: Botto 2010, 22. See also Das 2009.  
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economic policy issues was split between small groups and individuals in the State 
Department, the Department of Commerce, and the White House, among others.
39
 This 
scattered approach was succeeded by the creation of the Special Trade Representative office 
in advance of the Kennedy Round in 1962, although even this was initially staffed by only a 
dozen or so people (including a 28 year old Robert Hudec).
40
 The Special Trade 
Representative had only intermittent influence in US trade policy circles until 1979, when it 
was renamed the Office of the United States Trade Representative (‘USTR’) and was made 
the ‘principal locus for trade policy coordination and negotiation’.41 The substantial increase 
in both the scope and ambition of the multilateral trade regime in the aftermath of the Tokyo 
Round in particular led to increased demand for specialist trade expertise. As of mid-2014 the 
USTR had over 200 ‘committed professionals with decades of specialized experience in trade 
issues and regions of the world’42 with primary responsibility for ‘developing and 
coordinating US international trade, commodity, and direct investment policy, and overseeing 
negotiations with other countries’.43 Simultaneously, the knowledge-gathering infrastructure 
relating to US trade has become increasingly sophisticated and complex, giving the USTR’s 
trade policy experts more raw data with which to work. Moreover, the USTR only represents 
the most obvious accretion of trade policy expertise in a specific US government agency; 
trade expertise has also continued to multiply in other countries, in other government 
agencies,
44
 in lobby groups, think tanks, consultancies, NGOs, law firms and academia. 
Importantly, trade policy expertise such as this is not merely there to be strategically exploited 
by Member governments. Rather, it represents a body of knowledge and practices subject to 
its own methodological and professional idiosyncrasies which may result in findings that do 
not reflect immediate government priorities. 
                                                 
39
  Between 1954 and 1960 there was also a Council on Foreign Economic Policy which sought to coordinate 
the US’s foreign economic policy: see general information in ‘US Council on Foreign Economic Policy: 
Records, 1954-61’ available at <http://eisenhower.archives.gov/Research/Finding_Aids/pdf/US_Council_ 
Foreign_Economic_Policy.pdf>. 
40
  Dryden 1995, 64. 
41
  Ibid 252. 
42
  USTR, ‘About Us’ available at <ustr.gov/about-us>.  
43
  USTR, ‘Mission of the USTR’ available at <ustr.gov/about-us/about-ustr>.  
44
  These are further coordinated through the Trade Policy Review Group and the Trade Policy Staff 
Committee.  
 184 
 
One possible view sees a facilitative role for trade policy experts and economists, in which 
the latest empirical and theoretical developments are transmitted to negotiators who then 
rationally incorporate their insights into national trade policy and international negotiation.
45
 
Knowledge is here used to illuminate and clarify trade-offs as far as they may affect reflect 
national interests and to lead to better quality rules. This perspective views the role of expert 
knowledge as purely supportive, and does not consider how different forms of knowledge and 
the contests between them may in themselves socially construct the preferences and interests 
of the policy-makers. 
The superficial appeal of such a vision does not, however, stand up to scrutiny. 
Notwithstanding the ever-increasing number of trade experts, the impact of expert knowledge 
on trade negotiations has traditionally been assumed rather than rigorously traced.
46
 And it is 
important that such impact not be overstated. Although Robert Howse notes that the trade 
policy elite of the GATT era ‘tended to understand the trade system in terms of the policy 
science of economics, not a grand normative political vision’,47 the extent to which such 
GATT insiders were guided by economic science in the course of negotiation rounds, even at 
a purely ideational level, may itself be questioned. Nicolas Lamp, for instance, has recently 
highlighted how international trade negotiations are implicated in and shaped by ‘discourses’ 
of reciprocity, SDT, and development; ‘practices’ of participation; and ‘narratives’ of 
liberalization, fairness, stability and necessity.
48
 These background discourses, practices and 
narratives all interact in complex ways with the material drivers of Members’ interests.49  
                                                 
45
  This approach is now largely out of favour in social science circles: see Young 2004, 2; Botto 2010, 17. 
46
  ‘There may be a growing body of literature on the use of knowledge in a variety of policy fields, but 
studies on how research has been used in the area of trade policy and negotiations have lagged behind 
those in some other areas […]’: Tussie 2009, 2. 
47
  And were relatively ‘insulated from, and not particularly interested in, the larger political and social 
conflicts of the age’: Howse 2002a, 98. Howse’s emphasis in this article is on the GATT/WTO’s dispute 
settlement procedures, rather than negotiation rounds, but his characterization of the ‘trade policy elite’ of 
the GATT era is not limited to their role in dispute settlement.  
48
  Lamp 2013.  
49
  ‘Often, the link between research and policy, or evidence and practice, is viewed as a linear process, 
whereby a set of findings or lessons shift from the “research sphere” over to the “policy sphere”, and then 
has some impact on policymakers’ decisions and programmes. Reality tends to be much more dynamic and 
complex, with two-way processes between research, policy and practice, shaped by multiple relations and 
reservoirs of knowledge’: Young 2004, 2.  
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Moreover, even if one assumes the influence of particular forms of knowledge on trade 
law-making, there are still epistemic clashes between and within expert areas of knowledge to 
contend with, and bodies of expert knowledge are themselves often characterized by 
uncertainty or simply incomplete. As Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck notes:  
Despite the many links between trade policies, WTO rules, and social and environmental 
outcomes, the multilateral trading system lacks adequate mechanisms for gathering, 
reviewing, and assessing data on the relationship between trade rules and flows and key 
environmental and social indicators. It thus lacks the information and processes for 
enabling governments to harness the multilateral trading system to mitigate problems 
where it can and to adjust its rules where they may cause or exacerbate harm.
50
 
This is not merely a problem of information-gathering. Raising the profile of expert 
knowledge within trade negotiations will not necessarily resolve conflicts, and in some cases 
may exacerbate them. As such, Botto and Bianculli argue ‘expectations of academic incidence 
on trade policy should be cautious’.51 Trade negotiations are notoriously messy and complex, 
and epistemic concerns provide only part of a complex decision-making matrix. Although 
empirical and theoretical knowledge have an important role to play in trade negotiations, 
including in shaping Members’ understandings of their own interests,52 the impact of such 
knowledge is strongly curtailed by the other material and ideational dimensions of such 
negotiations. This can, in part, help to explain the significant gaps between first-best 
                                                 
50
  Deere-Birkbeck 2012, 122. 
51
  Botto & Bianculli 2009, 119. Botto approaches a common model (which she identifies as ‘more realistic’ 
than the alternative) of how knowledge affects decision-making as concluding that ‘technical knowledge is 
of relative and secondary significance, and that only exceptionally does empirical research have direct, 
instrumental and clearly identifiable effects on decision making’: Botto 2010, 18. That said, she also 
suggests that negotiators working on external trade policy ‘are more open to new ideas than are officials in 
other areas of domestic policy. […] [I]nternational negotiators are more sensitive to innovation and to 
changes in scenarios, most of them proposed from outside. Nonetheless, they prefer research that they 
commission themselves or that is produced in their own environments’: at 27. Diane Tussie advocates 
caution when considering the effect that research and ideas have on trade policy, as this effect may be 
limited by communication difficulties, countervailing material interests and other facts: Tussie 2009, 7. 
52
  ‘The complexity of [international trade issues] virtually compels policy makers to seek out frames of 
reference and evidence for their policies. These frames of reference are cognitive maps that describe 
problems and map out realities; but they also have the power to shape and create realities’: Tussie 2009, 1. 
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economic solutions and the written reality of WTO agreements as highlighted by authors such 
as Trebilcock and Sykes.  
2 The Problem of Differential Access to Expertise 
The connection between expert knowledge and the positions taken by Members in the course 
of trade negotiations is even more precarious for the WTO’s less wealthy Members. 
Asymmetric access to knowledge and expertise adversely affects developing countries’ 
abilities to protect and advance their interests in trade negotiations. During the Uruguay 
Round, there were significant differences between the level of experience of the various 
negotiators and the quality of information to which they had access. Major developed states 
were able to draw upon the expertise of staff with decades of general negotiating experience, 
including direct experience with GATT negotiations. The US and EC were able to draw on 
vast swathes of information concerning trade effects as generated by experienced domestic 
experts and long-established information gathering systems, while smaller countries largely 
had to rely on the information produced by external agents. This is not to say that developing 
countries were wholly devoid of resources. Larger developing countries, such as China and 
India, had experienced negotiators who had taken part in previous negotiating rounds and 
dedicated GATT missions. In addition, the Technical Cooperation Division of the GATT 
Secretariat provided developing countries with a basic level of technical assistance, by 
providing trade policy seminars, performing country studies, providing data on tariffs, non-
tariff measures and trade flows, and providing information on negotiating rules, procedures 
and techniques.
53
 Developing countries were also able to draw on expert information supplied 
by the OECD, UNCTAD and the World Bank.  
There were, however, significant limitations to these sources of information. Sheila Page 
points out that the OECD and World Bank figures on the potential benefits for developing 
                                                 
53
  See COM.TD/W/445, para 12. The objective was to ‘help developing countries in their preparations for 
and participation in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, by providing data, information 
and background documentation focusing on issues and problems in the negotiations, of interest to 
developing countries. The programme would thus aim at facilitating the more effective participation of 
developing countries in the Uruguay Round’: at para 9. Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck suggests that the WTO 
Secretariat should ‘provide more systematic objective information on the status and process of negotiations 
and on the implications for LDCs of various specific proposals under discussion, particularly when 
negotiations move into a rapid or technical phase’: Deere-Birkbeck 2012, 125. 
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countries were wildly optimistic, took into account a number of irrelevant factors, and only 
appeared after the Uruguay Round had begun.
54
 Such information was also less 
comprehensive and targeted than that used by the wealthiest participants. Less powerful states 
thus had much less of an idea of how their interests would be affected by the proposed rules.  
Resource constraints have also ensured that it is very difficult for many developing 
countries to obtain even information about what is going on in Geneva. Writing in 1998, 
Richard Blackhurst estimated that Members required at least three delegates in Geneva to 
cover only the most essential WTO meetings.
55
 By 2003, Håkan Nordström estimated that the 
minimum number necessary had risen to five, given that the number of meetings taking place 
each week in the WTO had tripled following the launch of the Doha Round.
56
 Nordström 
further highlighted that in 2003 there were 22 WTO Members (half least-developed countries, 
half small island developing states) with no formal representation in Geneva, as compared to 
the US, China, Korea, Japan and EC, which had over 15 delegates per mission each. The 
inability to attend these meetings is rendered all the more significant by the practice of 
decision-making by consensus, as consensus only requires that no one present at the relevant 
meeting objects. This has led some delegates to call for the number of meetings to be reduced 
so that developing countries can participate more effectively.
57
 On the one hand, this is a 
matter of input legitimacy, in that it relates to ensuring that developing countries have 
sufficient opportunities to participate in decision-making that affects them. On the other hand, 
it also has output legitimacy implications because it leads to the neglect of potentially relevant 
sources of information and undermines opportunities to contest prevailing ideas. 
The Doha Round
58
 brought with it a comparatively (in historical terms) extensive set of 
funds and projects for capacity building and technical assistance for developing countries,
59
 
which was in part intended to ameliorate some of the problems associated with a lack of 
expert capacity. The WTO Secretariat’s technical assistance measures are now largely 
                                                 
54
  Page 2002, 21. 
55
  Blackhurst 1998, 54. 
56
  Nordström 2006, 9.  
57
  See the views expressed by various interviewees in Kwa 2003, 16. 
58
  See Doha Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paras 2, 16, 20-1, 23-7, 33, 36 and 38-43. 
59
  Diane Tussie and Pablo Heidrich describe the WTO as having ‘a very generous budget’ for such activities: 
Tussie & Heidrich 2010, 41. That said, in recent years there has been trouble securing desired levels of 
funding: Smeets 2013, 1052-3 and 1078-82. 
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channelled through the ITTC, which was founded in 2003. Technical assistance is provided to 
developing countries on a needs-based approach, in which needs are assessed by both the 
ITTC and the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Division.60 Particular priority is given to LDCs.61 
These measures include training programmes (including Geneva-based, regional and national 
programmes),
62
 one-off seminars and conferences, outreach programmes for trade policy 
officials, e-learning programmes, internship programmes and the creation of WTO chairs at 
fourteen universities worldwide.
63
 The effectiveness of the programmes is monitored by the 
Technical Cooperation Audit Unit and is assessed on Results-Based Management principles.
64
 
Turning to the numbers, Maarten Smeets notes that by 2013 the Secretariat had trained over 
46,000 officials since the Doha Ministerial, including 20,000 officials completing a WTO e-
learning course,
65
 and that a further 250 interns had been recruited. This has arguably 
improved the opportunities for participation and contestation in WTO negotiations. Maarten 
Smeets notes that, among other things: 
Trainees reported that the exposure to WTO trade negotiations acted as a useful training 
tool to equip them to actively participate in the negotiations, submit position papers and 
defend their interests in the negotiations themselves. It can safely be said that never 
before in the history of GATT/WTO so many negotiating and text proposals were 
prepared and submitted by developing country Members, including by LDCs, sometimes 
on highly complex and technical issues.
66
  
                                                 
60
  Smeets 2013, 1051. 
61
  Ibid 1070. See also Doha Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paras 42 and 43.  
62
  Smeets 2013, 1056-8. 
63
  Ibid 1058-66. 
64
  Ibid 1066-9. The Results-Based Management approach is widely incorporated into UN development 
programmes, and is described by Smeets as follows: ‘the underlying idea is ensure that donors and partner 
countries direct resources to achieving results, and use information on results to improve decision making 
and programme performance, based on indicators, that allow to measure progress and determine change 
and impact’: at 1066-7. 
65
  Ibid 1069. It is unclear whether this number accounts for 46,000 individuals or 46,000 completed training 
programmes.  
66
  Ibid 1073.  
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In addition, Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie use the example of the G20 to illustrate how 
developing countries’ bargaining positions may be enhanced by coalition-based research, 
while Paul Mably has conducted a similar exercise focusing on the G33.
67
  
While these are positive developments for developing countries, from both participatory 
and epistemic perspectives, there are nonetheless clear limits to the epistemic openness of 
such capacity-building and technical assistance programmes. A significant proportion of 
technical assistance activities are directed towards educating developing countries ‘about the 
legal complexities of the commitments that countries made before they had acquired the 
appropriate analytical skills’.68 These programmes, in other words, are directed more towards 
ensuring better implementation of standards already committed to, rather than towards 
considering whether those standards serve developing countries’ interests or how they might 
be contested, or how developing countries may better advance their interests in future. The 
programmes also provide developing Members with little in the way of assistance in 
determining whether other Members are failing to comply with existing rules in a way that 
adversely affects their interests. As Tussie and Heidrich note: 
Only a very small part of this training concerns WTO rules on drawing up regional and 
preferential agreements, on the more common negotiating practices in multilateral 
discussions, or on the several possible interpretations of a single clause. There is no 
training on how to put in place systems to monitor separate and unfulfilled commitments 
that could adversely affect acquired rights. […] The technical assistance is designed in 
such a way that it is biased toward ensuring that countries comply with the rules, but 
without instruments to monitor if there is compliance elsewhere and thus determine if 
rights are being infringed.
69
  
Tussie and Heidrich also note that these training and internship programmes are generally 
taken up by a limited cross section of public servants who are usually from foreign or trade 
                                                 
67
  Narlikar & Tussie 2009; Mably 2009. 
68
  Tussie & Heidrich 2010, 41. 
69
  Tussie & Heidrich 2010, 42. Similarly although a significant facet of the Aid for Trade initiative launched 
at the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005 focuses on trade policy development, Dominique Njinkeu et al argue 
that ‘[e]xisting Aid for Trade programs tend to focus narrowly on enhancing participation in negotiations 
and implementing trade agreements’, with only a ‘limited supply of aid programs that promote independent 
thinking about trade policy and negotiations or that take a holistic and long-term perspective’: Njinkeu et al 
2008, 176. 
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ministries, rather than ministries for agriculture, industry, mining, development, technology 
and the like.
70
 Moreover, they point out that technical assistance activities are targeted only 
towards public servants, rather than those from the private sector.
71
 Taking all of these factors 
into account, they argue that ‘[t]echnical assistance conceived as merely neutral ceases to be a 
condition or circumstance and becomes, in effect, and active factor in reproducing the given 
distribution of costs and benefits’.72  
The WTO’s technical assistance programmes are therefore largely directed to legitimating 
existing WTO rules and processes by emphasising implementation and compliance, rather 
than allowing for a more critical epistemology to flourish that questions the rules themselves. 
Moreover, this narrowly instrumental epistemology often denies the ambiguity already 
present in WTO rules,
73
 by presenting specific interpretations of the rules advanced by the 
Secretariat as objective and uncontroversial. Gregory Shaffer’s interviews with developing 
country delegates to the WTO further highlight misgivings about the ideological tenor of the 
Secretariat’s technical assistance programmes. One interviewee even claimed that ‘[t]he 
problem [with the WTO Secretariat’s capacity-building programme] is that it is ideological’ 
and that technical assistance is often directed towards ‘the use of ideas to transform 
developing country negotiating positions’.74 In this sense the Secretariat’s technical assistance 
activities, while often framed according to a facilitative narrative (in the sense discussed in 
Chapter Five), tend to assume a much more technocratic character. Of course, developing 
countries are not the only ones subject to such ideological conditioning, which is experienced 
                                                 
70
  Tussie & Heidrich 2010, 42. 
71
  Ibid. 
72
  Ibid. 
73
  ‘If technical assistance terms itself neutral, in fact it interprets in order to ensure a form of implementation: 
it is creating obligations that might not have been so clear at the time of the negotiations’: ibid 43.  
74
  Shaffer 2005a, 650-1. Similarly: ‘In the words of Thandika Mkandawire, director of the UN Research 
Institute for Social Development, developing country “nationals” may simply serve to champion 
“externally driven policy agendas”, so that the resulting “dialogue” between donor and recipients can take 
on “the character of the conversation between a ventriloquist and a puppet”. See also: ‘[Technical 
assistance] generates a mental map of conformity, one that is often dysfunctional for the interests of 
recipient countries, perpetuating rules of the game in which the initial winners guarantee that they will 
persist. […] Without space to explore the possibilities of new contractual arrangements, the veil of 
ignorance is maintained through the impartial cloak of technical knowledge — a subtle means of 
reproducing the status quo by means of technical assistance’: Tussie & Heidrich 2010, 43. 
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by even the major players in WTO negotiations. Background norms and systems of 
knowledge can act to shape and limit the way that even the most powerful actors in the trade 
regime think about their interests and how to achieve them. Its impact, however, is much 
more keenly felt by those countries which have had fewer opportunities to shape and contest 
its formation. 
B The Secretariat 
Aside from its technical assistance activities, the WTO Secretariat plays an important, albeit 
comparatively limited, role in WTO negotiations. It helps with chairing committees and 
working groups, organizing the logistics of negotiations, information gathering and framing 
(including through providing economic simulations of negotiation scenarios), agenda-setting, 
brokering compromises, drafting agreements, and recording the results of meetings, among 
other things. Nonetheless, of the secretariats of international economic institutions, the WTO 
Secretariat is one of the smallest and weakest. In part, this is because of its comparatively 
small budget and limited personnel. In 2014, the total budget for the WTO Secretariat was 
CHF 197,203,900,
75
 as opposed to the World Bank’s administrative budget of US$2.6 
billion
76
 and the IMF’s gross administrative budget of US$1.186 billion.77 The WTO 
Secretariat also had only 634 staff,
78
 compared to over 12,000 salaried staff for the World 
Bank
79
 and roughly 2,500 for the IMF.
80
 Overall, this limits the scale of the contribution that 
the Secretariat can make to gathering and framing information for negotiations and more 
generally to functioning as a global knowledge institution.
81
 
Whereas WTO Members are expected to be partisan, and their representatives may exhibit 
wildly variant levels of expert competence in trade policy, the legitimacy of the Secretariat’s 
participation in multilateral trade negotiations is heavily tied to notions of independence and 
                                                 
75
  WTO, Annual Report 2014, 134. Obviously the US dollar exchange rate fluctuated throughout the year, but 
this was roughly equivalent to between US$200 million and US$220 million. 
76
  World Bank, Annual Report 2014, 10.  
77
  IMF, Annual Report 2014, 60.  
78
  WTO, Annual Report 2014, 134. 
79
 World Bank, Annual Report 2014, 11. 
80
  IMF, Annual Report 2014, 65.  
81
  See Miller 2007. 
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expertise.
82
 The WTO Secretariat’s impartiality is legally enshrined in WTO Agreement 
Article VI:4, which states that the ‘responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff of 
the Secretariat shall be exclusively international in character’ and that they ‘shall not seek or 
accept instructions from any government or any other authority external to the WTO’. 
Members are also obligated to ‘respect the international character’ of the Secretariat’s 
responsibilities and ‘not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties’.83 The WTO 
Agreement does not mention any specific competence requirements for Secretariat staff, but 
the preamble to the Secretariat Staff Regulations provides that ‘[t]he paramount objective in 
the determination of conditions of service shall be to secure staff members of the highest 
standards of competence, integrity and efficiency’,84 and Regulation 3.1 states that ‘[t]he 
recruitment policy of the WTO shall be to seek to attract and retain staff members offering the 
highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity’.85 
For the most part, the WTO Secretariat is widely respected for its adherence to the 
principle of independence
86
 and for its epistemic competence. That said, as glimpsed in the 
discussion on technical assistance above, the ‘international character’ of the Secretariat does 
not necessarily shield it or its officials from exhibiting institutional or professional bias. 
Secretariat officials’ assumptions about what is neutral or uncontroversial, even in terms of 
economic input, may be informed by a particular worldview that is not necessitated by the 
treaty language and which fails to recognize its own contingency. Developing Members in 
particular have often not been convinced of the neutrality of the Secretariat, seeing it instead 
                                                 
82
  The Secretariats of international organizations regularly invoke the legitimating power of notions of 
independence and epistemic competence. Outside of the hiring context, however, they tend to make less of 
an effort to stress notions of diversity. On the one hand, these Secretariats provide purportedly neutral 
expert advice which can inform debates and reduce information asymmetries between negotiating parties, 
serving at least a facilitative and potentially a deliberative function. On the other hand, the functionalist 
orientation of Secretariats can allow them, if sufficiently empowered, to slip into a technocratic mode, as 
most clearly exemplified by the implementation of the World Bank and IMF’s structural adjustment 
policies. 
83
  See also Regulations 1.4-5, 1.7, 1.9-10 of the Staff Regulations, WT/L/282.  
84
  Ibid Preamble. 
85
  Ibid. See also Regulation 5 (performance evaluation) and Regulation 7 (career development).  
86
  Although cf Alvarez-Jiménez 2010, who argues for introducing more formal conflict of interest rules and 
limitations on lobbying for Secretariat staff.  
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as more effectively advancing the interests of developed Members.
87
 Thus although the legal 
framing of the Secretariat helps to position it as a source of output legitimacy, its invocation 
of expertise and independence can in practice be used to mask a much more complex set of 
political preferences and power dynamics. 
C Non-Governmental Organizations 
Multilateral trade law-making may also be legitimated through the informal involvement of 
NGOs on the grounds of their ostensible expert competence and the diversity of views they 
can bring to the discussion. WTO Agreement Article V:2 provides that the General Council 
‘may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO’.88 In mid-1996 the General 
Council adopted the Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental 
Organizations (‘NGO Guidelines’) which stated directly that ‘it would not be possible for 
NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings’.89 No NGO has yet 
been granted observer status to the General Council or any WTO committees, and it is 
unlikely that any will be in the foreseeable future.
90
 NGOs have nonetheless been permitted to 
attend the plenary meetings of the Ministerial Conferences from Singapore onwards.
91
 As of 
yet, no NGO has been allowed to make any official statements at the Ministerial 
Conferences.
92
 However, the NGO Guidelines encourage the WTO Secretariat to play a ‘more 
active role in its direct contacts with NGOs who, as a valuable resource, can contribute to the 
                                                 
87
  Nordström 2005, 844. 
88
  There were no formal arrangements to include NGOs in GATT decision-making throughout the GATT era. 
This is notwithstanding Article 89:2 of the Havana Charter (‘Relations with Other Organizations’), which 
would have allowed for the ITO to make suitable arrangements to consult and cooperate with NGOs. See 
Sjöstedt 2012, 96. 
89
  WT/L/162. 
90
  Cf the Constitution of the ILO, which provides expressly for non-governmental delegates (representing 
employers and workpeople) to attend and vote at the General Conference of the ILO and on its Governing 
Body: see Constitution of the ILO, Articles 3, 4 and 7.  
91
  NGO Guidelines, WT/L/162; Sjöstedt 2012 lists the number of NGOs attending at the Ministerial 
Conferences under his study as follows: Seattle (746); Doha (220); Cancún (834); Hong Kong (999); and 
Geneva (426). 
92
  Van den Bossche 2008, 727.  
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accuracy and richness of public debate’.93 Chairpersons of WTO councils and committees 
may, in their personal capacities, also meet and discuss with NGOs.
94
 The Guidelines also 
encourage informal arrangements which allow NGOs to circulate information to interested 
delegations,
95
 and NGOs have consulted with and advised Member governments and 
participated in their delegations. There have also been proposals for NGOs to contribute 
collectively to an ‘Advisory Economic and Social Committee’ which would have some 
formal input into WTO decision-making, if not any form of vote.
96
 
Even confined to this limited set of informal contributions, NGOs can do much to enhance 
the output legitimacy of WTO negotiations, particularly by bringing a diversity of views to 
the table. Steve Charnovitz argues that:  
The value-added from NGOs is not really enhanced representation in Geneva. Rather, it is 
that NGOs can inject new energy, ideas, and values that may help to improve decision-
making in the WTO. NGOs’ proposals can improve the market of ideas that undergirds 
the WTO. […] Thus […] the value of NGOs for the WTO is not so much that they may 
enhance the ‘input legitimacy’ of the WTO, but instead that NGOs can enhance ‘output 
legitimacy’ by leading to better, more effective intergovernmental decisions.97  
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  NGO Guidelines, WT/L/162, para IV. 
94
  Ibid para V. 
95
  Ibid para IV. See also Van den Bossche 2008, 733 for the mechanics of how NGO position papers are 
circulated to the Members’ delegations. 
96
  See, eg, Lacarte 2004, 685; Petersmann 2001, 108-09. To date, the closest mechanisms to this in the WTO 
were the short-lived Informal NGO Advisory Body and the Informal Business Advisory Body, which 
advised the former Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi on WTO-related matters. Howse is more 
critical of the creation of WTO advisory committees, whether staffed by NGOs, parliamentarians, or some 
combination, as ‘it is an open question whether such ideas will ultimately not simply cabin or constrain 
democratic deliberation, through formalizing an understanding of which stakeholders have a legitimate 
place at the table’. He thus argues that ‘[p]eriodic meetings of such committees are no substitute for an 
ongoing and inclusive process of engagement of civil society and political actors with the activities of the 
WTO’: Howse 2002b, 659. 
97
  Charnovitz 2004, 680. Charnovitz even calls expressly for ‘de-emphasizing’ the representative claims of 
NGOs as ‘[i]deas are weighed not by how many people hold them, but rather by their scientific or 
philosophical merit’. He sees a role for IGOs, NGOs, and inter-parliamentary organizations in contributing 
to this ‘market of ideas’: 681-2. Nanz and Steffek also claim that ‘organized civil society can make an 
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Similarly, Daniel Esty has argued that NGOs can provide ‘intellectual competition’ to 
governments in the trade policy space, thus improving the quality of trade policy decision-
making.
98
 Gunnar Sjöstedt, after mapping NGO participation in five Ministerial Conferences 
during the Doha Round (from Seattle in 1999 to Geneva in 2009), notes that the potential for 
NGOs to increase the complexity of the Doha negotiations may have negatively affected the 
institutional efficiency of the negotiations in the short-term. Nonetheless, he also points to 
several ways in which NGO participation may enhance the long-term effectiveness of the 
negotiations, including through Member capacity-building, promoting ‘collective intelligence 
and learning’ to ‘pav[e] the way for smooth implementation of a binding treaty’, and drawing 
attention to a wider range of issues and interests that may otherwise have been missed.
99
  
Even so, the notional epistemic benefits of increased NGO participation remain subject to 
claims of systemic bias: in particular, the claim that Northern NGOs are overrepresented vis-
à-vis Southern NGOs and fail to adequately reflect the concerns of the global South,
100
 and 
the claim that most NGOs that have pursued links with the WTO are oriented towards private 
interests rather than public interests, or to producer interests over consumer interests.
101
  
Moreover, some WTO insiders view NGOs not as contributors to an open marketplace of 
ideas with the capacity to shape WTO decision-making for the better, but rather as 
mechanisms for transmitting WTO-framed information to the broader public. Generally 
noting the sometimes ‘distorted information’ that formed the basis for arguments used by the 
protestors in Seattle and elsewhere,
102
 some commentators suggest that more transparency and 
more active public education campaigns would solve, or at least mitigate, the problem of 
opposition as people came to understand the beneficial role fulfilled by the WTO.
103
 Sungjoon 
Cho describes the view that: 
If the WTO’s decision-making process can be made transparent to the public, subject to 
various inputs from various levels of participants of the global trading community — 
                                                                                                                                                        
important contribution by processing and disseminating information on world trade, with an emphasis on 
critical perspectives’: Nanz & Steffek 2004, 329. 
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  See Esty 1998, 136-7; see also Van den Bossche & Zdouc 2013, 98-101. 
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  Sjöstedt 2012, 108-11. 
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  See references at (n 106) of Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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  See references at (n 105) of Chapter Four of this thesis. 
102
  Lacarte 2005, 450. 
103
  See also Fakhri 2011, 95-6.  
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namely, governments, NGOs and the civil society in general — and thus facilitate 
discussion, deliberation and enlightenment on a global scale, the WTO can be deemed 
acceptable and thus legitimate.
104
 
This view does not seem to acknowledge the possibility that the WTO could itself learn from 
its interactions with governments, NGOs and civil society, but only that greater transparency 
could facilitate ‘enlightenment’. Cho points out that the Sutherland Report takes this even 
further, seeing NGOs as vessels to ‘promote the WTO’s image and enhance awareness of the 
WTO in general’.105 In itself this may be a beneficial goal, particularly when there does 
appear to be a great deal of misinformation about the WTO circulating in what passes for a 
global public sphere. It also points, however, to a sense that the WTO rules have been reified, 
and are not themselves considered matters for contestation, thereby further consolidating the 
WTO’s technocratic approach to its output legitimacy on matters of trade law-making. 
D Intergovernmental Organizations 
IGOs too play an ancillary role in multilateral trade negotiations. WTO Agreement Article 
V:1 provides that the General Council shall ‘make appropriate arrangements for effective 
cooperation with other IGOs that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO’. Several 
international organizations, including the FAO, UNCTAD and the IMF, have been granted 
observer status in relation to the Uruguay Round negotiations,
106
 the Doha Round 
negotiations, the General Council, and specific WTO committees.
107
 The WTO also expressly 
aims for policy ‘coherence’ with other international institutions in global economic policy-
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  See WTO Website, ‘International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted Observer Status to WTO 
Bodies’.  
 197 
 
making.
108
 To this end, the WTO maintains heavily formalized relationships with the World 
Bank
109
 and IMF
110
 but also releases joint communiqués and studies,
111
 and launches joint 
projects,
112
 with a host of other organizations.
113
 Many developing countries also rely on 
studies done by other IGOs, especially the World Bank and UNCTAD, to supplement and 
inform their own negotiation positions. As with the WTO, many of these organizations stake 
claims to epistemic competence (particularly in relation to their fields of specialism) and 
independence/neutrality. How formal and informal norms of independence, diversity and 
competence combine to generate output legitimacy varies from institution to institution, and it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to interrogate their construction. Entities such as the IMF 
and the Codex Alimentarius Commission are nonetheless broadly considered to provide 
expert, independent opinions on matters within their function.
114
 In this vein, Claire Kelly 
notes a form of ‘derivative legitimacy’ that institutions such as the WTO may be able to call 
on as a result of their institutional alliances. Successful alliances may generate legitimacy 
dividends for allied institutions, allowing them to better compete for global resources and to 
more effectively pursue their specific aims.
115
  
IV TERMS OF INTERACTION 
The output legitimacy of WTO law-making depends not just on norms governing the 
characteristics (competence, independence, diversity) of the participants in the law-making 
                                                 
108
  ‘The interlinkages between the different aspects of economic policy require that the international 
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Global Economic Policy-Making. 
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  See the Agreement between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World 
Trade Organization. See also WTO Agreement Article III:5.  
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112
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process. They are also heavily shaped by the terms of interaction between those participants. 
How those participants are positioned against one another, hierarchically or otherwise; what 
kinds of rules govern how to reach an authoritative decision; how transparent the negotiations 
are; who negotiators are accountable to and how much time they are given to negotiate — all 
of these things may affect the output legitimacy of WTO rule-making. On an institutional 
level they affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the law-making process. On a functional 
level they affect whether the substance of the rules is well-targeted towards achieving desired 
aims. More broadly, the norms governing the interactions between law-making participants 
structure how negotiating options come to be seen as desirable or undesirable, or even 
possible or impossible.  
The failure to make progress on the Doha Round has led a number of commentators to 
call for the ‘streamlining’ of WTO negotiation processes in a way that places a greater 
emphasis on output legitimacy.
116
 Even the concept of ‘streamlining’ law-making processes in 
itself represents a certain technocratic appeal, substituting as it does for the arguably more 
provocative concept of ‘reform’. This is far from the first time that stalled trade negotiations 
have led to such proposals. The failure to pass the Havana Charter in the US Congress in 
1950, for instance, partially inspired the creation of fast track negotiating authority
117
 and 
trade promotion authority
118
 in the US. These sought to prioritise international agreement on 
matters of notionally technical concern over standard congressional controls over treaty 
negotiations. A similar output-oriented impulse has now been fostered by the failure to 
conclude the Doha Round. In particular, there have been calls to further empower the WTO 
Secretariat,
119
 to turn to some form of weighted or critical mass voting over consensus, and to 
turn from the single undertaking to variably geometry. There have also been calls from other 
quarters to increase the transparency of the negotiations and the deliberative quality of the 
negotiations. Calls for greater functional effectiveness or institutional efficiency, however, 
                                                 
116
  ‘Why is there the current paralysis in the Doha Round? The short answer is that the world has changed, and 
the WTO, because of the cultural attitudes of its members, is mired in the old GATT theology of the past. 
Until the members of the WTO wake up and face the new realities, and develop decision making and rule 
making procedures that reflect the new geo-political power relationships, there will continue to be paralysis 
in the system’: Steger 2007, 486. 
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  See US Trade Act of 1974, § 151–154 (19 USC § 2191–2194).  
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  See US Trade Act of 2002, § 2103–2105 (19 USC § 3803–3805). 
119
  See, eg, Sutherland Report 2004, ch IX; Steger 2009, 814-24.  
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must also be considered in light of the intentional constructive ambiguity that pervades WTO 
law-making. The remainder of this part will consider how these proposals may affect the 
construction of input and output legitimacy in relation to law-making in the WTO.  
A Empowering the Secretariat 
Even taking into account the WTO Secretariat’s comparatively limited staff and budget, 
Manfred Elsig notes that their influence on multilateral trade negotiations appears to be on the 
decline.
120
 The Secretariat ‘enjoys only limited authority in formal proceedings’ while ‘a 
dominant role is reserved for contracting parties’ [sic] delegations within the system’.121 This 
is in stark contrast to the Uruguay Round, when then Directors-General Arthur Dunkel and 
Peter Sutherland were widely recognized as helping to drive the Round through to 
completion. During the Uruguay Round, GATT Secretariat officials were also regularly 
selected to chair negotiation groups (both formal and informal). For the Doha Round, 
although the Director-General continues to be the chair of the TNC, other chairing duties are 
more likely to be allocated to Member delegates.
122
 The marginalization of the Secretariat in 
this respect has also been fed by the relocation of trade law-making energy from the 
multilateral to the bilateral and regional arenas. Even the Secretariat’s knowledge production 
function appears to have been curtailed, with several delegations increasingly relying on their 
own economic simulations to assess possible negotiation outcomes.
123
  
Several commentators have suggested augmenting the powers of the Secretariat in relation 
to multilateral trade negotiations.
124
 The Secretariat’s role in the WTO is often portrayed as 
one of support rather than initiative; very much a weak facilitative role rather than a 
technocratic role, in marked contrast to the perceptions of various developing countries and 
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critics mentioned in Part III(A)(2), above.
125
 This weak view of the Secretariat’s role was 
criticized in the Sutherland Report on the Future of the WTO, the authors of which argued 
that the Secretariat should take a more active role as ‘Guardian of the Treaties’, defending the 
principles of the WTO against ‘domestic political preoccupations’.126 In particular, they 
expressed concern that ‘a more timid and diminished role’ for the Secretariat ‘is leading to 
lost efficiency for the WTO’.127 They thus proposed that the Director-General should continue 
to chair the TNC, and that this chairing role be extended to ‘other committees and councils 
when necessary’, including the General Council.128 In addition, they argued that the WTO 
Agreement, currently largely silent on the role of the Director-General, should more clearly 
spell out the powers and duties of the role to help strengthen the Director-General’s ability to 
act independently of the Membership.
129
 More recently, the Report of the Panel on Defining 
the Future of Trade went further to argue that the Secretariat should be able to ‘table 
proposals for action’ as this could ‘speed up deliberative processes and facilitate consensus by 
providing technical information and fresh ideas’, again with the caveat that ‘[t]his would in no 
way compromise the exclusive right of members to decide’.130 These aspects of the reports’ 
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  The Consultative Board expressed concern that the vision of the WTO as a ‘Member-driven organization’ 
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of the WTO system’: Sutherland Report 2004, para 338. Cf Elsig 2010a, 71. 
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  Sutherland Report 2004, ch IX in general, and para 361 in particular. The authors of the Report argue that 
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  Sutherland Report 2004, para 347. 
130
  Panel on Defining the Future of Trade 2013, 32. Cf Footer 2006, 171, who argues that ‘the very fact that 
this is not explicitly regulated has not deterred (former) Director-Generals (and Deputy Director-Generals) 
[sic] as well as Secretariat staff and Chairpersons acting under their own responsibility, from launching 
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analyses and prescriptions mainly focus first on questions of institutional efficiency and 
second on maintaining the social legitimacy of the WTO for its own sake. There is thus a 
focus on augmenting a specific type of output legitimacy that is institutionally rather than 
functionally oriented. There is also a parallel concern with ensuring that Member-driven input 
legitimacy is not compromised.  
The Sutherland Report also suggests a more broadly instrumental role for the Secretariat in 
arguing that that ‘[t]he membership should also encourage and stimulate a greater intellectual 
input from the Secretariat’.131 Indeed, the Report claims that  
the WTO should be making a pre-eminent intellectual input into public and political 
debate on trade policy matters, globalization, development and other pressing issues of 
the day on which the international trading system impinges.
132
  
This would include a ‘clearer — though always careful — lead on policy issues’.133 In making 
these claims, the Sutherland Report remains firmly committed to the idea that there is a 
relatively clear direction in which the WTO can move which is ‘consistent with its overall 
objectives’.134 The Panel on Defining the Future of Trade similarly argued that ‘members 
should support a stronger Secretariat, with sharpened expertise across the WTO’s range of 
activities, and stronger research capacity’.135 The focus is on foregrounding the Secretariat’s 
epistemic authority on the world stage, rather than in interrogating the knowledge structures 
that constitute such authority or in opening up further opportunities to contest the Secretariat’s 
views on matters. There is little consideration here of the potential politicization of the 
Secretariat, or of the possibility that the Secretariat would bring its own agenda to bear on 
such a role,
136
 no matter how ‘international’ in character its orientation. A strengthening of the 
WTO’s role as a global knowledge institution has the potential to bring great benefits, but the 
risks involved in doing so should not be ignored.  
                                                                                                                                                        
initiatives and tabling proposals for consideration by the broader membership’. See also Steger & 
Shpilkovskaya 2009, 129 who also argue that the Secretariat should be able to table proposals in 
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Some calls to enhance the powers of the Director-General and the Secretariat are, however, 
careful to specify the need for the Members to first come together to provide the Director-
General and Secretariat with a clear mandate, thereby carefully pairing input and output 
legitimacy concerns. Petros Mavroidis, for instance, argues that any expansion of the 
Secretariat’s currently limited range of administrative functions (servicing the dispute 
settlement and committee systems) should only be ‘upon request’ of the Members. He 
suggests that ‘the WTO would be better served if it were limited to preparing “useful papers” 
for its principals, the WTO Members’.137 In Mavroidis’s view, the social and political 
conditions of the Doha Round differ significantly from those in place at the time the Dunkel 
Draft was introduced during the Uruguay Round, and enhanced intervention by the Secretariat 
poses a high risk of failure. Ultimately, he concludes that ‘[m]aking the Secretariat co-
responsible for the observed failure to conclude negotiations is unfair’.138  
Many developing countries have also expressed concern at further involvement by the 
Secretariat, which they see as undermining the Member-driven aspect of multilateral trade 
negotiations.
139
 James Gathii notes that this ‘is in part informed by a desire not to have the 
experience during the Uruguay Round where the members of the WTO in effect ended up 
negotiating with the Secretariat rather than amongst themselves’.140 Instead, some developing 
countries have argued for more formal rules governing the relationship between the various 
parts of the WTO negotiating apparatus, including more clearly separating the roles of the 
TNC and the General Council, selecting the chairs of the TNC and other negotiating groups 
by consensus and confining negotiations to formal meetings.
141
 In this sense, ‘streamlining’ 
decision-making and making it more ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ may only lead to a further loss 
of a sense of ownership of the process on the part of developing countries, stimulating further 
disagreement and backlash; and eventually leading to a loss of legitimacy of WTO law for 
these countries.  
Thus legal reform proposals to augment the power of the Secretariat are in part framed as 
improving output legitimacy, often accompanied by an insistence that this need not 
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  Mavroidis 2011, 380. 
138
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undermine input legitimacy. The primary focus is on improving the institutional efficiency of 
the negotiations and concluding the Round, but there is also a secondary focus on improving 
access to technical information. Various of the risks associated with emphasizing output 
legitimacy are nevertheless evident, including the loss of Member control over law-making 
processes, the risks involved in the Secretariat taking a leading position in the face of broad 
disagreement about the direction of the Round, and the insistence that significant changes to 
the power relations in negotiations are simply marginal by-products of enhancing the 
essentially technical role of the Secretariat.  
B Informal Steering 
There have also been a number of proposals to create more informal steering mechanisms for 
WTO negotiations. The Sutherland Report recommended the creation of a senior officials’ 
consultative board tasked with holding ‘regular meetings to discuss the political/economic 
environment as well as current dossiers’ and to provide ‘some political guidance to 
negotiators’.142 This would be restricted to a maximum of 30 Members at any one time, with 
some permanent Members and some rotating Members.
143
 A similar proposal has been put 
forward by Pedersen (building on India’s suggestion at the 2009 Ministerial144) who argues 
for the creation of a Working Party on the Functioning of the WTO to provide a flexible 
forum for a ‘broad discussion of institutional and systemic challenges facing the multilateral 
trading system’.145 Pedersen suggests that this could be a more informal process than that 
found in General Council decision-making, and could be thought of as an ‘incubator or 
brainstorming forum for issues which cannot yet muster the required consensus to be formally 
catapulted onto the WTO agenda’, accentuating ‘informality, exploratory debate and non-
negotiation’. Indeed, he envisages such a group as being ‘allowed to invite outside experts 
and organizations to contribute to the discussion’.146 This may be contrasted with his 
discussion of the Functioning of the GATT System negotiating group (FOGS) during the 
Uruguay Round, which was expressly conceived as a site for negotiation, and one which 
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focused on promoting Ministerial involvement in decision-making.
147
 Pedersen is nonetheless 
careful to impose clear limits on the power of such a body, emphasising that it would continue 
to be Member-driven and that this would provide a purely deliberative, recommendatory 
process without any official decision-making powers. 
Pedersen suggests that moving such a process away from formal decision-making power 
may prove beneficial for effective deliberation, as it depoliticizes the process and encourages 
‘serious, creative, and outside-the-box thinking on trade-related issues’.148 Although this 
would not directly affect the rights and obligations of WTO Members, it could have an 
important role in opinion and will-formation about the relevant institutional structure of the 
WTO. Although Pedersen emphasizes that his proposal remains ‘Member-driven’, it does so 
in a way that continues to augment the importance of contestation, deliberation and expertise. 
It thus represents a shift in thinking away from the idea that Members have wholly 
independent and predetermined wills that they attempt to implement through international 
organizations such as the WTO, and towards an appreciation of the capacity of international 
institutional frameworks to frame and shape Member’s understandings of their own interests.  
C Consensus, Voting, the Single Undertaking, and Variable Geometry 
Proposals to streamline negotiations through abandoning the consensus principle in favour of 
some form of weighted or ‘critical mass’ voting adopt a similar institutional output-oriented 
narrative. These alternative voting methods hold out the promise of passing laws that would 
otherwise be blocked under the consensus principle. The idea of weighted voting, in which 
Members would be allocated a voting share based on, say, their share of world trade, is not 
particularly new to multilateral trade law-making. On 21 January 1947, for instance, the UK 
proposed a formula for weighted voting for use in the Preparatory Committee for the 
International Conference on Trade and Employment and for elections to the Executive Board 
of the ITO,
149
 while the US proposed a system of weighted voting that would apply only to 
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149
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issues arising out of the balance-of-payments provisions and membership of the Executive 
Board.
150
 More recently, weighted voting proposals have been made in response to the 
perceived paralysis associated with consensus voting in WTO negotiations. In 2003 Thomas 
Cottier and Satoko Takenoshita proposed a form of ‘weighted voting’ to address the 
ineffectiveness of the WTO’s legislative wing, with a suggested formula that took into 
account Members’ contributions to world trade, their GDP, their population and market 
openness (defined as the proportion of imports to GDP).
151
 The Warwick Commission, in 
their 2007 report, considered a similar voting model but ultimately rejected it on the grounds 
that governments would find it difficult to agree a precise formula, that it would de facto 
disenfranchise certain countries, and that it too strongly contradicted the prevailing consensus 
culture in the WTO.
152
  
Some authors have even called for an explicit trade-off between an input legitimacy 
associated with consensus, and output legitimacy associated with weighted voting.
153
 In early 
2013, Arvind Subramanian argued for the abolition of the consensus principle and the 
accompanying veto power on the grounds that ‘too much legitimacy can hurt global trade’.154 
He claims that the main problem with the WTO’s law-making effectiveness, not just in 
relation to Doha, is that it has ‘suffered from too much democracy and associated blocking 
powers’.155 His solution — that ‘larger countries’ be allowed to ‘negotiate among themselves 
while offering assurances to the smaller countries that they would receive the benefits of such 
negotiations and be spared any burdens’ — is unlikely to be reassuring for any smaller 
country currently facing the pressures of regional trade negotiations or indeed with a memory 
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of the Uruguay Round’s ‘grand bargain’.156 More recently, Cottier has supplemented the idea 
of weighted voting with a ‘consensus minus’ proposal, which would take the veto away from 
individual Members and allocate it to coalitions only, such as the US and EU together, or 
‘Brazil and India and China jointly’.157 He frames these proposals as specifically concerned 
with how one can ‘bring about and secure output legitimacy of rules’.158  
Amrita Narlikar notes that the WTO has proven responsive to evolving norms and the 
changing balance of power in its Membership (particularly through the rise of India, China, 
and Brazil) by altering its procedures (through increased opportunities for transparency and 
participation) and substantive focus (through an increased focus on development). She also 
notes, however, that the relevant constituencies remain ‘dissatisfied and disgruntled’,159 in 
part because the more fair and equal procedures have come at the cost of efficiency of 
decision-making, trading off institutional output legitimacy for input legitimacy. Moreover, 
this has encouraged the EU and US to negotiate elsewhere, ‘where their relative power is 
stronger and the negotiation process faster’.160 As such, Narlikar too considers streamlining 
the decision-making process by altering the consensus rule. Canvassing the options of an 
executive board, a critical mass approach or weighted voting, she decides that weighted 
voting is the preferable option — in particular, a double threshold voting system in which the 
first vote could be carried by a percentage of global trade or global national income, and a 
second vote which must be carried by a minimum number of countries.
161
 While this would 
lead to the demise of absolute consent in the multilateral trading system on an ongoing basis, 
any such move would still need to be agreed in advance by current WTO Members.  
Another suggestion has been to temper the consensus principle on a more informal basis, 
by introducing a ‘critical mass’ approach. This would seek to encourage a culture in which 
Members refrained from blocking a proposal if a ‘critical mass’ of the relevant Members had 
already agreed to it. John Jackson, for instance, floated the idea that the critical mass could be 
defined as ‘an overwhelming majority of countries and an overwhelming amount of the trade 
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weight in the world, such as 90% of both of these factors’.162 The Warwick Commission also 
endorsed a critical mass approach (again as part of the informal negotiating culture rather than 
as a formal rule), noting its relative success in relation to the telecommunications, financial 
services and information technology agreements of the late 1990s.
163
 Jackson,
164
 the Warwick 
Commission,
165
 Cottier
166
 and Elsig
167
 have all agreed that commitments entered into on a 
critical mass basis should also be subject to the MFN principle, thereby extending the benefit 
of the commitments to all WTO Members.
168
  
The idea of critical mass voting is also strongly linked to proposals to reintroduce a 
variable geometry approach to the negotiations, which would allow for plurilateral 
agreements of differentiated Membership. This is to be contrasted with the single undertaking 
approach, in which ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’,169 and reservations to the 
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developing country participation in their formation, and the very small size of the accepted ‘critical mass’ 
in relation to these agreements: at 76-7.  
169
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accept all of the provisions of all of the agreements: see Finger & Schuler 1999; Steinberg 2002, 359-60. 
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undertaking: Footer 2006, 95; see the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement, and the International Bovine Meat Agreement.  
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agreements are not permitted.
170
 The variable geometry approach was standard prior to the 
Uruguay Round, but was seen as problematic given the experience with the Tokyo Round’s 
plurilateral codes. On the one hand, variable geometry helped to usher through a series of 
plurilateral agreements, including the Standards Code and the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping, 
SCM and Customs Valuation Agreements. On the other, many of the plurilateral agreements 
failed to attract many signatories, undermining their effectiveness. Moreover, the widely 
differentiated rights and obligations that arose from each Member being able to pick and 
choose which agreements to sign up to led to a level of legal complexity that posed barriers to 
enforcement and implementation. Today, proposals to roll back the single undertaking have 
come under strong criticism from developing countries.
171
 For one, there is a concern that 
variable geometry could lead to increased fragmentation in the negotiations, which could 
make it more difficult for developing countries to form negotiating coalitions.
172
 
Overall, therefore, there have been a series of proposals to make WTO law-making more 
efficient and effective by weakening the consensus principle and turning away from the single 
undertaking. Some frame this as an essential trade-off between legitimacy and effectiveness, 
while others insist that the WTO’s output legitimacy depends on removing principles that 
have come to be understood as barriers to efficient decision-making. Pauwelyn, meanwhile, 
argues that these solutions are illusory at best. For Pauwelyn, the strength of the consensus 
principle and the single undertaking is directly related to the ‘higher levels of law and 
discipline’ that emerged from the Uruguay Round, in particular its ‘stricter dispute process’ 
and strong enforcement capacity. Lowering the barriers posed by these principles in the 
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  WTO Agreement Article XIV:5 provides that ‘[n]o reservations may be made in respect of any provision’ 
of the WTO Agreement, and reservations may only be made with respect to the multilateral and plurilateral 
trade agreements as expressly permitted by those agreements.  
171
  ‘A key scenario to avoid is one where small and poor countries are engaged on only a narrow set of issues, 
such as discussions on cotton, market access, and [SDT], while the broader systemic and regulatory issues 
that define the multilateral system are negotiated exclusively by larger players’: Deere-Birkbeck 2012, 124. 
During the Uruguay Round, the single undertaking was seen as a device used by developed countries to 
coerce developing countries into agreeing to agreements and provisions that they considered detrimental to 
their interests: See Rolland 2010, 72. See also Chimni 2004, 25; MTN.TNC/W/18, para 3. 
172
  ‘Fragmentation helps them accomplish these goals by making it difficult for weaker states to create 
coalitions through cross-issue logrolling and by dramatically increasing the transaction costs that 
international bureaucrats and judges face in trying to rationalize the international system or to engage in 
bottom-up constitution building’: Benvenisti & Downs 2007, 625.  
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negotiating context may allow for more efficient law-creation, but would then undermine the 
legitimacy of the rules themselves when it is time for them to be enforced. This could then 
potentially undermine support for the rules, and weaken the legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system, leading to a new equilibrium closer to that seen in the GATT era.
173
 The 
focus on streamlining the WTO’s law-making processes for short term institutional efficiency 
gains may therefore ultimately undermine the input legitimacy of the rules and the output 
legitimacy of the dispute settlement system.  
D Transparency and Reason-Giving 
Rules and practices relating to transparency and reason-giving in negotiations are similarly 
regularly framed in terms of their contribution to output legitimacy.
174
 On the one hand, 
transparency may improve the functional efficiency and effectiveness of negotiations by 
improving negotiation participants’ access to relevant information, thereby sharpening ideas 
about which outcomes are desirable and achievable and how they might best be implemented. 
The right information can show which rules and practices have been successful in achieving 
their aims or have produced more problematic or unintended consequences, or make it more 
difficult for actors to adopt inconsistent and self-serving positions in different fora. In 
Benedict Kingsbury’s words:  
Some of the justifications given for [publicity] are entirely non-instrumental, but most of 
the justifications relate to the improving the quality of the law or decision (through better 
information, or reduced risk of venality or co-option or regulatory capture), to 
strengthening the overall legitimacy of the institution and hence support for it, or to 
                                                 
173
  Pauwelyn 2005, 38-9. 
174
  See Curtin & Meijer 2006; de Fine Licht et al 2011. Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey, for instance, note that 
the ‘availability of relevant factual and scientific information enhances transparency of governance because 
it enables States and other actors to assess the need for action and whether the [International Environmental 
Institution (‘IEI’)] succeeds in promoting relevant action. At the same time, to the extent that access to this 
kind of background information is designed to assist the IEI in promoting effective collective action, it is a 
crucial aspect of transparency for governance as well. By the same token, the legitimacy of an institution 
flows not only from its decision-making processes but also from its success in promoting its ends. This 
“output legitimacy” too is connected to transparency, especially to transparency for governance’: Brunnée 
& Hey 2011, 28 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). For a focus on regime effectiveness, rather than 
output legitimacy per se, see RB Mitchell 1998. 
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improving the overall quality and impact of the laws and law-governed behaviour through 
sociological mechanisms such as the “civilizing effect of hypocrisy”, the reinforcement of 
latent inclinations or aspirations to do the right thing, or “blowback”.175 
From a deliberative perspective, more transparency may help to improve the available pool of 
information and to sharpen understanding about the reasons behind various actors’ 
decisions.
176
 The perception of transparency can also in itself enhance faith in the fairness and 
integrity of the negotiating process, which may reduce the likelihood of opposition to certain 
proposals.  
Yet transparency is also just as often framed as providing an obstacle to output legitimacy, 
at least when outputs are framed in terms of institutional efficiency. Transparency may 
increase opportunities for various actors to find flaw with and oppose negotiation proposals, 
dragging negotiations on for longer. There is also a difference between the availability of 
information and the extent to which people make use of that information
177
 — mere 
publication on its own does not entail the promised benefits of transparency. Indeed, the sheer 
quantity of trade-related information that can be made available can become increasingly 
difficult to parse due to its scale and complexity. Transparency’s promise of better access to 
information may then translate either into extra power for the expert few, or simply the 
misleading use of information that has been divorced from its proper context. In addition, 
increasing transparency can also prove both resource and time intensive. It costs money to 
organize, translate, format, store and publish information, and it takes time to create, publish, 
perform and digest information.  
The modalities of how a principle of transparency may apply in relation to the Doha 
Round, and the potential effects of these modalities on the WTO’s output legitimacy, are 
complex. One question relates to who gets to enjoy the immediate benefit of increased 
transparency — is it sufficient that the negotiations be transparent merely to some of the 
Members, all of the Members (generally referred to as relating to internal transparency) or to 
the global public at large (often referred to as external transparency)?
178
 Each option 
                                                 
175
  See Kingsbury 2009, 48 (citations omitted). 
176
  de Fine Licht et al ( n 174) 7-8.  
177
  Curtin and Meijer 2006, 117-18. 
178
  See articles in ‘Mini-Symposium on Transparency in the WTO’ (2008) 11 Journal of International 
Economic Law 705. 
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implicates different subjects of legitimacy and communities of legitimation. On the internal 
side, the Uruguay Round negotiations were criticized by many developing countries as 
lacking sufficient transparency, partly as the result of the Green Room processes mentioned 
above and the failure to engage with NGOs. This in part led to the adoption of paragraph 49 
of the Doha Declaration, which states that:  
The negotiations shall be conducted in a transparent manner among participants, in order 
to facilitate the effective participation of all. They shall be conducted with a view to 
ensuring benefits to all participants and to achieving an overall balance in the outcome of 
the negotiations. 
Pedersen tracks the development of reforms concerning internal transparency in the WTO 
from the time of the Singapore Ministerial through to 2005. He highlights improvements in 
practice and procedure, including more open consultation processes, the promulgation of 
statements outlining future negotiation processes, and reports on the substance and processes 
of informal Heads-of-Delegation meetings.
179
  
There appears to be a core disagreement between developing and developed countries as to 
what transparency may entail. Several developing countries have stressed the importance of 
formal negotiating rules to enhance the transparency of the negotiation process, including 
requiring that all negotiations take place in formal sessions without concurrent informal 
meetings. By contrast, developed countries have countered that transparency would be better 
served by retaining flexibility in negotiations as this would more likely reduce the 
opportunities for procedural obstruction.
180
 Most of these debates, however, are framed in 
terms of the importance of equal participation and inclusivity for developing countries. 
Questions of institutional efficiency only receive peripheral notice, while the impact of 
transparency in negotiations on the functional legitimacy of the rules produced has been 
largely neglected.  
Furthermore, paragraph 49 of the Doha Declaration refers only to the negotiations being 
conducted ‘in a transparent manner among the participants’ — it has nothing to contribute 
                                                 
179
  See, eg, Pedersen 2006, 121-2. Even the final Green Room meeting of the July 2004 General Council 
meeting was comparatively transparent — ‘everybody knew when it was taking place, what the agenda 
was and who was present’: 122. See also the General Council and TNC discussions on internal 
transparency at WT/GC/M/57 and TN/C/1. Note the relevant Principles and Practices governing the TNC 
remain best endeavours obligations and are non-binding.  
180
  See discussion in Gathii 2004, 892-3. 
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with respect to external transparency. Paragraph 10 of the Declaration does refer to the 
broader public, but again views transparency more as an aid to enlightening the public about 
the WTO’s benefits: 
While emphasizing the intergovernmental character of the organization, we are 
committed to making the WTO’s operations more transparent, including through more 
effective and prompt dissemination of information, and to improve dialogue with the 
public. We shall therefore at the national and multilateral levels continue to promote a 
better public understanding of the WTO and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, 
rules-based multilateral trading system. 
The WTO has taken many steps to fulfil this commitment.
181
 On the one hand, it has the 
various modes of engagement with NGOs and IGOs discussed above. On the other, it engages 
directly with the public via its extensive and regularly updated website, on which it publishes 
speeches, press releases, reports and derestricted documents (pursuant to the 2002 General 
Council decision on Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents
182
). 
Much of how this is presented to the public is handled by the WTO’s Information and 
External Relations Division. Importantly, the WTO also publishes the notifications that it 
receives from various countries as required under the covered agreements, making it an 
important source of trade data for use by the private sector and civil society. The recent WTO 
Director-General mandated Panel on Defining the Future of Trade nonetheless highlighted 
two problems with WTO notifications. First, some Members either delay their notifications 
until a very late stage, or disregard their notification obligations altogether. Second, some of 
the notification requirements are not well-designed and do not result in the production of 
optimally useful information.
183
  
Aside from the question of which actors should enjoy the benefits of transparency, an 
additional question arises as to which materials and processes need to be made transparent. 
The minutes of the meetings for the TNC, other dedicated negotiations working groups and 
many of the WTO’s standing committees and working groups are regularly published. Some 
                                                 
181
  For a fuller discussion of how WTO rules on transparency, notice and comment operate in relation to 
public participation in the WTO, see Bonzon 2014, 244-9. 
182
  WT/L/452. At present this provides for the vast majority of WTO documents to be published within 60 
days of their circulation.  
183
  Panel on Defining the Future of Trade 2013, 32. 
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argue that this should go further. Daniel Esty, for one, also argues that ‘monthly General 
Council meetings should be open to the public and the media’.184 But should treaty drafts be 
published? If so, how far along do the drafts have to be before this becomes necessary? Daniel 
Esty, for instance, argues that:  
the WTO should adopt a practice that potential trade rules or policies be advanced in draft 
form with public “notice” and an opportunity for all interested parties to “comment” on 
the draft. Decision-makers should then be required to respond to the comments and 
concerns put forward.
185
  
To date, this proposal has not gained much traction. Nevertheless, several Members publicize 
the broad contours of their negotiation intentions on their government websites.
186
  
In addition, the last decade or so has seen proposals to introduce some form of public 
reason-giving into negotiation processes.
187
 Traditionally, reason-giving, so essential to 
judicialized dispute settlement processes, has generally not been considered necessary for 
Members during negotiations. Members may find it advantageous to provide reasons for their 
negotiating positions in the hope of persuading others to agree with them, but they have 
traditionally not been required to justify their ultimate decisions to agree or not agree with 
given proposals. Nevertheless, the Sutherland Report recommended that the General Council 
adopt a Declaration which would require that ‘a Member considering blocking a measure 
which otherwise has very broad consensus support shall only block such consensus if it 
declares in writing, with reasons included, that the matter is one of vital national interest to 
it’.188 More recently, the Report on The Future of Trade by the Panel on Defining the Future 
of Trade, as convened by former Director-General Pascal Lamy, advocated that Members 
‘vetoing the adoption of decisions provide reasoned explanations for their position’.189  
                                                 
184
  Esty 2007, 525. 
185
  Ibid 524. 
186
  The 1985 Leutwiler Report suggested that ‘governments should be required regularly to explain and defend 
their overall trade policies’ and that ‘the making of trade policy should be brought into the open’: Leutwiler 
Report 1987, 13, 41 and 49. 
187
  The role of reason-giving in the context of the WTO’s ‘administrative’ disciplines has also been examined 
in Hepburn 2012.  
188
  Sutherland Report 2004, 81.  
189
  Panel on Defining the Future of Trade 2013, 31-2. 
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These proposals, once again, have generally been framed in terms of institutional 
efficiency; they are seen as a way of speeding up the negotiation process by deterring 
Members from exercising their veto in the face of increased public scrutiny. In theory it could 
also have implications for functional efficiency, as both the process of Member self-
justification and the engagement of other Members with those justifications can lead to more 
reasoned negotiation. This, however, would require some fairly optimistic assumptions about 
how extensive the reasons provided by Members would be likely to be, and how closely they 
tie to the actual reasons for the veto in a given case. No matter how extensive the drafting and 
reason-giving requirements, there are simply some aspects of the process that will never be 
adequately reflected in published materials. It is the rare Member that would wish to go on the 
record as stating that it is holding up negotiations because it needs to appear to be standing 
firm against WTO negotiations due to an impending election. 
E Constructive Ambiguity 
Trade negotiations are not purely determined by an eye to output legitimacy. Functional 
imperatives are balanced against competing national interests, material drivers and public 
scrutiny to produce legal texts that are often constructively ambiguous by design. 
Constructive ambiguity may provide a means by which consensus can be achieved more 
quickly, as all sides consider that they have been allowed sufficient room to manoeuvre. In the 
process, however, it may result in provisions that it is difficult to implement efficiently or 
effectively, as there is little clarity about what the provision is intended to achieve or how it is 
intended to achieve it (beyond the fact of the ambiguity itself). The institutional efficiency it 
affords in allowing agreements to be concluded more quickly thus often comes at the expense 
of functional effectiveness.  
An important example which illustrates the imperfect trade-offs that constructive 
ambiguity poses between institutional efficiency and functional effectiveness may be found in 
the process leading up to the adoption of the decision to submit the TRIPS Amendment for 
approval to the Members. The Amendment negotiations were not formally a part of the Doha 
Round negotiation structure and were not included as part of the Doha Round’s single 
undertaking. Indeed, the TRIPS Waiver decision called for the TRIPS Council to initiate the 
process of formulating an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement on the understanding that ‘it 
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will not be part of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 45 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration’.190 It appears that the Members wanted to ensure that the Amendment was 
shielded from competing negotiating priorities and the uncertain duration of the Doha Round 
negotiations.  
The Waiver and Amendment decisions both represented attempts by the WTO to address 
the problem of access to essential medicines for developing countries. Following the entry 
into force of the TRIPS Agreement, an attempt by multinational pharmaceutical companies to 
bring a lawsuit against South Africa concerning its HIV/AIDS medicines programme,
191
 and 
the US’s TRIPS-based opposition to a Brazilian HIV/AIDS programme,192 NGOs and media 
outlets expressed concern that the TRIPS patent provisions were undermining developing 
countries’ attempts to counteract burgeoning public health crises. In particular, the TRIPS 
Agreement’s provisions relating to compulsory licensing were seen as impeding developing 
countries’ access to (cheaper) generic medicines. There was thus a clear functional imperative 
to change the law in a way that allowed these countries greater access to such medicines.  
The issue of access to essential medicines was first raised in formal terms at the WTO by a 
group of developing countries at a TRIPS Council meeting in June 2001.
193
 Later that year, on 
the same day that it adopted the Doha Declaration, the Ministerial Conference adopted a 
separate Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
194
 On 30 August 2003, 
following extensive negotiations, the General Council adopted a temporary waiver (the 
TRIPS Waiver) which would allow less wealthy countries to import generic medicines under 
compulsory licences in circumstances where they were unable to manufacture the medicines 
domestically.  
                                                 
190
  WT/L/540 [11]. 
191
  See Pharmaceuticals Manufacturer’s Association of South Africa v President of the Republic of South 
Africa, Notice of Motion in the High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division), Case No 
4183/98 (filed 18 February 1998). The case was ultimately dropped. See also ’T Hoen 2003, 43-4. 
192
  See Brazil — Patent Protection, Request for Consultations, 1; ’T Hoen 2003, 44-6. 
193
  IP/C/W/296, submitted by the Africa Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Venezuela. 
194
  WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. 
 216 
 
The adoption of this Waiver, and subsequently the decision submitting the Amendment to 
Members for approval,
195
 was not straightforward. There were a number of points of 
disagreement between developing countries and, in particular, the US. This was resolved for 
the immediate purpose of passing the Waiver through the intervention of the chair of the 
TRIPS Council, who set out in a statement ‘several key shared understandings of Members 
regarding the Decision to be taken and the way in which it will be interpreted and 
implemented’.196 This removed the pressure from the limitations of the Waiver by creating an 
ambiguous interpretive space for certain of its provisions.  
Moreover, even the legal status of the Chairman’s statement was left ambiguous. A 
footnote to the decision adopting the TRIPS Waiver noted that the Waiver was to be 
interpreted ‘in light of’ the Chairman’s statement. Yet a subsequent corrigendum to that 
decision inserted an additional line at the start of the footnote, identifying it as a ‘Secretariat 
note for information purposes only and without prejudice to Members’ legal rights and 
obligations’.197 This meant that not only were the terms of the Waiver ambiguous, but the 
legal status of the purported clarification to the Members ‘shared understandings’ was itself 
ambiguous.  
As effective as this might have proven for ensuring that the Waiver and Amendment 
decisions were adopted (the statement was also read out before the decision adopting the 
TRIPS Amendment for submission to the Members), neither the Waiver nor the Amendment 
decision have been well-received from a functional perspective. Both are considered to 
impose complex and burdensome conditions on the manufacture, export and import of generic 
medicines by developing countries.
198
 Only one country has availed itself of the special export 
licence system set up under Paragraph 6 of the TRIPS Waiver — Rwanda — and that was 
back in 2007.
199
 Instead, the workability of the system has depended on the informal 
balancing of interests between pharmaceutical originators, generic drug manufacturers, and 
importing and exporting Members in the ambiguous legal space generated by the texts of the 
                                                 
195
  In accordance with Article X of the WTO Agreement, the Amendment can only come into force once two-
thirds of the WTO Membership has accepted it, and even then it is only binding on the accepting Members. 
196
  WT/GC/M/82 [29]. 
197
  WT/L/540/Corr.1, asterisked footnote. 
198
  See, eg, Abbott & Reichman 2007, 936-57.  
199
  IP/N/9/RWA/1. 
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Waiver and Amendment. Nevertheless, portraying this as a simple trade-off between the 
institutional efficiency of the law-making process and the functional ineffectiveness of the 
Waiver and Amendment would be misleading. Even in 2007, two years after the Amendment 
was submitted to Members for approval, Abbott and Reichman were pessimistic that 
continued negotiations could lead to anything other than an ‘impasse’.200 It appears that the 
trade-off here was not necessarily between institutional efficiency and functional 
effectiveness, but rather between institutional efficiency and nothing at all.  
V CONCLUSIONS 
Given the undeniable urgency of the TRIPS Waiver and Amendment negotiations for the lives 
of millions of people, the above does not provide cause for optimism that WTO Members will 
rally around functional effectiveness as the leitmotif of future negotiations anytime soon. 
Even if they did, too great a focus on maximizing output legitimacy would bring its own 
dangers. This chapter nonetheless considers that a great focus on how law may shape output 
legitimacy narratives, and how it is shaped by them in turn, could bring a number of benefits 
to WTO negotiations. It can ensure that the assumptions on which negotiations are conducted 
are more clearly aligned with more reliable knowledge about the world. It may help to 
identify areas of common concern. It may also help to sharpen individual negotiation 
positions and to clarify the potential costs and benefits of potential trade-offs.  
It is evident that many elements of the WTO law and practice governing law-making have 
a direct bearing on output legitimacy concerns, including in relation to both the functional and 
institutional effectiveness of the WTO. These include norms and practices governing the 
characteristics of the law-making participants relating to epistemic competence, independence 
and diversity; as well as those governing the terms of interaction between such law-making 
participants, including the allocation of powers of framing, agenda-setting, decision and 
review, voting rules, the single undertaking, and transparency and reason-giving. There are 
further mechanisms which tie into the functional and institutional effectiveness of WTO law-
making, which call for further investigation. The TPRM, in particular, has the potential to 
play an important role in monitoring and reviewing the effects of WTO rules on a Member-
by-Member basis, as does the WTO committee system.  
                                                 
200
  Abbott & Reichman 2007, 984-7. 
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The relationship between the rules and practices that govern and influence WTO law-
making and the functional effectiveness of WTO rules is complex. On the one hand it is clear 
that there is room for further epistemic input and review of WTO rules, which also have the 
potential to shape how Members interests are framed;
201
 and there is certainly room for 
greater contestation of existing WTO rules and the present Doha agenda. On the other hand it 
seems that many of the more powerful Members are relatively comfortable with the present 
state of affairs.
202 
Moreover, to the extent that there has been a focus on reforming WTO law-
making processes, the emphasis has been on improving institutional efficiency through 
streamlining such processes rather than on ensuring that they are better informed and 
reasoned.
203
 Although there are strong drivers for this focus on institutional efficiency — the 
collapse of the Doha Round and the turn to preferential trade agreements — it is important 
that the longer term legitimacy of the agreed rules is not sacrificed for the sake of short term 
expediency.  
It should also be noted that several of the proposals highlighted above claim an 
unavoidable trade-off between input and output legitimacy in law-making processes, in 
particular the need to sacrifice elements of input legitimacy to get things done. Yet the 
relationship between these two aspects of legitimacy need not be viewed in such a binary 
way. Input legitimacy may help strengthen elements of output legitimacy in the long term, by 
encouraging stronger buy in from a wider range of actors, and by ensuring that rules take into 
account a sufficiently diverse range of interests when first made. The production of various 
                                                 
201
  ‘Naturally, procedures for intergovernmental accords are not dependent on given constellations of power 
alone. As normative framing conditions delimit the choice of rhetorical strategies, they effectively structure 
negotiations just as much as the influence of “epistemic communities” (which occasionally generate 
thoroughly normative, global background consensuses over supposedly purely scientific questions, as in 
the case of today’s neoliberal economic regime)’: Habermas 2001, 109. 
202
  There is also no guarantee that an improved set of rules would of itself result in changed negotiation 
outcomes. See Shapiro 2005, 350. See also Hart 1990, 274-5: ‘Hard-nosed policy analysts and negotiators 
in government have always appreciated that a rigorous economic, legal, sociological, or political analysis 
would expose the shortcomings of the heavily brokered and compromised solutions found in international 
agreements and implemented in domestic law’.  
203
  ‘Regrettably, proposals on WTO reform are frequently advanced on the basis of ill-defined concerns about 
weak “efficiency” or “performance,” without a sufficiently clear articulation of the broader goals, 
normative purpose or benchmarks against which the WTO’s performance, efficiency, or credibility should 
be judged’: Deere-Birkbeck 2012, 121.  
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forms of knowledge and the allocation of power to experts may help shape Members 
understandings of their own interests, changing the dynamics of input legitimacy. Meanwhile, 
theories of deliberation seek to unify aspects of both input and output legitimacy by showing 
how properly structured political participation can lead to better outcomes, and how providing 
a stronger role for knowledge and reason can enhance participants’ understandings of their 
own interests and relationships. Ultimately, both would appear to be necessary to develop 
rules and practices that respond to current needs and interests while remaining sufficiently 
flexible to address future challenges. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, ECONOMIC EVIDENCE AND OUTPUT 
LEGITIMACY 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
In stark contrast to the WTO’s trade negotiation function, its dispute settlement system is 
considered to enjoy widespread social legitimacy. It is referred to repeatedly as the ‘jewel in 
the crown’ of the WTO, and the Sutherland Report was confident to pronounce: ‘So far so 
good: the system has worked’.1 Several authors have investigated the legitimacy of the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system from multiple perspectives. Robert Howse and Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis have extensively analysed the concept of ‘adjudicative legitimacy’ as applied to 
WTO dispute settlement, noting the importance of ‘fair procedures; coherence and integrity in 
legal interpretation; and institutional sensitivity’ in legitimating adjudicative decisions.2 Sol 
Picciotto describes (with some exasperation) a technical-rationalist vision of legitimate 
adjudication as prevailing in the WTO.
3
 Joseph Weiler argues that the dispute settlement 
system has developed different legitimating strategies for its internal and external 
constituencies, and that the friction between these strategies has produced some 
‘dysfunctional’ features in WTO dispute settlement.4 Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke 
unpack the problems facing any attempt to legitimate international adjudication in democratic 
terms. They propose a range of procedural mechanisms for fostering democratic legitimacy, 
ranging from reason-giving and open panel hearings, to norms ensuring the independence and 
impartiality of adjudicators, to making use of the principle of systemic interpretation when 
                                                 
1
  Sutherland Report 2004, 50. 
2
  See Howse & Nicolaïdis 2003a, 331-41; Howse & Nicolaïdis 2003b. See also Howse 2000a; Howse 
2003b. Howse is clear to distinguish his vision of adjudicative legitimacy from the naïve vision that 
adjudication is a matter of ‘technical expertise underpinned by a consensus about competence rather than 
contestable legal interpretations’: Howse 2001a, 374. 
3
  ‘Under a formalist view of law, legitimacy is thought to be provided by law because it offers a process for 
decision-making that is technical-rational: a logical application of precise or unambiguous rules prescribing 
obligatory conduct, to implement politically determined aims’: Picciotto 2005, 479. 
4
  Weiler 2001, 193. 
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interpreting treaties.
5
 Several other writers have sought to advance theories of adjudicative or 
judicial legitimacy; or to claim legitimacy as the inevitable advantage of a proposed reform 
such as increasing the use of amici curiae or establishing a standing first-instance panel.
6
 
The focus of this chapter is complementary to this work on adjudicative legitimacy — it 
addresses a gap in the literature relating to the output legitimacy associated with the dispute 
settlement system’s functional effectiveness in ‘clarifying’ and enforcing WTO rules.7 Such 
functional effectiveness is concerned not just with ensuring that the system is structured to 
maximise legal compliance (what may otherwise be termed legal effectiveness). It is also 
about ensuring that rules designed to implement desired policy outcomes are operating as they 
should.  
This chapter’s analysis of the relationship between WTO norms and practices, output 
legitimacy, and the functional effectiveness of WTO rules parallels the analysis in Chapter 
Six, except that the focus here is on dispute settlement rather than trade negotiation rounds. At 
the same time, the scope of the analysis in this chapter is much narrower. Whereas Chapter 
Six took a very high-level overview of the legal and institutional mechanisms involved in 
structuring negotiation rounds, this chapter focuses much more specifically on the treatment 
of economic evidence in relation to various WTO Agreements, which until recently has failed 
to receive the kind of attention devoted to the treatment of scientific evidence in SPS disputes. 
In doing so it aims to show that the demands of output legitimacy may be relevant not just to 
broad institutional questions, but may also have specific legal and policy implications for how 
WTO disputes are handled. While there are various aspects of dispute settlement that could 
benefit from this kind of analysis, such as treaty interpretation, or the selection processes for 
WTO panellists and Appellate Body members, the treatment of economic evidence also 
provides a particularly glaring example of how the WTO’s claims to output legitimacy are not 
necessarily backed up in practice.   
                                                 
5
  von Bogdandy & Venzke 2012, 24-38. 
6
  See also Alvarez 2006, ch 9; Fukunaga 2008; Petersmann 2008c. 
7
  This output-oriented aspect of the legitimacy of dispute settlement has received little attention in either the 
WTO or in relation to international economic adjudication more generally. Von Bogdandy and Venzke 
note that: ‘Such functional narratives appear to be a little bit weaker with regard to the WTO and 
arbitration in investment disputes, but here too it is possible to find elements providing links for functional 
legitimation, such as increasing economic welfare in the WTO or fostering economic development through 
foreign investment in the case of ICSID’: von Bogdandy & Venzke 2012, 25. 
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The DSU sets out a number of functional imperatives for the dispute settlement system 
which may be used to assess its output legitimacy. Article 3.2 provides ‘that it serves to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify 
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’. It also notes that ‘[t]he dispute settlement system of 
the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system’. Article 3.3 provides that the ‘prompt settlement’ of disputes between 
Members ‘is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a 
proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members’. It also stresses that ‘the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements’. Similarly, Article 3.4 notes that: 
Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory 
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this 
Understanding and under the covered agreements. 
DSU Article 3.7 notes that the ‘aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a 
positive solution to a dispute’. 
These provisions identify several potential outputs by which the efficiency and 
effectiveness of that dispute settlement system may be measured. First, there is the immediate 
institutional goal of efficient (‘prompt’) and effective (‘satisfactory’ and ‘positive’) dispute 
settlement, as reflected in Articles 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7. The dispute settlement system is largely 
successful in settling the disputes brought before it, although there is a subclass of disputes 
(such as the EU-US beef hormones dispute and the Canada-US softwood lumber dispute) that 
have proven more intractable. Several disputes have also pushed the boundaries of what may 
be considered ‘prompt’.  
Second, there is the broader functional goal of ensuring the ‘security and predictability of 
the multilateral trading system’ as noted in Article 3.2. This output is much broader; it is more 
difficult to use this as a yardstick for measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the dispute 
settlement system, as the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system as a 
whole is dependent on many factors outside of its control. It would hence be difficult to 
isolate the specific contribution made by the dispute settlement system to this goal in general 
terms. Article 3.2 may nonetheless be read as encouraging procedural norms that facilitate 
security and predictability, including potentially norms relating to transparency, ‘judicial’ 
independence, reasoned deliberation and careful assessment of evidence. It may also be 
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considered to encourage consistent approaches to interpretation and compliance, but without 
specifying what form those approaches must take and while allowing room for change over 
time. Further investigation of the output related implications of Article 3.3 would be worthy 
of future research, but it is less relevant as a normative yardstick for the concerns addressed 
by this chapter. 
Third, the dispute settlement system is tasked in Article 3.2 with ‘clarifying’ the provisions 
of the covered agreements in accordance with customary international law, in a manner that 
‘preserve[s] the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements’, without 
adding to or diminishing those rights. In attempting to carry out these functions, WTO dispute 
settlement organs are often confronted with complex economic evidence and argument. This 
is because the WTO covered agreements represent an attempt to translate a loose set of 
economic ideas into a politically viable system of legal norms. The vocabulary and authority 
of economics is co-opted and mediated through law, leaving arguments as to the nature of the 
facts to be framed in economic terms. Panels may be required to determine, for example, 
whether a ‘competitive relationship’ exists for the purposes of GATT Articles I or III;8 to 
consider a law or regulation’s impact on imports or exports as part of a ‘necessity’ test under 
various heads of GATT Article XX;
9
 or to determine whether a subsidy has caused ‘serious 
prejudice’ under Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.10 Panels may also be required to take 
into account economic information when reviewing whether a domestic authority’s initial 
compilation of the facts is adequate.
11
 
                                                 
8
  Parties have adduced consumer surveys and econometric analysis as evidence in such cases: see, eg, Japan 
— Alcoholic Beverages II, Panel Report, paras 6.28-32; Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, Panel Report, paras 
10.44-50; and Chile — Alcoholic Beverages, Panel Report, paras 7.31-47, 7.68-79, and 7.81-8.  
9
  See, eg, in relation to GATT Article XX(d), Appellate Body Report, Korea — Various Measures on Beef, 
Appellate Body Report, paras 162-4.  
10
  Although the determination of whether or not there has been ‘serious prejudice’ is a legal question, 
underlying issues of causation and degree require empirical evaluation. 
11
  Under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for instance, panels may be required to investigate whether a 
domestic authority’s examination of the impact of dumped imports on domestic industry included ‘an 
evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry [...]’, 
and was ‘proper’, ‘unbiased’, and ‘objective’. Similarly Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement requires 
domestic regulators to ‘take into account as relevant economic factors’ when conducting a risk assessment. 
See also the reference to ‘economic consequences’ in the definition of ‘risk assessment’ in SPS Agreement 
Annex A, para 4. 
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It has been argued elsewhere that some of the economic ideas underlying WTO rules are 
dated,
12
 that they carry inherent biases towards certain Members,
13
 and that they are, even on 
their own terms, incoherent
14
 or poorly defined.
15
 They remain, nonetheless, at the heart of the 
WTO rulebook, and subject to enforcement through the WTO dispute settlement system. If 
the functions set out in the DSU are to mean anything at all, then when WTO rules specify 
economic metrics for determining the boundaries of those rights and obligations, panels must 
take such metrics seriously and not ignore them in favour of their own unconstrained 
discretion. To that end, it is crucial that panels ensure that their reasoning relating to such 
economic metrics is not epistemically arbitrary.
16
 It must instead be rationally justifiable in 
accordance with the economic metric specified in the relevant provision, within the context 
and limits of the legal process. In other words, panel and Appellate Body decisions must be 
epistemically legitimate. This may be thought of as a specific component of the dispute 
settlement system’s output legitimacy.  
Despite the economic foundations of WTO rules, the presumed relevance of negative 
market impacts to any WTO dispute,
17
 and the effects of panel rulings on Members’ economic 
policies,
18
 WTO panels have often proven reluctant to engage rigorously with economic 
evidence and argument. In the face of disputes characterized by increasing factual complexity 
and disagreement over the facts,
19
 panels’ cursory treatment of economic evidence and 
                                                 
12
  See, eg, Gomory & Baumol 2001. Jan Tumlir described GATT Article XIV as ‘unnecessary’ and 
‘motivated by the fallacious dollar shortage theory current in the 1940s’: Tumlir 1986, 7. 
13
  Or to certain economic groups spread across and within different Members’ territory. See generally Stiglitz 
2003; Chang 2002; Chang 2008. 
14
  See discussion in Chapter Six, Part II.  
15
  See Driesen 2001; Dunoff 2001, 1219. 
16
  Cf the concept of ‘epistemic non-arbitrariness’ in Brewer 1998, 1672, which concerns judges making non-
arbitrary choices when faced with competing epistemically valid sources of information. Another way of 
approaching this is to claim that legal decisions have ‘veritistic value’; that is, that there is value in legal 
decisions reflecting true judgment: see Goldman 1999, 272. 
17
  DSU Article 3.8 provides that ‘[i]n cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a 
covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment’. 
See also DSU Article 3.3. 
18
  See Bown 2010, 396-8. 
19
  This trend is also evident in other international tribunals. Anna Riddell and Brendan Plant note that the ICJ 
has been required to make more extensive findings of fact in recent cases, including in relation to 
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continued refusal to turn to independent economic experts for assistance raises some difficult 
questions. Such practice results in inaccurate, opaque, and unconvincing judgments with 
uncertain implications. It compromises the due process rights of the parties, undermines the 
effectiveness of WTO rules, obfuscates the effects of those rules, and ultimately damages the 
output legitimacy of the dispute settlement system. This matters, because even dry technical 
disputes on causation and ‘competitive relationships’ have repercussions for the working 
conditions, standards of living, and self-government of billions worldwide.  
This chapter argues that the failure of the panels to engage more carefully and rigorously 
with economic evidence and argument, particularly through the use of economic experts, 
undermines the output legitimacy of the dispute settlement system. Part II demonstrates how 
various provisions of the DSU may be understood as promoting and protecting epistemic 
legitimacy in WTO dispute settlement. Part III highlights how panels are failing to live up to 
the promise of epistemic legitimacy in these provisions by making decisions that lack a 
rational basis and are non-transparent. Part IV accounts, in part, for these deficiencies by 
drawing attention to the epistemic limitations of the sources of information on which panels 
currently rely. Finally, Part V argues that the increased use of panel-appointed experts could 
augment the epistemic legitimacy of panel decision-making significantly, and explores the 
implications of using such experts for the dispute settlement system.  
II NORMS ENSURING EPISTEMIC LEGITIMACY IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
A decision may be considered epistemically legitimate
20
 if it is justifiable in accordance with 
a given set of epistemic criteria (formal epistemic legitimacy), or if a given community 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘significant quantities of scientific and technical evidence’. They suggest that such increasing complexity 
appears to render ‘obsolete’ the ICJ’s reasons for failing to use its fact-finding powers: Riddell & Plant 
2009, 70. 
20
  In using the term ‘epistemic legitimacy’ I wish to differentiate it from the term ‘expert legitimacy’. 
Commentators often write of ‘expert legitimacy’ when discussing how the involvement of scientific (in the 
broad sense) and technical experts justifies the exercise of authority. It is often framed as a distinct 
category alongside democratic legitimacy: see, eg, Shapiro 1998, 44-7; Stahn 2005, 47-9. This tends to 
conflate the idea of ‘expert rule’ with the internal methodological integrity of expert processes. Yet the 
distinctive feature of ‘expert legitimacy’, as opposed to other forms of legitimacy (such as those based on 
consent, justice, or the legal form), is its emphasis on epistemic competence, rather than normative 
justifiability. In general, to claim that something is legitimate in the normative or political sense is to claim 
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believes that it is so justifiable (social epistemic legitimacy).
21
 There are several procedural 
norms at play in WTO disputes that may be understood as designed, at least in part,
22
 to 
improve the reliability of panel and Appellate Body decisions about the facts underlying 
disputes, including those relating to economic matters. These norms help to protect the formal 
epistemic legitimacy of panel decisions by ensuring that panelists have the necessary 
empirical knowledge to assess compliance with the covered agreements, and that they use that 
knowledge appropriately when making decisions.
23
 Such norms also help to protect social 
epistemic legitimacy by ensuring that the various communities of legitimation engaged with 
the WTO — Members, trade experts, NGOs, the press — also perceive the system to be 
acting in this way. These norms may be grouped into five categories, which again may be 
divided between norms that govern the nature of the participants in the process and those that 
govern the terms of interaction between those participants.  
Turning first to the terms of interaction this time, the first category seeks to ensure that 
there is a rational basis for the panels’ decisions. It includes, for example, DSU Article 11, 
which requires that panels make an ‘objective assessment of the facts’.24 It also includes the 
principle of due process known as the ‘no evidence’ rule,25 which bars decision-makers from 
                                                                                                                                                        
that its exercise of political power is rationally justifiable in normative terms. For consent-based forms of 
legitimacy, for example, the exercise of political power by one actor over another is considered justified 
because the second actor has, at least in theory, agreed to such exercise in advance. ‘Expert legitimacy’ as 
commonly discussed, then, is generally a mixture of epistemic legitimacy and other standard normative 
forms of legitimacy (such as consent or legality). 
21
  Cf Weiler 1999, 80-1 for a discussion of the distinction between formal and social legitimacy in a political, 
rather than epistemic, context.  
22
  Occasionally the covered agreements directly prioritize other concerns over epistemic legitimacy; for 
instance SCM Agreement Annex V, para 9 specifies that ‘ordinarily the panel should not request additional 
information to complete the record where the information would support a particular party’s position and 
the absence of that information in the record is the result of unreasonable non-cooperation by that party in 
the information-gathering process’. 
23
  See Stein 2008. 
24
  The Appellate Body has read this to provide that ‘a panel has the duty to examine and consider all the 
evidence before it, not just the evidence submitted by one or the other party, and to evaluate the relevance 
and probative force of each piece thereof’: Korea — Dairy, Appellate Body Report, para 137.  
25
  In Canada/US — Continued Suspension, the Appellate Body noted that ‘the protection of due process is an 
essential feature of a rules-based system of adjudication, such as that established under the DSU’: Canada 
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making any finding based on evidence which, ‘taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of 
supporting the finding’.26  
The second category, again concerning the terms of interaction, includes norms seeking to 
preserve the transparency of panel decision-making. Such transparency opens up the decision-
making process to public scrutiny, which both deters decision-makers from making arbitrary 
and unjustified claims and allows for the development of public trust. Norms preserving 
transparency include DSU Articles 18.1
27
 (no ex parte communications with panels or the 
Appellate Body) and 12.7
28
 (panel reports shall set out findings of fact and basic rationale 
behind findings).
29
 Transparent decision-making is also protected by two principles of due 
                                                                                                                                                        
— Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para 433; see also US — Continued Suspension, 
Appellate Body Report (all paragraph references from here on refer to the Canadian version of the report). 
For a more extensive discussion of the application of principles of due process in the WTO dispute 
settlement system, see AD Mitchell 1998, 145-75; see especially 160-2 for a discussion of the no evidence 
rule; see also Mitchell & Heaton 2010.  
26
  Wade & Forsyth 2009, 229-30; see also AD Mitchell 1998, 149. 
27
  This is complemented by Rule VII:2 of the DSU Rules of Conduct
 
which forbids covered persons 
(including, among others, panelists, panel-appointed experts, and members of the Secretariat support staff) 
from engaging in ex parte contacts on the matters under consideration during proceedings: WT/DSB/RC/1.  
28
  The Appellate Body has described DSU Article 12.7 as reflecting ‘principles of fundamental fairness and 
due process’, arguing that ‘where a Member has been found to have acted inconsistently with its 
obligations under the covered agreements, that Member is entitled to know the reasons for such a finding 
as a matter of due process’: Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US), Appellate Body Report, paras 105-
07 (footnote omitted). Turning to the Oxford English Dictionary, the Appellate Body found that Article 
12.7 required panels to ‘set forth explanations and reasons sufficient to disclose the essential, or 
fundamental, justification for those findings and recommendations’: para 106. 
29
  Other provisions include DSU Article 11, which requires panels to consult regularly with the parties, and 
DSU Article 13.1, which requires panels to inform the authorities of a Member before seeking information 
or advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of that Member. The need for transparent 
panel reports is further emphasized by the requirements in DSU Articles 7.1 and 11 that panels must make 
such findings ‘as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for’ 
in the covered agreements. Although the DSB’s adoption of panel reports is generally an automatic 
formality, it would be reduced to a totally empty ritual if the panel report adopted failed to reflect the 
reasoning behind it. The Appellate Body moved to protect the DSB’s role in EC — Export Subsidies on 
Sugar, where it held that the Panel had falsely adopted judicial economy in such a way as to fall short of its 
obligation to make such findings as necessary to assist the DSB in making a recommendation or ruling: 
Appellate Body Report, paras 334-35. 
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process: the hearing rule, which requires decision-makers to provide those affected by their 
decision
30
 with an opportunity to hear and respond to the case against them,
31
 and (again) the 
no evidence rule, which requires decision-makers to ‘provide reasons that are adequate, 
intelligible and that deal with the substantial points raised by the parties’.32 
The third category turns to the nature of the participants. It is concerned with the 
competence of the participants in the dispute settlement process. Hence DSU Article 8.1 
provides that panels ‘shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-
governmental individuals’,33 and the indicative list of potential panelists indicates ‘specific 
areas of experience or expertise of the individuals in the sectors or subject matter of the 
covered agreements’.34 More specifically, paragraph 4 of the GATS Annex on Financial 
Services requires that panels ‘for disputes on prudential issues and other financial matters 
shall have the necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial service under dispute’. 
Similarly, Appellate Body members must be ‘persons of recognized authority, with 
demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered 
agreements generally’.35 In addition, participation in expert review groups under DSU art 13.2 
is ‘restricted to persons of professional standing and experience in the field in question’.36 
The fourth category aims to preserve the independence and impartiality of panelists, to 
prevent the incursion of bias or the perception of such bias. Such norms include DSU Article 
8.2, which provides that panelists ‘should be selected with a view to ensuring the 
independence of the members’, and the ‘governing principle’ in Rule II of the DSU Rules of 
                                                 
30
  Limited for present purposes to the parties to the case.  
31
  See AD Mitchell 1998, 156, for a discussion of various provisions in the DSU and the Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review reflecting the hearing rule. See also Wade & Forsyth 2009, 402 for a discussion of 
the application of the hearing rule in the UK. 
32
  AD Mitchell 1998, 149. 
33
  More specifically, this includes ‘persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a 
representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or 
Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or 
published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member’.  
34
  DSU Article 8.4. 
35
  DSU Article 17.3. 
36
  DSU, Appendix 4, para 2. See also TBT Agreement, Annex 2, para 2; SCM Agreement Articles 4.5 and 
24.3. 
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Conduct, which requires various participants in the dispute settlement process
37
 to be 
‘independent and impartial’ and to ‘avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest’.38 The 
requirements of independence and impartiality are also enshrined in another principle of due 
process — the bias rule,39 which provides that no decision-maker may determine a case in 
which the decision-maker is, or could ‘fairly be suspected to be’, biased.40  
The fifth category seeks to enhance the diversity of the sources of information available to 
the dispute settlement organs, providing further opportunities for contestation and refinement 
of legal and factual positions adopted over the course of the dispute.
41
 This is, for example, 
facilitated by the adversarial nature of the WTO’s dispute settlement process, as well as the 
extensive practice of third party submissions in WTO disputes. In addition, DSU Article 13.1 
provides panels with ‘the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual 
or body which it deems appropriate’.42 Similarly, DSU Article 13.2 authorizes panels to ‘seek 
                                                 
37
  Panelists, Appellate Body members, arbitrators, Secretariat support staff and panel-appointed experts. 
38
  WT/DSB/RC/1. Other relevant norms include DSU Article 8.3, which prohibits citizens of parties to a 
dispute from serving on the panel for that dispute; DSU Appendix 4, which prohibits citizens of parties to a 
dispute serving on an expert review group without the mutual consent of the parties; and the requirement 
that panels make an ‘objective’ assessment of the facts in DSU Article 11. See also Rule VI of the DSU 
Rules of Conduct for more detail on covered persons’ self-disclosure requirements. 
39
  In Canada/US — Continued Suspension the Appellate Body held that: ‘Fairness and impartiality in the 
decision-making process are fundamental guarantees of due process. Those guarantees would not be 
respected where the decision-makers appoint and consult experts who are not independent or impartial. 
Such appointments and consultations compromise a panel's ability to act as an independent adjudicator’: 
Appellate Body Report, para 436. See also AD Mitchell 1998, 154-5. 
40
  Wade & Forsyth 2009, 380-1. 
41
  As Whitney Debevoise has noted: ‘Interestingly, there are no rules of evidence for testing the credibility of 
information. It is merely assumed that information submitted by a Member will be truthful and complete. 
The only way to test factual submissions is to submit additional information or opinions’: Debevoise 1998, 
824.  
42
  Panels have exercised their discretion to seek information and advice under DSU Article 13 even when: (1) 
neither party contested a particular version of the facts; (2) neither party requested that the panel seek such 
information; and (3) the parties agreed specifically that the panel need not seek further information: for 
examples of (1), see, eg, Colombia — Ports of Entry, Panel Report, paras 7.180-1; China — Publications 
and Audiovisual Products, Panel Report, para 6.46; US — Anti-Dumping Measures on PET Bags, Panel 
Report, para 7.5. For an example of (2), see, eg, US — Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, paras 99-110. For 
an example of (3), see, eg, EC — Biotech, Panel Report, para 7.16.  
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information from any relevant source’ and ‘to consult experts to obtain their opinion on 
certain aspects of the matter’.43 More specifically, when considering a ‘factual issue 
concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may 
request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group’.44 Panels are not, however, 
expressly required to seek information, no matter how complex the dispute or how limited the 
technical knowledge of the panelists.
45
 
III DEFICIENCIES IN THE CASE LAW 
In the face of complex economic evidence the approach taken by many panels has fallen far 
short of the promise of epistemic legitimacy contained in these rules and principles. This has 
resulted in several decisions which lack both formal and social epistemic legitimacy, 
undermining the proper enforcement of WTO rules and the output legitimacy of the WTO 
more broadly. These problematic decisions may be divided into two categories: decisions for 
which there is no rational basis, and decisions suffering from a lack of transparency. 
A Lack of Rational Basis 
Those decisions lacking a rational basis may be further broken down into two subcategories: 
decisions where panels lacked sufficient evidence to make epistemically justifiable 
conclusions, and decisions where panels ignored or misapprehended the evidence that was 
before them. US — Upland Cotton provides an example of the former. In the original Panel 
proceedings, Brazil’s evidence included an expert report by Dr Daniel Sumner which made 
use of an economic model owned by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
(‘FAPRI’). Oddly, although the US was given access to the workings of the model by 
                                                 
43
  Similar provisions regarding consultation with experts appear in SPS Agreement Article 11.2; TBT 
Agreement Article 14.2; Customs Valuation Agreement Article 19.4; and SCM Agreement Articles 4.5 and 
24.3. Of these, SPS Agreement Article 11.2 is unique in specifying that panels ‘should’, rather than ‘may’, 
seek advice from panel-appointed experts in disputes involving ‘scientific or technical issues’.  
44
  Appendix 4 to the DSU sets out the rules and procedures for such expert review groups in greater detail.  
45
  See discussion below at (n 58) and accompanying text. Panel fact-finding is also constrained by the 
invariably brief working procedures for consultation with experts which are drafted for each dispute in 
consultation with the parties: see, eg, Canada — Continued Suspension, Panel Report, Annex A-5: 
‘Working Procedures for Consultations with Scientific and/or Technical Experts’. 
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FAPRI,
46
 this access was granted only subject to the express stipulation that the model not be 
provided to either Brazil or the Panel.
47
 Despite noting the due process issues surrounding 
Brazil’s lack of access to the FAPRI model, the Panel simply claimed that: ‘We have not 
relied upon the quantitative results of the modelling exercise — in terms of estimating any 
numerical value for the effects of the United States subsidies, nor, indirectly, in our 
examination of the causal link required under Articles 5 and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement’.48 
The Panel nonetheless took the analysis into account ‘where relevant to our analysis of the 
existence and nature of the subsidies in question, and their effects under the relevant 
provisions of the SCM Agreement’.49 The Panel thus used the model to determine the 
‘effects’ of the relevant subsidies despite being unaware of the workings of the model — all 
while expressly claiming that it did not consider its ability to make an objective assessment of 
the matter to be affected.
50
 As expressed by Hylke Vandenbussche, ‘[t]his lack of information 
makes the Panel’s analysis look arbitrary’.51 On appeal, the Appellate Body gently chided the 
Panel for failing to provide sufficient reasons for their decision, but disregarded the idea that 
the Panel’s underlying reasoning may have been deficient.52 As such it did not find the 
problems with the Panel’s causation analysis to amount to legal error.53 The Appellate Body’s 
                                                 
46
  FAPRI received US funding for its work: US — Upland Cotton, Panel Report, paras 7.18(2) and 7.1205-
06. 
47
  Ibid paras 7.18(2) and 7.1206.  
48
  Ibid paras 7.1205-06. 
49
  Ibid para 7.1209. 
50
  Ibid para 7.18(5). See Sapir & Trachtman 2008, 193. Sapir and Trachtman’s analysis is part of the 
American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on WTO Case Law. This series brings together expert 
economists and lawyers to comment on the jurisprudence of the WTO, providing an invaluable resource 
for scrutinising the epistemic legitimacy of WTO case law concerned with economic metrics. 
51
  Vandenbussche 2008, 216. 
52
  Although no claim was made under DSU Article 11, the Appellate Body asserted an inherent power to 
review whether a set of facts is consistent or inconsistent with a given treaty provision: US — Upland 
Cotton, Appellate Body Report, para 399; see also EC — Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para 132. In 
general the Appellate Body may review only matters of law, not of fact, but the question of whether a panel 
has satisfied the ‘objective assessment’ standard is considered a matter of law and hence reviewable: DSU 
Article 17.6. See also US — Wheat Gluten, Appellate Body Report, para 151.  
53
  See US — Upland Cotton, Appellate Body Report, paras 448 and 458. 
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formal preservation of the Panel’s decision on this point cannot serve to erase the epistemic 
deficiencies of the original decision.  
Soon after, in US — Continued Zeroing,54 the original Panel was criticized by the 
Appellate Body for failing to seek out additional information from the US Department of 
Commerce to corroborate the use of simple zeroing during the relevant periodic reviews. The 
Appellate Body held that ‘while a panel cannot make the case for a party, Article 11 requires 
a panel to test evidence with the parties, and to seek further information if necessary, in order 
to determine whether the evidence satisfies a party’s burden of proof’.55 It further held that the 
Panel failed to take the ‘necessary steps’ to seek information from the parties that would 
‘elucidate its understanding of the facts and issues before it’, had failed to consider the 
evidence ‘in its totality’, and had therefore failed to make an objective assessment of the 
facts.
56
 Although in the main body of the report the Appellate Body claimed that it could not 
determine whether further enquiry under DSU Article 13 would have ‘yielded greater clarity 
as to the evidence’,57 it could not resist adding in a footnote that ‘[a]t a minimum, it would 
seem the Panel should have done more to engage the parties on the specific question of [the 
extent to which the Panel could rely upon certain documents] in determining the use of simple 
zeroing’.58 It thus provided an unusually strong condemnation of the Panel’s failure to make 
its decision on a rational basis. 
                                                 
54
  US — Continued Zeroing, Appellate Body Report. 
55
  This was held to be the case ‘regardless of whether a party has requested it to seek such information’: US 
— Continued Zeroing, Appellate Body Report, para 347 (emphasis added). See also Canada — Aircraft, 
where the Appellate Body noted that Canada’s refusal to provide information prevented the panel from 
conducting an objective assessment of the facts: Appellate Body Report, para 192. 
56
  US — Continued Zeroing, Appellate Body Report, paras 347-8. 
57
  Ibid para 347. 
58
  Ibid fn 742. The Appellate Body’s approach in US — Continued Zeroing appears to be at odds with its 
earlier approach in EC — Sardines. There, the Appellate Body held that ‘[a] contravention of the duty 
under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case cannot result from the 
due exercise of the discretion permitted by another provision of the DSU, in this instance Article 13.2 of 
the DSU’: EC — Sardines, Appellate Body Report, para 302. Yet the Appellate Body has also repeatedly 
affirmed that the objective assessment test in DSU Article 11 ‘regulates’ a panel’s exercise of its 
discretion: see also Japan — Agricultural Products II, Appellate Body Report, para 127, and US — 
Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, paras 104 and 106. 
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US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), and US 
—Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) all provide examples of where panelists have 
simply either ignored or misapprehended the relevance of economic data and analysis to their 
decisions.
59
 US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) required both the Panel and the Appellate 
Body to address the effects of contested US legislation on the conditions of competition. 
Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis note that the Appellate Body’s report ‘makes claims 
concerning economic effects without performing an economic analysis’60 even though the 
‘effects [were] determined to be crucial to its illegality’,61 and that ‘[a] distinguishing feature 
of the dispute is that the [Appellate Body’s] (as well as the Panel’s) finding is not based on 
any empirical verification’.62 Although confirmed by the Appellate Body, these aspects of the 
decision would therefore seem to fall short of both the DSU Article 11 requirement to make 
an objective assessment and the no evidence rule.  
Similarly, in US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), after treating the US subsidy 
estimates data (provided in the original case) as being of ‘central importance’,63 the Panel 
marginalized the US re-estimates data for the purposes of the DSU Article 21.5 proceedings 
on uncertainty grounds — even though the re-estimates were no more uncertain than the 
original estimates.
64
 This time the Appellate Body held that the Panel had failed to make an 
objective assessment of the facts ‘by dismissing the import of the re-estimates data submitted 
by the United States on the basis of internally inconsistent reasoning’.65 The Appellate Body 
further criticized the Panel’s reluctance to engage more deeply with the economic model used 
by the parties, stating that: 
The relative complexity of a model and its parameters is not a reason for a panel to 
remain agnostic about them. Like other categories of evidence, a panel should reach 
conclusions with respect to the probative value it accords to economic simulations or 
                                                 
59
  For further criticism of the misapprehension of economic evidence in other cases, see Grossman & 
Mavroidis 2007a, 387 and Howse & Neven 2007, 167.  
60
  Horn & Mavroidis 2007b, 629. 
61
  Ibid 634-5.  
62
  Ibid 633. 
63
  US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), Appellate Body Report, paras 287 and 291. 
64
  Indeed, the Appellate Body noted that ‘[i]f anything, the re-estimates might be expected to be more reliable 
because they reflect the historical performance of the programme’: ibid para 287. 
65
  Ibid para 292. 
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models presented to it. [...] the Panel could have gone further in its evaluation and 
comparative analysis of the economic simulations and the particular parameters used.
66
 
The Appellate Body went on to complete the analysis on a different basis.
67
  
Finally, in US —Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), the Panel found that there had 
been insufficient evidence to determine whether certain US Department of Defence research, 
development, testing, and evaluation programmes had funded ‘predominantly’ assistance 
instruments, or had also to some degree funded procurement contracts. Funding assistance 
instruments would have violated Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, whereas funding 
procurement contracts would not. The EU argued that the Panel had failed to exercise its 
powers under DSU Article 13 to seek out additional information from the US. On appeal, the 
Appellate Body was scathing of the Panel’s neglect, judging that: 
We consider that the particular circumstances of this dispute demanded that the Panel 
assume an active role in pursuing a train of inquiry that would allow it to apply its 
predominance approach. In failing to seek additional information regarding the use of 
assistance instruments under all of the [US Department of Defence] programmes, the 
Panel compromised its ability to assess properly whether the effects of all 23 [research, 
development, testing and evaluation programmes] […] caused adverse effects to the 
interests of the European Communities.
68
 
They went on to find that the Panel had thereby violated its obligation under DSU Article 11 
to make an objective assessment of the facts.  
B Lack of Transparency 
Panels dealing with complex economic evidence have also fallen short of the WTO’s 
procedural norms on transparency in two ways. Firstly, it is not clear that panelists have been 
fully transparent about their engagement with economic experts. Secondly, panel reports often 
fail to set out the rationale behind their economic findings adequately.  
                                                 
66
  Ibid paras 357-8. 
67
  Ibid paras 295 and 448(b). See Davey & Sapir 2010, 199. 
68
  US — Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), Appellate Body Report, paras 1144-5. 
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1 Failure to Acknowledge Use of Economic Expertise 
Panels rarely acknowledge which sources they draw upon for economic expertise, either 
during proceedings or in drafting their reports.
69
 Indeed, so far, not a single panel has 
acknowledged seeking information or advice from an independent economic expert.
70
 It is 
difficult to tell whether WTO panels have made use of economic experts unless they 
acknowledge them in their reports. There have, however, been several cases to date which 
demanded consideration of complex, technical economic information which would seem to 
require specialized expertise but in which panels made no such acknowledgement. Chad 
Bown highlights that ‘subsidy cases such as Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC), the Canada 
and Brazil Civil Aircraft disputes, as well as others likely require specialized expertise in 
corporate finance’.71 This suggests that panels have been relying on their own expertise, on 
experts provided by the Secretariat, or most troublingly, consulting independent experts, but 
without providing the parties with the opportunity to confront such evidence nor mentioning it 
in their reports. The problems with using such ‘experts fantômes’ were summarized by Judges 
Al-Khasawneh and Simma of the ICJ in their dissenting opinion in Pulp Mills. They noted 
that the use of such ‘“invisible experts” [...] would deprive the Court of the [...] advantages of 
transparency, openness, procedural fairness, and the ability for the Parties to comment upon 
or otherwise assist the Court in understanding the evidence before it.’72 
                                                 
69
  The practice of not acknowledging expert assistance in panel reports appears to have its origins in the 
GATT years. The WHO’s appearance in Thailand — Cigarettes, GATT Panel Report, paras 73 and 80 has 
been cited as the first and only use of panel-appointed expertise in GATT dispute settlement: Pauwelyn 
2002b, 325 (footnote omitted). Yet one year earlier, when referring to advice rendered to the Panel by the 
IMF in Korea — Beef (US), South Korea noted that ‘[w]hen panels had consulted an expert in the past they 
were not bound to accept the expert's advice, and neither were the GATT contracting parties’: Korea — 
Beef (US), GATT Panel Report, para 81. Moreover, despite the absence of references to independent 
experts in previous panel reports, the Annex to the Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute 
Settlement and Surveillance, L/4907, para 6(iv) noted that panels would ‘often consult with and seek 
information from any relevant source they deem appropriate and they sometimes consult experts to obtain 
their technical opinion on certain aspects of the matter’. 
70
  As distinct from an IGO with a formal institutional link to the WTO, such as the IMF or the World 
Customs Organization. 
71
  Bown 2010, 417. 
72
  Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgment [2010] ICJ Rep 14, para 14 (dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma) (‘Pulp Mills’). See also Riddell & Plant 2009, 336. 
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Transparency in this regard would be well-served by Joost Pauwelyn’s suggestion that 
there should be an explicit prohibition on ex parte communications between panels and panel-
appointed experts, as ‘[t]he disputing parties should get an opportunity to comment on all 
input provided by experts, no matter how trivial it may seem’.73 At present, the prohibition on 
ex parte contact between panelists and experts in DSU Article 18.1 only applies when those 
experts are tied to one of the parties. At minimum, the hearing rule would also require 
panelists to notify the parties of any expert input, the content of such input and, where 
possible, provide the parties with the opportunity to respond.
74
 This should apply to any 
expert input on economic matters with a bearing on the final decision, whether such input 
derives from panel experts, the Secretariat, or elsewhere (for instance, Lori Wallach recounts 
an incident when one of the panelists in the original EC — Hormones dispute sought out an 
officially rejected amicus brief from Public Citizen to read while on holiday).
75
  
In contrast, panels have acted transparently when seeking economic information and 
advice from IGOs.
76
 In India — Quantitative Restrictions the Panel notified the parties that 
they intended to consult with the IMF, provided the parties with the opportunity to comment 
on the questions put to the IMF and to respond to the IMF’s answers; and noted when it was 
relying on information provided by the IMF to reach specific conclusions. The Panel also 
quoted the questions posed to, and the answers received from, the IMF in part in its report, 
although the full correspondence was not reproduced.
77
 Any unacknowledged use of 
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  Pauwelyn 2002b, 350. 
74
  Writing on international tribunals, Gillian White has argued that ‘[t]he fundamental nature of this principle 
of the equality of the litigants’ means that, where parties are denied the opportunity to comment on 
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  Wallach 2000, 775. 
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  For instance, panels have consulted the IMF for information on India’s balance-of-payments situation, on 
the implementation of exchange fees, and on the interpretation of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF: 
India — Quantitative Restrictions, Panel Report; Dominican Republic — Import and Sale of Cigarettes, 
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China — Auto Parts, Panel Report; EC — Chicken Cuts, Panel Report; EC — IT Products, Panel Report. 
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  India — Quantitative Restrictions, Panel Report, paras 5.11-13 and 5.164-8. 
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economic expertise provided by invisible experts, and even Secretariat staff, falls far short of 
these standards.  
2 Lack of Transparency in Panel Reports 
As mentioned above, DSU Article 12.7 requires that ‘the report of a panel shall set out the 
findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any 
findings and recommendations that it makes’. Although no panel has yet been overturned for 
falling short of Article 12.7, the Appellate Body has criticized panels for the lack of detail in 
their economic reasoning. In US — Upland Cotton, the Appellate Body noted that ‘the Panel 
indicated expressly that it had taken the [economic] models in question into account. It would 
have been helpful had the Panel revealed how it used these models in examining the question 
of third country responses’.78 The Appellate Body further criticized the Panel’s lack of 
transparency, stating that ‘the Panel could have provided a more detailed explanation of its 
analysis of the complex facts and economic arguments arising in this dispute’.79 The 
Appellate Body nonetheless declined to ‘second guess’ the Panel’s appreciation and weighing 
of the evidence.
80
  
André Sapir and Joel Trachtman also point out that the Appellate Body has several times 
held that DSU Article 11 requires panels to ensure that domestic authorities provide ‘reasoned 
and adequate’ explanations for their determinations in the trade remedies context. In both US 
— Wheat Gluten and US — Lamb, for instance, the Panels were required to establish that the 
competent domestic authority (the US International Trade Commission in each case) had 
failed to fulfil its obligations to consider all relevant economic factors and provide reasoned 
and adequate reports in accordance with Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.
81
 Despite the different sources of obligation for the duty to give reasons at the 
domestic and panel levels, they nonetheless argue that ‘a fortiori’ panels should in turn ensure 
                                                 
78
  US — Upland Cotton, Appellate Body Report, para 448 (citation omitted). The Appellate Body nonetheless 
decided against ‘second guessing’ the Panel’s fact finding.  
79
  Ibid para 458. 
80
  See also EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, Appellate Body Report, paras 135-43, 254 
and 1304-5. 
81
  US — Wheat Gluten, Appellate Body Report, paras 156-63; US — Lamb, Appellate Body Report, 
paras 140-9. 
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that their own reports are ‘reasoned and adequate’.82 This line of argument was picked up in 
US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), in which the Appellate Body held that ‘where a 
panel operates as the initial trier of facts [...] it would similarly be expected to provide 
reasoned and adequate explanations and coherent reasoning’.83 While this finding of the 
Appellate Body is to be welcomed, it remains to be seen as to how far it will alter the practice 
of panels when addressing economic evidence and argument in their reports. 
There are, of course, limits to how much panels should be expected to record in their 
reports. In Chile — Price Band System (Article 21.5), the Appellate Body noted that ‘a panel 
is not required, in its report, to explain precisely how it dealt with each and every piece of 
evidence on the panel record’.84 With respect to experts specifically, in EC — Hormones the 
Appellate Body noted that ‘a panel cannot realistically refer to all statements made by the 
experts advising it and should be allowed a substantial margin of discretion as to which 
statements are useful to refer to explicitly’.85 Panels may also be subject to confidentiality 
restrictions, especially in relation to sensitive business information. However, when it comes 
to evidence and analysis that is material to a panel’s conclusions, and where such evidence 
and analysis is complex and both the parties and the wider public would benefit from its 
detailed breakdown, it is vital that the panels engage in as detailed an examination as is 
permitted in the circumstances and be as open as possible about the sources of their reasoning.  
IV THE EPISTEMIC LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The problems identified above have undermined the epistemic legitimacy of individual 
decisions and of the dispute settlement process in general. The question then becomes what 
may be done to improve the situation. Panelists draw upon several sources of economic 
information. Since they have so far declined to use panel-appointed economic experts, panels 
have relied on themselves, the parties, the Secretariat, amicus briefs, and the corrective force 
of the Appellate Body to generate and test factual economic claims. Each of these has 
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  Sapir & Trachtman 2008, 193. See also Horn & Mavroidis 2007a, 125. 
83
  US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), Appellate Body Report, para 293, fn 618.  
84
  Chile — Price Band System (Article 21.5), Appellate Body Report, para 240. 
85
  EC — Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para 135; referred to with approval in Canada — Wheat Exports 
and Grain Imports, Appellate Body Report, 63, fn 251. 
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structural and practical limitations which, without more, weaken the epistemic legitimacy of 
the decision-making process.  
A The Panelists 
With the exception of the vague exhortation in DSU Article 8.1 that panelists be ‘well 
qualified’ and the more specific requirements of the GATS Annex, the requirements for 
panelists in the covered agreements clearly do not require them to have any level of 
specifically economic expertise, let alone economic expertise tailored to the particular dispute. 
This has been reflected in practice; Chad Bown points out that in nine disputes involving 
significant economic evidence and arguments, only five of the 27 panelists had PhDs in 
economics, and only a handful of others had undergraduate or masters level degrees in 
economics. Fewer still were practicing as professional economists. As distinguished as many 
panelists may be, and notwithstanding the valuable contributions many of them make to the 
dispute settlement process, it is clear that the vast majority of them lack the qualifications 
necessary to engage fully with specialized and complex economic information without 
assistance.
86
  
To counter this, Bown recommends that at least one panelist in any given dispute should 
have ‘formal graduate training in economics’.87 As Reto Malacrida points out, however, the 
selection of panelists is a complex process driven by the agreement or agreed criteria of the 
parties.
88
 If even one party would prefer not to have panelists with economic expertise this is 
likely to have an impact on panel selection. Moreover, it could equally be argued that the key 
missing qualification for panelists has been legal training. It may be quite difficult to find 
many mutually acceptable candidates who are both legally trained and have graduate 
qualifications in economics. Consequently, although the flexibility of the panelist selection 
system serves a number of other purposes well, other sources will likely be needed to shore 
up the epistemic legitimacy of panel decisions. 
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  See Pauwelyn 2002b, 331. 
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  Bown 2010, 430. 
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  Malacrida 2010, 436. 
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B The Parties 
There are also significant limits on the ability of the parties to contribute to the epistemic 
legitimacy of the dispute settlement system. The WTO panel process is set up partly along 
adversarial lines. Panels are reliant on the parties to provide them with the vast majority of the 
evidence necessary to construct a factual record. It is the responsibility of the parties, not the 
panelists, to satisfy their respective burdens of proof and, where necessary, to provide the 
evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case.
89
 The advantages of the adversarial model 
of dispute settlement include the control it gives parties over their arguments and the rigorous 
scrutiny and counterargument to which each party is subjected by their opponent. This mutual 
hammering out of opposing viewpoints is supposed to have a refining effect conducive to the 
production of authoritative factual and legal truth.  
Following a purely adversarial logic, it may seem reasonable for panels to rely simply on 
their party experts, leaving panel-appointed experts out of the process. In light of the factual 
complexity of many cases before WTO panels, and to back up the epistemic authority of their 
arguments, parties often make use of experts. They refer to publications by experts, they 
commission reports from experts, and they involve experts directly in meetings with panels. 
This often has beneficial effects on the epistemic legitimacy of panel judgments; in US — 
Upland Cotton, the Panel ‘underlined’ that ‘we consider the participation of experts, as part of 
the submissions of the parties and third parties, contributed constructively to our duty to 
conduct an objective assessment of the matter before us’.90  
Yet economic experts appointed by parties are vulnerable, as in domestic systems, to many 
forms of bias. Even if the experts do not suffer from actual bias, there may still be a 
perception of bias which undermines their social epistemic legitimacy. Party experts may 
reflect a selection bias on the part of the parties, who are likely to seek out experts whose 
                                                 
89
  See India — Patents (US), Appellate Body Report, para 94. 
90
  US — Upland Cotton, Panel Report, 284, fn 1323. The Panel also observed, however, that ‘it is open for a 
Member to determine the composition of its own delegation for the purposes of WTO dispute settlement. 
Neither the DSU nor the SCM Agreement contains specific rules on any sort of qualification of experts’. In 
any case, despite the contributions of party experts, the Panel’s ‘objective assessment’ was heavily 
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Vandenbussche 2008.  
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record and methodology is sympathetic to their arguments.
91
 Party experts may suffer from 
reference bias as a result of the strategic limitations placed by the parties on the experts’ 
terms of reference. Experts may be perceived as suffering from some form of financial bias if 
they have been commissioned by the parties directly. Party experts may also be considered as 
afflicted with prosecutorial bias if they are or are seen to be psychologically co-opted by the 
adversarial process as ‘hired guns’.92 Finally, in a form of bias peculiar to international law, 
party experts may be perceived as tainted by national bias if they are citizens of a Member 
who is a party to the dispute.
93
  
Domestic adversarial systems have many safeguards that are used to contain the distorting 
effects of such biases on fact-finding and argument and which thus serve to preserve the 
epistemic legitimacy of judicial processes. Many of these are dependent on the vertical 
relationship between the parties and the court as an organ of the state. In WTO proceedings, 
however, parties are formally equal sovereigns participating before a tribunal with no direct 
ability to compel compliance. Neither counsel nor experts for the parties have an explicit duty 
to disclose all relevant information to the panel, nor to provide unbiased evidence.
94
 Party 
experts are not even bound by the impartiality and disclosure provisions in the DSU Rules of 
Conduct. There is no international professional body to watch over the ethics of international 
lawyers appearing before the WTO. With no direct coercive powers, panels are unlikely to 
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  Lianos 2009, 15 and 17; Cameron & Orava 2000, 228. 
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  Lianos 2009, 17. Variations on prosecutorial and financial bias are also well recognized in domestic courts. 
See, eg, Jessel MR in Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) 17 LR Eq 358, 373: ‘Undoubtedly there is a natural 
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  Lianos 2009, 14. Cf Part 33.2 of the UK Civil Procedure Rules 1998: ‘An expert must help the court to 
achieve the overriding objective by giving objective, unbiased opinion on matters within his expertise’; and 
Part 35.3: ‘This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he has received instructions or by 
whom he is paid’. 
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have inherent jurisdiction to prosecute for contempt.
95
 Nor is there recourse to discovery.
96
 
These all compound the logistical and political difficulties that parties face when seeking to 
gather information from outside of their own jurisdictions, especially when they seek 
information from within the jurisdiction of an opposing party.
97
 In the face of all of this the 
injunction to Members in DSU Article 3.10 not to use the dispute settlement procedures 
contentiously, and to engage in the procedures in good faith, seem comparatively anaemic.  
When it comes to party experts, therefore, WTO dispute settlement relies on extra-legal 
factors such as the expert’s personal integrity and, if enough of the experts’ evidence is made 
public, the scrutiny of their peers.
98
 Such factors are not always sufficient to ensure the 
epistemic legitimacy, or even relevancy, of information provided by party experts. Writing in 
relation to the Appellate Body’s decision in Japan — DRAMS, Meredith Crowley and David 
Palmeter note that: 
The [Appellate Body’s] task in developing its economics analysis was complicated by the 
fact that the economic arguments presented by the parties and the Panel were sometimes 
incorrect and at other times were irrelevant. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body spent 
a great deal of time bogged down in hearing arguments that ultimately had no bearing on 
the case, but which were construed by the parties to be related to the economic criteria set 
out in the SCM Agreement.
99
 
To counter such problems, WTO panels, like many other international tribunals, have limited 
inquisitorial powers.
100
 The right of panels to seek information from the parties under DSU 
Article 13 is one such example of these powers. Yet even this provides only a weak 
mechanism for extracting information — when panels seek information under DSU 
Article 13.1, the information generally remains within the sovereign jurisdiction of one of the 
parties, who control the level of disclosure.
101
 Although Members are required to respond to 
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any such request for information ‘promptly and fully’, there have been several cases to date 
where parties have refused to do so. Members have usually justified such refusal on 
confidentiality grounds,
102
 even though confidentiality alone is not considered a valid 
excuse.
103
 Furthermore, although panels may draw adverse inferences from a Member’s 
refusal to provide requested information,
104
 so far panels have generally chosen not to do 
so.
105
 The parties and party-appointed experts, therefore, are a useful source of information, 
but such information is best verified against other sources. 
C The Secretariat 
The WTO Secretariat provides another source of economic information and advice. DSU 
Article 27.1 provides that the Secretariat ‘shall have the responsibility of assisting panels, 
especially on the legal, historical and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with, and of 
providing secretarial and technical support’. Bown interprets the reference to ‘technical 
support’ to include a specific delegation of the responsibility to provide technical economic 
support to the parties.
106
 This provides a broader reading of Article 27.1 than is necessary or 
desirable. Whereas the ‘legal, historical and procedural’ aspects of the Secretariat’s support 
capabilities are framed in the context of ‘the matter dealt with’, the word ‘technical’ is placed 
alongside ‘secretarial’ without any such context. As such this suggests that the word 
‘technical’ in Article 27.1, unlike in various other parts of the covered agreements, was only 
intended to refer to incidental administrative matters. While this does not prevent the 
Secretariat from providing economic assistance — the list in Article 27.1 is inclusive — it 
certainly does not demand it.  
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  Canada — Aircraft, Panel Report, paras 9.176-82; US — Wheat Gluten, Panel Report, paras 8.11-12; US — 
Upland Cotton, Panel Report, paras 7.631-32; Turkey — Rice, Panel Report, paras 7.99-107. 
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  See Indonesia — Autos, Panel Report, para 14.235. 
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  Canada — Aircraft, Appellate Body Report, paras 187-90. 
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In practice, however, panels do make use of the expertise of Secretariat economists.
107
 
Bown argues that the Secretariat should provide additional economic support in the course of 
WTO dispute settlement, including through using more PhD-level economists in the support 
staff for WTO panels.
108
 When it comes to complex economic analysis, however, even if the 
Secretariat’s mandate is interpreted to include economic advice, the Secretariat is not the best 
place to turn, for reasons relating to qualifications, transparency and bias. 
Bown notes that Secretariat support teams for panels have ‘only rarely been staffed with a 
Secretariat-provided economist’, and that although some of the lawyers included in support 
teams have had prior training and experience in economics, none of them have been PhD-
level research economists.
109
 Bown suggests that the solution to this is to increase the 
resources of Secretariat panel support teams by including at least one PhD-level research 
economist on each team.
110
 There are, however, other significant issues with relying on 
Secretariat support that go beyond credentials. 
As far as transparency is concerned, the information exchange between panels and 
Secretariat staff is largely hidden. Although this leads to certain efficiencies in decision-
making, it becomes problematic if the Secretariat is expected to provide economic 
information likely to be material to the panel’s final decision.111 At present the Secretariat’s 
advice to panels is generally not released to the parties during proceedings, nor published to 
the public at large once the panel report has been circulated. Parties are not given the 
opportunity to cross-examine the support staff. That Secretariat staff have provided any 
information at all is rarely acknowledged in panel reports. When it is, the acknowledgement is 
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brief and general, without highlighting specific contributions. As changing these factors 
would require a substantial reimagining of the Secretariat’s role in WTO disputes, this 
suggests that panels should instead turn to other sources for economic information when such 
information is likely to prove material to their decisions. The parties’ right to respond to the 
case against them under the principles of due process should not depend on the source of the 
evidence. 
With regards to bias, Secretariat staff are obliged under the DSU Rules of Conduct to 
remain impartial and independent and to disclose any relevant conflicts of interest. Article VI 
of the WTO Agreement also provides that their responsibilities ‘shall be purely international 
in character’, pointing to their role in representing the Membership’s collective interests.112 
This independent character insulates them from charges of selection, reference, financial, or 
prosecutorial bias, if one accepts the assumption that the WTO itself is neutral as to the 
outcome of any given dispute. National bias may continue to play a role, but is largely 
ignored on necessity grounds.
113
 
Yet there are good reasons to question the assumptions of WTO neutrality, especially in 
economics-heavy disciplines such as anti-dumping. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann points out that 
‘[c]onfidence in the independence and “public interest” functions of the Secretariat’ has been 
undermined by ‘political interferences’.114 He cites occasions when ‘at the request of US trade 
diplomats — the GATT/WTO Secretariat’s Legal Affairs Division was prevented from 
offering independent legal advice in GATT/WTO dispute settlement proceedings challenging 
anti-dumping measures’ as well as when ‘the GATT/WTO Secretariat’s Anti-dumping 
Division was “packed” with lawyers from the US Department of Commerce and the US 
International Trade Commission’.115  
Secretariat support staff may also suffer from various forms of institutional bias. Their 
assumptions about what is neutral or uncontroversial, even in terms of economic input, may 
be informed by a particular worldview that is not necessitated by the treaty language and 
which fails to recognize its own contingency. Robert Howse has written on how the neutral 
and technocratic facade of the GATT collapsed when subjected to deeper interrogation about 
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115
  Ibid 845. 
 246 
 
the economic basis for its exclusion of environmental and labour concerns, noting that ‘what 
ultimately backed their position was not, as it turned out, state-of-the-art economics, but 
highly contingent and contestable social and political notions’.116 With these examples in 
mind, and considering the weaknesses identified above in relation to the economic 
qualifications of Secretariat support staff and the lack of transparency in consultations with 
the Secretariat, WTO panels should be wary of relying solely on the Secretariat for economic 
information and advice. 
D Amicus Briefs 
Amicus briefs may provide another potential source of economic information. Although both 
panels
117
 and the Appellate Body
118
 have admitted amicus briefs in the past, their use remains 
controversial amongst various WTO Members and they are used only sparingly.
119
 Beyond 
the political controversy, amicus briefs are of limited use in shoring up epistemic legitimacy. 
Amicus briefs are designed to advocate specific legal conclusions, rather than provide a 
neutral factual record. As such they suffer from all of the same issues surrounding the 
perception of bias that plague parties and their experts. The differences between how amicus 
briefs and independent expert evidence are perceived are well illustrated by the response by a 
group of developing countries
120
 to the admission of amicus briefs in US — Shrimp. The 
group sought to introduce a footnote to DSU Article 13 ‘clarifying’ that ‘seek’ did not allow 
panels to accept unsolicited amicus briefs, all while reaffirming the right of panels to seek the 
‘opinions and views’ of experts.121 Moreover, as a systemic matter, amicus briefs can hardly 
be relied on as a major source of economic information and advice — there is no guarantee 
that amicus briefs will even be submitted in a given case, let alone contain relevant, 
independent, and comprehensive economic analysis. 
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E The Appellate Body 
The Appellate Body provides something of a control on panel fact-finding, although certainly 
not a comprehensive one. The Appellate Body is only able to review panel fact-finding when 
a panel has made errors sufficiently ‘egregious’ as to amount to an error of law,122 and has 
proven generally unwilling to acknowledge that errors have risen to this level. It may 
‘complete the analysis’ so long as the original factual record is sufficiently complete, but 
where it considers a panel’s initial fact-finding to be inadequate it lacks the ability to conduct 
any further fact-finding of its own or to remand the case back to the panel. There is, in any 
case, no guarantee that a case will make it to the Appellate Body. Even if it does, it only does 
so at great expense to the parties. Finally, as legal experts, Appellate Body members are even 
less likely to be practising, highly qualified economists; as occasionally reflected in their 
reasoning.
123
 As such the Appellate Body should not be relied on to counteract the 
deficiencies in other areas of panel fact-finding and reasoning when it comes to economic 
matters.  
V IMPLICATIONS 
The dispute settlement system’s reliance on solely the parties, panelists, the Secretariat, 
amicus briefs, and the corrective force of the Appellate Body to address complex economic 
evidence and analysis in disputes is thus epistemically deficient from both formal and social 
standpoints. This suggests that WTO panels should rethink how they approach to such 
evidence and analysis. Fortunately, it seems likely that many of these problems can be 
addressed within the existing framework, without the need for laborious treaty amendments.  
A Appointing Independent Economic Experts 
The increased use of independent economic experts by panels, using their powers under DSU 
Article 13 and similar provisions, could help overcome many of deficiencies of epistemic 
legitimacy identified above. Independent economic experts can be enormously helpful in 
                                                 
122
  EC — Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para 133. The Appellate Body will intervene only when a panel 
has ‘exceeded the bounds of its discretion, as the trier of facts, in its appreciation of the evidence’: US — 
Wheat Gluten, Appellate Body Report, para 151. Concomitantly, it will overlook ‘inconsequential 
inaccuracies’ in fact-finding: EC — Chicken Cuts, Appellate Body Report, para 186. 
123
  See Grossman & Mavroidis 2007a, 387; Horn & Mavroidis 2007b; Howse & Neven 2007, 167. 
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minimising the potential for epistemic arbitrariness in panel decision-making. In the words of 
the Appellate Body, the role of such experts is to help panelists ‘understand and evaluate the 
evidence submitted and the arguments made’124 by the parties. As mentioned above, and in 
marked contrast to their approach to SPS and GATT Article XX disputes, no WTO panel has 
formally called upon any individual experts for information or advice on economic matters.
125
 
Panels have used their powers to seek such information from other IGOs, but only those given 
some formal role in the WTO Agreements — and even then only rarely.126 It may be that the 
lack of clear inter-institutional links for many of the provisions concerned with economic 
metrics has discouraged the panels from seeking out similar advice from elsewhere. In this 
way economic evidence has been treated very differently than has scientific evidence under 
the SPS Agreement. Whereas part of the problem in the SPS Agreement has been to minimise 
expert overreach, when it comes to economic evidence the problem has been a failure to 
engage with expertise in a way that honours the rules themselves and gives confidence that 
the dispute settlement organs have decided correctly.  
This is unfortunate, as panel-appointed experts are strong sources of epistemic legitimacy 
due to their relative expertise, transparency, and independence. Panels are free, subject to 
addressing the objections of the parties and expert availability, to appoint PhD-level, 
practising professional economists who specialize in precisely the area of economic analysis 
that is relevant to the dispute.
127
 Appointees to expert review groups under DSU Article 13.2 
are required formally to be ‘persons of professional standing and experience in the field in 
                                                 
124
  Japan — Apples, Appellate Body Report, para 130. 
125
  In such cases panels have consistently and openly sought advice from individual scientific experts: see, eg, 
US — Shrimp, Panel Report and EC — Asbestos, Panel Report. In addition, panels have sought information 
and advice from linguistic experts on translation issues and WIPO on the interpretation of the Berne and 
Paris Conventions: see China — Auto Parts, Panel Report; China — Publications and Audiovisual 
Products, Panel Report; China — Intellectual Property Rights, Panel Report; US — Section 211 
Appropriations Act, Panel Report; US — Section 110(5) Copyright Act, Panel Report; EC — Trademarks 
and Geographical Indications, Panel Report.  
126
  See (n 76) above and accompanying text. 
127
  To this end, Malacrida’s suggestion that the DSB create ‘an indicative list of governmental and non-
governmental economic experts’ is problematic: Malacrida 2010, 437. High-level research economists 
have distinct disciplinary specialties in particular sectors, and part of the benefit of DSU Article 13 and 
equivalent provisions is that it allows panels to seek out any source of information.  
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question’;128 the expertise of panel-appointed experts is otherwise limited only by the 
availability of any given expert.
129
 Moreover, if treated similarly to scientific experts in SPS 
disputes,
130
 information exchange between panels and their appointed experts would provide a 
more transparent record of how panels formulate their economic conclusions, better serving 
the due process rights of the parties, the function of the panels in making recommendations to 
the DSB, and the openness of the dispute settlement system.  
As far as independence is concerned, panel-appointed experts are subject to the standards 
of independence and impartiality that apply to the panelists and support staff, must overcome 
the objections of the parties during the selection process, and face the often fierce scrutiny of 
their peers. Unlike party experts, panel-appointed experts are subject to the independence and 
disclosure requirements in Rules II, III, and VI.2 of the DSU Rules of Conduct. They can also 
only be selected in accordance with the requirements of due process, including the hearing 
rule.
131
 Panels have fewer incentives than parties to select experts whose views only represent 
a small part of the field. As panels can select a variety of experts representing different 
                                                 
128
  DSU Appendix 4, para 2. 
129
  In practice it may sometimes be difficult to find suitable economic experts. Mike Beckers notes that in 
Canada/US — Continued Suspension, of the 71 experts who were suggested by the international 
organizations consulted by the Panel, only 35 responded to the initial request for background information, 
and only one escaped objection from either of the parties: see Beckers 2009, N34. See also Australia — 
Apples, Panel Report, paras 1.21-46, 1.48-52, and 7.1-102. However, as the Appellate Body noted in 
Canada/US — Continued Suspension, ‘the practical difficulties that a panel may encounter in selecting 
experts cannot displace the need to ensure that the consultations with the experts respect the parties' due 
process rights’: Appellate Body Report, para 480. 
130
  In almost all SPS cases resulting in a panel report to date, panelists have: involved experts in the panel 
meetings; consulted with the parties about the appointment of experts; consulted with the parties about the 
questions to be put to the experts; circulated the experts’ reports to the parties in draft form; named the 
experts used in the final panel reports; stated expressly which expert evidence they are relying on when 
reaching conclusions; quoted extensively from independent experts’ submissions to the panel; and 
appended transcripts of meetings with experts to the panel report. Panels have also on occasion included 
additional working procedures on consultation with experts and appended correspondence between the 
panel and the parties concerning the use of scientific experts to the panel report. The consistent 
acknowledgement of the use of experts in the draft and interim reports has also given the parties plenty of 
opportunity to consider, scrutinize and rebut the panel’s characterization of expert evidence. 
131
  See Canada/US — Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, paras 480-1. 
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approaches, panel-appointed experts are less likely to suffer from selection bias.
132
 Panel 
experts’ terms of reference/working procedures are also generally finalized only after 
consultation with the parties, which should also discourage reference bias. As these experts 
are paid by the WTO
133
 and hired to report to the panel, they are less likely to suffer from 
financial or prosecutorial bias in favour of either of the parties, and are less likely to represent 
any form of consistent institutional bias.
134
 Moreover, the presence of panel experts 
encourages the parties, and party experts, to clarify and justify their own positions more 
carefully when framing their submissions. Party experts, knowing that their submissions will 
be subject to additional expert review, are likely to be more critical of their own work and less 
likely to fall prey to prosecutorial bias. Panel-appointed experts are also generally non-
nationals of the parties to the dispute. Overall, there are far more controls to ensure the 
independence and impartiality of panel-appointed experts than there are with other sources of 
expertise.  
In addition, a turn to independent economic experts could have beneficial consequences for 
developing countries participating in disputes. Proceedings before the WTO are becoming 
more complex and more costly. Parties who wish to participate effectively in shaping the facts 
of the case are increasingly reliant on economic experts. As India argued before the Panel in 
US — Steel Plate:  
[t]he calculation of dumping margins can be a complex matter, requiring substantial 
expertise. Complaining parties, particularly developing countries, should have equal 
access to analytic expertise, just as they now have equal access to legal assistance in 
WTO dispute settlement. Being able to present alternative analyses is essential to their 
                                                 
132
  ‘Systems that rely on experts accountable solely or primarily to the court have the advantage of reducing 
the gamesmanship that is possible when dueling experts of the parties have the responsibility for 
submitting the economic evidence’: Diane P Wood, Judge, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal, Illinois 
(United States) in OECD Policy Roundtable, Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law, OECD Doc 
OCDE/GD(97)200 (1996) 69. 
133
  Pauwelyn 2002b, 339. 
134
  This is not to claim that experts cannot experience institutional bias or that they are wholly apolitical. For 
analysis of the survival of politics in technical standards bodies such as the Codex Commission see 
Livermore 2006; and Pollack & Shaffer 2009, 162-74. The lack of advocates for a particular economic 
approach may also reflect broader social and political biases relating to the funding of research or academic 
trends, rather than the merits of a given position. 
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ability to enforce those provisions in the [Anti-Dumping] Agreement that turn on legal 
interpretation of the investigative process, such as the provisions at stake in this 
dispute.
135
  
As things stand, more frequent use of panel-appointed experts could provide developing 
countries with additional means to scrutinize and criticize the expert evidence adduced by 
wealthier Members, as well as to provide their own ‘alternative analyses’. Although this could 
still increase the short term cost of litigation, the cost would be borne by the WTO
136
 and is 
unlikely to become a problematic drain on the budget. 
B Technocracy, Managerialism and the Limits of Expertise 
Any call for greater expert involvement raises the spectres of technicalization, 
depoliticization, managerialism
137
 and expert overreach, as identified in Chapter Five Parts 
III(C) and (D). These can result in political decision-making being overwhelmed by 
technocrats whose jargon, embedded biases, and presumed authority neutralize the possibility 
of political involvement for anyone outside of their professional community; often in the 
service of the interests of the powerful few. Structurally, the turn to economic expertise can 
emphasize and prioritize the values embedded in dominant economic vocabularies to the 
exclusion of others. This poses a problem if it shuts out alternative voices and blinds decision-
makers to the contingency and the political consequences of their decision-making.
138
 To that 
end, as with scientists in relation to the SPS Agreement, it is crucial that the economic and 
political justifications underlying the economic metrics in the covered agreements continue to 
be interrogated, as well as their economic, political, social, and cultural effects.  
It is only in rare cases, however, that the panel dispute settlement process will prove the 
appropriate forum for such interrogation. The economic metrics in question have been 
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  US — Steel Plate, Panel Report, Annex D-2 ‘Oral Statement of India’ (23 January 2002) para 86. 
136
  The experts’ ‘fee is minimal and most panel members as well as experts do it for the experience and the 
prestige, not the money’: Pauwelyn 2002b, 339. 
137
  See Kennedy 2001; Kennedy 2005; Koskenniemi 2007b; Koskenniemi 2007a; Koskenniemi, 2009b. 
138
  See Laski 1931, 9: ‘My point may, perhaps, be made by saying that expertise consists in such an analytic 
comprehension of a special realm of facts that the power to see that realm in the perspective of totality is 
lost. Such analytic comprehension is purchased at the cost of the kind of wisdom essential to the conduct of 
affairs. The doctor tends to think of men as patients; the teacher sees them as pupils, the statistician as units 
in a table’. 
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incorporated into the covered agreements, are the subjects of shared understandings by the 
Members, and will, for the most part, have been introduced into the proceedings by the parties 
themselves. While it is important to remain alert to the risks of managerial thinking, these 
risks should not be allowed to eclipse the value of using empirical and rational means to 
advance goals selected according to political processes. Rather, they should be used to draw 
attention to the goals served by such expertise; to the biases inherent in expert vocabularies; 
and to the effects of choosing some forms of expertise over others. Requiring epistemic 
legitimacy in decision-making clarifies these goals, biases, and effects and minimizes the 
opportunities to manipulate the language of expertise to justify the exercise of arbitrary 
power. 
The risks of managerialism do, however, make it all the more crucial for expert evidence to 
be used within appropriate limits. Anne van Aaken highlights four general limits on the use of 
economic analysis in international law that may be applied here. First, economics is subject to 
the limits of human knowledge. Complex systems cannot always be reduced to a series of 
easily understandable ‘facts’, but this does not mean that panelists should ignore the 
information that is available.
139
 Second, economic knowledge does not produce independent 
normative conclusions.
140
 This can be read as an assertion of the limits of epistemic, as 
opposed to political, legitimacy. Economic knowledge cannot tell us how to live our lives; it 
is only once particular goals have been chosen that it can produce recommendations about 
how to achieve those goals. Panelists should therefore be careful not to pose normative 
questions to experts or to treat expert advice as binding.
141
 Third, it is important to maintain 
the functional distinction between the role of economic experts and the role of panelists.
142
 It 
is for experts to provide and elucidate an economic reading of the facts; it is for panelists to 
make an objective assessment of the facts so presented in line with the requirements of the 
covered agreements, a hermeneutic function. Fourth, as a practical matter much economic 
analysis in international law has relied solely on classic rational choice theory and has treated 
                                                 
139
  van Aaken 2010, 29. 
140
  Ibid 30. 
141
  Some of the Tokyo Round plurilateral codes actually required panels to take the advice of technical expert 
groups as authoritative and binding; these provisions were not carried over into the WTO covered 
agreements. 
142
  van Aaken 2010, 30. 
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the state as a ‘black box’. This should be opened up to take into account a greater variety of 
actors and changes in preferences.
143
 To these I would add, particularly in light of the SPS 
case law, that panels should confine their questions to experts to matters within the realm of 
the experts’ expertise, and to ignore any expert advice offered that goes beyond these 
confines.
144
  
There are a number of ways to encourage panels to stay within such limits. Panelists could 
be given extra training in fact-finding techniques and in dealing with economic evidence and 
advice. Guidelines could be drawn up to assist economic experts in fulfilling their functions, 
and to panelists when dealing with such expertise. Both the EC and the UK, for instance, have 
guidelines on the submission of economic evidence and data collection in competition 
cases.
145
 At present, the working procedures for consultation with experts in WTO disputes 
focus more on confidentiality, due process concerns, and the mechanics of seeking expert 
advice, rather than the delimiting the respective functions of panelists and experts.
146
 
Finally, even if dispute settlement organs remain alert to the proper limits of the expert 
contribution to the dispute settlement process, certain risks to the use of experts that remain 
unavoidable. Increasing the complexity of factual arguments in disputes can provide a hook 
which can be used to prolong disputes and even to generate additional disputes. Expert 
languages cannot readily be translated for public digestion. In addition, locating experts, 
getting approval from the parties, and commissioning reports based on their expertise can be 
                                                 
143
  Ibid 30-1. 
144
  Laski frames this as a problem of expert ‘humility’: Laski 1931, 2 and 7. These problems were recognized 
by the Appellate Body in Canada/US — Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, paras 415-84. 
145
  See UK Competition Commission, Suggested Best Practice for Submission of Technical Economic 
Analysis from Parties to the Competition Commission (2009) available at <http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/corporate_documents/corporate_policies/ 
best_practice.pdf>; EC Directorate-General for Competition, Best Practices for the Submission of 
Economic Evidence and Data Collection in Cases Concerning the Application of Article 101 and 102 
TFEU and in Merger Cases (2010) available at <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_submissions.pdf>. 
146
  See, eg, Canada/US — Continued Suspension, Panel Report, Annex A-5, ‘Working Procedures for 
Consultations with Scientific and/or Technical Experts’; Australia — Apples, Panel Report, Annex A-5, 
‘Procedures for the Panel’s Meeting with the Experts and Parties and the Panel’s Second Substantive 
Meeting’; Australia — Salmon (Article 21.5 — Canada), Panel Report, Annex 2, ‘Revised Working 
Procedures’, paras 14-18. 
 254 
 
time-consuming. This causes friction with the WTO’s notionally streamlined timetable for 
panel disputes. Pursuant to DSU Articles 12.8 and 12.9, panels generally have six months in 
which to conduct an examination, which can be extended to a maximum of nine months. DSU 
Article 20 also provides that unless the parties agree otherwise, the period from the date of 
establishment of the panel until the DSB considers the panel report for adoption should ‘as a 
general rule not exceed nine months’. This should not be seen as an insuperable obstacle to 
the appointment of economic experts by panels. DSU Article 12.2 anticipates that ‘[p]anel 
procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high quality panel reports, 
while not unduly delaying the panel process’. SPS cases are frequently extended because of, 
among other reasons, the complexity of the facts of the case, the need to consult with 
scientific and technical experts, and the due process concerns of the parties.
147
 The issue of 
delay has not proven a significant obstacle to the progress of these cases, several of which 
have run well over the nine month time limit in DSU Article 12.9. WTO practice suggests that 
the authority of panels does not lapse merely because they have exceeded these time limits.
148
 
Moreover, extended timetables are likely unavoidable considering the increasing factual 
complexity of cases. In EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, even without 
the involvement of panel-appointed experts, the proceedings ran for just under seven years.  
These systemic issues with the resort to increased economic expertise do not necessarily 
cancel out their potential contribution. Rather, it must be remembered that expertise provides 
a tool for understanding and framing the world. As with any tool, it can be used productively 
or it can be used in a way that causes harm — indeed, the perception of whether it is being 
used well or misused may depend upon one’s vantage point. It is therefore important when 
deciding whether to call upon economic expertise to consider all of the potential risks and 
benefits together. At present, it would appear that the deficiencies posed to the dispute 
settlement by failing make greater use of independent experts far outweigh the potential risks 
involved in utilizing them more.  
VI CONCLUSION 
The failure of panel decisions to achieve epistemic legitimacy when faced with economic 
evidence and argument has not been limited to one or two isolated and forgettable cases. 
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  See Kennedy 2011, 239-42 and 245-50. 
148
  Waincymer 2002, 305-06. 
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Rather, it forms part of a broader systemic failure of the WTO dispute settlement system to 
incorporate and foreground independent economic expertise into its decision-making 
processes. This is troubling because of the extent to which disputes now turn on readings of 
embedded economic metrics which rely on complex factual evidence. There will be occasions 
in which poor drafting and politics may mean that no clear economic metric is evident or that 
the use of the provided metric would make no sense.
149
 There may be significant 
disagreement amongst economists about what given economic metrics may demand or 
demonstrate.
150
 This makes it all the more important for panels to recognize and articulate 
such deficiencies and differences and to provide adequate reasons for choosing between 
conflicting pieces of information. Although panels have drawn on various sources of 
economic information in the course of disputes, their failure to make use of independent 
experts has only undermined their output legitimacy. Although there may be historical and 
cultural reasons for why such experts have not been used until now, these should not be used 
to continue to justify otherwise arbitrary decision-making. Importantly, it is possible to 
address the deficiencies of the existing approach without facing the formidable challenge of 
amending the covered agreements — panels simply need to make greater use of powers they 
already possess. That said, it remains crucial for panels to recognize the political and 
epistemic limits of independent economic expertise to prevent overreach from the realm of 
knowledge, malleable as it may seem, to the realm of normativity.  
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  See Janow & Staiger 2007a, 131; Janow & Staiger 2007b, 290; Grossman & Mavroidis 2007b, 425 and 
432; Mavroidis & Sapir 2008, 319. 
150
  See WTO, World Trade Report 2005, 171-212, 206. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has not sought to valorize one particular approach to the WTO’s legitimacy. 
Rather, it has sought to explore the parameters of the relationship between WTO law and 
various key legitimacy narratives. It has shown that narratives of legitimacy permeate many 
levels of WTO law- and decision-making. They shape the processes by which laws and 
decisions are made and thereby ultimately shape the resulting laws and decisions. In turn 
these processes of law- and decision-making reinforce legitimacy narratives by creating 
shared understandings about common practices and values. Moreover, the thesis has 
highlighted the multiplicity and contingency of these narratives — some of which have 
proven complementary, others wholly incommensurable — with the aim of destabilizing the 
idea that there exists an objective and freestanding account of legitimacy that could resolve 
the WTO’s legitimacy problems, whether normatively or socially.  
In particular this thesis has argued that, on the one hand, the input-oriented narratives 
relating to consent and democracy have proven unable to carry the normative legitimating 
burden placed on them by various communities of legitimation. Specifically, they largely 
neglect: (1) the instrumental reasons addressing why particular laws and institutional 
processes should exist; and (2) the role played by those laws and processes in constructing 
communities of legitimation and in influencing various actors’ preferences. On the other 
hand, output-oriented narratives that focus on instrumental concerns have long been identified 
with a narrow functionalism, or worse, technocracy. One consequence of this identification 
has been the neglect of how specific legal mechanisms may be used to improve the functional 
efficiency and effectiveness of WTO rules to further common goals, and also how legal 
mechanisms affect how those goals are constructed in the first place. Another consequence 
has been the neglect of how input- and output-oriented legitimacy concerns may interact to 
guard against the twin evils of instrumental rationality and political chaos.  
Chapter Two sought to clarify the concepts of ‘power’ and ‘legitimacy’ as used in the 
thesis. It also made two preliminary arguments. First, it argued that the WTO, both in its own 
right and as a vessel for others, acts as a locus of power in a way that makes the question of its 
legitimacy a matter worthy of careful and sustained investigation. Second, it argued that 
legitimacy itself is a distinctive (if somewhat messily invoked) concept that is a worthwhile 
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subject of inquiry for international trade lawyers, and indeed international lawyers more 
generally. This is because unlike other bases for compliance such as coercion, self-interest or 
habit, legitimacy poses the question of whether laws and institutions are worthy of 
compliance; a question central to matters of law-making and enforcement, and to the sense of 
law as law, rather than merely as an instrument for the powerful.  
Part Two then explored the relationship between WTO law and two of the most 
prominent (primarily) input-oriented narratives of legitimacy associated with the WTO: 
consent and democracy. Chapter Three focused on consent, and considered how various 
legitimating narratives of consent have emerged in domestic law, international law, and WTO 
law over time. In the process it highlighted the historical contingency of these narratives, as 
well as the variety of ways in which even something as apparently straightforward as consent 
can be conceptualized.  
Notwithstanding the key central role played by consent in legitimating WTO law, it 
suffers from clear philosophical, normative and descriptive limitations. Chapter Three 
therefore considered the limitations of consent as a sufficient narrative of legitimacy for WTO 
law. Normatively, consent must be supplemented by some non-consensual norm to convey a 
binding sense of legal or moral obligation; and the philosophical basis for such a norm is less 
than clear. Consent also leaves large gaps when it comes to justifying particular exercises of 
power. It has little to contribute in the face of the agency costs associated with broad grants of 
discretionary power to agents, and has even less to say about why particular types of agents 
(lawyers, economic experts, etc) should be invested with such power (beyond the idea that 
that is what the Members want). Moreover, consent narratives, focusing as they do on 
Member will, generally fail to give due consideration to the role of non-Members (whether 
lobbyists, NGOs, IGOs, experts or otherwise) in the creation and implementation of WTO 
law. Their focus on the formal moment of prescription for law also results in the neglect of 
much of the ‘background’ of trade law and policy making in the WTO Secretariat, the 
committee system, and national administrative networks. All of this combines, in the face of 
the increased political and technical complexity of WTO law, to provide a rather brittle 
skeleton of legitimacy which almost completely neglects questions of function, substance, and 
outcome — ie questions of outputs. This helps to explain why various commentators have 
seen it necessary in recent times to turn to alternative sources of legitimacy for WTO law.  
Chapter Four addresses that other grand input-oriented narrative of legitimacy — 
democracy. The Chapter identified four main families of democratic legitimacy narratives that 
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have enjoyed prominence in relation to WTO law: direct democracy, representative 
democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. While the WTO is far from 
satisfying the requirements of any these approaches to democracy in any strong sense, they 
are still frequent calls for it to be democratized along each of these lines. Although not as 
strongly or clearly embedded in WTO law as the consent narrative, these various narratives 
have distinct, sometimes incompatible, implications for how WTO law is conceptualized, 
applied and reformed.  
Of the four narratives, the direct and representative versions are exclusively input-
oriented; several of their limitations strongly parallel those of the consent narratives. The 
participatory and deliberative democratic narratives, however, are capable of also addressing 
certain matters of substance and outcome, and hence matters of output legitimacy. They are 
concerned not only with ensuring that law reflects Members’ preferences, but also in realizing 
ideals of political participation and reasoned decision-making with a view to making ‘better’ 
decisions. These narratives thus place a stronger emphasis on mechanisms governing expert 
knowledge, transparency, communication and reason-giving. Although deliberative 
democracy may seem promising as a means of bridging the gap between input and output 
legitimacy, it faces serious challenges in the WTO context; not the least of which is the 
tendency of its advocates to lose sight of the subjects of democracy in favour of expert 
determination. That is, the focus on the epistemic aspects of deliberative decision-making 
risks eclipsing the idea that democratic decisions should be made by the people, as well as for 
the people.  
Part Two therefore explored the close relationship between input legitimacy narratives 
and how WTO law is structured and implemented, and the limits to the legitimating capacity 
of these narratives. It showed that consent has been essential to understanding the legitimacy 
of WTO law as it is, while democracy is increasingly pushed as something the WTO and its 
laws should embody. It demonstrated that there are a multitude of ways of conceiving of 
consent-based and democratic legitimacy, each with distinctive implications for WTO law. It 
also showed that a focus purely on input legitimacy narratives has serious limitations. Such a 
focus is unable to account for many of the reasons why specific agents are allocated authority 
over others, or why particular forms of knowledge are prioritized. Input legitimacy narratives 
cannot address why WTO law may be desirable beyond the idea that it reflects the preferences 
of a given group, the members of which vary depending on which narrative of legitimacy is 
chosen. Moreover, claims to justify the exercise of power on the basis of input-oriented 
 259 
 
accounts often outstrip the internal justificatory power of such narratives, leading to claims of 
false legitimacy. Any story of WTO law’s legitimacy therefore, needs to take account of 
output legitimacy as well as input legitimacy.  
The third part of the thesis consequently turned to the concept of output legitimacy and 
explored some of its implications for multilateral trade negotiations and WTO dispute 
settlement. Chapter Five elaborated on the concept of output legitimacy and its relationship 
with WTO law. It traced the emergence of such narratives at the domestic and international 
levels, before also considering their place in debates about WTO law. As with Chapters Three 
and Four, this chapter highlighted the multiple forms that such narratives can take and the 
very different implications these forms have for how WTO law is conceptualized. The chapter 
then turned to four key dangers associated with output legitimacy narratives and WTO law: 
the absence of a clear WTO mandate; the distance between stated aims and their 
implementation; the downsides associated with technicalization and depoliticization; and the 
tendency of experts to stray beyond their professional competences. As with input legitimacy 
narratives, output legitimacy narratives are often invoked in ways that ignore these 
limitations. This is potentially problematic as it can lead to the unjustifiable empowerment of 
expert groupings and can lead to a narrow instrumental rationality that ignores the preferences 
and interests of WTO Members and human beings.  
Having further elaborated the concept of output legitimacy in Chapter Five, and having 
drawn attention to both its benefits and its dangers, Chapters Six and Seven explored the 
implications that a heightened focus on questions of output legitimacy may have for WTO 
law. Chapter Six focuses on the interplay between output legitimacy concerns and WTO law-
making through multilateral trading rounds. It emphasized the importance of law for 
constructing our sense of what constitutes an appropriate outcome for the multilateral trade 
regime, sometimes regardless of whether that outcome may be desirable in more functional or 
economic terms. The chapter also considered how legal norms and practices relating to WTO 
law-making may implicate or improve: (1) the functional efficiency and effectiveness of 
WTO rules; and (2) the institutional efficiency and effectiveness of WTO rule-making 
processes. To this end, the first part of this chapter focused on the role played by norms 
relating to the epistemic competence, independence, and diversity of WTO law-making 
participants in constructing the functionally-oriented output legitimacy of WTO law. This part 
concluded that the current arrangements pose a high risk of false legitimation, and that more 
could be done to strengthen the functional orientation of WTO law-making processes. The 
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second part of the chapter turned to claims that the WTO law-making processes should be 
‘streamlined’ through changes to processes involving the Secretariat, voting, the single 
undertaking, transparency and reason-giving. It argued that matters of institutional efficiency 
— simply making sure that agreements are concluded — are being prioritized over questions 
of functional effectiveness and whether the concerns of the broader Membership are being 
met. As such, it cautioned against too quickly assuming that the institutionally-oriented output 
legitimacy benefits of such streamlining can offset the threats posed to the functionally-
oriented output legitimacy (as well as the input legitimacy) of WTO rules.  
Chapter Seven, the final substantive chapter, investigated what consequences a greater 
focus on output legitimacy may have for the WTO dispute settlement system. More 
specifically, it focused on the treatment of economic evidence in WTO disputes to highlight 
the distance between the dispute settlement organs’ relatively straightforward claims about 
fact-finding and the rather messier reality of their practice. In doing so, it sought to remedy 
the imbalance in much of the existing literature which deals with the legitimacy implications 
of ‘hard’ scientific expertise but tends to allow economic expertise to continue to operate in 
the background with relatively little scrutiny. The Chapter highlighted five categories of legal 
mechanisms that can be thought of as enhancing the functional output-oriented legitimacy of 
dispute settlement decisions: the rational basis requirement, requirements of transparency and 
reason-giving, requirements of independence, requirements of epistemic competence and 
tools for ensuring epistemic diversity and contestation. It noted that these mechanisms are not 
used as extensively as they could be, especially when it comes to the appointment of 
independent economic experts by panels, and considered the relative epistemic value of the 
various sources of information available to the panels.  
The limitations of the various legitimacy narratives, even in their ideal forms, does not 
mean that we should turn away from legitimacy altogether. An ideal may still be worth 
striving for even if it cannot be realized. In striving for a more legitimate WTO law, however, 
it is important that we keep sight of both the benefits and the dangers associated with 
particular legitimacy narratives. This calls for a critical approach to both input- and output-
oriented forms of legitimacy and the ways in which they constitute, and are constituted by, 
WTO law.  
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